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Abstract
In this thesis we present a cognitive-scientific view of word meaning. We begin by
spelling out some general enterprises of which this thesis may form a small part. En¬
terprises such as the entwining of facts concerning the epistemology of language use
and semantic analysis; the orientation of a study of word meaning as part of a study
of thought; and the restoration of a study of thought to the psychological domain. We
also indicate some of the tools we eHmploy in the rest of the thesis.
One tool is that provided by Situation Theory and particularly its notion of conditional
constraints. Another is a pre-theoretic point that encourages to distinguishes certain
semantical questions from related ontological ones. Another tool is a set of puzzles of
word meaning an analysis of which forms one objective. These and other tools allow us
to isolate some points at which theories of sense and word meaning may diverge. And
this prepares the ground for a discussion of competing theories.
Our discussion is informed by psychological concerns and it is these that we take to
motivate a general account of word meaning, Sense Generation, and a specific version
of this, the Relational View. Sense Generation, we argue respects linguistic constraints
concerning ambiguity as well as psychological constraints concerning concepts. We
argue, further, that the details of the Relational View are supported by psychological
argumentation. And we meet our first objective which is to present an analysis of the
various puzzles.
We then turn to the philosophical literature in order to combat some well established
positions and arguments which count against the efficacy of Sense Generation views.
Sense Generation views hold that the meanings of words are descriptional; opposing
this view are the arguments of Kripke and Putnam. We consider first the literature
on proper names whose meanings, it is argued, are not descriptional. Our position
with respect to this argument is that it be treated as an inadvertent reduction of the
traditional conception of analyticity. We then turn our attention to the psychological
literature on natural kind concepts and suggest that these do not standardly address
V
the problems that Kripke and Putnam raise. Again, our suggestion is that with an
alternative conception of analyticity, one resulting from Situation Theory and Sense
Generation, the Kripke-Putnam argument concerning natural kinds can similarly be
viewed as a reductio. We spell out the Relational View of natural kind concepts.
Our attention then turns to a major psychological theory of concepts, prototype theory.
We argue that it fails to meet various constraints of a psychological nature and, further,
that these constraints are met by the Relational View, which we re-label the Family of
Constraints view. We attempt to adduce reasons for prototype theory's shortcomings
by giving a detailed comparison between it and the Family of Constraints view.
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Two essentially different modes of analysis are possible in the study of psy¬
chological structures. It seems to us that one of them is responsible for all
the failures that have beset former investigators of the old problem, which
we are about to tackle in our turn, and that the other is the only correct
way to approach it.
The first method analyses complex psychological wholes into elements. It
may be compared to the chemical analysis of water into hydrogen and oxy¬
gen, neither of which possess the properties of the whole and each of which
possesses properties not present in the whole. The student applying this
method in looking for the explanation of some property of water — why it
extinguishes fire, for example — will find to his surprise that hydrogen burns
and oxygen sustains fire. These discoveries will not help him in solving the
problem. Psychology winds up in the same kind of dead end when it analy¬
ses verbal thought into its components, thought and word, and studies them
in isolation from each other. In the course of analysis, the original proper¬
ties of verbal thought have disappeared. Nothing is left to the investigator
but to search out the mechanical interaction of two elements in the hope of
reconstructing, in a purely speculative way, the vanished properties of the
whole.
Psychology, which aims at a study of complex holistic systems, must replace
the method of analysis into elements with the method of analysis into units.
What is the unit of verbal thought that is further unanalyzable and yet
retains the properties of the whole? We believe that such a unit can be
found in the internal aspect of the word, word meaning.
^
(Vygotsky, 19St; p. 5)
This piece from Vygotsky's Thought and Language represents a part of Vygotsky's at-
1
CHAPTER 1. THE BACKGROUND 2
tempt to spell out his research programme in investigating the nature of verbal thought.
It also serves as a good indication of the position which we adopt in this thesis. In mov¬
ing toward a cognitive science of word meaning, our aims are threefold: to establish
some framework for describing word meaning; to account for much of what is known
concerning the psychology of concepts; and to suggest the re-orientation of both word
meaning and concepts as central aspects of a cognitive scientific study of thought.
Vygotsky's own observations concerning the nature of verbal thought are startling in
their breadth. Indeed, we will use some of the examples he cites later in this thesis.
However, there is one aspect of Vygotsky's view of word meaning to which we do not
subscribe, his apparently internalist stance: a word meaning is an "internal aspect".
One would think that this commits Vygotsky to a version of what we may, following
Putnam, call the "meanings are in the head" hypothesis. Whether or not this is the case,
as will become apparent, this hypothesis is not one we subscribe to. Indeed, according
to the framework we develop later, meaning relations are very much external.
The force of Vygotsky's claim, however, is much broader than any debate between
internalist and externalist view of meaning. If true, his suggestion is that in studying
verbal thought, the twin aspects of words and thoughts are inseparable. To study one
in isolation from another is analogous to studying hydrogen separately from oxygen:
such an enterprise will never licence valid claims concerning the macroscopic properties
of water. Similarly, to study words in isolation from thoughts will never be informative
as regards verbal thought.
Surprisingly, perhaps, support for this general claim can be seen in Frege. The later
Frege's concerns were such as to centrally locate the fact of language being cognitively
significant. Accordingly, rather than viewing expressions of language as possessing just
a Meaning or referent, he held that they also possessed a sense, and that therein lay the
expression's cognitive significance. Frege viewed the individuation of senses as deriving
from propositional-attitude psychology, hence Evans' (1976) suggestion that senses are
to be equated with "ways of thinking". Whether this controversial reading of Frege
is correct is not a matter for this thesis. That Frege introduces cognitive significance
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into semantic theory is. Apparently, then, the enterprises in which Frege and Vygotsky
locate themselves should not be seen as too distinct. This, unfortunately, is not true of
their respective literatures today.
Current psychological theories of concepts are disparate. In this thesis we will not
focus on all, but on the traditional analytic view of concepts and that which purports
to replace it, prototype theory. Both views encounter difficulties, but the literature
is confused as to the role of these theories of concepts. Traditional analytic views,
as we shall see, can require the specification of conceptual content to lie beyond the
possible apprehension of the possessors of concepts. Prototype views, while apparently
accounting for much of what possessors of concepts are deemed to know in virtue of
their possession of those concepts, seem unable to account for aspects of thought in the
way that was required of the traditional analytic view. Accordingly, some subscribe
to hybrid or binary views of concepts: concepts contain cores which are compositional
and the domain of thought; they also contain identification procedures which give rise
to prototype effects. Such subscribers ordinarily hold that conceptual cores behave
according to the traditional analytic view. Here, the problems of the two separate
views are confounded, for this last suggestion is such as to presume that the contents
of thought may lie beyond the possible apprehension of possessors of those thoughts
and their constituent concepts. Psychological experimentation may reveal the nature of
identification procedures, but it does not reveal the content of thought.
Current philosophical views on word meaning, and here we are thinking primarily of the
views of Kripke and Putnam, are predominated by the view that many words simply
do not have Fregean senses. The argument is advanced most forcefully in the case of
natural kind terms and proper names but both Kripke and Putnam appear committed
to the view that the argument can be applied to many other words. Putnam, in Is
Semantics Possible?, suggests the following.
A theory which correctly describes the behaviour of perhaps three hundred
words has been asserted to correctly describe the behaviour of tens of thou¬
sands of general names.
(Putnam, 1975; p. 141)
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The point that we shall attempt to make during this thesis is that if it is true that
general names do not, in general, possess Fregean senses then the possibility of a theory
of semantics ever explaining uses of words is limited at best. By rejecting Fregean senses,
out of which are composed thoughts, we also reject the motivation behind the notion
of sense, which was to explain the cognitive significance of language. For it is in the
sense of an expression that its cognitive significance, its very contribution to thought, is
deemed to lie. Rejected, also, is the view that propositional-attitude psychology should
play a role in a theory of semantics. For it is the attitudes that one may adopt towards a
sentence which Frege seemed to suggest lay behind his individuation criterion for senses.
Since Frege's notion of sense, then, is so intimately connected to an account of thoughts,
the rejection of the Fregean position also amounts to a rejection of Vygotsky's approach.
A consequence of the Kripke-Putnam position is that it distances a study of word
meaning from what may be empirically observed concerning the attitudes language
users may take towards uses of these words. That is, the meaning of a word is deemed
to be independent of the attitudes one may take towards its uses. One goal of this
thesis is, then, to suggest that this bifurcation between word and thought is not a
necessary one. I hope to suggest that we have been led astray by an insistence on
a particular characterisation of concepts and of word meaning, one inherited from a
traditional analytic conception of meaning. I hope to suggest that there are real choices
that cognitive scientists may take in approaching a study of word meaning and I wish
to argue for the efficacy for one set of such choices. Having done so, I will attempt to
show that this set of choices does, indeed, allow for the bringing together of empirical
and theoretical studies of word and thought.
In this chapter, our objective is to make explicit those aspects of a theory of word
meaning which will be treated as implicit throughout the later chapters. We begin by
drawing a rarely made distinction between a semantic question, concerned with the
conditions under which a word X may be used, and an ontological question, concerned
with what an X actually is. In certain respects, this simple distinction can be viewed
as one of the main concerns of the thesis. For it is the making of this distinction that
frees us from many traditional restrictions on constructing a framework to describe
CHAPTER 1. THE BACKGROUND 5
word meaning. So, having made the distinction, we turn to some puzzles of word
meaning: an analysis will be postponed until Chapter 4. However, in the following
section, we establish some intuitions concerning these puzzles and those aspects of the
psychological literature where, it seems, answers might be forthcoming. We then turn to
consider some of the formal apparatus that we will employ during the rest of the thesis.
This apparatus weds our approach of word meaning to a view of information and, in
the following section, we pre-empt a naive interpretation of this wedding. Finally, we
preview the rest of the thesis and lay down the skeleton of the arguments around which
we later attempt to lay some flesh.
1.1 Drawing a Distinction
In some respects, one of the main claims made in this thesis regards the importance
of distinguishing questions of semantics from questions of ontology. This is not to say
that these questions are independent, but simply that they are separate. With respect
to word meaning, throughout the thesis, we will rely on being able to distinguish two
claims associated with the use of words: one to do with the information uses can carry
and one to do with the ontological commitments such uses make. Our contention will
be that a semantic theory should be concerned more with the former than the latter.
Let us consider an example.
Suppose noj is a fully-Hedged word: that is, it plays a full role in normal language
use. It is uncontroversial to assume, then, that attached to this word, there are certain
conditions of use, call them noj-conditions. Now these conditions are such that, provided
they obtain, a use of noj is licenced by the grammar of the language, taking grammar in
a wide sense. That is, such conditions are taken to be implicated in determining when a
given word may be used. Now it is also uncontroversial to assume that, provided these
noj-conditions obtain, it is their obtaining that invest uses of noj with informational
content. That is, uses of noj can convey information to the effect that noj-conditions
obtain. Of course, uses may be infelicitous, they may be used in cases where noj-
conditions do not obtain, and such uses provide cases of misinformation. But, in general,
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a use of noj will convey information concerning the obtaining of noj-conditions.
Now the above description suffices as a picture of what this thesis attempts to do. For
various words, at various points in the thesis, we will try and explicate a theory of
their conditions of use, one which does justice to a number of problematic observations.
However, while it is clear that such an objective is uncontroversial from the point of
view of studying word meaning, before we begin we must be equally clear about what
it is we are not trying to do.
A nonsense word such as noj illustrates well a discussion of conditions of use and in¬
formation, precisely because it is a nonsense word: we do not know what noj denotes,
be it a process, an event, an individual or whatever. And this fact is crucial, for it is
often assumed that the questions of what noj is and what conditions must obtain for
noj to be used, yield the same answers. The first question is prima facie an ontological
one: it asks what constitutes a noj. And such questions are typically asked of natural
scientists. The second question is central to the thesis. It asks what conditions underly
uses of the word noj, a question of a more obviously semantic nature.
Thus, associated with the study of word meaning, one often comes across a semantic
question and a related ontological question. It is a contention of this thesis that whether
these questions yield the same or different answers is itself an open question, and one
that is subject to empirical enquiry. That is, borrowing a little from Wittgenstein, we
must not simply say that these questions must yield the same answer, rather we must
look and see. I hope that, in some way, this thesis may be interpreted as an attempt to
do just that.
1.2 Some Puzzles ofWord Meaning
The sorts of puzzle which we will consider cannot possibly subsume all the interest¬
ing puzzles of word meaning. Each, however, can be taken to illustrate the general
difficulty of accounting for the vagueness of words and the inherent defeasibility or non-
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monotonicity involved in their uses. That said, each puzzle either illustrates a different
aspect of word meaning for which some account must be given or some facet of these
aspects that is suggestive of an analysis.
The first puzzle illustrates the simple fact that the uses to which a word can be put
depend greatly on the situation of use. In some situations the word can be used, in
others, it seems, it cannot. Further, depending on the situation, the same word may
be used seemingly to mean different things. The second puzzle illustrates the fact
that provided the situation of use is of a particular kind, words may be used to refer
to all manner of objects to which they would not ordinarily refer. The third puzzle
illustrates an important issue to do with vagueness. That is, not knowing whether the
current situation is of the right kind can lead to equivocation and disagreement about
whether or not a given word can be used in that situation. So it illustrates the fact that
vagueness may be seen as a property of a word, a situation and the agent's knowledge
of that situation, rather than simply as a property of the word.
Finally we come to the fourth puzzle. This puzzle illustrates the problem of deciding
upon any conditions of use for a word. Such is the variety of circumstances under which a
word can be used, even when it is used conventionally, that it might seem that outlining
such conditions will be a matter for natural science and not the humble semanticist.
This puzzle is interesting for more than just this, however, for, of all the puzzles, this
exemplifies the kind of puzzle which has traditionally attracted most attention. Not
only have philosophers discussed the issue of natural kind terms but, particularly in the
psychological literature on concepts, the facts about natural kinds have been seen as an
important difficult test-case on which theories can cut their teeth. With the distinction
made in section 1.1 borne in mind, we will argue in Chapter 3 that these puzzles can
all be assimilated to the same framework.
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1.2.1 The Lion Puzzle
Let us consider the word lion and some of its uses. In the context of a zoo or circus
one seemingly uses lion to mean "real lion". But imagine a different context, that of a
museum or art gallery. Then, it seems, one would use the word lion to mean "statue of
a lion" or "picture of a lion". That is, there appear to be two different senses of lion. If
indeed this is the case, then one could imagine some context, one neutral with respect
to these senses, under which both these senses could be used to talk of one and the same
object. Importantly, however, we would expect the difference in sense to manifest itself
in differences in the way that the word could be used with each sense. Consider the
following as an example.
Fred is sitting on a park bench in London. He knows that at the other end
of the park there is a statue of a lion. An art student approaches him and,
explaining that her still-life assignment is to sketch a lion, she asks Fred if
he has seen one. Fred replies that he has and points her towards the statue.
A little later an exhausted zoo-keeper appears and, explaining to Fred that
a lion has escaped from the zoo, he also asks Fred if he has seen one. Fred
replies that he hasn't.
Fred seems to be adopting different attitudes to the same question: Have you seen
a lion? In one situation he replies affirmatively, in the other negatively. How are
we to characterise Fred's responses? We might be tempted to say that Fred is being
flexible with the truth but such a characterisation seems inappropriate: characterising
one response as true, the other as false, would not help us in capturing the fact that
both seem equally felicitous. An alternative might be to claim both utterances to
be veridical but that "lion" is simply ambiguous: that is, Fred's utterances employ
different meanings of "lion", one meaning for real lions, another for statues of lions.
Quine (1960), for example, suggests that "light" is ambiguous in just this way. He
claims that one "clear condition" of ambiguity is the fact that the application of an
ambiguous word to certain objects can be both affirmed and denied: such terms can
be "clearly true or clearly false of one and the same thing" (§27 p. 131). A raven's
feather, for example, is both light (in weight) and not light (in colour). Similarly, a
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particular financial institution may be both a bank (a money bank) and not a bank (a
river bank). Fred's case seems similar, but whereas we may be led to claim, intuitively,
that Fred's statue both is, and is not, a lion, there is an important difference in the
cases of "light" and "bank". In these latter cases, the different meanings of these words
are deemed independent and unrelated (at least, synchronically). In the case of Fred's
uses of "lion", the two meanings are highly related and indeed it is crucial to the success
of his utterances that this is so.
In a similar vein, it seems, we wouldn't be tempted to claim that "lion" is simply vague
as "heap" and "bald" are considered vague. It is not that the application of the word
"lion" to the statue is fuzzy; rather, there is a clear sense in which we can say of the
statue that it is a lion and a clear sense in which we can say that it is not. Broadly
speaking, it seems then that there are two sorts of meaning attached to "lion": a core
meaning, to do with real lions, and a peripheral meaning, to do with other kinds of lion,
which is related to the core meaning in a particular way. Which meaning the word carries
on a particular occasion of use seems to depend on the informational requirements of
the agents involved which, in turn, seem to depend on the sort of situation they find
themselves in. An adequate theory of word meaning must explain the relationship
between core and peripheral word meaning while doing so in a way that supports the
basic intuition that the application of a word to an object crucially depends on the
nature of the situation in which the word is used.
1.2.2 Nunberg's Ham Sandwich
Nunberg (1978) discusses a particular case of metonymy (see also Lakoff, 1987): a
waiter employs the phrase "ham sandwich" to refer to a customer who has ordered
a ham sandwich. This puzzle is similar to the Lion Puzzle though it offers a starker
illustration of the fact that words may apply to all manner of objects to which they
would not ordinarily apply. In this case "ham sandwich" applies to an individual (a
customer) who has none of the properties of ham sandwiches which make them ham
sandwiches.
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Similar considerations apply in this case as in the Lion Puzzle. Claiming that "ham
sandwich" is ambiguous ignores the important relations between its various uses. Addi¬
tionally, since we can imagine numerous similar examples, to analyse these in terms of
ambiguity would suppose a quite vast, and probably implausibly vast, lexicon. Indeed,
this is very much the point which Clark (1983) suggests undermines traditional, dictio¬
nary theories of word meaning. Similarly, just as before, claiming that "ham sandwich"
is vague or questioning the veridicality of the waiter's utterances also seem implausible.
It is also clear that in this case it is the situation in which the waiter finds himself that
allows him to make the particular use of "ham sandwich" that he does: if he said the
same thing in describing a total stranger in a launderette, it is unlikely he would convey
the same meaning. What we require of a theory of word meaning is that it allows the
sort of defeasibility illustrated by all these examples to be very much dependent on the
nature of the situation of utterance.
1.2.3 LakofF's Mother and Macken's Father
In this section we actually give two puzzles though they are so alike we can treat them
as one. The first comes from the work of George Lakoff (Lakoff, 1987); the second from
the work of Betsy Macken (Macken, forthcoming).
Lakoff is concerned to expound a theory of cognitive models and, by this means, to
discount the standard interpretations offered by prototype theorists of prototype effects.
His article is wide-ranging, but we will focus on one aspect, the one most relevant to
this discussion, that of the concept mother. Lakoff suggests what, perhaps, we already
suspect: the concept mother cannot be given by a definition. There are no simple
sets of conditions which are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for the application of
the concept. Instead, Lakoff suggests that mother is defined in terms of a number of
cognitive models each of which itself receives a definition. He lists five:
1. The Birth model: the person giving birth is the mother.
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2. The Genetic model: the female contributing the genetic material is the mother
3. The Nurturance model: the female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the
mother of that child.
4. The Marital model: the wife of the father is the mother.
5. The Genealogical model: the closest female ancestor is the mother.
These different definitions serve to indicate the many different kinds of use to which the
word mother can be put. Indeed, the word can be used discriminatively so as to pick
out one model as opposed to another. Lakoff offers the following example where mother
is deemed to have the meaning given by the nurturance model.
I am not a nurturant person, so I don't think I could ever be a real mother to any child.
What is clear, then, is that kinship terms such as mother do not lend themselves to clear
definition and that there are cases where mother can be used to apply to some mothers
and not to others. And it is precisely this problem which Macken's analysis illustrates.
Her problem is perhaps best observed in a dialogue which she recorded between a small
group of six and seven year olds. Their statement of this problem and, after a brief
interlude, their casual dismissal of it is so appealing we reproduce it below.
Hasan: My father...
Richard: You don't got no father.
Cassandra: He got a father.
Richard: Not his real father.
Cassandra: He got a father that lives with him.
Hasan: My father gonna buy me a bike.
(Macken, forthcoming)
What the dialogue reveals is that Richard and Cassandra have different conceptions of
what may and may not be called a father. Alternatively, they have different ideas about
the kinds of situation in which the word father can be used. To begin with, Richard
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is adamant: the word cannot be used to describe an aspect of Hasan's circumstances.
However, after some discussion, Cassandra insists that the word is appropriate because
there are two kinds of circumstance under which it is appropriate to describe someone
as a father: when certain biological facts hold and/or when certain social facts hold.
Thus, the puzzle indicates several interesting facts. One is that the vagueness of words
such as father should perhaps not be considered to be a property of the word as, for
example, accounts in terms of fuzzy set theory assume (cf. Osherson & Smith, 1981;
Zadeh, 1965), but as resulting from an ability to decide whether the current situation
is of the appropriate type for the word to be used. So the content the word can convey
does not have to be expressed in "fuzzy" terms, for it is not the word that vagueness
involves. Rather it involves determining whether a given situation is of a given type.
Another interesting fact revealed by this puzzle is that, associated with one and the
same word may be several different sets of conditions of use, and that these different
conditions of use are constitutive of the different senses the word has.
1.2.4 Putnam's Lemon
In trying to represent certain aspects of the meaning of words, it seems we want to
capture certain generalisations about the properties of the objects to which those words
apply. Though puzzles like the previous one may convince us of the difficulty of stating
whether a given word applies to a given object, we may be tempted to treat such puzzles
as special cases. Accordingly, we may consider the objective of a theory of word meaning
to be the identification of those conditions which allow a word to apply to, and only to,
objects which it undeniably describes. We might, for example, consider the conditions
which allow the word "lemon" to apply to objects which most certainly are lemons and
not to objects (like statues) which most certainly are not. Even though the justification
for such a distinction may fall foul of our discussion of section 1.1, even with such a
restriction, such conditions are notoriously difficult to isolate. That is, even restricting
attention to entities which really are lemons, the arguments of Putnam (1975) testify to
the difficulty in divining a set off conditions of use: though we might want to say that
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lemons are oval-shape, we can easily imagine discovering one that has been squashed
and, similarly, we can imagine finding sweet-tasting lemons, lemons painted red and so
on. Virtually every property one might want to ascribe to the class of objects that are
lemons can seemingly be defeated. That is, for virtually every property, we can imagine
counterfactual circumstances under which a lemon does not possess that property. The
problem then is how a theory of word meaning can capture generalisations concerning
the properties of a class of objects and allow for defeasibility: how is it that we can infer
that an object described as a lemon is oval and acidic-tasting and yet accept that some
lemons can be flat and sweet?
1.2.5 Complex Nominals
In perhaps all the literatures of cognitive science which have a bearing on issues to do
with words and their uses, complex nominals provide a source of often acute embar¬
rassment. An example such as stone lion indicates why, for the entity referred to is not
generally regarded as being both a stone thing and a lion. That is, the complex nominal
is not intersective in the way that red car is: a red car is both a car and a red thing.
Complex nominals such as stone lion are more similar to standard privatives such as
former senator and fake gun than they are to intersective ones. Indeed, Franks (1989)
has argued that stone lion is a functional privative. Now, the phrase complex nominal
derives from Levi (1978) in which she discusses how the semantics of various compounds
may be considered to be compositional. Her own view, which is that compounds are the
surface-structure manifestations of transformations of a deep-structure representation,
is not of direct interest here. Rather, her examples are. Table 1.1 lists a number of
complex nominals and the categories to which Levi assigns them.
Nonpredicate NPs such as these provide difficulties for theories of semantics precisely
because they are non-predicative. That is, the meaning of the complex nominal is not
the same as that of the head noun with the adjective in post-copula predicative position.
That is, a stone lion is not a lion which is stone, a ham sandwich is not a sandwich
(*»k«ck is ham. Most other adjectives, however, function in the opposite way. That is, the










Table 1.1: Some Complex Nominals (following Levi, 1978).
designation of the NP is given by the intersection of the designations of the adjective
and noun. Compounds such as red car, wet dog and tired writer are generally of this sort.
And the fact of their intersective nature is typified by the fact that such compounds are
predicative. A tired man is, indeed, a man who is tired, and so on.
Now, in the case of stone lion we may take the locution lion which is stone as only
partly and inexactly specifying the meaning of the complex nominal. The fact that such
paraphrases often seem to require some additional component or relation such as statue
which is made of in the case of stone lion has led some linguists (cf. Kay & Zimmer,
1976) to suppose that the interpretation of compounds such as these are potentially
infinite. That is, their interpretation depends on an infinite number of relations which
mediate between the components of the compound.
What we have shown in the previous sections, however, suggests that the problems
that are posed by nonpredicate NPs are, in some sense, subsumed by the puzzles of
single word use. If we consider the case of the Lion Puzzle and the related nonpredicate
NP, stone lion, we can see that lion appears to have two senses. One can apply to
statues of lions, one applies only to real lions. The point being that our analysis of the
nonpredicate NP stone lion will depend on which sense we assign to the head noun lion.
If, for example, we assign it the sense "statue of a lion" then there is now no problem
in analysing the nonpredicate NP. Indeed, its meaning can be seen to result from the
usual composition of the meaning of adjective and noun. That is, if this is the sense of
lion, then the NP is intersective. For stone lion translated in this way simply means
stone statue of a lion. So, it is in this sense that we intend the puzzles we considered
earlier in this chapter to subsume the related puzzles provided by the corresponding
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nonpredicate NPs.
1.3 Concepts and Word Meaning
Having distinguished, in section 1.1, the question of which conditions must hold for a
word X to be used and the question of what an X is, we are now free to indicate what
the puzzles entail. Before we do, let us re-iterate our view of the uses of words, their
conditions of use and the informational content which they may possess.
Prima facie, the puzzles of the lion, the ham sandwich and the mother/father seem
to indicate that the same word can carry different information on different occasions
of use. That is, associated with each word and the context in which it is used is a
set of conditions. It is the obtaining of these conditions, we assume, that licences the
use of the word. And, moreover, it is the obtaining of these conditions that invest
these uses of words with informational content. So, we will assume that a competent
speaker of the language will generally use words only if the conditions of their use are
assumed to hold in the context of use. And, in general, this will be assumed unless
there is evidence to the contrary. That the speaker's assumption may be wrong can
lead to cases of misinformation. But, that the speaker's assumption may be correct,
that is, in cases where these conditions do hold, their obtaining allows the use of the
word to carry information to that effect. That is, a competent hearer of the language,
realising that the word may be used only in certain circumstances, takes the speaker's
locution as evidence that these circumstances hold. The hearer, then, assumes the use
is informational unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Now, the puzzles suggest that associated with each word there may be many sets of
conditions, each set relevant to particular kinds of circumstance and corresponding to
different conditions of use. Lion, in the circumstances where an exhausted and increas¬
ingly frantic zoo-keeper is involved, seems to have the informational content normally
associated with the locution real lion. And lion, in the circumstances where an art-
student, a museum curator or a parks attendant is involved, seems to have informational
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contents normally associated with locutions such as statue of a lion, picture of a lion,
etc. And the case is similar in the other puzzles. Ham sandwich seems to have differ¬
ent informational content associated with its different uses; father, too, seems to have
different contents associated with its uses, a fact of which Hasan, no doubt, is painfully
aware.
Now there are many interesting questions to do with this difference in content, but
the primary one from the point of view of psychology concerns the relation between
these contents and the contents of mental representations. To attempt to explicate this
relation, we will consider two related topics in cognitive psychology. One is concerned
with "dictionary" theories of mind, the other to do with theories of concepts.
In trying to explain how people both understand and process language, theorists have
found the analogy with dictionaries appealing. As Clark's work shows (Clark, 1983;
Clark & Gerrig, 1983; Clark, 1989) the analogy has often been taken as much more. That
is, the assumption behind models of human parsing has been that, at some point during
parsing, a "mental lexicon" is accessed. Entries in the mental lexicon are compared with
the input, segmented into words, in terms of orthographical or phonological properties
and, that done, the "sense" associated with the word is "read off" from the dictionary
entry. In cases where there are multiple senses for a given word, the appropriate sense
is selected from a list of possible senses. Now, we will have much more to say about
this in Chapter 3, but for now it is sufficient to note some of the characteristics of such
dictionary theories.
Firstly, they associate with words some descriptive content. This content, it is assumed,
guides linguistic behaviour, that is it guides, or determines, the appropriateness or
otherwise of any use of a given word. Secondly, such theories presume that this content
is mentally represented in a certain way. Namely, the assumption is that any sense
of a given word is permanently represented, just as in a dictionary, and that parsing
constitutes the selection from such senses. So, there are two claims: one is to do with
the descriptive content that can be seen to be implicated in linguistic behaviour; the
other is to do with how such content is represented.
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The second sort of theory in which we will be interested concerns the psychology of
concepts. From observations concerning the discriminability of behaviour, the conjec¬
ture has been made that guiding such discriminations is a descriptive content, labelled
a concept. For example, a child sorting a variety of objects into two heaps, lemons and
non-lemons, is taken as evidence that the child has the concept lemon. Just as with the
dictionary theories, there are two claims often associated with theories of concepts.
One is the assumption that the criteria used in sorting lemons from non-lemons are con¬
stitutive of the concept. That is, such criteria reveal the descriptive content associated
with the concept. And it is also assumed that such descriptive content guides behaviour,
that is, it determines the appropriateness or otherwise of any use of a given concept.
Secondly, there is also a claim about mental representation. That is, it is assumed that
these concepts are permanently represented. That is, the assumption has been that se¬
mantic memory is comprised of a finite number of units: each unit comprises a certain
descriptive content. Determining the appropriateness of certain behaviours is consti¬
tuted by the process of finding the appropriate unit, a unit whose descriptive content
is satisfied by the current circumstances. These units, then, are concepts. Now, this
last process, that of finding the right concept for the circumstances, has always been
recognised to be hard. But, nonetheless, the picture which most theories of concepts
paint is the one we have described. In many respects, it is a picture which bears a
striking similarity to the dictionary theories we described above. Indeed, as we shall
see, the prevailing view is that the contents of the mental lexicon are none other than
concepts. However, for the moment, let us return to the puzzles.
The first three puzzles all seem to involve the partitioning of informational content into
the information associated with unconventional uses and that associated with conven¬
tional uses. That is, the information associated with X where something isn't really
an X and the information associated with X when something really is an X. So, for
example, the statue of a lion in the Lion Puzzle is not really a lion, though the word
lion may apply to it. Similarly, the customer ordering the ham sandwich isn't really a
ham sandwich, though the words ham sandwich can be used to refer to that customer.
And likewise in the case of Hasan's father. Richard is adamant that a "live-in" father
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is not a real father, but nonetheless he can concede that the word father may apply
to such individuals. Now, although we are not so much concerned with the conditions
under which something is an X, we are concerned with all cases in which the word A'
carries informational content. So, during the course of this thesis, we will be concerned
with two issues. We will be concerned to distinguish cases of the same word carrying
different information. And we will be concerned to determine the ramifications of these
cases for claims made both by traditional dictionary theories and theories of concepts.
The last puzzle is most illuminating given our stated aim of exploring the literatures on
concepts and word meaning, for, the puzzle of Putnam's Lemon is worrying for anyone
concerned with questions of informational content, descriptive content and conditions of
use. As our earlier discussion indicated, arguments have been advanced to the effect that
natural kind terms are simply non-descriptional. Such a conclusion is indeed disturbing
for one whose aim is an explication of the conditions under which such words may
be used and of the informational content associated with such uses. Are we, then, to
conclude that language users are unaware of the conditions under which the word can
be used?
There are several possible answers. One, interestingly enough, comes from the psycho¬
logical literature on concepts, in particular, from prototype theory. The work of Smith
& Osherson, for example, has been to explicate concepts in terms of descriptive content
which is based on the prototype for that concept. So, the claim is made (Smith et. al.,
1988) that associated with the concept for apple, say, is a certain cluster of descriptions.
Further, the claim is advanced that these descriptions are implicated in the composition
of concepts, such as red and apple, for example, in forming the complex concept red
apple. Now were this a claim simply about the conditions of application of concepts, we
would be none the wiser concerning the informational content associated with uses of
natural kind terms. However, the literature on concepts is much more closely tied to
the literature on word meaning. Johnson-Laird (1987), for instance, proposes a theory
of word meaning in which the senses of words are represented in a mental lexicon, the
entries of this lexicon being prototypes.
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We will have more to say of this correspondence between word meaning and concepts
later. Indeed, Chapters 5 and 6 should be seen as an attempt to draw out this cor¬
respondence more clearly. The striking similarity between positions adopted in the
philosophical literature on word meaning and the psychological literature on concepts is
suggestive that a comparison of these approaches may be mutually illuminating. Indeed,
in Chapter 7, we take seriously the identification Johnson-Laird suggests, and consider
the ramifications for prototype theory of considering Sense Generation as a theory of
concepts. At any rate, returning to the puzzle of Putnam's Lemon, we can say that the
descriptive content we associate with uses of natural kind terms will depend on how we
treat the psychological literature on concepts. And this we do in Chapter 6.
Before we leave this section, we must draw a further distinction, one which has important
ramifications for the representational claims associated with theories of concepts and of
word meaning. The distinction concerns two views of concepts, two views of the senses
of words.
Concepts and senses have been seen in two lights: firstly, as effective classifications
of various behaviours and, secondly, as mental represented objects. So, for example,
dictionary theories have been taken not simply as descriptions of conditions under which
a word may be used, but as claims about how knowledge of such conditions is mentally
represented. For instance, the debate between decompositional theories of the mental
lexicon (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1987) and meaning-postulate theories of the mental lexicon
(Fodor et. ah, 1980) do not differ in their claims about words. They both claim, for
example, that bachelor is appropriate for single, adult males. Where they differ, however,
is how this knowledge is to be encoded. Decompositional theories, for example, hold
that there are discrete lexical entries which contain a decomposition of the sense of a
word in more primitive terms. That is, the analogy with a dictionary is very strong
indeed. Meaning postulate theories, however, view a lexical entry not as decomposed
into more primitive terms but as being related via meaning postulates to other entries.
So, although these approaches are logically equivalent, it is thought that they make
different claims about how senses are mentally represented.
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When we come to discuss dictionary theories and concepts, we must be clear about
the relation between these two claims. In particular, we start from observations about
word use. We will, in Chapter 3, formulate a theory of how it is that the same word
may have numerous different senses. So, our theory will not prima facie be about
representations. Rather, it will be concerned with the appropriate classification of
word uses and the information they can carry. Armed with this classification, we will
leave open the question of how this classification is represented. Rather, the theory is
intended as specifying constraints on what such representations must encode, what they
must compute. In particular, the theory should be seen as specifying, in a certain way,
the nature of the relationship between words and their informational contents. How
this relation is to be interpreted in terms of representation or computation is another
matter.
Let us be more abstract. Consider our old friend noj. And let us suppose that this word
has a number of different informational contents, ici ... icn. There are many ways
we can describe the relationship between these contents and the word noj. We could
describe it in terms of a single relation between noj and ic\ ... icn. We could consider
the relationship in terms of some two-place function mapping noj and some entity to
a single informational content. We could consider the relation in terms of a function
composition. For example, we could consider the composition of a function mapping noj
to x and a parameterised function mapping x and a context to an informational content.
We could consider the relation in terms of two functions, three functions, and so on. In
fact, given such a relation, there are an arbitrary number of ways of describing it. What
is crucially important for our purposes is that the functional description we employ
makes sense given our interest in the literature of cognitive science. Indeed, we take it
that the various disciplines of cognitive science place constraints on what counts as an
appropriate functional description. That is, we will not be talking in great detail about
mental representation, because for each functional characterisation we employ, there is
a potentially infinite number of different ways that function could be computed. So,
even equipped with an appropriate functional characterisation of the relation between
a word and its informational contents, such a characterisation is consistent with many
different claims concerning mental representation. That is, one cannot advance one
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particular claim on the basis of such a characterisation. However, though it is logically
possible to derive many different functional characterisations for the relation between a
word and its informational contents, we place the constraint that such a characterisation
must be appropriate to the various disciplines of cognitive science. That is, it must be
philosophically appropriate, psychologically appropriate, formally appropriate, and so
on.
Now, when we consider standard theories of sense, we can see two possibilities for
error, both in their representational claims and in their functional claims. Firstly, with
respect to the functional claims there is the possibility that the functional description
they employ is simply not appropriate. So, for example, the relation between a single
word and its uses is standardly considered in terms of a single function. This is what
is assumed by theories which are committed to the view that all the uses of a word, or
even simply all the conventional uses of a word, must have something in common. And
the meaning must specify what these commonalities are. Now while such a functional
description may be appropriate, it is by no means certain. Indeed, we shall argue in
this thesis that it is not appropriate.
So one source of the inadequacy of a theory of word meaning is whether or not the
functional description employed is appropriate. Another possibility for error arises when
this functional description, whether appropriate or not, is taken as directly revealing of
mental representation. So, for example, a meaning postulate theory of word meaning
may be, according to some views, an appropriate description of certain aspects of word
meaning. However, if it is seen as directly revealing of the way in which that aspect
arises from mental functioning then another source of error may arise. That is, the facts
of the matter about representation, the computational primitives of neural architecture,
for example, may be at odds with the way such a functional description is formulated.
Tndeed, this is hardly surprising since it is a standard result of the theory of computation
that a given function may be computed in arbitrarily many ways. So, when a particular
functional description is taken as a statement of how that function is computed, the
possibility of error will arise. Consequently, we will not claim that the theory we offer
later is committed to any particular facts about how this theory might be implemented.
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Similarly, although we hold to the view that certain aspects of the theory are mentally
represented, we do not make claims concerning how they are represented.
To recap, then, our position is one which treats theories of concepts and sense as similar
in certain essential respects. They are similar inasmuch as the functional descriptions
they attempt to characterise are similar. Their precise relation we only guess at later.
Our position, however, is that the functional descriptions they employ are not appropri¬
ate given considerations in the literature and, therefore, we attempt to provide a more
appropriate functional description. Concerning representational claims, our position is
that the nature of representation is logically independent of the nature of the function
computed: that one cannot advance from a position on the latter directly to a position
on the former. Inasmuch as representational claims have efficacy, they do so only to the
extent that they sit with the facts about representation, the facts about the computa¬
tional primitives of a neural architecture. As we do not touch on this issue, we make
only limited representational claims. Our claim is simply that the theory we offer later
amounts to a better functional description of issues to do with word meanings, concepts
and senses than those offered previously.
The question to which we now turn is that of what these senses and concepts are senses
and concepts of. To answer this question, we turn to a discussion of Situation Theory.
1.4 Word Meanings as Informational Constraints
Barwise Si Perry (1983), in Situations & Attitudes, spell out what they call the Relation
Theory of Meaning. Central to this theory is a view ofmeaning relations or constraints in
which these constraints play a dual role: that is, they are seen both as meaning relations
and as carriers of information. These two aspects of constraints are also suggestive of
the wider concerns of Barwise Si Perry's theory.
For Barwise Si Perry, the study of meaning is intimately wedded to a study of infor¬
mation flow. That is, it is concerned with the conditions under which information can
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flow and the extraction of this information from situations and by agents. By locating
various kinds of meaning within an overall picture of information, by concentrating on
the information that agents can extract and on the exploitation of aspects of situations
by agents in conveying information, Barwise & Perry offer a less dogmatic approach to
meaning. By this we mean to distinguish this theory from traditional theories of mean¬
ing. Though we will not consider these here, we will focus later (Chapters 5 and 6) on
the approaches of Kripke and Putnam which assume a traditional analytic conception
of meaning.
Barwise & Perry offer an incomplete taxonomy of constraints. There are two broad
classes of constraint: conditional and unconditional. We can further subdivide these
classes into nomic, necessary and conventional constraints. Before explaining what
these last are, we will consider the distinction between conditional and unconditional
constraints. But before we may do this, we will have to consider some of the building
blocks of Situation Theory.
In Situation Theory we can talk of situations in terms of the facts which they support.
We model facts in terms of infons and we write that a situation s supports some infon
a as follows:
s a
Facts are composed of some relation and some number of individuals which are appro¬
priate for the argument roles of that relation. We write that a fact a has a relation R
and arguments ao ... an as follows:
a =< R, a0, ...,an;+ >
We indicate that such arguments do stand in the relation R by assigning the infon a
polarity, +; a polarity, —, would indicate the opposite. Now, facts may or may not
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be supported by particular situations and we write that the fact a is supported by a
situation s, as follows.
s |= a
Now, by these means we can also talk of situation types. That is, we can talk of the
type of situation such that situations of that type support a. We write the situation
type, 5, as follows:
S = [5 | s |= a]
Constraints can also be viewed as facts. In this case, there is a relation "involves",
written =>, which has two argument roles associated with it, roles for which situation
types are appropriate. So, if a constraint is supported, we can write this as follows
5 |=<=s>,Si, S2; + >
where Si and S2 are both situation types. This means that, firstly, a situation s supports
a fact and this fact is a constraint. And, secondly, that the constraint holds between
two situation types Si and S2 such that provided there is a situation of type Si then
there is one of type S2.
Now we are in a position to say what an unconditional constraint amounts to. Uncon¬
ditional constraints are ones whose existence is independent of any particular situation.
That is, there are no conditions on s for the constraint to be a fact. Alternatively, all
situations, regardless of their type, will make such a constraint a fact. That is, such
constraints are deemed to be universal, components of all situations.
Now conditional constraints are of quite a different nature. For a conditional constraint
to be a fact, it must not only be supported by some situation s, but that situation
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must be of a certain type. Barwise (1985) offers an alternative way of writing this.
Conditional constraints could be written
=► S2 | B
where Si, S2 and B are all situation types. B refers to the background situation
type, the type that must be realised if the constraint is to be supported. Provided this
situation type is realised, then the involves relation holds between the specified situation
types. But what this amounts to is the claim that unless certain conditions, background
conditions defining the type B, hold in the current situation then within that situation
the constraint does not hold. That is, within such situations there is no meaning or
informational relation between types Si and S2.
We can picture conditional constraints as indicated in Figure 1.1. That is, we can
view the relativity of conditional constraints as holding to a situation, b. This, Barwise
tells us, offers a better viewpoint on the seemingly mysterious background conditions
defining the situation-type B. Thus, any situation which would previously be of the
type B, defined by these background conditions, will now be seen as a smaller situation
of b. A conditional constraint relativised with respect to 6 in this way, can then be
seen as a fact which is a component of all situations which are included in b. In all
situations smaller than or equal to b, therefore, the informational relationship between
Si and S2 holds; in other situations, the relationship does not hold. One can see, then,
that a conditional constraint can be thought of as a "local" version of an unconditional
constraint: provided an agent remains within certain situations, defined in terms of 6,
the informational relationship which is the constraint will appear as an entailment, as
a necessary relation, as unconditional. The theorist, having privileged access, can see
that the constraint is really of a conditional nature but, of course, the theorist herself
is limited: constraints that appear unconditional may, in fact, simply be conditional
constraints. The appearance of unconditionality, then, is one that can arise from the
inability to consider all relevant situations.
There are a number of other sorts of constraint which we will just briefly mention:
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Figure 1.1: A Picture of Conditional Constraints.
nomic, necessary and conventional. Nomic constraints are ones which reflect natural
laws. The relation between smoke and fire, for example, reflects natural laws. Necessary
constraints are exemplified by relations between, for example, kissing and touching. It
is deemed necessary that every kissing is accompanied by a touching. Conventional
constraints reflect relations that can be flouted. For example, it is a convention of
language that one says what one believes, but one can be dishonest, thus breaking the
convention.
Before turning away from constraints, we should note that in postulating the existence
of constraints, there is at least a dual commitment. One commitment is to the logical
nature of the relation specified by the constraint. For example, if we propose that there
is a conditional constraint relating x to y, then, duly, the nature of this relationship
should be conditional. Similarly, we make a commitment to the relata of the constraint.
That is, we make a commitment that these are the terms of the constraint to which
agents may become attuned. If, for instance, no agent behaved in a way consistent with
this relation between x and y, but did so consistent with a relation between x A z and y,
then the latter might be seen as revealing the true nature of the constraint. A related
commitment is an ontological one. Constraints are facts just as the fact that I, at the
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time of writing, am writing this thesis. In the ontological commitment we make, there
is little difference. Consequently, we must be careful when postulating the existence
of constraints. We must be careful, for example, in postulating many constraints as
opposed to just one, as we ought to be careful in postulating the existence of an object
corresponding to every possible vantage point we may have on a single object. To
extend the analogy, suppose that in looking around me I judge there to be six chairs
in the room. Now, it is presumably not beyond the realm of possibility that there are
seven chairs in the room but that there is some mysterious optical illusion which only
allows me to detect six. Now, were I to claim that there are six chairs in the room,
I must accept the possibility of error. What looks like six chairs might, in fact, be
seven. And, in postulating constraints, there is a similar danger. What may look like
one constraint might, in fact, be two and what may look like two might, in fact, be one.
Since, in postulating constraints we make claims about the structure of the world, we
must, consequently, exercise a certain caution.
So much for the detail of constraints. Stepping back a little, we can see that, in situation
semantics, there is an entwining of meaning and information and, we may suggest,
this entwining offers a potentially richer view of semantics. So, for example, Barwise
(1989) tells us that "such a theory will have more to do with the ordinary use of the
word meaning than with the use that identifies meaning with linguistic or conventional
meaning" (p. 50). It is the possibility of this richer view of semantics which, given the
concerns we expressed in the first section, is appealing. However, we can focus on a
number of aspects.
Barwise (1989) distinguishes several types of meaning. Firstly, there is what he himself
chooses to call meaning, namely sentence meaning. Consider the sentence I admire
Vygotsky. If I utter such a sentence then I express a proposition which is undoubtedly
true. If someone else utters the same sentence, then the proposition they express will be
different, indeed it may turn out to be false. Firstly, the situation-semantical enterprise
is one of turning away from analysing propositions solely in terms of their truth value.
Instead, it proposes to treat more seriously the "subject matter" of propositions. For
example, my utterance of I admire Vygotsky does not simply express a proposition which
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is true, it expresses a proposition about myself and about my disposition towards the
works of Vygotsky. This notion of subject matter marks, then, one of the departures
of situation semantics from more traditional approaches. Another, concerns the other
types of meaning Barwise discusses.
Sentence meaning, then, is that which is common to all utterances of a given sentence
and it is necessarily of rather an abstract nature. Content, however, is rather different.
The particular proposition I express by my utterance of I admire Vygotsky is, in some
sense, the meaning not of a sentence but of a particular utterance. It is the meaning of
the particular event where I utter the sentence. This type of meaning is what Barwise
calls content. The third type of meaning which Barwise discusses is that of intended
meaning, what a given speaker of a sentence intends to convey. This, Barwise calls
user meaning. If I am not a competent user of English, for example, then I may utter
I admire Vygotsky fully intending to convey just the opposite. This, then, would be a
case where user meaning and content may diverge.
In discussing the puzzles of section 1.2, we need to ask which type of meaning we
need to examine. Consider Fred, the statue of the lion and the sentence this is a lion.
When Fred utters this sentence while pointing to the lion, it seems Fred may adopt two
different attitudes to his utterance. Alternatively, he may intend two different meanings
for the same sentence. But, it would not be right for us to simply analyse the puzzle
in terms of what Fred intends to mean, for, as the puzzle indicates, Fred's interlocutors
are capable of grasping the same meanings. So the notion of meaning we need is closer
to Barwise's notion of content. Let us look at this in more detail.
An utterance of the sentence you are likely to fall asleep expresses some proposition. The
content of the proposition can be thought of as being determined by two general factors:
the meaning of the sentence and the circumstances of utterance. These latter will, for
instance, determine the referent of the indexical you. So we can write the propositional
content of the sentence as C(S,c) where C is the content, S the sentence and c the
circumstances of utterance. So, we have a picture of how the content of an utterance
can vary not only with the sentence uttered but also with the context of utterance.
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For sentences such as Leo is a lion, where Leo is the proper name of the statue of a
lion near to where Fred is sitting, the picture is a little more difficult. Whereas it is
possible to suggest that the content of the sentence, C(S, c), differs on the occasions
of Fred's utterances because the contexts of use, c, differ, this compels us to the view
that words such as lion are like other indexical expressions. It may well be that the
context sensitivity of expressions in the puzzles can be formally distinguished from
that of indexicals. Accordingly, though we will relate our discussion of the senses of
expressions to this notion of the content associated with utterances, we will not be
committed to the identification of the properties of common nouns with those of other
indexical expressions. The prospect of such an identification would take us outside the
scope of this thesis.
We will finish this section by commenting on the background conditions with respect
to which we may construe conditional constraints as being relativised. Conditional
constraints, as we saw in Figure 1.1, can be conceived as facts which hold only in certain
situations, situations which are smaller than or equal to, say, b. Now, the conditions
that were previously employed in defining situation-types, B, can be better understood.
For, previously, if someone were to ask the nature of this background situation-type,
that is, ask the nature of these background conditions, we would encounter problems.
Firstly, it is not clear that an answer would ever be forthcoming and, secondly, it was
not clear that it wasn't a fair question to ask. I now wish to suggest, in defence of our
later use of conditional constraints, that such a question is better directed at a natural
scientist than it is at a semanticist. This is not due to some inward malevolence towards
natural scientists, but rather that such a question is precisely the sort of question to
which natural science begs answers.
Asking the nature of background conditions is equivalent to asking what conditions need
be satisfied by the current situation in order for this constraint to be satisfied. That
is, it is to ask why such and such an informational relation holds in a give situation.
Casting constraints as facts alters this drastically. For, now, to ask why an informational
relation holds in a situation is to ask why one particular fact holds in a situation. And,
presumably, the only possible answer will be couched so as to explain why this fact
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depends for its existence on various other facts.
Consider the fact of the chair on which I am sitting being a Chippendale. There are
presumably many other facts on which the existence of this fact depends. Many of
these will be facts concerning who made the chair, its style, the period in which it
was made, and so on. But there are many other facts on which the fact of my chair
being a Chippendale depends. Facts concerning the tools with which it was made, facts
concerning the ability of furniture makers to communicate with one another, and facts
concerning the ability to identify and maintain particular styles. Indeed, were we to
articulate all the facts which matter as far as a chair being a Chippendale is concerned,
we would have produced a complete science of furniture making and much else besides.
Now, it is similar, I am suggesting, for facts that happen to be conditional constraints
which relate worldly conditions to types of uses of words. Clearly, some of the condi¬
tions on which their existence depends will be of considerable relevance to a semantic
enterprise. I would not suggest otherwise. What seems likely, however, is that an artic¬
ulation of the background conditions with respect to which a conditional constraint is
relativised is not a goal that should be expected of a semantic theory. It is enough that
a semantic theory should correctly characterise the informational relationship between,
for example, words and their meanings. It should not also have to articulate all those
facts on which the existence of this relationship depends.
1.5 Concepts and Information
The view we have sketched, namely that of viewing concepts as expressing attunement
to informational constraints, raises the interesting question of in what sense concepts
can be said to be informational. For, if concepts are themselves informational then how
are cases of misinformation to be explained?
There are many cases where the mental states of individuals do not carry information
about a situation with which they are linked. The case of the Ames room provides a
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classic illustration. The Ames room is constructed so that, viewed from a particular
vantage point outside the room, it looks like a conventionally arranged and constructed
room. However, there is a deception in this. For, if one enters the room it soon becomes
apparent that the construction is distinctively non-conventional: that the walls are
not parallel and nor are the floor and ceiling. However, the construction is such that
these look parallel when viewed from this particular viewpoint. Now, quite clearly,
someone viewing the Ames room from this position can entertain various conjectures
about it. One might be that the ceiling and floor do indeed lie in parallel planes. That
is, someone's concept of what it is for two planes to be parallel may well be satisfied.
Only on further inspection, will it seem otherwise.
Now there are several observations here which have relevance for our claim that concepts
are informational. One is that the concept of "parallel planes" guides certain behaviour.
Behaviour involving reaching to the floor, for example, may well be guided by the belief
that this is parallel to the ceiling and consequently perpendicular to the bodily axis. In
this sense, the satisfaction of the concept appears to inform the agent's actions. It also
informs the agent's thoughts: thoughts concerning other facts about the room such as
the distance the walls are apart from one another.
In an important sense, however, this aspect of the concept of "parallel planes" is not,
and cannot be, informational. For, although concepts may guide behaviour it is clear
that, in the cases of the sorts of illusion we have considered, such behaviour is not based
on the actual way of the world. It is based on the way the world is viewed and, in
cases where the view provides an incorrect view of the way of the world, such views do
not provide information. They do not indicate that things are thus and so, they merely
purport to so indicate. In this sense, then, concepts should not be seen as informational:
the mere accessing or use of a concept does not guarantee its satisfaction.
But such a conclusion is not incompatible with the view that there are informational re¬
lationships to which concepts express attunement. So, for example, in order to have the
concept parallel planes, there must be some constraints which, say, govern the behaviour
of bodies that lie in parallel planes. Without these it would be difficult to imagine there
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being a corresponding concept. So, when we say a concept is informational, we mean
merely this: there is some constraint or set of constraints to which such a concept ex¬
presses attunement. It is not to say that whenever a concept is accessed or used the
constraints to which it expresses attunement are part of the current situation. For to
say that, would disallow the possibility of concepts supplying misinformation.
1.6 The Argument: a Preview
In this chapter we have established a framework for discussing issues of word meaning
and concepts, a framework that distinguishes the ontological question of under what
conditions can something said to be an X from the semantical question of under what
conditions can the word X be used. We have presented a number of puzzles whose
solution we require and have related these to the more notorious category of complex
nominals. Finally, since part of our approach is to offer a formal account of a theory of
word meaning, we have expanded on the formal framework of Situation Theory. These,
then, are the tools we will need to begin.
In Chapter 2, we will describe a number of options that, at least prima facie, are open for
a theory of word meaning to adopt. The first we consider are choices in how we explicate
meaning. So, for instance, we will consider whether meaning relations are best seen in
terms of situation theory's conditional or unconditional constraints; we will consider
whether the meaning of unambiguous words is to be explicated in terms of one or more
such meaning relations; and we will consider whether these meaning relations can be
conceived of as being descriptional. The remaining choices in the Chapter relate to the
mental representation of word meaning. Here, we will relate the choices for both the
number and content of mental representations of the meanings of unambiguous words.
We will also comment on the relations between these choices. Before, finishing this
chapter, however, we will consider a few remaining issues as, for example, the relation
between the language in which we might describe mental representation and the facts of
representation. By these means, many of the possibilities for a theory of word meaning
will have been enumerated.
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In Chapter 3, we spell out a type of theory of word meaning, Sense Generation. We
discuss, in some detail, Herb Clark's related theory of Sense Creation, and indicate the
differences. We expand on his account of Sense Selection, distinguishing two types:
weak and strong sense selection. The deficits of sense selection accounts lead to our
characterisation of Sense Generation, where we expand on the notions employed in the
theory: senses, words and lexons.
In Chapter 4, we spell out a particular theory which falls under the rubric of Sense
Generation: this is the Relational View. The first part of this chapter details the
motivation for this view, much of which comes from a consideration of the psychological
literature on concepts. Having outlined these, we turn to a more formal description of
the relational view in terms of situation theory and, where necessary, with reference
to a prolog implementation. The view is initially described in terms of an example
of natural kinds. Following this, however, we return to the puzzles of Chapter 1 and
offer an account of their solution. At the end of this chapter, we begin a discussion of
meaning and, in particular, analyticity, that will occupy us, in essence, for the following
couple of chapters.
We start, in Chapter 5, by considering an influential argument that certain words, proper
names, are not descriptional in the way that we have assumed for common nouns. Such
a conclusion, if correct, will have significant ramifications for the general application
of our theory. We begin by examining some description theories of proper names and
suggest that one of the important motivations behind these theories was the possibility
of giving some account of cognitive significance. We then turn to Kripke's argument
in Naming and Necessity which stands to refute these theories. Despite the apparent
validity of Kripke's argument, it results in the divorce of philosophical approaches to
word meaning from the notion of cognitive significance. Rather than take this option,
we suggest that Kripke's argument, while seeming to be valid, is best construed as a
reductio. It should be seen as suggesting that the conception of analyticity which it
presumes is in need of revision. Accordingly, we propose an alternative conception of
analyticity that which is suggested by Sense Generation.
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In Chapter 6, we discuss the related psychological literature on concepts, with par¬
ticular respect to the treatment of natural kind terms. We begin by considering the
traditional classical view of concepts and some of its failings, and by relating such a
view to the Frege-Russell position on proper names. Following this, our attention turns
to Prototype Theory where, again, its more obvious failings and its relation to the
Searle-Strawson position on proper names are examined. We then briefly consider hy¬
brid views, those which assume concepts to be comprised of one component amenable
to a classical analysis, one amenable to a prototype analysis. We then return to the
argument of Kripke and consider the related arguments of Putnam. Our suggestion is
that their conclusion that natural kind terms are non-descriptional remains unrefuted
by these psychological theories of concepts. However, by accepting the position of the
previous chapter, that the Kripke-Putnam position should be viewed as a reductio, we
suggest that these psychological views of concepts are immune to the Kripkean con¬
clusion. We briefly spell out a Sense Generation account of natural kind terms and
specify how it circumvents Kripke's arguments. Finally, we hint at a possible reconcili¬
ation between the psychological treatment of concepts and philosophical views of word
meaning.
Our last major chapter, Chapter 7, is concerned with offering a re-interpretation of one
psychological theory of concepts, prototype theory, from the perspective of the relational
view of Chapter 4. We begin by offering both an exposition of prototype theory and
expositions of two models of prototype concepts. This achieved, we offer a classification
of prototype theory in terms of the choices we outlined in Chapter '2. Having developed
a clear conception of prototype theory, we expound on some of its difficulties. We briefly
re-iterate the relational view, though we now call it the Family of Constraints view and
this establishes the position from which we can attempt the main focus of Chapter 7,
a detailed comparison of prototype theory with the Family of Constraints view. Our
suggestion is that this comparison suggests greater psychological plausibility for the
Family of Constraints view.
In the last chapter, Chapter 8, we begin by recapping on the arguments of the thesis,
its results and its implications. We conclude with a discussion of some future research
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which it is hoped the work we have related in this thesis will lead to.
Chapter 2
The Choices
In this chapter we start moving towards a theoretically coherent view of word meaning.
We are thus naturally led to consider a number of choices. The decisions we make in this
chapter will determine the nature of our theory of word meaning. In the next chapter
we will argue against various options and settle on one, Sense Generation. Here we
concentrate more or less on simply what these choices are.
2.1 Meaning
As we saw in section 1.4, within Situation Theory there are a number of ways of treating
meaning and information. In particular, we have a choice as to whether we analyse the
puzzles of Chapter 1 in terms of conditional or unconditional constraints. However, as
we shall see, this is not the only choice facing our analysis of the meaning relations
underlying such puzzles.
2.1.1 Conditional or Unconditional
The choice of whether conditional or unconditional constraints are taken as mean¬
ing relations crucially depends on how we treat the issues of defeasibility and non¬
monotonic! ty.
36
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Standardly, meaning relations are taken to be indefeasible, that is, they observe the
property of monotonicity: in all contexts of use the relation itself, rather than our
knowledge of it, cannot be overturned. Classical entailment relations are one sort of
relation which is indefeasible and, indeed, this fact can be used in describing the property
of monotonicity, as follows.
AN
A,V> b <t>
Thus, if in all models where A is true, <f> is also true, then A can be said to semantically
entail <j>. Consequently, if any other proposition ip is also true, then A and xp is said to
semantically entail (p. The only condition we need to determine is whether or not all
models satisfy both A and <f>. We need not concern ourselves with the relation between
<p and xp.
The assumption that meaning relations are semantical entailments is a commonplace,
even though it may be claimed merely as a working assumption. And this has a bearing
on various troublesome facts concerning natural language. One is the prevalence of
defaults. So, the fact that birds typically fly might tempt us to suggest that bird means
flying animal. Now, were this to be the case, construing meaning in terms of entailments
would render it impossible for bird to mean anything other than flying animal. That
is, it would be impossible to say that the designation of bird included things which
were not flying animals. To say that emus are birds, for example, would amount to a
contradiction. The clear fact of the error of this conclusion can be taken to imply either
one of two things: that meaning relations are not entailments and they do not have the
property of monotonicity; or that bird does not mean flying animal.
Consequently, if meaning relations are deemed to have the property of monotonicity,
that is, they cannot be defeated, then any explication of meaning must be in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Indeed, it is often argued that the possibility that a
claim may be defeated, renders that claim to be about something other than meaning.
So, for example, the arguments of Putnam and Kripke are both of this character. They
assume, for instance, that since it is not a necessary fact that lemons are yellow, such a
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fact cannot be part of the meaning of lemon.
Despite some of the apparent problems of this construal of meaning relations in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions, it cannot easily be rejected. The origins of such
a construal may be traced back to, among others, Kant, Leibniz and Hume, and the
notion of analyticity. We will discuss this more in section 5.3. For now, though, we
can suggest the following: the conception that meaning relations are entailments disal¬
lows the possibility that meaning relations may be overturned or defeated. If a claim
concerning Xs can be defeated, then it cannot be a claim based on the meaning of X.
Though we will discuss later some of the analytic conceptions of meaning, we will briefly
mention an alternative based on an interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of Criteria-
relations.
Baker (1974) offers us several properties of criterial- or C-relations or, alternatively, the
relations of C-support. Firstly, criteria contribute to meaning: if x C-supports y, then
the meaning of y is partly determined by x. Through being evidence that makes y
certain, x partly determines the content of the meaning of y. Such meaning relations
are given as part of the "grammar" of our knowledge of language and the world, and
as such the connection between the antecedent and the consequent is a priori. If we do
take such C-relations to partly constitute the meaning of a sentence or word, then we
arrive at the conclusion that a change in C-relations will produce a change in meaning.
Secondly, the C-relation is distinct from entailment. Wittgenstein consistently contrasts
criteria with necessary and sufficient conditions — it is "weaker", in that C-support is
logically both positively and negatively inconclusive. This is related to the circumstance-
dependence of C-support: whether particular evidence functions as a criterion for a
particular claim depends upon the circumstances. At P/§ 164, he notes, regarding the
possibility that someone who is casting her eyes over a text may not in fact be reading,
that "in different circumstances, we apply different criteria for a person's reading". And
as Phillips (1978) notes, evidence is only criterial evidence in certain circumstances. This
circumstance-dependence is taken by Baker to imply that C-relations are defeasible: the
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claim to knowledge based upon a particular criterion may fail in just those cases where
in fact the evidence is not a criterion for the claim. That is, if the criteria for a claim
are satisfied (for example, someone may be manifesting pain-behaviour), then we may
not be able to make the claim that she is in pain, simply because we learn that in fact
she was acting at the time: we can have true evidence for a false claim.
However, although C-relations are weaker than entailments (though they can still sup¬
port certainty), they are not to be confused with inductive relations. In any case in
which criteria support a claim, the claim is made certain; in contrast, were it an induc¬
tive relation, the claim would only be made probable to the degree that its underlying
inductive generalisation were supportable. Such an inductive relation is necessarily
based upon experience, and so cannot conform to the requirement that C-relations be
knowable a priori. Indeed, in order to keep clear the distinction between C-relations and
inductive relations, Wittgenstein introduced the notion of Symptoms, or S-relations to
describe the latter. S-relations may form part of the sense of a term, and indeed may be
evidence to support the use of a term for example in making a knowledge-claim about
the world; but it does not form part of the evidence that makes the claim certain.
Another aspect of the C-relation is that it is an internal relation: that is, the meaning-
relation itself, though dependent upon circumstances, is not to be decomposed into a
pair or relations with some independent third entity. So if x is C-related to y, then x
is taken directly as evidence for y, without first checking on the appropriateness of the
circumstances or the possibility of defeaters. That is, the "transition" from the criteria
to the facts of the matter is a priori.
Now, the possibility that meaning relations may be defeated in the manner of C-relations
also seems inherent in the formulation of conditional constraints. In their base form,
conditional constraints are as follows.
p =A q given r
That is, the relation between p and q does not hold universally. In particular, it does
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not hold in situations where r does not hold. Let us call such situations ->r-situations.
Constraints such as these, however, do hold in what we may call r-situations. Now, this
aspect of conditional constraints gives rise to a kind of defeasibility.
First, let us note the character of a conditional constraint in r-situations. Within
situations of this type, the conditional constraint behaves just as an entailment. That
is, within this type of situation, if p is true then q must be true.1 So, for example, if an
agent never encountered a -ir-situation, the agent's behaviour would be such that one
could not discriminate the nature of the relation: one could not distinguish a conditional
constraint from something akin to an entailment.
This likening of conditional constraints to local versions of entailments renders them dif¬
ferent from certain other defeasible relations and, in particular, probabilistic relations.
A probabilistic relation holding between p and q would serve to indicate that in any
given situation there is a certain probability associated with the outcome q given the
outcome p. That is, if the relation between p and q is truly a probabilistic one, then
there can be no a priori grounds for discriminating between situations in which both p
and q hold and ones in which just p holds. That is the nature of genuinely probabilistic
relations. Conditional constraints, however, are quite different. Barwise (1985) consid¬
ers the relation between his daughter Claire rubbing her eyes and her being sleepy. The
question that an analysis begs is whether this relation is unconditional, conditional or
probabilistic.
If the relation is unconditional then in all circumstances in which the antecedent condi¬
tion is satisfied (Claire rubbing her eyes) the consequent condition (Claire being sleepy)
will also be satisfied. No situation can prove to be exceptional in this regard. The fact
that there are other situations, ones in which there is an abundance of pollen in the air,
in which Claire rubs her eyes and yet is not sleepy is, then, a demonstration that the
relation between eye-rubbing and being sleepy is not of this unconditional nature.
'It should be noted that our discussion is more properly centred on what Barwise & Perry (1983)
call necessary conditional constraints. Whenever we talk of conditional constraints, it is this kind of
constraint we mean.
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Conditional Constraints Barwise & Perry,
Sense Generation
Unconditional Constraints Kripke, Putnam
Table 2.1: Choice 1: Meaning Relations as Conditional or Unconditional Constraints.
One possibility, then, is that the relation is a conditional one. If this is the case, then
there will be certain types of situation in which the relation holds between eye-rubbing
and being sleepy and certain types of situation in which it does not. Notice that this
is different from the picture we would obtain if the relation was truly probabilistic.
For then it would be the case that the relation would hold in certain situations and
not in certain others. If the relation is conditional then it holds in certain types of
situation and not in certain other types. That is, there is the possibility of classifying
those situations according to their type in a way that is not possible with probabilistic
relations. That is, with a conditional constraint we have the possibility, in principle, of
examining the current situation, of determining its type, and consequently determining
whether the relation holds or not. With a truly probabilistic relation, we have no such
possibility. We may only examine actual outcomes. This difference between conditional
relations and probabilistic ones, a difference relating to the former's a priori nature and
the latter's a posteriori one, is an important one.
The choice, then, in analysing meaning relations in terms of constraints, seems clear and
some positions are summarised in Table 2.1. Though discussion of Sense Generation
will come in Chapter 3, the choice it adopts is also indicated.
1. Meaning Relations as Conditional Constraints: allows meaning relations
to give rise to apparent defeasibility by the fact that they hold in certain types of
situation and not in certain other types.
2. Meaning Relations as Unconditional Constraints: disallows meaning rela¬
tions from exhibiting defeasibility.
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2.1.2 One or More: the Unitary Hypothesis
The choice we describe in this section is between viewing the informational content of
the uses of a single unambiguous word as arising from one meaning relation or more
than one meaning relation. That is, whether we see the relation between the uses of
a word and the information they convey as effected by a single constraint or by many
such constraints. In many ways, the question reduces to that of deciding whether the
uses of a word betray a single set of conditions which underly its use, or whether it
betrays many such sets of conditions. In perhaps a trivial sense, most would agree that
several meaning relations underly all the uses of a given word. Cases of metonymy and
metaphor, it is standardly assumed, are cases where the word has a different meaning
from the conventional. However, our concern is not so much with just these "peripheral"
uses. Rather our question is whether the conventional uses of single words belie single
or multiple constraints. In the case, for example, of those uses of lemon which refer to
real lemons, the issue is whether such uses belie one informational constraint or many.
As we shall see, which choice we take here depends on our previous choice.
One view which might take meaning relations as unconditional constraints is the one
which we alluded to above, that of Kripke and Putnam. The major concern of their
articles Naming and Necessity and Is Semantics Possible? is precisely with these con¬
ventional uses of words. Now, on their view, it is assumed that the meaning of a word
must be expressible in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions on word use. Such
conditions must, therefore, be ones so as to capture all the possible facts of word use
in all situations of use. Ignoring the difficulties associated with this view, it is clear
that such a conception allows no motivation for the view that the conventional uses of
a word belie more than one meaning relation: to what possible use could any additional
meaning relations be put? If each individual meaning relation specifies necessary and
sufficient conditions, then the theorist has no need of any further meaning relations.
So, if we postulate meaning relations which are unconditional, which hold in all sit¬
uations, then there can be no obvious motivation for specifying more than one such
meaning relation to explicate the conventional uses of a given word. However, to be
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thorough, we will note that to postulate multiple unconditional constraints to explicate
the uses of words is, technically, an option.
Now the view which treats conventional uses as arising from conditional constraints does
have a more meaningful option here. Firstly, one could assume that only one conditional
constraint belies the conventional uses of a word. However, in this case, there may be
problems in dealing with counterfactual conditionals. Let us suppose that the particular
constraint is as follows.
s |=<=>,5x,52;+ >
So, Si might be the type of situation in which an entity had the property of having
atomic number 79 and S2 might be the type of situation in which the word gold applies to
that entity. Now, an important fact about the constraint above is that it is a component
of situation s and of all smaller situations, but not of ones which are not included in
s. That is, there are situations in which the constraint does not hold. In order to
explain the facts of language use, the theory would have to consider the possibility of
cases where the current situation was not of type Si and yet where the word gold does
apply to entities which are components of that situation. It would not be enough to
simply assert that the current situation was not included in s, for this fails to offer an
explanation of the facts of language use in precisely situations of this sort. What we
require is a theory that explains the facts about language use in all situations in which
a word may be used. So, the only meaningful option would be to alter our definition of
Si so that the constraint correctly predicted the facts of language use in all situations
in which gold could be used and to relativise the constraint to a larger situation s'.
But, since such situations seem boundless in number and nature, this option would
appear to reduce to the first, one in which meaning relations are taken as unconditional
constraints.
However, another possibility is to view the conventional uses of a given word as involving
more than one meaning relation, more than one conditional constraint. By these means
we can avoid the pitfalls associated with viewing meaning in terms of single conditional
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Conditional Constraints Unconditional Constraints
One ?? Kripke, Putnam
More Sense Generation ??
Table 2.2: Choice 2: Single or Multiple Meaning Relations. Constraints.
constraints, the pitfalls associated with counterfactual conditionals. Now, the argument
is that p involves q given r and that in certain circumstances, those in which r does
not hold, other meaning relations hold: p' involve q given r'. Clearly, a challenge for
such an approach is to spell out the relation between p and p' and between r and
r'. But this possibility of considering multiple conditional constraints as underlying
the conventional uses of words is, nonetheless, one which circumvents arguments from
counterfactual conditionals.
We now have a four-way choice: between unconditional or conditional constraints; and
between one or many of these. This is summarised in Table 2.2.
2.1.3 Are Meaning Relations Descriptional?
In answering this question, we will first consider one notion of meaning relations, that
deriving from the Fregean notion of sense. At a later stage (section 5.1.1 and section 5.3)
we will have a little more to say about Frege's view of senses but, for the purposes of this
section, we will concentrate more on how this notion has been interpreted and used in
the psychological literature on word meaning. Finally, we will relate this to the notion
of informational content in Situation Theory which we discussed in Chapter 1.
The standard Fregean picture of sense prevalent in psychology is as follows: words have
two aspects to their meaning, sense and reference. A proper name like Aristotle, for
example, may have the sense "the teacher of Alexander" and has, of course, as referent,
Aristotle himself. Sense is taken to determine reference. That is, it is the satisfaction
or otherwise of descriptions such as "the teacher of Alexander" that determine precisely
which individual is the referent of the name. Senses of words contribute to the senses of
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sentences (thoughts) by the principle of compositionality. Further, senses are parts of
the common language and are grasped by every competent user of the language. Finally,
though Frege himself never stated that senses are descriptions, it seems a commonplace
view in psychology.
Johnson-Laird (1987), for example, adopts this view of senses and, equating them with
the meanings of words, he focusses on their mental representation. In particular, he
claims that "there are entries in the mental lexicon that allow ready access to the
information that an individual has about the sense of a word" (Johnson-Laird, 1987; p.
205). As to the question of whether such meaning relations can be described, assuming
that this does not follow from the fact that they can be represented, the answer from
Johnson-Laird seems to be equivocal. While accepting that there may be some words,
natural kind terms, for example, whose senses are not amenable to description and,
consequently, receive only a partial entry in the lexicon, he points to the fact that
for other words (his examples are words such as plate and vase) their senses can be
described. Indeed, these descriptions can form part of the entries in the mental lexicon.
So, Johnson-Laird's answer is that, meaning relations may be descriptional in principle
but, in practice, it depends on the particular word.
Another area of psychology in which we come across the notion of sense is Clark's work
on Sense Creation (Clark, 1983). Clark's concern is with the senses of novel uses such
as that of porch in the paper boy porched the newspaper. So Clark's concern is only
indirectly related to the issue of whether or not senses can be described. But Clark
concurs with Johnson-Laird. Senses can, in principle at least, be described. Indeed,
Clark's ability to explain the sense of denominal verbs such as to teapot depends on this
fact.
In many respects, the notion of sense employed in the psychological literature is akin to
the notion of informational content. Barwise (1989) draws a distinction between three
uses of meaning: when it is used to mean sentence meaning, when it used to mean
content and when it is used to mean user meaning. The notion of content here refers
to the meaning attached to "the event of A's using it [a sentence] to say something to
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B, a specific action which means something" (Barwise, 1989; p. 62). That is, content
refers to the meaning of an act of uttering some sentence, namely, at least at one level,
the conveying of information. And this seems to be precisely what the psychological
notion of sense is getting at, not the notion of sentence meaning to which senses are
often tied in the philosophical literature. So, the meaning of A saying to B "The paper
boy porched the paper" is equivalent, in some sense, to the situation-theoretic notion
of the informational content which that utterance conveys.
So, at least with respect to the conventional uses of natural kind terms, the psychological
literature seems consonant with the idea that these senses are not descriptional. The
philosophical literature, too, seems to espouse the same view. Kripke, for example, in
his Naming and Necessity rejects the Fregean picture of sense for natural kind terms and
claims that they are more like proper names in having solely a referent or denotation.
However, the reasons for such a rejection are largely due to the fact that such words
are deemed to have a single meaning. That is, there is a single meaning relation or
sense underlying all their uses. And it seems a fact of natural kind terms that all their
uses cannot be given one single description. Hence, the view that arises is that natural
kind terms either do not have sense or that such senses are non-descriptional. So, one
option, that of taking meaning relations and senses to be non-descriptional in certain
cases, appears to be a corollary of the previous choices.
By allowing a word to have more than one meaning underlying its conventional uses,
this problem is circumvented and one can claim that such meaning relations, even in the
case of natural kind terms, are descriptional. The results of this section are tabulated
in Table 2.3. Though we haven't discussed Sense Generation, we will indicate where
it stands on the issues raised in order to act as something of an appetiser for the next
Chapter.
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Conditional Constraints Unconditional Constraints





Table 2.3: Choice 3: Are Meaning Relations Descriptional?
2.2 Lexons
Lexon is the term we reserve for that component of entries in a mental lexicon which
represents so-called "semantic" information. That is, information which specifies either
totally or partially the meaning of a word on given occasions of use. The question of
whether a particular LEXON adequately captures the facts pertaining to all the uses of
its corresponding word or merely some subset thereof, is one we discuss in section 2.2.2.
Before we discuss the choices which we should consider for LEXONs, let us turn to a
discussion of the nature of a mental lexicon.
A mental lexicon is deemed to be the locus of those mental representations which express
the linguistic properties of words. So, for instance, each word will be deemed to have a
mental representation which encodes facts concerning the word's syntactic category, its
subcategorization, its phonology, morphology and its semantics. It is the nature of the
semantic component of entries in a mental lexicon with which this thesis is primarily
concerned.
Clark (1989) offers the following summary of theories such as these.
Every word has a lexical entry in memory that pairs a phonological shape,
like /dog/, with a conventional meaning, like "canine animal". The con¬
ventional meaning is really a brief, partial description of some aspect of the
world. All the words taken together form a list called the mental lexicon.
When we need a word, we search this list for a word with the right con¬
ventional meaning. And when we hear the phonological sequence /dog/, we
search the list for that shape and retrieve its conventional meaning. Al¬
though this may be somewhat of a caricature of the dictionary theories, it
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isn't far wrong.
(Clark, 1989; p. 2)
Now Clark, in a series of papers (Clark, 1983, 1989; Clark & Gerrig, 1983; Morrow
& Clark, 1988), has presented a number of reasons why such dictionary theories are
inadequate as theories of the mental lexicon. Indeed, we will discuss his own suggestion
later (Chapter 3). For our current purposes, however, we simply need note that these
theories and Clark's alternative both presuppose the existence of a mental lexicon.
Clark's concern is to do with how various "lexical and conceptual possibilities" are to
be represented: for example, whether the possibilities for the hues which red may denote
are to be represented in terms of a static "dictionary" or whether they are the products
of some generative lexical process. But the lexical process he suggests, itself takes as
input entries in a mental lexicon.
Johnson-Laird (1987) is perhaps more explicit. His conclusion regarding the mental
representation of the meanings of words is that information about word senses is lo¬
cated in "entries in a mental lexicon" (Johnson-Laird, 1987; p. 205). That is, a mental
dictionary that contains entries in which the senses of words are represented, and these
senses may be more or less complete. For example, if the language user is ignorant
of the full sense of the word or if the word is a theoretical term, then the represented
senses may be incomplete. Johnson-Laird suggests that the representation of the senses
of natural kind terms may be relatively incomplete in this way. At any rate, what is
clear is that within the psychological literature on word meaning, it is a commonplace
assumption that information pertaining to word senses is represented in a mental lex¬
icon. We will not challenge this assumption in any great detail, though our concern
is to present both a rejection of dictionary theories and an alternative. This we do in
Chapters 3 and 4. Later in this chapter, however, we will consider in more detail the
representational assumptions we make in positing entries in a mental lexicon.
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2.2.1 One or More
The choice we have here is precisely how many lexons we postulate in order to represent
the variety of word senses. Take, for example, light. This has at least two word senses:
"light-weight" and "light-coloured". So it is that we can say of a raven's feather both
that it is, and that it is not, light. Such a condition Quine (1960) takes as an indicator
of the ambiguity of light. Now it is standardly assumed that, in the case of ambiguous
words, their different word senses are represented in different entries. That is, we
would expect two LEXONs for the single word light. Indeed, such a method of solution
characterises the dictionary theories of word meaning in which all the different senses
a word may have are simply listed, each sense warranting a different entry. Such a
solution, however, cannot be general.
Zwicky & Sadock (1975), in their discussion of ambiguity tests, contrast cases of ambigu¬
ity with cases of what has variously been termed vagueness, indeterminacy or generality,
this last being Quine's term. The choice is, as Zwicky & Sadock point out, between
postulating distinct underlying semantic representations in the case of ambiguity and
postulating single representations that correspond to several distinct states of affairs
in the case of generality. Take the case of the word cousin. This word can be used
to refer both to females and males, but the word does not appear to be ambiguous
between these possibilities. It is not that the word has two underlying representations,
one corresponding to male and one to female cousins. Rather, it seems that the word
does not specify the sex of the referent(s). That is, it is general with respect to this
possibility. Similarly, in the case of dog. The more frequent reading of dog holds that it
is general with respect to whether the referent is male or female. However, there is also
a reading "male canine" which is clearly not general.
The issue, then, for any theory of word meaning is how it treats the variety of senses
words appear to have. Take the case of the Lion Puzzle of Chapter 1. Here there appear
to be two senses of lion. One which appears to apply to statues of lions, one which does
not. So is lion, for example, to be accorded two LEXONs or merely one? Do we treat
such uses as manifestations of an underlying ambiguity? Or are they manifestations of
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Number of LEXONS
One More
Sense Generation Dictionary Theories,
Sense Selection
Table 2.4: Choice 5: The Number of LEXONs for Non-ambiguous Words
an underlying generality?
We will consider these options in detail in Chapter 3 but it is worth noting that there
is a further option concerning the number of LEXONs we postulate. Suppose that there
are good reasons for believing lion not to be ambiguous. Such a conclusion would lead
us to postulate one LEXON for lion. Now, by assuming that lion is general with respect
to the possibilities suggested by its uses, we would conclude that the LEXON for lion is
unspecified with respect to many properties: whether animate or not, whether made
of flesh and bone or not, whether golden brown or stone grey, etc. Indeed, such a
LEXON would be considerably inspecific. An alternative, however, which we discuss in
Chapter 3 and which we raise in the next section, is to view the LEXON as embodying
default information and the various senses which the word may have as arising from
some further process, one which is clearly non-monotonic.
The choice for the number of lexons then concerns whether we treat the various senses
of a case like lion as manifesting ambiguity or not, as manifesting one or more LEXONs.
This simple choice is summarised in Table 2.4 and, again, we indicate where Sense
Generation stands. It is worth re-iterating, though, that the table does not indicate a
stand with respect to all words, only with respect to those words which seem not to
be ambiguous. Thus, one option is to treat all cases where words have more than one
sense as instances of ambiguity. Sense Generation, while accepting that many words are
genuinely ambiguous, holds to the view that many non-ambiguous words have multiple
senses. It is these words that should receive only one LEXON.
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2.2.2 The Content of Lexons
The descriptive content we associate with lexons will crucially depend on the number
of lexons we postulate. Let us, by way of example, consider the case of mother from
section 1.2.3. As Lakoff (1987) points out there appear to be distinct senses of mother
associated with the cognitive models he proposes underlies its use. These are the birth,
genetic, nurturance, marital and genealogical models. Now, let us consider each of the
above choices in turn: ambiguity, generality and default.
Ambiguity: This choice would entail us treating mother as an ambiguous word. For
each of the five different senses of mother there would be a distinct LEXON. The contents
of these lexons would be treated as if they were as independent from one another as
the different senses of bank or light. The content of each LEXON would be that content
which would pick out each type of mother: the LEXON corresponding to the birth model
would specify content that would refer to adult females who have given birth to a child;
the LEXON corresponding to the nurturance model would specify content that would
refer to adult females who have nurtured a child; and so on. That is, the content of a
LEXON is determined by the different senses we assume a word to have.
In the case of the Lion Puzzle, this choice would entail there being at least two LEXONs
for lion. The content of one would be such that it would apply solely to real lions; the
content of the other would be such that it would apply solely to statues of lions.
Generality: This choice would entail that we treat the different senses of a word as
different manifestations of the same general or inspecific LEXON. Consequently, the
content of the LEXON must be general with respect to all possible senses. In the case of
mother, the LEXON would not specify a genetic relationship, a birth related relationship,
a nurturance relationship, a marital relationship or a genealogical relationship. In infor¬
mational terms, the LEXON would amount to the disjunction of all these relationships,
provided these particular relationships exhaust the different senses of mother.
In the case of the Lion Puzzle, this choice would entail there being one single LEXON
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One lexon Generality Option Sense Generation
More than one lexon Weak Sense Selection Strong Sense Selection
Table 2.5: Choice 5: The Number and Content of LEXONs
for lion. Its content would be inspecific with respect to distinguishing properties of real
lions and statues of lions. That is, the LEXON would not specify the property of animacy
since statues are inanimate; it would not specify "made of flesh and blood" since statues
are not; and so on.
Default: This choice would entail that we treat the different senses of a word as being
derived non-monotonically from a LEXON which specifies the default content associated
with senses of the word. In the case of mother, for example, the LEXON would specify
the default sense of mother, presumably one that satisfies all the models which Lakoff
proposes. In the case of other senses of mother, their content would be derived non-
monotonically from the content of this LEXON.
In the case of the Lion Puzzle, this choice would entail there being one single LEXON
for lion. Its content would express the default sense of lion, presumably "real, animate
lions". The content of senses such as "statue of lion" would then be derived from the
content of this LEXON.
Later (section 3.1), we will discuss reasons why the ambiguity and generality options
are not appropriate for the kinds of puzzles considered in Chapter 1 and why the last
option, the default option, is preferable. For now, however, it is enough to note the
various choices and their interdependence. Again, we indicate where the theories we
will discuss later, Sense Generation and the Weak and Strong forms of Sense Selection,
stand with respect to this choice.
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2.2.3 The Relation Between Senses and Lexons
Even given the earlier choices there is still freedom in defining the relation between
senses and LEXONs, especially in terms of their content and number. In particular, those
theories which postulate more than one LEXON in order to capture the observed diversity
of the senses of words, are relatively unconstrained in determining precisely what number
of LEXONs they postulate. Similarly, and concomitantly, they are unconstrained in the
contents they postulate for such LEXONs. Indeed, this lack of constraint may lead to
the claim that such theories require furnishing with explanatory principles to determine
precisely these issues of content and number. We will not dwell on this matter. However,
one aspect of the relation between senses and LEXONs upon which we have already
touched is that of the relations between their contents and, in particular, whether the
relation is monotonic or otherwise.
The Generality option of the previous section is one that is forced by standard views of
word meaning. According to the discussion of Zwicky & Sadock (1975) we are led to be¬
lieve that there are only two possibilities for word senses: either the word is ambiguous,
having multiple senses; or it is general having an inspecific sense. Now, postulating an
inspecific LEXON entails that the addition of particular sorts of information is strictly
monotonic. Take cousin for example. As we have already noted, this appears to be gen¬
eral with respect to sex. Consequently, any further specification of the sense for cousin
with the information male or female is monotonic. The added information contradicts
nothing. Indeed it is to avoid such contradiction that the claim of generality is made.
Suppose that we assume bird to have the sense "flying animal". This plausible suggestion
is confounded by the fact that there are certain birds which do not fly. That is, the facts
pertaining to these birds contradict the assertion contained in the sense. Consequently,
to avoid such a contradiction, the claim of generality is made: since there are birds
which fly and birds that do not, bird must be general with respect to these alternatives.
Bird cannot mean a flying animal.
Notice that the argument proceeds from the possibility of contradiction to a revision of
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Table 2.6: Choice 6: The Relation Between the Content of Senses and LEXONs
the sense and/or lexon for bird. However, there is nothing to suppose that contradic¬
tions of this sort do not or should not occur. Indeed, in the case of the Lion Puzzle, the
possibility of contradiction seems unquestionable. Here, it seems, it is perfectly possible
to say of lions that they are animate creatures and that an inanimate statue of a lion is
nonetheless, in some sense, a lion. So, it seems, that in some cases at least, entities to
which a word applies contradict the assertions contained in the sense of that word.
In general, then, there seems to be no a priori reason why one would wish the relation
between the senses a word may have and its lexon to be a monotonic one. It merely
seems a commonplace assumption. The possibility that the relation could be non¬
monotonic, however, is one which rejects the Generality option, at least as a viable
move for all cases. Indeed, if one accepts that the content of a sense may be non-
monotonically derived from the content of a lexon then one may allow lexons to
encode information pertaining to the default sense, and yet still allow for any observed
diversity of senses. The possible relations between the contents of senses and lexons is
detailed in Table 2.6.
2.2.4 Describing Senses and Lexons
In this section we shall briefly consider the relationship between the kind of language
in which we will represent senses and lexons, and claims concerning mental represen¬
tation.
In assuming that senses and LEXONs may, in principle, be descriptional, we are commit¬
ted not only to their description but to a particular manner of description. Consistent
with much work both in the linguistic and psychological literatures, we will describe
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senses and LEXONs in terms of what are variously called feature-structures, directed
acyclic graphs, attribute-value pairs, etc. Much of the detail of these we will leave at an
intuitive level. However, in the following, we explore one formal language in which one
may express facts concerning feature structures. A language in which we may describe
the content of senses and of LEXONs provides, among others, a means by which we may
classify theories of senses and LEXONs. Indeed, in Chapter 3, we will classify a number of
different such theories. The formalisation that we offer is similar, though not identical,
to Johnson (1988).
Johnson (1988) introduces and later formalises, in terms of Attribute-Value Logic (AVL),
a language for describing feature structures. There are several reasons for choosing such
a language. One concerns its expressive power and since, as Shieber points out, this is
likely to equal that of a Turing machine, we should be able to compute anything that
we both want to compute and that is computable. Another reason is the widespread use
of such languages in linguistic theories, particularly the mono-stratal, lexical theories
such as HPSG (Pollard & Sag, 1987), CUG (Uszkoreit, 1986), etc. It is not inconceivable
that an implementation in terms of such a language might one day be reconciled with
one or other of these approaches.
There are several components to the basic language which defines Attribute-Value Struc¬
tures or (AVSs).2 An {AVS) is a quadruple as follows: AVS — (attr, val, lab, 6) where
attr is a set of atoms called attributes, val is a set of atoms called values and lab is
a set of atoms called labels. Further, attr, val and lab are disjoint. 6 is the partial
function 6: lab x attr lab u val.
Consider the following AVS as an example.
Let attr = {ao,ai,<z2}> val = {^0,^1,^2}, lab = {I0J1J2} and 6 be as follows.
2This characterisation of an AVS differs from that of Johnson (1988), where an AVS is defined as a
triple (F, C, 6), where F = attr u lab u val; C = attr u val, and 6 is the partial function 6: fxf n
F, subject to the restriction that 6(c, /) is undefined for all c E C and / £ F. Johnson's characterisation
allows what we call attributes to act as what we call values and vice versa; our characterisation explicitly
disallows this. However, the difference is minor and does not affect the points we make later.
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*(/o,ao) = '1 Kh,(k)) = vo 6(h,a\) =
^(^0,ai) = V\ <5(/i,a2) = /2 f>(h,a2) = V2
Such an attribute-value structure can also be represented diagrammatically in the usual






We assume the usual subsumption ordering on such structures. Identity of attribute-
value structures holds if and only if identity holds of the corresponding partial functions.
Two attribute-value structures AVS and AVS' are ordered by subsumption (AVS C
AVS') if and only if the corresponding partial function 6' is a extension of 6.
In the discussion of the later chapters, we will be concerned to describe the senses and
LEXONS associated with given words. Accordingly, we need a convenient way of notating
the various lexons for a given word and senses for a given LEXON and we will notate
these by indices. For example, we will notate the AVS associated with the yth LEXON of
the ith word as AVS(Lij), and the fcth sense associated with that LEXON, as AFS(Stj^).
Consequently, for each unambiguous word j will assume just one value; for ambiguous
words it will assume more than one value.
So far in this section we have been concerned to illustrate the kind of language with
which we may describe senses, LEXONs and the relations between their contents. The
classification we offer in Chapter 3, will be based on this kind of language, though, it
will be clear, that it does not depend on any particular version. However, the main
purpose of this section was to reflect on the claims that one might be tempted to make
on the basis of phrasing a psychological theory in the terms of a language such as the
one described. It is to a consideration of some of these claims that we now turn.
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The content that we postulate for senses is primarily intended to serve a classificatory
role. Senses axe seen as classifiers of linguistic behaviour; of when we may or may not
use a given word to refer to a given entity. To describe senses in terms of attributes
and values is, then, to effect a classification of linguistic behaviour in such terms. So,
for instance, if we claim that one sense of lion is classified by the attribute-value pair
ANIMATE: +
then the claim would be that such a sense may apply to entities which are indeed ani¬
mate. Entities, that is, possessing the property of animacy. So senses classify linguistic
behavior in terms of the properties that entities may possess. Unfortunately, when we
consider LEXONs, their classificatory role is more complicated.
Even though we may describe LEXONs in the same language with which we describe
senses, the claims we attach to LEXONs must necessarily be more carefully made.
Lexons play a dual role in a psychological theory. Firstly, they play a role similar
to that proposed for senses: that is, LEXONs are deemed to classify behaviour. Sec¬
ondly, they are deemed to correspond to some mental representation. Let us consider
each aspect in turn.
The assumption of a mental lexicon ties one to the view that the content of entries
in that mental lexicon has some privileged role compared to other content. One may
compare such a view of the content of LEXONs with syntactic phenomena. A word's
morphology, for instance, may be represented in the lexicon in infinitival form. So,
under the entry for the word take, the morphology will be represented as take. Other
morphological forms will then be generated from this base infinitival form by means
of productive morphological rules. So the one base form assumes a privileged status
compared to the other derived forms and this difference in status, if interpreted as a
psychological claim, will manifest itself in terms of differences in behaviour. And so it
is with the semantical entries of a mental lexicon or LEXONs. If we assume that certain
content is represented as LEXONs and certain other content is derived from this, then
we may expect there to be differences in behaviour that accords with this difference in
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content. Similarly, if we observe differences in behaviour that accords with differences in
semantic content then we may expect these different contents to be expressed differently
in our theory. Some content may be expressed as the content of a lexon, other content
may be seen as derived content. Now, should we chose to describe these contents in
terms of attributes and values, then we have said no more or less than such and such
behaviour may be classified in terms of these attributes and values. A problem arises,
however, when we claim that these LEXONs are mentally represented.
The claim that LEXONs are mentally represented amounts to the interposition of a third
entity between two we have already discussed: behaviour and attributes and values,
or properties. And in this interposition lies great scope for what appear to be some
erroneous claims concerning mental representation.
One such erroneous claim would be the claim that the language in which we, as theorists,
represent the content of LEXONs is one and the same language as that in which this
content is mentally represented. For the facts concerning mental representation do not
appear to be consistent with what we would expect if these mental representations are
as our formal language is. Symbolic systems, whose operations are defined in terms of
a formal language, perhaps like that we have earlier described, typically do not exhibit
the properties we have come to associate with mental representations. Facts such as
the graceful degradation of human memory, for example, seem incompatible with a
view of memory based on standard symbolic computation. Indeed, in many respects,
the computational properties of a distributed representation account of word meaning
would appear to more closely resemble those of human architectures. So, at any rate,
we do not claim that the attribute-value structures by which we describe LEXONs are
represented in these very terms in the head. Rather, our claim is that these attribute-
value structures classify mental representations.
It is a standard result of computational theory that any computable function may be
computed in an arbitrary number of ways. So, for example, we may compute the
function which maps 2 and 3 to 5 in an indefinite number of ways. Indeed, it is surely
no different in the case of the theory of word meaning we will outline later. It, we
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will claim, suggests that the function between words and their uses may be computed
in a certain way. It does not, indeed it cannot, suggest that this is the only way of
computing this said function. And so the claim cannot be that this is the way in which
such a function is mentally computed. Rather, the claim is weaker: that the function
which we describe, between words and their uses, is mentally computed and that the
content of LEXONs which we postulate and which is implicated in this function classifies
mental representations. So, we assume that the content of LEXONs provides a means
for individuating mental states. Someone with a different content for the same LEXON
would be in a different mental state. Of course, the means by which we, as theorists,
may individuate mental states is not something we wish to illuminate. Indeed, such
a task seems Herculean. All we wish to establish is the precise claims that one may
attach to our postulation of particular LEXONs with particular contents. And the claims
are twofold. Firstly, that this particular content can be taken to classify behaviour.
Secondly, that this particular content classifies mental states. We say nothing more.
It is clear, then, that commitment to this kind of formal descriptive language in no way
constitutes a commitment to decompositional theories of word meaning though neither
does it constitute a rejection of such theories. The issue of whether word meanings may
be mentally represented in terms of decompositions or meaning postulates is, then, quite
independent from the issue of whether such representations can be classified in terms
of LEXONS. From the perspective adopted in this thesis, decompositional and meaning
postulate theories are indistinguishable since both can achieve the same formal classifi¬
cations of supposed mental states. They are only distinct when they are interpreted as
claims about the mental states themselves.
We finish this section by offering some justification for the kind of language we have
chosen. Indeed, our choice may seem ill-judged especially given our comments of sec¬
tion 7.2.1 that, in the light of arguments concerning coherence, such a language is par¬
ticularly ill-suited for a theory of concepts. However, our choice is motivated primarily
by the need to compare the approach we develop later (Chapter 4) with prototype the¬
ory. Most of the explicit formulations of prototype theory are phrased in terms of an
attribute-value language. So, in order to effect the comparison with prototype theory
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in Chapter 7, we will also adopt a simple attribute-value language.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined a number of different choices that a theory of word
meaning may take. The first concerns whether we view word meanings in terms of
conditional or unconditional constraints. The second concerns whether we assume that
the various uses of a word betray one or more constraints. Thirdly, we focussed on the
issue of whether word meanings are descriptional. We have suggested that this choice
is determined in part by the previous two. Viewing the uses of a word as betraying
a single unconditional constraint would support Kripke's conclusion that the meanings
of certain words, natural kind words for example, are non-descriptional. If we regard
the uses of a word as betraying many conditional constraints, however, it seems that
one may still hold to the view that word meanings are descriptional even in the case
of natural kind words. Our fourth and fifth choices reflect the number and content of
entries in a mental lexicon that we postulate for various words. The choices determine
whether we choose to treat certain words as ambiguous or general. An alternative
is to view LEXONs as embodying default information. This then reflects on the final
choice which is the relation between the content of senses and LEXONs. We mentioned
the possibility that one can see this relation of content as being either monotonic or
non-monotonic.
Our final concern in this chapter was to put some distance between the formal language
in which we describe the contents of senses and LEXONs and a claim about mental
representation. Our position is that while senses must be seen as classifying linguistic
behaviour, LEXONs must be seen to perform a dual classificatory role. They classify both
behaviour and mental states. The precise manner in which this classification is effected
is not a topic we address, though an account of this must form a part of any complete
cognitive scientific theory of word meaning. With this much in place we are now in
a position to consider a particularly influential argument, found in the psychological
literature, which addresses the nature of senses and argues for a form of Sense Creation.
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One Sunday night I happened to walk for some fifteen paces next to a group
of six drunken young workmen, and I suddenly realised that all thoughts,
feelings, and even a whole chain of reasoning could be expressed by that one
noun, which is moreover extremely short. One young fellow said it harshly
and forcefully, to express his utter contempt for whatever it was they had
all been talking about. Another answered with the same noun but in a quite
different tone and sense — doubting that the negative attitude of the first
one was warranted. A third suddenly became incensed with the first and
roughly intruded on the conversation, excitedly shouting the same noun,
this time as a curse and obscenity. Here the second fellow interfered again,
angry at the third, the agressor, and restraining him, in the sense of "Now
why do you have to butt in, we were discussing things quietly and here you
come and start swearing." And he told this whole thought in one word,
the same venerable word, except that he also raised his hand and put it on
the third fellow's shoulder. All at once a fourth, the youngest of the group,
who had kept silent till then, probably having suddenly found a solution to
the original difficulty which had started the argument, raised his hand in a
transport of joy and shouted ... Eureka, do you think? Found it? Found
it? No, not Eureka at all; nor did he find anything; he repeated the same
unprintable noun, one word, merely one word, but with ecstasy, in a shriek
of delight — which was apparently too strong, because the sixth and the
oldest, a glum-looking fellow, did not like it and cut the infantile joy of the
other one short, addressing him in a sullen, exhortative bass and repeating
... yes, still the same noun, forbidden in the presence of ladies but which this
time clearly meant "What are you yelling yourself hoarse for?" So, without
uttering a single other word they repeated that one beloved word six times
in a row, one after another, and understood one another completely.
(Dostoevsky, The Diary of a Writer)
Having established some choice points for theories of meaning and sense, in this chapter
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we characterise one option called Sense Generation. Sense Generation admits of a
number of distinct approaches though they are all similar in spirit, if not in detail, to
the view that Herb Clark espoused in his 1983 paper, Making Sense ofNonce Sense, and
that Clark & Gerrig (1983) called Sense Creation. Sense Generation is indeed motivated
in part by Clark's considerations concerning nonce sense and the senses of contextual
expressions. However, what distinguishes Sense generation from these expositions of
Sense Creation is the treatment of conventional uses of words, the traditional domain
of theories of meaning and sense.
We begin by examining Clark's arguments in favour of Sense Creation. Clark presents
these by way of a rejection of what he calls the sense selection assumption. This is a
standard assumption of parsing which he claims to be invalid for the parsing of contex¬
tual expressions. We differ from Clark in that our concern is not simply with contextual
expressions but also the conventional uses of words. In our analysis, we will consider
two distinct types of Sense Selection, Strong and Weak, and possible variants of these.
Whereas Clark's original objections apply to Strong Sense Selection, it seems that Weak
Sense Selection may obviate these. However, arguments against both forms of Sense
Selection can be adduced from the psychological literature and we will develop these
in some detail. Most importantly, these arguments strongly suggest a number of at¬
tributes we would expect a theory of sense to have. Such a theory, we will argue, is
Sense Generation.
We then turn to a brief outline of some of the intuitions behind Sense Generation
and of its key claims and these will be illustrated by an example. One aspect we will
not consider straight away is the mechanism by which senses are generated. Rather,
our attention will turn first to some of the objects which play a role in the theory,
concentrating on what is meant by "sense". We postpone the issue of how senses might
be generated until Chapter f.Afc.
In the final section of this chapter, we turn away from the issue of senses and to the
issue of word meaning. Traditional approaches to word meaning have rested on two
assumptions. One, the Unitary Assumption, is that unambiguous words have one and












one water, a Henry Moore
finger cup, apple-juice chair
John's dog, my tree
a waller, a cupper
to farewell, to Houdini
to do a Napoleon, to do a Nixon
to do the lawn, to do the porch
Churchillian, Shavian
atomic, manual
very San Francisco, very Picasso
Table 3.1: Ten Types of Contextual Expression
only one meaning. The other is that such meanings can only be properly described in
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions on word use. I will argue that the picture
of sense which we have established requires a theory of word meaning to reject these
two assumptions. In essence this calls for a revised notion of analyticity, which at this
stage we will only crudely characterise. However, in Chapter 5 we will examine the role
that the traditional conception of analyticity has played in arguments concerning proper
names and how certain of these arguments may be circumvented were our revised notion
of analyticity accepted. This, then, will pave the way for our discussion of natural kind
terms in Chapter 6.
3.1 Motivating Sense Generation: Some Alternatives
Clark (1983) espouses a view according to which the senses of certain expressions, so-
called contextual expressions, are not selected from some exhaustive list but are, rather,
created on and for the nonce. Hence the title of his paper, Making Sense of Nonce
Sense. In motivating his view, Clark begins by outlining various sorts of contextual
expression and Table 3.1, reproduced from the original article, summarises this.
The problem with such expressions is that their senses are highly dependent on context.
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Aspect of Meaning












Table 3.2: Classification of Expressions
Take apple-juice chair, for example. Out of context, we may find it difficult even to
imagine a possible sense for this expression. But in context, it is easy. If, for example,
in a dining room there is in front of each place-setting a glass of different flavoured juice,
then apple-juice chair can serve to identify a particular chair. That is, it may have the
sense "chair in front of which is some apple-juice". Similarly, with the other types of
contextual expression. One water, for example, may, depending on context, have the
senses "one glass of water", "one bucket of water", "one drop of water", and so on. As
for denominal verbs, Clark offers the following, by now well-known example.
Imagine that Ed and I have a mutual friend named Max , who has the
occasional urge to sneak up behind people and stroke the back of their legs
with a teapot. One day Ed tells me, "Well, this time Max has gone too far.
He tried to teapot a policeman".
(Clark, 1983; p. 301)
Here, to teapot is being used with the sense "to rub the back of someone's leg with a
teapot". We can construct other scenarios to further exemplify the properties of these
expressions, but the point is surely clear. There can be no limit to the number of
explanatory scenarios with which we can furnish a particular contextual expression and
so, in principle, there can be no limit to the number of senses of said expressions. This
is what Clark calls "non-denumerability". Further, the fact that the sense of contextual
expression are so dependent on the context in which they are used suggests that said
expressions are akin to indexicals. This is what Clark means by "contextuality". Indeed,
Clark offers the classification of expressions reproduced in Table 3.2.
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Now we may well quibble with Clark's classification, in fact we will do just this a little
later in this section, but the classification serves the purpose for which it was intended,
namely to highlight the fact that there are numerous expressions whose senses shift.
They shift according to context and in ways such as to make the totality of senses non-
denumerable. This, then, is the problem for standard views of parsing. For, as Clark
indicates, most parsers assume that the senses of expressions are stored in a finite lexicon
and that parsing consists, in part, of the selection of the appropriate sense from among
these. This is what Clark calls the sense selection assumption. However, not only is
it impossible to enumerate in a finite lexicon a non-denumerable set of lexical entries,
it is also impossible to select from that set. The selection of a sense from a lexicon
presupposes the search of that lexicon, and the search of a non-finite lexicon could
not terminate. Thus, the sense-selection assumption is invalid, at least for contextual
expressions. Though Clark, in his original article, appears agnostic as to whether the
assumption is valid for other expressions, in the next section we will attempt to put this
to the test.
Now, although Clark's concerns and ours are clearly related there is an important dif¬
ference. Clark's paper explicitly addresses the problem for parsing created by the fact
that certain expressions, contextual expressions, have non-denumerable senses. The
difference lies in the fact that Clark explicitly excludes the conventional uses of words
from this category of expressions. That is, "lemon" when used to refer to things which
most certainly are lemons is deemed not to be a contextual expression. Clark discusses
the case of water.
The water could be used in the conventional sense "the substance called
water" or in some nonce sense "the glass, or pail, or drop, or the teaspoon,
or..., of water.
(Clark, 1983; p. 302)
That is, for Clark, conventional senses and nonce senses are distinct. Indeed, any one
of a number of quotes could make the point. Earlier, as we have seen, Clark classified
expressions such as bachelor and blue as "purely intentional expressions", expressions
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whose senses are fixed. Contextual expressions are expressions whose senses can shift.
Later, Clark adds,
If teapot were actually in the lexicon as a verb with the sense "rub the
back of the leg with a teapot", then...I wouldn't have had to go beyond the
conventional meaning listed in the lexicon.
(Clark, 1983; p. 326)
Now it seems the point is clear. Conventional senses, such as the sense, "substance
called water", of water, are indeed listed in the lexicon. Clark's conclusions concerning
parsing stem from a consideration of contextual expressions and the implication is that
considering the senses of conventional expressions does not force the same conclusion.
Indeed, for conventional senses the sense-selection assumption holds: these can be listed
in a finite lexicon. Clark & Gerrig (1983) are more explicit. A pure case of sense selection
they give is the example of the senses associated with radish. Dictionary entries such
as "plant of the genus Raphanus''' and "pungent root of such a plant" are instances of
conventional senses, senses which are finite in number and listed in the lexicon. It is on
precisely this issue that Sense Creation and Sense Generation differ. As we shall see,
one of the main motivations behind Sense Generation is precisely that what we consider
to be the conventional uses of words belie many different senses, just, in fact, as with
contextual expressions.
Arguing that conventional uses of words are like contextual expressions cuts across the
classification schema in Table 3.2. Indeed, we may well quibble with other aspects of
Clark's classification, though it is fair to say that the classification is not solely Clark's.
Indeed, it is one which is standardly assumed in many different approaches to semantics.
But, returning to the classification we are given, not only may we wish to assimilate
many of his "purely intentional expressions" to the category of contextual expressions,
but one might argue that proper names and pronouns could also be so assimilated.
Consider the pronoun she and the degree to which we may maintain that it has a fixed
sense. Now, indexical expressions such as these are generally thought not to have a
fixed sense which determines their reference, rather their reference is determined by
factors determined by the situation of utterance. However, one might be tempted to
CHAPTER 3. SENSE GENERATION 68
suggest that one property that the referent of she must satisfy, regardless of the context
of utterance, is that of being female. That is, one may suggest this property as a fixed
aspect of the meaning of she. The "shifting" aspect of the meaning having to do with
which female it is that is referred to in the context of utterance. However, even such
a claim as this, seems to encounter difficulties in explaining instances where something
is palpably not female, yet nonetheless being referred to as she. Male drag artists,
for example, can, with great felicity, be referred to by uses of she and her. Similarly,
in the case of individuals who have changed sex. In many instances, particularly for
legal concerns, they are deemed not to have changed sex. Thus, if they were originally
female, in the eyes of the law they are female still, and the word woman is taken to
apply to them. However, in many other circumstances they are rightly described as
men. That is, depending on circumstance, a word such as man may be taken to either
apply or not to apply to one and the same individual. So to presume that words such
as these and the related pronouns carry the fixed imputation that their referents are
of one particular sex is a mistake. Rather, the imputation changes according to the
circumstances in a way that likens them to contextual expressions. That is, while it
may not be clear just precisely how these examples are to be accommodated, it is also
clear that they cannot be excluded from the category of contextual expressions a priori.
Rather the classification of pronouns as expressions whose sense is fixed is one that has
to be argued for rather than stated by fiat.
Similar points can be made against Clark's classification of proper names. His discus¬
sion seems to assume that these are just as Kripke (1972) describes: rigid designators,
expressions whose reference is fixed and whose sense, in as much as they can be said
to have any sense, is also fixed. In Chapter 5, we will discuss the possibility that there
is an alternative to this characterisation of proper names based on a revised notion of
analyticity which Sense Generation seems to require. We postpone further discussion
until then.
In the following discussion of theories of sense we will be concerned mainly with the
apparently conventional uses of words and their associated senses and their assimilation
to the category of contextual expressions. Consequently, though our arguments will be
CHAPTER 3. SENSE GENERATION 69
related to those of Clark, there will be differences. We begin by introducing a little
terminological difference: what Clark characterises by the sense selection assumption,
we call Strong Sense Selection. We call this "strong" simply because, as a psychological
theory, it makes stronger claims regarding the number of mental representations needed
to account for the diversity of senses. We then contrast this with what seems a more
plausible alternative, Weak Sense Selection. We conclude that neither are satisfactory.
3.1.1 Strong Sense Selection
Strong Sense Selection is characterised by Clark's sense selection assumption. Namely,
that each and every sense of a given word is listed in the lexicon under the entry for that
word and that what is required for successful communication is selection of the correct
one in the circumstances in which the word is used. That is, in terms of the choices of
Chapter 2, for each sense of an unambiguous word there will be a separate LEXON such
that the descriptions comprising each sense and its corresponding LEXON are the same.
Before we turn to some of the problems which this view faces, let us consider some of
its implications for a couple of examples.
Turkey is a word which can be used with different intended senses. One can, for example,
use it with the sense of "living, feathered, large, galinaceous bird" when talking of
farmyard turkeys. Just as with Clark's denominal verb to teapot, we can picture a
scenario in which this is the case. For example, in "The farm-hand fed the turkey", we
would clearly want the sense of turkey to include the fact of their being alive, at least
at the time of feeding. Another sense for turkey is one which expresses the fact that
the animal has been killed and prepared for cooking. At Christmas, for example, when
we ask if we are having a turkey for dinner, we are not asking if we are about to be
served a living, feathered, large, galinaceous bird. These observations are problematic
for a theory of sense which excludes conventional senses, for what is clear is that both
farmyard and dinner-table turkeys are very definitely turkeys. It is not that some
entirely novel sense of turkey has been created. Rather there are two related but different
senses for the same word.
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A more familiar example comes from the work of Betsy Macken. In her forthcoming
paper, Out of the Mouths of Babes, she reproduces a number of children's conversations
and one, given below, strongly suggests that the participants are attaching different
senses to the word father.
Hasan: My father...
Richard: You don't got no father.
Cassandra: He got a father.
Richard: Not his real father.
Cassandra: He got a father that lives with him.
Hasan: My father gonna buy me a bike.
(Macken, forthcoming)
As Macken points out, Richard seems to be aware of more than one "definition" for
father: his first utterance seems to rest on the sense for father, "real father"; his second
utterance relies on the fact that he knows father may have the sense "live-in father".
In this case, of course, one may argue that only one of these senses should be labelled
conventional. However, it would not be difficult to find an example where it seems
that father had two senses both applying to conventional fathers. For instance, imagine
a game involving fathers and their offspring where each father is paired with a child.
Further suppose that one of the offspring, X, has reached a certain age and has become
a parent. When an instruction is issued, as part of the game, to the fathers, the sense of
father would be such as to exclude X, yet apply to all the other fathers. Even were all
these fathers to be "real fathers", the example would stand: there would be two senses
attached to father, one applying only to a subset of real fathers. A related example
is where a sense of father applies to some, though not all, biological fathers and some
adult males who may have no offspring. An illustration comes from the case of an
undoubtedly real father, that is a biological father, who nonetheless is so neglectful and
uncaring that neighbours claim that he is not a father. Indeed, they may exclaim that
he is not a real father, while an adult male care-giver could well be described as a real
father by such concerned folk. Hence, there is a sense of father which applies to some
biological fathers and not to others.
Now Strong Sense Selection has only one way of treating these puzzles. The assumption
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is that each and every sense is to be listed in the lexicon. So Strong Sense Selection
supposes that there must be two lexical entries for turkey and father. In fact, it assumes
that there must be at least two, since we cannot exclude the possibility of finding more
senses for these words. So we will have two senses for turkey listed in the lexicon: one
being "large, living, feathered, galinaceous bird", the other being "large, dead, plucked
and cooked, galinaceous bird". For father, too, we will have at least two entries in the
lexicon: one for the sense "biological male parent", one for "adult male care-giver".
Though, if our suggestion above is correct, the number of entries will be far greater.
This, then is the analysis, now let us turn to some of its problems.
One problem stems from the fact that there are important differences between senses
over and above the fact that they may apply to different objects. One such difference is
the distinction that may be drawn between those senses that are attached to a word by
default and those that are attached only exceptionally. In the case of father, above, it
seems that the sense "biological father" assumes the status of a default while the sense
"live-in father" is more of an exception. The sense selection assumption holds that
these different senses are simply listed in the lexicon: we are left none the wiser as to
whether the distinction between default and exceptional senses is respected. Indeed as
we have characterised Strong Sense Selection, this distinction is not respected. This is
not to say that it could not be so respected, simply that the apparatus of Strong Sense
Selection alone does not achieve this.
Now even were Strong Sense Selection to distinguish, somehow, between default and
exceptional senses, there would still be an important deficit to its treatment. Namely,
its assimilation of vagueness or generality to ambiguity. The issue, then, is whether these
senses of father and turkey betray ambiguity. Let us return to some of the examples we
have already considered.
Cruse (1986) offers some criteria by which one might establish that a given word is
truly ambiguous. He enumerates both indirect and direct tests for ambiguity. For
example, one indirect test is that the two senses of an ambiguous word may have different
synonyms that, themselves are not synonymous. Consider, the case of bank exemplified
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by the following pairs.
The bank is grassy.
The slope is grassy
The bank is wealthy.
The financial institution is wealthy.
Though bank and slope and bank and financial institution are not synonyms, they are
close enough in meaning for the point to be made. That is, the two senses of bank seem
to be similar in meaning to slope and financial institution, respectively. Further, since
these are themselves not similar in meaning, we have some evidence for the claim that
bank is ambiguous. That is, evidence for the independence of the different senses of
bank. Cruse gives other indirect tests. The different senses of ambiguous terms should
have different opposites or antonyms. Consider light.
The feather is light.
The feather is heavy.
The room is light.
The room is dark.
Here, the first two pairs show the antonymous relation between light and heavy, while
the second two show the antonymous relation between light and dark. Since heavy and
dark appear neither to stand in an antonymous nor a synonymous relation, this is further
evidence of the ambiguity of light. We will not enumerate all of Cruse's criteria, but
the addition of one direct test will suffice. He suggests the test of zeugma. When the
different senses of an ambiguous word are simultaneously made active, a tension can
result: this tension is labelled zeugma. The following serves to illustrate.
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Jon and his bath continued to run.
Here run has two senses involving two denoted actions: one where a man is training for
a marathon, one where the tap in his bath is gushing water. The strange quality of the
sentence is attributed to the fact that for the correct interpretation of the coordinated
sentence both senses of run must be accessed and that these two senses are antagonis¬
tic. That is, the simultaneous access of more than one sense of an ambiguous word is
generally disallowed. This, then, is taken as further evidence of ambiguity.
Now none of these tests are infallible nor, even, some proportion taken together. In¬
deed, we could hardly expect it to be otherwise. Quine (1960), in his discussion of the
ambiguity of terms (§27), indicates some of the problems of distinguishing ambiguous
terms. While one line of evidence that a term is ambiguous, is the fact that it "can be
clearly true or clearly false of one and the same thing" (§27, p. 131), he continues, "this
trait, if not a necessary condition of ambiguity of a term, is at any rate the nearest we
have come to a clear condition of it." So, perhaps definitive tests for ambiguity are not
what we should expect. However, that we have some indicators is what we require for
our continued exposition of Strong Sense Selection.
The question that should concern us is whether items such as father and turkey are
indeed ambiguous, for this is how Strong Sense Selection treats them. By Quine's
criterion they most surely are. We can envisage a particular individual of whom it can be
said that he is and is not a father. Similarly, an individual turkey can, depending on the
circumstances, be said both to be and not be a turkey. Cruse's criteria suggest, however,
that, on the contrary, these words are not ambiguous. Take the test of synonyms, for
example. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to find a synonym for a five, farmyard
turkey that is not also synonymous with dinner-table turkey. Galinaceous bird, for
example, will not do. And dinner-table turkey is, of course, not truly synonymous with
turkey. Similar difficulties are encountered with the test of antonyms. The case of father
is similar. What antonyms or synonyms of the two senses "biological father", "live-in
father", could there be that would not themselves be synonyms?
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The third test of zeugma, perhaps, provides the strongest evidence against the sugges¬
tion that these words are ambiguous. Consider the following.
Jon both fed and ate the turkey.
Here, there does not appear to be the same zeugmatic tension seen earlier. And indeed,
taken together, the evidence is suggestive that father and turkey are not ambiguous.
It is useful to bear in mind that a claim of ambiguity amounts to two quite separate
claims. Firstly, there is a claim about content. Secondly, there is a representational
claim. With regard to the independence of these claims, we can see that we could, were
we so inclined, suggest that the same content be repeated n times in a lexicon. This
results in ambiguity, in a technical sense, but where such ambiguity is not manifest in
any contentful way. Consequently, it is not surprising that the criteria outlined above
are not in agreement. Quine's criterion, for example, is prima facie a claim about
content. Can the same word be associated with mutually exclusive contents, is the
question whose answer this criterion requires. But this is not, at first glance, a claim
about representation. The tests of synonymy and antonymy are similar. They rely on
sameness and oppositeness of content, and not on representational issues. The test
of zeugma, however, relies not on some simple measure of content. It also appears to
depend on the ability to access this content. That is, it depends, in some way, on the
nature of the representation of the different senses of an ambiguous term. For Strong
Sense Selection assumes that not only may there be different content associated with
the same word but that these different contents are independently represented.
We can also add that the different senses of turkey and, perhaps to a lesser extent,
father, are related. The different senses of turkey apply to individuals at different stages
in some cycle, sadly, in this case, the life-cycle. The different senses of father apply to a
disparate group of individuals who all bear some similar important relation to at least
one member of the younger generation. The precise nature of the relation differs, but
each relation seems similar to every other. An adoptive father is a father who assumes
the conventional father role. A neglectful father is one who may be genetically related
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to his charges but doesn't possess the loving attributes of conventional fathers. Treating
these different senses as if they result from ambiguity is to ignore the important relations
between them. Indeed, one of the characteristics of indisputably ambiguous words, such
as light and bank, is the fact that their different senses are not so obviously related. The
examples we have looked at so far have not, though, been of this kind and consequently
the Strong Sense Selection treatment of these is untenable.
Our discussion so fax has, then, suggested the following. Firstly, that there are different
senses of words such as father and turkey. Secondly, that, for each of these words, the
different senses are not independent. That is, the words are not strictly ambiguous.
Yet this is precisely what is assumed by Strong Sense Selection. It assumes that the
different senses of father are as independent as the different senses of light. This, then,
is one problem with Strong Sense Selection.
Another problem relates to Strong Sense Selection's assumption that the number of
senses of a word can be given in a finite list. Clark, as we have seen, is quite emphatic
about this issue: contextual expressions do not possess a finite number of senses. So,
with regard to contextual expressions of the sort detailed in Table 3.1, the assumption of
a finite number of senses is clearly invalid. However, we have been concerned more with
what might be called the conventional senses of Clark's '"purely intentional expressions".
The issue, then, is whether the number of senses associated with father in describing
conventional fathers is finite.
This issue is difficult to resolve in a principled and unequivocal manner. Indeed, it is
debatable as to what one would want to count as evidence either way. However, the
example involving the game seems to suggest that father can indeed have an infinite
number of senses. For the sense that father has in the circumstances is precisely deter¬
mined by those circumstances, just as with Clark's denominal verb to teapot. The fact
is that we can envisage infinitely many different circumstances in each of which father
possesses a different sense. One of Mary Shelley's creations, Baron Frankenstein, could
be said to be the father of another, the monster. An amoeba could also be said to be
both father and mother to the two cells which result from its binary fission. While this
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is a very different from the sense normally associated with father, it is clear that it is
not unrelated. Nor would it be easy to argue that such a use of father amounted to a
completely unconventional use as in the case of to teapot. Considerations such as these,
suggest that there may indeed be no bound to the number of senses conventionally
attached to a word such as father.
Perhaps the case of turkey is even clearer. The two senses we isolated earlier apply
to the same individuals at two points in a process. One is live, the other has been
prepared for eating. Yet there surely is nothing intrinsic to these stages in the process
which allow turkey to have these senses, other than the fact that it is widely useful for
us to distinguish them. The implication is that were we to find it useful to distinguish
between other types of turkey, we could use turkey with different senses that would effect
this distinction. Suppose, for example, that we wanted to distinguish between healthy
and unhealthy turkeys. One person, suppose the one gathering healthy turkeys, may
shout to a farm-hand standing in the turkey enclosure, Do you have any more turkeys?.
Turkey, here, seems to have the sense of "healthy turkey" and only if the farm-hand
were also a pedant would this have to be made explicit. Further, it seems that were
the farm-hand to be a pedant and produce, in response, an unhealthy turkey, a reply
of "That's not what I meant" could be expected. Such examples seem unlimited in
number and this further suggests the unlimited number of senses that can be associated
with a word.
Cruse is even more explicit on this point. In discussing the issue of the number of
possible senses associated with words he has the following to say.
One of the basic problems of lexical semantics is the multiplicity of semantic
uses of a single word form (without grammatical difference). There seems
little doubt that such variation is the rule rather than the exception: the
meaning of any word form is in some sense different in every distinct context
in which it occurs.
(Cruse, 1986; p. 51)
Taking Cruse's point seriously necessarily commits one to the view that there may be
infinitely many senses one might call conventional. So, perhaps our examples were not
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necessary to drive home the point. However, the point should at least be clear. Strong
Sense Selection assumes that all the senses of every word can be listed in a lexicon of
finite size. All the evidence points to the fact that this assumption is quite without
foundation.
Having found Strong Sense Selection theories wanting, we now turn to an alternative
class of theories of sense, so-called Weak Sense Selection.
3.1.2 Weak Sense Selection
Weak Sense Selection is characterised by the view that many of the senses of words
simply convey more specific information than that found in their corresponding lexical
entries. So, what is required for successful communication is an initial selection from
among some finite number of lexical entries possibly followed by some further specifi¬
cation of that lexical entry's content. That is, in terms of the choices of Chapter 2,
for each LEXON there will correspond several senses, the descriptions that comprise the
LEXON subsuming these corresponding senses. That is, the relation between a sense and
the LEXON from which it comes is a monotonic one. Again, before we turn to some of
the problems one might envisage for this view, we will consider some examples. The
particular analysis we choose will not really be at issue: rather, the kind of analysis. We
will be at pains to make this clear. Motivation for the Weak Sense Selection analyses
will, further, rely on the discussion of particular examples found in the previous section.
Consider, again, the example of turkey. The Strong Sense Selection analysis required
at least two lexical entries corresponding to its different senses. Weak Sense Selection,
however, requires that whatever lexical entries we hypothesise, senses can be computed
as a result of the specification of their content. If, for example, we hypothesise a lexical
entry to correspond to the sense "large, galinaceous bird" then the two senses of the
previous section can be computed by adding further information. The sense "farmyard
turkey" may be added by adding the information that the bird is alive; that of "dinner-
table turkey" may be obtained by adding the information that the bird is dead, plucked
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and otherwise prepared for eating. The actual process by which information such as
this may be added is presumably complex, but we can envisage it to be highly context
dependent. So, senses are derived, in context, from a general lexical entry, a lexical
entry which describes all entities to which the word applies.
Weak Sense Selection suggests that the lexical entry for turkey, for example, may apply
to all entities to which the word applies, i.e., turkeys. Of course, many senses of turkey
will apply to specific kinds of turkey, but the lexical entry must be sufficiently general
so as to apply to all. There are a number of problems with this view which relate to
the problems identified by Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975). We postpone further
discussion of the Kripke-Putnam view until Chapters 5 and 6. Here we will little more
than hint at these problems.
One problem, though, relates to the fact that turkey should not apply to objects which
are not turkeys. This places a requirement that whatever lexical entry we hypothesise
it should not admit of entities to which the word does not apply. Another problem is
that it should clearly apply to all turkeys. These, then, are the requirements that our
lexical entry should specify necessary and sufficient conditions on the application of a
word. That is, the conditions which are sufficient for the application of a word and
the conditions which are necessary for the application of that word. The problem is
that such conditions are notoriously difficult to specify as the arguments of Kripke and
Putnam testify. Indeed, their arguments may convince us that such conditions simply
cannot be found. This being the case for conventional uses, how much more difficult
then must the problem be when we consider novel uses such as those that form the focus
of Clark's attention.
Were there to be one general lexical entry, then, to account for all the conventional uses
of a word, Weak Sense Selection would suffer major drawbacks. It would be difficult
in the extreme to specify the content of such a lexical entry. One way of avoiding this
pitfall is to hypothesise multiple lexical entries to account for all the conventional uses
of a word. This, it seems, is the only plausible option for Weak Sense Selection.1
1One may argue here that this rather depends on the nature of the lexical entry. Prototype theory,
for example, may be thought to circumvent this problem. Indeed, so might any theory where lexical
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An example of this kind of Weak Sense Selection is provided by Cruse (1986). He
considers the case of dog and two of its senses: "canines" and "male canines". The
conjecture is that the second sense may be computed on the basis of some contextual
influence. Were this to be the case, it would illustrate Weak Sense Selection perfectly.
We could hypothesise the content of the lexical entry for dog to be "canines" so that
the sense "male canines" may be derived from it by the adding of information supplied,
perhaps, by context. In fact, dog seems more likely to be ambiguous but the point is
hopefully made. Weak Sense Selection could, returning to the turkey example, hypoth¬
esise two lexical entries for turkey corresponding to the senses "farm-yard turkey" and
"dinner-table turkey". The other senses we encountered, "healthy farmyard turkey" for
example, can then be computed, again by adding information. Before turning to some
of the problems of this view, let us see how the father example could be treated.
Father, under Weak Sense Selection, would be accorded more than one lexical entry (to
avoid the Generality option) but less than the total number of senses. For example, it
could have a lexical entry corresponding to "biological father" and one corresponding to
"male adult assuming the role of father". Now, an adoptive father falls under the latter
description but is not accurately described by it. Yet it seems clear that there is indeed
a sense of father which can apply to just adoptive fathers. We need simply construct a
scenario as before. According to Weak Sense Selection such a sense can be computed by
the addition of information, in this case information pertaining to the facts of adoption.
Similarly, the lexical entry can be used to compute a sense "foster father" for father.
So, Weak Sense Selection can, with some assumptions about context and the supply of
information, accommodate most of the puzzles we have discussed without recourse to a
non-finite lexicon. However, there are problems.
Firstly, we have already noted the problem of specifying necessary and sufficient condi¬
tions. This appears to rule out what we have called the Generality option, the option of
specifying one general lexical entry. A more realistic alternative is to consider specifying
a finite number of lexical entries, though more than one, from which additional senses
entries are identified with cluster concepts. We will argue in Chapter 7, in particular, that such a move
towards cluster-concepts is beset by other difficulties.
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may be derived. The problems with this option though are, principally, twofold. One
concerns the fact that it leads us to treat generality as ambiguity. The other concerns
the fact that we may be ignoring an important psychological aspect of word meaning
by treating related senses as independent. Let us take each in turn.
Let us consider the way we envisaged Weak Sense Selection treating the father case.
One possibility was that we could have two lexical entries: one corresponding to the
sense "biological father", one corresponding to the sense "live-in father". Were these
the only two senses for father, we would have a Strong Sense Selection analysis. Ac¬
cordingly, we might envisage that our objections to Strong Sense Selection could well
apply here. Indeed they do. One major concern with Strong Sense Selection was that
it postulated multiple lexical entries for words that are not seemingly ambiguous. The
same is true of Weak Sense Selection. It is not as pernicious: not as many lexical entries
are hypothesised. But, for all that, it treats father as an ambiguous word. We will
not detail the arguments against this treatment as they can be found in the previous
section. Rather, we turn our attention to the other problem with this option, that of
ignoring the psychological factors relating to senses.
Much of the following discussion will trade on the psychological factors which underly
the application of a concept to an object. Though this issue is clearly related to that
of how a word may apply to an object, a discussion of this relation and its relevance to
theories of sense is in order. We begin by considering some views from the psychological
literature itself.
Throughout the psychological literature pertaining to concepts there are strong con¬
nections drawn with the psychology of word meaning. Indeed, often the assumption is
made that word meanings and concepts are one and the same. This is an identification
with which we do not agree but when we come to talk of senses in the next section
we will say more about how these relate to concepts. For now, however, we will be
concerned with conceptions that already pervade the psychological literature.
Numerous researchers seem committed to the close ties between concepts and word
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meaning. Cohen & Murphy (1984), for example, are quite explicit in connecting the¬
ories of concepts to theories of semantics. They suggest that theories of concepts can
be traced, via the model-theoretic tradition, to Frege himself. Further, they suggest
that concepts have been viewed as definitions of terms (of some language) and that an
appropriate question for a theory of concepts is how such definitions operate in lan¬
guage comprehension. Both of these suggestions indicate very direct parallels between
the notion of sense, which can indeed be traced to Frege, and the psychological notion
of concept. Indeed, the suggestion is that senses are none other than concepts.
Similar connections are drawn by Johnson-Laird (1987). In his discussion of meanings
and prototypes (pp. 203-4) Johnson-Laird claims that the lexical entries for natural
kind terms are likely to include information for identifying and imagining exemplars
as well as other conceptual information. His discussion suggests that prototypes (a
notion ostensibly developed as part of a theory of concepts) should be represented in
the mental lexicon. That is, we are led to believe that prototypes play a crucial role
in natural language understanding. For our purposes, then, we would need to consider
how the various senses of a word are related to the prototype associated with them.
That is, how senses associated with word use relate to concepts which form the stable
mental representations underlying word use.
Connections between concepts and what we call senses can be found frequently in the
psychological literature. Carey (1988), for example, uses the terms "concept x" and
"meaning of the term 'x'" interchangeably to refer to mentally represented concepts
and meanings. This is justified, she adds, by the fact that supposed differences between
child and adult mental lexical entries always corresponded to a conceptual difference.
Again, the suggestion is that whatever comprises an entry in the mental lexicon, it is a
concept.
What I have tried to demonstrate here, is that, for a psychological input into our theories
of sense, we need to examine psychological theories of concepts. Much of this will be
done in Chapter 7. Here we concentrate on a particularly influential argument regarding
the coherence of concepts, an argument that suggests the mistake in treating genuinely
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related contents as independent. It is here, in the treatment of genuinely related senses
as independent lexical entries, that we will find Weak Sense Selection lacking.
Categories cohere. That is, there is something that brings objects together to form
categories and whatever concepts are it is this "something" that they should specify.
In exploring the arguments concerning conceptual coherence and their implications for
Weak Sense Selection we will consider a number of examples, though we will concentrate
later on a possible analysis of mother. A number of consequences follow from this
treatment and, in particular, we will argue that we cannot maintain both Weak Sense
Selection and a theory-based view of coherence. To see this we must turn to Murphy &
Medin (1985).
Murphy & Medin (1985) distinguish between internal and external components of con¬
ceptual coherence. Both aspects derive from theories of the world. Internal coherence
results from the relations between properties (described, perhaps, in terms of attribute-
value pairs) for which the theory provides an explanation. For example, the various
properties of chairs represented in the concept (its size, having a seat, its rigidity and
so on) cohere in virtue of theories concerning the function of a chair. External rela¬
tions between different concepts are also motivated by theories that support causal and
explanatory connections between those concepts. Consider the concepts cat and dog.
According to Murphy & Medin these concepts are coherent to the extent that they are
embedded in our theories of the world: the greater the number of connections between
such concepts and the rest of our knowledge, the more coherent and stable they are.
The connection of cat to many different aspects of our knowledge (such as our theories
of domestic life, ownership, pleasure and so on) provides it with coherence over and
above that which is provided by our theories of cat alone, which is the source of the
concept's internal coherence. The same thing is true of complex concepts, for example
cat and dog. The concept is coherent as a result of there being many common theories of
cats and dogs. Seemingly, on Murphy & Medin's view, we could not allow that complex
concepts such as elephants and lemons or stone lions and trout have the same level of
coherence as cat and dog. This stems from the fact that such complex concepts have
fewer common theories to relate the component concepts.
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This view of the theories underlying coherence seems to be intimately connected to
metaphysical issues. Accordingly, for Murphy and Medin, concepts result from the way
that theories cut up the world. Consequently, categories that cut across ontological
boundaries would not be very coherent. For example, elephants and hopes would not be
considered coherent, unless this category were motivated by a theory. If this theory were
consistent with one's other theories, the coherence of the concept would be enhanced.
The claim of Murphy & Medin is that the flexibility of conceptual coherence derives
from the flexibility of particular theories. On our interpretation of their claim, this
means that there are two mechanisms for allowing coherence to be flexible. Either,
in certain contexts, coherence is enhanced by constructing an explanation or theory
or, alternatively, the theories that underpin coherence are inherently flexible. It is not
clear how these mechanisms for flexibility in coherence would work for examples like
the Lion puzzle in which there are two different, yet apparently equally coherent, senses
associated with the same word, lion.
The Lion puzzle shows that the word lion can be used quite appropriately to talk of a
statue of a Hon. However, there is a question as to just how many of our theories of
lions involve statues. Seemingly, our theories of lions are capable of cutting the world
up so that we can categorically assert that a statue of a lion is not a lion. One approach
to this phenomenon is to view it as a peculiarity of word use. However, we wish to
preserve the intuition that there is an essential perspectival aspect to this case. That
is, we can adopt a different perspective on a statue of a lion: we may simply view it as
a lion. Additionally, in this case each of these perspectives seems equally coherent. As
we see it, there are two possibilities for Murphy & Medin to account for this apparent
flexibility in coherence. One is to invoke their suggestion regarding the flexible nature
of theories. Another is to adopt the standpoint of Weak Sense Selection, and thus hold
that there are two lexical concepts for lion. In what follows we will explore the former
possibility and conclude that the latter is their only plausible option. This in turn leads
to an inconsistency.
Under the first option, that of invoking flexibility in theories, we envisage three possible
mechanisms open to Murphy & Medin for achieving the flexibility of coherence. One
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mechanism that Murphy & Medin offer is that of the construction of an explanation in
cases such as elephants and hopes where, seemingly, ontological boundaries are crossed.
In the above case, apparently there is a similar crossing of ontological boundaries. Our
theories of lions tell us that stone lions are not really lions, though presumably there
are some theories of lions that are also theories of stone lions. Perhaps, then, it is that
the coherence of the concept of lion in this case relies on a constructed explanation.
However, since our stable, underlying theories concerning lions cannot all apply in the
case of the stone lion, it must be that the use of lion in talking of a stone lion is less
coherent than the use of lion in talking of a real lion. This follows because coherence
in Murphy & Medin's view falls out of the number of explanatory links which structure
the concept. Hence, on this view such constructed explanations necessarily lead to less
coherent concepts than those stable explanations provided by the knowledge base. This
is at odds with our intuitions. Seemingly both uses are, in this case, equally coherent.
What we want is to allow that both ad hoc and stable explanations can provide for
equal coherence.
Murphy & Medin provide another mechanism to account for the flexibility in coherence
that we observe. This is the possibility that we may have flexible theories. In the
case of the stone lion, we might suppose that our theories concerning lions are flexible,
accounting for the observed flexibility of coherence in use. The use of lion to talk of a
stone lion can be coherent as we would want in virtue of the fact that the same theories
concerning lions can also be theories concerning stone lions. However, this does not
accord with the intimate connection that theories have to metaphysical concerns. If
our theories concerning lions are also theories concerning stone lions then we have no
principled manner of cutting the world such as to differentiate between non-lions (like
our stone lion) and real lions. We take it that this undermines the metaphysical position
that Murphy & Medin adopt.
A third possibility that we believe Murphy & Medin may allow for is the option of theory
change. This option entails that in order to preserve the coherence of the lion concept
when employed to talk of a stone lion, the theories underlying the concept would have
to change. This, however, seems problematic. Since they adopt the Quinian position
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of viewing theories as components of a large and intricate web, a change in one will
have ramifications for the others. In this case we would have to change our theories
concerning lions so as to allow the possibility of inanimate lions. Changes as radical
as this, as they acknowledge, would require a global reorganisation of one's knowledge
base. It would also require, under most interpretations, a divorcing of theories from
metaphysics. This is precisely what we argue for. In Chapter 4 we will present a view
that is not tied to the assumptions that lead to these counter-intuitive consequences.
As we have seen there are good reasons to suppose the kind of flexibility observed in
coherence is not to be captured by the notion of flexibility in theories. We now turn to
the second possibility we pointed to earlier.
The alternative position that we believe Murphy & Medin might adopt is the one that
we call Weak Sense Selection. That is, the above arguments will not go through if we
assume that there are two lexical entries and hence two lexical concepts for lion. Aside
from the arguments already presented against this option, it seems there are further
considerations that would prohibit Murphy & Medin from taking this view. Following
Quine (1960), we might like to distinguish between two lexical entries for light. This
move seems legitimate. After all, it seems that the theories we have for light-weight
objects do not have to be the same as those for light-coloured objects. For the case
of lion, although lions and stone lions are differentiated by the theories provided by
the knowledge base, lions and stone lions are nonetheless very closely related. It is
presumably the case then that since we can relate lions and stone lions we have theories
to do just this.
Returning to the Weak Sense Selection of mother, we can see that similar arguments
apply. Weak Sense Selection holds that words such as mother have multiple lexical
entries, perhaps ones corresponding to the senses "biological mother" and "female adult
care-giver". If we tie Murphy & Medin's arguments to this position then we can see
the possibility that these different senses are indeed not independent, but related by
theories. Were this to be the case, positing independent lexical entries would ignore the
psychological import of such theories. Consider the following example.
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Kim lives with her biological mother, Mary. Mary adopts a child, Jane,
to whom Mary behaves in all respects as she does to Kim. Jane calls Mary
"mother" and behaves towards her in the same way Kim does. Initially, Kim
cannot accept that Mary is Jane's mother but after some time she does.
How is it that Kim's notion of mother appears to change? One possibility is that
initially she only has the biological mother concept of mother and that she somehow
acquires another concept of mother, the adoptive mother concept. Even though Kim
starts off with the notion of mothers as biological mothers, one can envisage that Kim's
theories of the world allow her to construct an explanation of how Jane can call Mary
"mother". Indeed, she may come up with a new notion of mother, a mother who is
like a biological mother in all respects save the biological relations. That is, Kim, with
her notion of a biological mother, equipped only with her theories of the world, can
construct the notion of an adoptive mother. The fact that this seems so clearly to be
the case undermines the starting point of Weak Sense Selection. Namely, that there
may be independent lexical concepts for mother. The fact that they may be related
by our theories of the world indicates that they are not independent. We should note
here the fact that different words do have contents which may be related by theories.
Yet the fact of their relation could not be suggested as undermining their existence as
different words. So, our argument does not concern simply the fact that the contents
of the senses of mother may be related, but that they are related in a certain way. In
particular, what the example suggests is that the content which may be associated with
one sense is derivative, in some way, of the content associated with another sense. For
instance, the content of the "adoptive mother" sense of mother may be derivative on
the content of the "biological mother" sense of mother.
We have seen, then, that to posit independent lexical entries is to undermine those
very arguments that Murphy & Medin advance in favour of theories. Yet, we take
those arguments as very good grounds to accept the theory-based account of concepts.
Consequently, we also take it that what is needed to avoid the pitfalls of the sense
selection accounts is an extension of this theory-based view. So, although we crucially
need a way of describing the difference between lions and stone lions and mothers and
adoptive mothers, we need a way of avoiding making an unprincipled distinction at the
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level of lexical entries.
There are several possible responses to this difficulty. One is to place constraints on
the way theories may relate these independent lexical entries. That is, we may want to
place constraints on the possible extensions of any two of the lexical entries for mother,
such that one cannot be extended to form the other. However, this flies in the face
of the observation that we can do just this. Kim can construct a notion of adoptive
mother from her notion of biological mothers. So for this to be a viable option, more
justification is needed. Another option is simply to reject the arguments of Murphy &
Medin that the coherence of senses is determined by theories: the fact that biological
and adoptive mothers may form a coherent complex concept has nothing to do with the
theories that relate them. As stated earlier we agree with Murphy & Medin's general
position. We believe that the only other alternative is to reject the assumptions on
which Weak Sense Selection is based.
A consequence of considerations such as those of Cruse (1986) and Murphy & Medin
(1985) require theories of sense and word meaning to posit different lexical entries only
on the basis that a word has senses which are genuinely unrelated in the sense indicated
above: that is, the content of one sense must not be seen as being derivative in some way
on the content of the other. For examples such as the ones we have examined above,
we are committed, then, to the view that words should receive only one lexical entry.
One suggestion we have already considered which would assign only one lexical entry
to father, say, is the Generality option. In many respects, the Generality option is close
to what we would expect of a theory of sense. It respects both the psychological and
linguistic evidence we have considered. Where the Generality option singularly fails is in
the fact that lexical entries may contain little or no content. The reason is clear. Since
words can apply to so many disparate objects, there are really very few commonalities
between them. Consequently, very little can meet the twin criteria of necessity and
sufficiency for the conditions of application of a word. Consequently, the content of
lexical entries must necessarily be sparse. Another failing of the Generality option is
its seeming inability to distinguish between default and exceptional senses. Even the
content of default senses must presumably be inherited just as with exceptional senses.
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These unfortunate consequences result from one assumption underlying the mechanism
by which senses may be derived from lexical entries. In our preceding discussion we have
assumed that this mechanism is fundamentally monotonic. It is the rejection of this in
favour of a mechanism which is fundamentally non-monotonic which is the hallmark of
Sense Generation.
3.2 Characterising Sense Generation
The previous sections have been concerned to detail what Sense Generation is not. In
this section we attempt to say what it is. The term Sense Generation presumably admits
of a number of distinct theories of sense. We will, in Chapter 4, outline a particular
version of Sense Generation called the Relational View. The purpose of this section is
simply to convey, in an intuitive way, the properties of Sense Generation approaches,
some of the theoretical apparatus on which they rest and some of the formal apparatus
in terms of which such approaches can be described. We briefly consider some of the
psychological claims that one may associate with such apparatus.
Sense Generation is a framework for the treatment not only of contextual expressions
such as Clark has outlined, but also of the conventional senses of words. It attempts
to marry linguistic considerations concerning ambiguity with psychological evidence
concerning coherence. It also attempts to respect the distinctions between default and
exceptional senses. As such it embodies the following principles. Only independent
senses should derive from independent (at least, synchronically) lexical entries. A lexical
entry for a word should contain the information associated with the default sense of
that word. Non-default senses are, it is assumed, generated from the lexical entry by a
process which is fundamentally non-monotonic. Importantly, the process by which these
senses are generated is envisioned to be one that provides the sense with its degree of
coherence. That is, in terms of the choices of Chapter 2, for each unambiguous word
there is a single LEXON from which senses may be derived, their content possibly being
related non-monotonically to that of the LEXON. We will discuss the integration of such
a view of senses with a view of meaning in Chapters 5 and 6. For the present let us
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concentrate on Sense Generation in itself.
The first consideration is the result of our previous discussion concerning linguistic
evidence for ambiguity and psychological evidence concerning coherence. Our previous
discussion has shown that given these considerations, we are unable to assign, say, lion,
two different lexical entries: one corresponding to "real lions", one to "statues of lions".
The second consideration indicates that the lexical entry for lion should embody that
information associated with the default sense for lion. Borrowing the familiar notation
of feature-structures, we might expect such a lexical entry to have the following content.
Whether these are the correct attributes and values to describe the default sense of lion
is, presumably, a matter for empirical study. So we are not committed to, and nor does
our account rely on, these particular attributes and values. Rather, we are using these
particular attributes and values simply to demonstrate the nature of Sense Generation.
The third and fourth considerations require that the sense of lion, "statue of lion", must








COLOUR : brown (3.2)
LEGS : 4
The derivation may be, and in this case is, non-monotonic. The mechanism for such a
derivation must also be one which provides this sense with its coherence. In Chapter 4,
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we will examine in more detail a proposal concerning the nature of this mechanism.
Before we do so, however, we will say a little more about the kinds of object which play
a role in Sense Generation. In particular, we will say more about the notion of sense
we are employing.
3.2.1 Senses
We take senses to be descriptions of word meanings. Further, we assume that these
must be both privately, mentally representable and publicly specifiable. It is important
to note that our commitment to senses does not constitute a commitment to Frege's
"third realm", distinct from the mental and physical realms of objects. The most
important aspect of senses for our purposes is the way in which we assume that they
guide linguistic behaviour. In particular, we assume that the application of a word to an
object is mediated by the sense of that word. That is, we assume that the description
which constitutes the sense is satisfied by that object. This assumption requires that
the correct uses of a word must be explicable in terms of the sense or senses which
that word possesses. As such, we can take senses to classify the linguistic behaviour of
cognitive agents. An example will clarify what is meant.
Suppose our cognitive agent, Fred, is asked to identify lions in his immediate vicinity
and suppose further that despite being aware of a nearby statue of a lion he replies that
there are no lions in his immediate vicinity. Supposing that senses classify linguistic
behaviour, we can posit that Fred's understanding of "lion" relied on a sense of "lion"
which excludes statues of lions. We might, for example, posit a sense which applies only
to real lions. However, on other occasions Fred can respond that there is a lion nearby.
Such a use of "lion" here seems to depend on a sense for "lion" which includes statues
of lions.
This view of senses is closely related to that espoused by Evans (1976). In his dis¬
cussion of the Fregean notion of sense, Evans claims that underlying Frege's position
is a commitment to what he calls the "intuitive criterion of difference" for thoughts.
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"Thought" is the term Frege used to describe the senses of declarative sentences and,
as is well-known, he viewed these thoughts as being composed out of the senses of the
sentence's parts. Evans describes the intuitive criterion of difference for thoughts in the
following way:
...the thought associated with one sentence 5 as its sense must be different
from the thought associated with another sentence S' as its sense, if it is
possible for someone to understand both sentences at a given time while
coherently taking different attitudes towards them, i.e., accepting (rejecting)
one while rejecting (accepting), or being agnostic about, the other.
(Evans, 1916; pp. 18-19)
Evans cites the example Frege himself used to illustrate this intuitive criterion of identity.
Frege describes the case of the mountain which has the two names Ateb and Aphla.
Since it is perfectly possible for someone to understand2 both the sentences "Ateb is at
least 5000 metre high" and "Aphla is at least 5000 metres high" and yet accept one as
true and the other as false (or at least to be agnostic about its truth), the sentences
must have different senses. This despite the fact that the two sentences have the same
truth value or Fregean Meaning. Given that the only difference between these two
sentences is the proper name in subject position, it follows from the intuitive criterion
of difference for thoughts and Frege's principle of compositionality that these proper
names have different senses. Different words, then, even though they may have the
same referent, can have different senses. However, this is somewhat different to the
case of Fred described earlier. Here, if we are to explain the differences in linguistic
behaviour that Fred exhibits towards the word lion in terms of senses, then we will have
to demonstrate that this one word has different senses.
For the intuitive criterion of difference for thoughts to imply that one and the same
word has different senses, we must consider one and the same rational agent and her
understanding and attitude towards one and the same sentence at a given time. Consider
Fred, contemplating the statue before him, being approached by both the art student
and the zoo-keeper, and, this time, each uttering the sentence That is a lion (with
2Though one may, of course, argue that if there was such an individual then they could not possibly
be said to understand these sentences.
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suitable ostensive gesturing so as to leave Fred in no doubt as to the subject of the
proposition(s) expressed). The issue is whether or not Fred can take different attitudes
to these different uses of the very same sentence where the same entity is indicated by
the demonstrative.
The issue seems to isolate a genuine choice point for theories of meaning and sense,
related to those we isolated in the previous chapter. The position we adopt will almost
certainly have significant ramifications for other aspects of our theory. For example,
we could adopt the position that Fred does not (at least, coherently) adopt different
attitudes towards the sentence That is a lion. However, such a position is one which
prohibits the difference in linguistic behaviour which Fred exhibits towards this sentence
from being explicable at the level of the attitudes, in particular, at the level of thought.
Given our interest in theories of word meaning and theories of concepts, such a position is
not one we will adopt. That is, our goal is one of explaining behavioural differences such
as these in terms of the contents of thought and the contents of concepts. So, whereas
some may argue that the use of lion by the art student is metonymic or metaphorical,
that is, to be distinguished from conventional uses, we will not argue along these lines.
Instead, we assume that Fred can coherently adopt different attitudes to this sentence
and, hence, that, by Frege's criterion, lion has two senses at least.
So much for senses. In the last section of this chapter and in chapters 5 and 6, we will
return to the claim, already mentioned, that senses are descriptions of meanings. In
particular, we will argue that this view of senses commits us to an alternative to the
traditional view of meaning, one which can be found, in essence, in Situation Theory.
While this will form the semantical foundation of our view, for the present it suffices to
note that we merely require that senses provide a psychologically plausible classification
of linguistic behaviour.
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3.2.2 Words
In tying senses to words, it is only proper to say a little more about words themselves.
First, we should be clear what we mean by word. The problem here is that word can be
used to mean a number of different things. As Lyons (1968) points out, and Brown &
Miller (1980) reiterate, such a fact forces care in terminology.
One sense of word can be used to describe word forms. For example, in this sense, laughed
(as in I laughed) and laughed (as in I have laughed) are instances of the same word. That
is, the same phonological or orthographic string. The fact, though, that these different
word forms have different syntactic properties (laughed in I laughed is in the simple past
tense form, while in I have laughed it is in the past participle form) allows us to claim
that they are really different words. Here, word has the sense of morphosyntactic word.
Throughout this thesis, however, we will in general mean neither of these when we talk
of words. Rather, we are more concerned with the sense of word meaning lexemes.
Before we turn to LEXONs we will say a Little more about this notion of lexeme in order
to deflect a criticism of our approach.
In the analysis of Chapter 4, as we shall see, little is said about the diversity of senses
attached to verbs. Indeed, the analysis trades almost entirely in common nouns. The
reason is the difference that can be seen between nouns and verbs when one looks at
their inflectional morphology.
The intuition that different word forms can be related to one another leads to the ab¬
stract notion of word called lexical morpheme or lexeme. Different word forms can be
analysed morphemically as in the following example: laugh can be analysed as {laugh
+ Present), laughed as {laugh -f Past). In addition, verbs may belong to various
aspectual classes. Run, in Jon ran for example, may be assigned the process aspec¬
tual type. In Jon ran a marathon, run may be assigned a culminated process reading
(cf. Moens & Steedman, 1988). Such observations as these provide difficulties for an
approach concerned with the lexical semantics of verbs such as run. Consider, for ex¬
ample, the following pair: Jon was running and The tap was running. Clearly, these
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pairs illustrate the fact that the verb run can be used to refer to different sorts of pro¬
cess, the problem is to decide on the locus for this difference. The intuitive criterion
of difference requires not a pair such as this, but two readings deriving from one and
the same sentence. In the case of Mt. Ateb we required sentences predicating the same
concept of the same entity. Here we may do the same. This is running, for example,
with suitable gesturing to the water pouring forth from the tap, may suffice, but the
result is an unusual sentence to say the very least.
However, this is not the only option. We could just as well question the possibility of
coherently adopting different attitudes to a sentence such as The tap is running. Indeed,
it seems almost certain that one can. However, we still have a difficulty in deciding on
the locus of the change in sense that the intuitive criterion of difference requires. Should
we, for example, simply state that running has two different senses? And, if so, does
this result from the fact that run can have those different senses or has it something to
do with the simple progressive form? Let us take another example.
Compare Jon demonstrates with Jon is demonstrating. Although the case is far from
clear cut, it seems that the first sentence has a primary reading in which demonstrate
means to illustrate by example. Similarly, the second seems to have a primary reading
in which demonstrate means to protest publicly. Were we convinced that the senses of
demonstrate were generally different in these cases, then the problem comes in deciding
the locus of this change in sense. Is it due to the verb stem pace lexeme, the copula
or the aspectual class? With common nouns, fortunately, such problems are all but
obviated.
Concentrating on common nouns, then, allows the locus of change in sense to be more
easily decided. This is not to say that, in the case of morphologically more complex
words such as verbs, deciding on the locus of change is beyond our means. Indeed, we
assume that this is not the case, in principle, though it may be difficult in practice.
Rather, our concentration on common nouns is in order that the exposition of Sense
Generation is as clear as possible and that we are not distracted by issues concerning,
for example, morphology, which strictly, are not Sense Generation's main concern.
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3.2.3 Lexons
Throughout the literature on the mental representation of the meanings of words there is
an assumption that words receive entries in a "mental lexicon". Just as for dictionaries,
the entries of mental lexica include orthographic, phonological, morphological, syntactic
and semantic information. Finding the meaning of a word is a question of "looking
up" the appropriate entry in the mental lexicon and reading off the relevant semantic
information (cf. Clark, 1983; 1989). Of course, as we have suggested in section 2.2.4, this
metaphor does not commit one to any particular representational claim: it does commit
one to a claim that such-and-such content is represented, but it does not commit one to
any particular view as to how this content is represented. If, then, we are to correctly
classify the linguistic behaviour of agents then our theory must allow for something to
play an analogous role to such mental lexical entries. We choose to call the "semantic"
aspects of such entities LEXONs, partly to avoid spurious and unwanted connotations of
other more familiar terminology (cf. lexical concept). When we talk of LEXONs we mean,
quite simply, those descriptions that we take to define the stable mental representation of
the semantic contributions of words. And these descriptions are descriptions of worldly
properties that we associate with the default uses of words.
Chapter 4
The Relational View
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us
use the same word for all, — but that they are related to one another in many
different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships,
that we call them all "language".
(Wittgenstein, PI, §65)
In the last chapter, we spelt out, somewhat abstractly, a view by which the sense of
a given use of a word, may be generated from that word's lexical entry. However, it
is not difficult to see that, given our abstract characterisation, it seems that we are
committed to the view that words may, in principle, have any sense whatever. In fact,
unsurprisingly, such a characterisation requires a caveat. And it is the purpose of this
chapter to spell out a particular view of Sense Generation, the Relational View, which
provides just such a caveat. In particular, the Relational View is an attempt to provide
some psychologically motivated constraints on the process of generating senses from
lexons. Much of the psychological motivation comes from the literature on concepts
and, as such, is best viewed in the context of extant theories of concepts. However, we
will do this in Chapter 7, where we consider more fully the implications of the Relational
View for a theory of concepts.
First, then, we briefly consider some of the psychological motivation behind the Relation
View. Such motivation is best seen in terms of morals which derive from the existing
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psychological literature. Having done this, we spell out the Relation View in some detail,
attempting to account for some of the puzzles of Chapter 1 and, in the meanwhile,
showing how the morals are observed. Our exposition of the Relational View will be
in terms of situation theory and, in some instances, we will make reference to a prolog
program which has been used to assist in the development and exposition of these ideas.
4.1 The Morals
In order that we may draw some morals concerning theories of word meaning and sense,
we need to look at some theories that have been proposed. The discussion of these
theories we leave until later (Chapter 6). And, indeed, a more detailed exposition of
the arguments which suggest these morals will also appear later (Chapter 7). For the
purposes of this chapter we simply need to consider the kinds of descriptions that have
been offered in the psychological literature to explain the behaviour of words. The
descriptions fall roughly into two types: those suggested by classical theory; and those
suggested by prototype theory. Let us consider each type of description with respect to
the word lemon.
Classical theory holds that the meaning of words and their corresponding concepts
comprise a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, or a set of properties common
to all the elements to which the word refers. The following exemplifies this claim with







Prototype theory, also a theory of concepts, is committed to rather different descriptions
as exemplifying the content of concepts and, hence, as determining the behaviour of
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words. Indeed, the theory is one that adopts the position of explicating concepts in
terms of a "cluster" of descriptions. As such there are weightings attached to attributes
and also a specification of possible values for each attribute. There are more properties
of prototype concepts, but we will leave this until later. The following, then, is the kind
















The numbers to the right of each value indicate the weighting of that particular attribute-
value pair and the braces indicate that the values contained within are disjoint with
respect to that attribute. Now, with these simple descriptions at our disposal we can
outline some of the psychological considerations that we take to motivate the Relational
View and which, in Chapter 7, we will consider in more detail.
Moral 1 The Moral of Coherence
Categories cohere. That is, there is something that brings objects together to form
categories and whatever concepts are it is this "something" that they should specify.
According to the classical theory of concepts, coherence is determined by attribute-value
matching. That is, to determine whether a given object is a member of a category, we
must determine whether the object satisfies the properties indicated by the attribute-
value structure representing the concept. Assuming that the object may be described by
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an attribute-value structure, then we would require this to be subsumed by the attribute-
value structure corresponding to the concept. For prototype theory too, coherence is
determined by a similar process of attribute-value matching. There are a number of
arguments, though, why an attribute-value matching view of coherence is going to be
insufficient to capture the full rich structure of real-world categories.
Recent discussion has led to the view that representing coherence is necessarily going
to involve what might be described as "knowledge-rich" techniques. As a simple exam¬
ple we might consider how a malformed lemon that has become rotten and turned a
peculiar shade of purple would still be categorised as a lemon. Seemingly, this can't be
modelled in terms of similarity as computed by attribute-value matching since very few
of the attribute-value pairs of either (1) or (2) would match those describing the object.
Murphy & Medin (1985) and Medin & Wattenmaker (1987) argue that similarity com¬
puted by attribute-value matching is simply insufficient to determine the coherence of a
category. Instead, Murphy & Medin (1985) propose that a major part of the coherence
of a category is determined by "theories and knowledge of the real world" (p.312), these,
in turn, being composed or "made up" (p.313) from concepts. Theories like those, for
example, which express knowledge of such relations as flattening, painting, ripening,
etc.
In trying to glean psychological truths for our account of word meaning this position
seems circular. If we accept for sake of argument that senses can be described by
concepts then Murphy & Medin's arguments suggest that senses are to be represented
in terms of "theories" which in turn are to be represented in terms of concepts, these also
describing senses. Murphy & Medin reject the suggestion that their position is circular,
a clearer rejection can be made, I believe, once a particular assumption is abandoned:
the Unitary assumption.
Underlying both the prototype and classical approaches is an assumption, the Unitary
assumption, that a single, "basic-level" category (Rosch et. al., 1976) is to be repre¬
sented by something corresponding to a single, unitary data structure, variously called
a concept, lexical concept or, as we call it, a LEXON. It seems that it is this assumption
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together with Murphy & Medin's arguments concerning coherence which appear to lead
to circularity. The problem arises because a sense or concept is seen as both being a
component of a theory and being composed of theories. For an account of word meaning,
this suggests that underlying various uses of a single word is a single sense, itself being
comprised of various other senses, these giving the single sense its coherence. So, the
circularity emerges when we stipulate that, in fact, it is only one sense that underlies all
the uses of a given word and it is this that leads us to think of senses as being composed
of senses and the circularity that implies. We can avoid this circularity by denying that
the various uses of a word all depend on a single sense. Rather, we may allow that these
various uses may depend on a number of different, though related, senses. To conclude,
any theory which attempts to represent all of the uses of a word in terms of a single
sense can be ruled out by the moral of coherence a priori.
As an alternative, it seems that a much more intuitive account of conceptual coherence is
forthcoming when we consider some more examples like the lemon. Intuitively, it seems
that a dinner-table turkey is a turkey, not because of some particular set of properties
that it has, but because we know of relations that hold in the world such that the
properties of the object we observe (dinner-table turkey) stand in this relation with
the properties of normal turkeys. Similarly, we can still talk of a dismantled bicycle
as a bicycle apparently not because of some similarity as computed by attribute-value
matching but because of our knowledge of dismantling operations. Murphy & Medin
(1985) make a similar point. They state that "much of our reasoning about concepts
may be based on constraints about operations that are permissible" (p.295). This point
seems fundamental and we might expect that this clue could help in developing our
account of word meaning. In particular, if some of the senses which underly the uses
of a word express facts about such permissible "operations", then it seems our account
will have more promise in respecting the psychological arguments regarding coherence.
Moral 2 The Moral of Representational Economy
In principle, there seem to be many ways of representing a category by encoding in¬
formation in the attribute-value structures we use to describe senses. One way might
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be to record, for every exemplar to which the word applies, the value of each attribute
pertaining to the category. For example, if shape is relevant to the category of lemons
then for each lemon we encounter, we could simply record its shape. This is the strategy
that prototype theory adopts: if, equipped with (2) as our representation of the cate¬
gory of lemons, we encounter a flat lemon, the prototype structure will be revised. The
disjoint set of values for the attribute "shape" will be expanded to include "flat" with
a suitable weighting indicating its typicality. Such a strategy seems grossly inefficient
and also fails to respect the following intuition: concepts are hypothesised to capture
generalisations in order that finite brains may represent infinite possibilities. The strat¬
egy also seems implausible from the point of view of cognitive development, a point
that has been made by others (for example, Cohen, 1983; p.87). As an alternative, we
might consider that it is our knowledge of operations and other relations in the world
that allow us to represent categories in the way that we do. Such knowledge should
not be encoded in each representation we have for different classes of objects as it is in
prototype theory: we wouldn't want to add the value "flat" for the attribute "shape"
for each of our representations for "lemon", "orange", "house", "pie" and so on. Rather
we would like to say that our knowledge of the "flattening" operation is generalised
across our representations of categories. This notion of generalisation of knowledge of
operations will be an important feature of the framework to be developed. The moral
of representational economy is that we must require that whatever structures we hy¬
pothesise to describe word meanings they must genuinely generalise; in principle, they
shouldn't incorporate information specific to each exemplar.
Moral 3 The Moral of Central Exemplars
In everyday reasoning the inferences we make regarding categories are often based on
typical exemplars. If we have to explain what dogs are we tend to describe what
have been called their default properties. Such an observation is made much use of
by Putnam (1975) and these default properties seem to be very similar to what he
calls "core facts". The pervasive nature of default reasoning suggests that the central
exemplars, or those exemplars for which "core facts" are indeed facts, have special
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cognitive significance. This is also something that a theory of word meaning should
respect. Classical theory singularly failed to respect this moral and we might see this as
the reason for its problems. Prototype theory, on the other hand, accords the central
exemplars a special status in that they are represented by the prototype. Due to the
weightings on attribute-value pairs, prototype theory also offers a way of distinguishing
different, non-central exemplars. However, the moral of Central Exemplars is that any
theory of word meaning must distinguish between the representations of central and
peripheral exemplars.
Moral 4 The Moral of Context Dependence
In a number of ways the meanings of words can be said to depend on the context
in which we find them. "Lion" when used to describe a fierce lion seems to mean
something quite different from "lion" when used to refer to a statue of a lion. Typically,
it appears as though the same word carries different meanings and the nature of the
difference directly reflects the nature of the differences between the situations in which
it is used and the purposes for which it is used. Barsalou, for example, has shown
very convincingly a number of effects of context on our representations of categories
(Barsalou, 1982; Barsalou, 1987). Barsalou's conclusion seems to imply that there are
no stable representations corresponding to concepts (a conclusion that the framework
we develop later will endorse, albeit with a qualification). However, were the same
conclusion to apply to word meanings, it would appear very unintuitive: words do seem
to have a stable core meaning and the meaning of words in use seems related to the
core meaning. The two meanings of "lion" in the lion puzzle, for example, seem highly
related. Therefore the conclusion I will take from observations of context dependence is
that a theory of word meaning must have an adequate account of the role of situational
factors in determining the deviation of the meaning of words in use from what I take to
be their core meaning. This is the Moral of Context Dependence.
These morals allow one a considerable degree of freedom and the framework I shall
present here should by no means be seen as the only approach consistent with them. As
far as an account of word meaning is concerned, these are the morals we must respect:
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1. Senses and concepts must express generalisations and lend themselves to econom¬
ical representations a la classical theory. In addition, we would expect that facts
about operations (such as flattening, drying, ripening, etc.) should be similarly
expressed in an economical way.
2. Multiple word meanings, and hence senses, (perhaps especially those correspond¬
ing to operations) should be implicated in the various uses of a single word.
3. Our account of senses must be sensitive to the important cognitive distinction
between central and peripheral exemplars. That is, we expect there to be some
distinction between the senses a word has when used to describe central as opposed
to peripheral exemplars.
4. The deviation of peripheral word meaning and senses from core meaning and
senses should be sensitive to the situation in which the words are used and to the
informational requirements of the agents involved in their use.
In describing the framework I shall offer an interpretation of it in situation theory.
Though I shall not refer to it directly, an implementation in C-prolog has been com¬
pleted.
4.2 Worms
We take it that situation type of uses of a given word is related to a set of properties
given by that word's lexon. We will label such a relation, woRd Meaning (or worm).
Taking the example of lemons once more, the worm will relate the type of uses of lemon
to a set of properties, perhaps those given in (1) which is repeated below. Our account
of the Relational View will not depend on the particular properties we have chosen, that
is, the particular attribute-value pairs in (1). That is, it does not depend on whether
(1) does indeed describe the core sense of lemon. Rather, what the Relational View
amounts to is a more general claim about the nature of such core senses, their relation
to peripheral senses and how language users may be flexible in their use of words.
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The LEXON for lemon, then, expresses attunement to a set of properties and their relation






In Situation Theory we can view this worm as a relation in the following infon where
the property P is that provided by the lexon for lemon.
< worm, LEMON, P; 1 > (4.4)
where
P = [p | < oval, p; 1 > A
<C acidic, p; 1 > A
< yellow, p; 1 > A
< fruit, p; 1 >]
As suggested earlier, worms can be thought of in terms of constraints. One constraint
might be used in parsing so as to constrain the possible interpretations associated with a
given use of a word. For example, given a use of lemon we may want to conclude that we
have an individual which has acidic taste, yellow colour and so on. Another constraint
might be used in generation so as to constrain the possible ways of describing a given
individual. For example, given an individual which has the properties of acidic taste,
yellow colour and so on, we would wish to conclude that the word lemon may be used
to describe such an individual. That is, there are two possible constraints, one which
necessarily seems to involve word use, the other which involves the abstract properties
of a word. Here I shall be concerned solely with the latter kind of constraint.
Our worm will associate the type of uses of a word with a particular set of properties
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provided by the lexon for that word and so the worm expresses the sort of constraint
we need to characterise the conditions under which the word can be used. Taking the
example of lemons again and assuming that we can also associate some properties with
an lemon, then provided that the properties associated with the individual include those
specified by the lexon then the individual can be described as a lemon. In Situation
Theory, we will represent the properties associated with the individual by means of
a restricted parameter. What we then have amounts to the following: provided the
restricted parameter associated with the object has those properties specified by the
lexon then that word can be used in describing the object. Following Barwise (1985),
the constraint can be expressed as follows.
Si => S2 | B (4.6)
where
Si = [s | s (=< P, p; 1 >] (4.7)
and
S2 = [s | s |=<C describe, p, lemon; 1 >] (4.8)
and
B = [b | b |=< worm, LEMON, P; 1 >] (4.9)
and
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P = [Pi i < oval, pi; 1 » A (4.10)
C acidic, pi; 1 > A
< yellow, px; 1 > A
< fruit, px; 1 >]
(4.6) is a conditional constraint. That is, it is a constraint that is relativised with
respect to some background situation type, B, such that provided we have a background
situation of this type then the constraint holds. (4.6) and (4.9) express the fact that
if we have an individual with the property P then it is in virtue of the worm lemon,
a component of the background conditions, that the individual can be described as a
lemon1. Note that we have introduced another relation describe. It is assumed that
this relation holds between a use of a word such as lemon and an object represented by
a parameter anchored to that object such that, if the relation holds, the word, lemon,
can be used to describe the object.
So far we have a framework that is very similar to classical theory and we might con¬
sider whether it respects the morals that are so important. Although we cannot yet
see how all the morals are to be respected, we can note in passing that the moral of
representational economy is respected since the properties given by lexons express a
significant degree of generalisation, a la classical theory. Worms also offer a way of de¬
scribing the central exemplars. The question then remains as to how to accommodate
the peripheral exemplars and, as we shall see, these are to be accommodated by what
we will call combinations of worms (or COWORMs).
4.3 Coworms
Consider a peripheral exemplar of the category of lemons, one that has been squashed
flat. That is, an individual that will not satisfy the description we gave previously for
lemon but which would satisfy, among others, the following description.
'Although I shall not discuss the issue of perspectives, by locating worms in the background situation
type this account seems to have certain interesting parallels with the notion of perspectives developed
by Jerry Seligman (1990).









Now, with this individual we can associate what in Situation Theory can be modelled
by a restricted parameter. The parameter this time though will not have the properties
given by the lexon for lemon but will, instead, be as follows.
Since any object to which p might be anchored will not have the properties expressed
by the lexon for lemon, the constraint (4.6) cannot licence uses of the word lemon to
apply to such objects However, cognitive agents have a wealth of information at their
disposal that we might characterise as being in their background resource situation. This
situation allows the agent access to information about the world that will resolve certain
local inconsistencies. One such inconsistency is where the object we are considering does
not have the properties expressed by the lexon for lemon (e.g., a squashed lemon) and
yet may nonetheless be described as a lemon. In this instance the resource situation
allows us to access worms that can resolve the inconsistency. One such worm relates
the type of uses of flatten with a lexon giving two related properties. The properties
are identical except for the stipulation that one holds of flat individuals and the other
holds of individuals which are identical except that they may have any shape.
The arguments we considered in discussing coherence and representational economy
indicate the kind of solution we require. We need a further constraint which expresses
the fact that an individual with a certain set of properties may be described by a use
of, say, lemon, provided that the properties it has are related, by a worm, to those
of the lexon lemon. So we will have a worm lemon and a worm flatten which when
p | < flat, p; 1 » A (4.12)
< acidic, p; 1 > A
< fruit, p; 1 > A
< yellow, p; 1 >
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combined suitably will describe a flattened lemon. In Situation Theory, this can be
expressed as another constraint governing the properties of the word lemon. Provided
the restricted parameter associated with a given object is of a sort that is related by the
worm for flattened to the sort of parameter associated with the worm for lemon, then
the object is such that it could be described by a use of lemon. This new constraint is
as follows.
Si =► S2 | B' (4.13)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P2, p; 1 >] (4.14)
and
s2 = [s I s |=< describe, p, lemon; 1 >] (4.15)
and
B' = [b | b |= < worm, LEMON, Px; 1 > a
< worm, FLATTEN, Pi, P2; 1 >]
(4.16)
and
p2 = [p | < flat, p; 1 > A (4.17)
<C acidic, p; 1 > A
< yellow, p; 1 > a
< fruit, p; 1 >]
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Very briefly, we have seen how this Relational View can cope with both central and
peripheral exemplars. Respecting the moral of central exemplars, it treats central and
peripheral exemplars differently: central exemplars are accommodated by worms, pe¬
ripheral exemplars by COWORMs. The fact that peripheral exemplars are treated by
COWORMs, however, allows the moral of coherence to be respected. For instance, in
the treatment we gave for our flattened lemon, one can see the worm flatten as ex¬
pressing, in some sense, a theory. It is precisely this kind of "knowledge-rich" solution
that the moral of coherence demanded. The moral of context dependence is also re¬
spected by ensuring that the worms that underly word use are seen as components of
the background situation. The background situation may change either as agents focus
situations change or as agents require different information from their focus situation.
In addition, COWORMs capture the added generalisation that prototype theory seems to
miss. Our knowledge of flattening is not encoded in each of our representations for var¬
ious categories but it is encoded separately in a way that will generalise. This plausible
and desirable result suggests an interesting developmental prediction. Namely, when
we acquire the lexon flattening we concomitantly learn that all manner of objects that
are flat can be described in new ways: we learn that flat objects that otherwise look
like lemons can also be described as lemons. Unlike most other accounts, this allows
that we don't have to change our data structure describing lemons on encountering a
flat lemon for the very first time.
In addition to respecting the Morals, I believe the account offered here is promising for
other reasons. Consider a situation in which Fred comes into my office and tells me that
he has a lemon in his pocket. Corresponding to an instance of default reasoning, there
is a sense in which I come to believe that Fred has a yellow, oval-shaped fruit on his
person. This inference can be expressed by considering that it is the lexon for lemon
which is used in such reasoning. We may, however, acquire further information that
conflicts with the lexon for lemon and so rules out lemon as an appropriate word. In
such circumstances we may have to find a different property, which may be given by a
relating this lexon and certain other lexon(s) via a coworm. However, there is also
a sense in which I know nothing of what Fred has in his pocket other than that there is
something and Fred calls that something a lemon. The fact that so little information can
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be conveyed by the use of a word seems to correspond exactly to the indeterminacy in
finding a particular corresponding worm or coworm to describe that word's meaning.
COWORMs are also implicated in the realisation of the background conditions with re¬
spect to which conditional constraints are relativised. When we wished to describe a
squashed lemon as a lemon, the first constraint (4.6) clearly failed as (4.11) does not
have the property P in (4.9). The inapplicability of the constraint we can assume to be
due to the fact that the actual background situation was not of type B in (4.6). The
inappropriateness of the constraint leads to the utilisation of a different but related con¬
straint as in (4.12), relativised with respect to some new set of background conditions,
B'. This time the constraint holds because (4.11) has the property P2 in (4.15). If we
consider the way this constraint is expressed then we can see it as revealing something
of the nature of the original background conditions with respect to which the constraint
in (4.6) is relativised. The particular coworm that is part of the second constraint
tells us that the negation of that coworm was a condition of the original background
situation type. That is, returning to our example, the fact that the worm "flattened"
relates the constraint (4.12) to the constraint (4.6) tells us that (4.6) presupposes that
lemons aren't squashed flat and this then is one of the background conditions with re¬
spect to which (4.6) was relativised. In this framework then, the process of finding an
appropriate coworm is the process of realising background conditions.
So now we have a very basic framework with which to explore word meaning. It seems
to respect the morals that I have tried to argue are so important and by the use of
coworms the account seems to offer a solution some of the problems we discussed in
Chapter 1. Now, we turn our attention to some of the other problems of Chapter 1.
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4.4.1 The Lion Puzzle
Fred has been sitting on a park bench experiencing a number of situations. In one
situation he claims to have seen a lion and in this we would probably agree. In another,
he claims not to have seen a lion and again we wouldn't argue. Now we can suppose that
Fred knows that something like the following constraint holds concerning what kind of
object may be described as a lion.
Si =► S2 | B (4.18)
where
Si = [s | s (=< P, p; 1 >] (4.19)
and
S2 = [s | s (=< DESCRIBE, p, lion; 1 >] (4.20)
and
B = [b | b |=< worm, LION, P; 1 >] (4.21)
and2
2Clearly, P only expresses some of the information relevant to lionhood.
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P = [p | <c animate, p; 1 > A
< four-legged, p; 1 > A
< one-tailed, p; 1 >]
(4.22)
That is, we may describe the default sense Fred associates with the word lion as follows.
When Fred responds to the zoo-keeper, his use is in accordance with this constraint.
That is, Fred hasn't come across an object whose description is of the sort expressed by
the lexon for lion, i.e., an animate object with 4 legs and a tail. So provided that the
constraint Fred is exploiting is expressed by the lexon lion, he has replied correctly
to the zoo-keeper. But what of the art student? Fred has access to a background
resource situation which supports many infons. One expresses the fact that there is a
lexon statue. This lexon relates two properties to the word statue. One property
holds of, say, animate things (the class of things modelled by statues), the other holds
of inanimate things that stand in certain relations to the animate things (the class
of statues). Though this doesn't accurately or fully describe the relationship between
statues and the things they model, it will suffice for our purposes. In a similar fashion






Sj => S2 | B' (4.24)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P2, p; 1 >] (4.25)
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and
S2 = [s | s |=< DESCRIBE, p, lion; 1 >] (4.26)
and
B' = [b | b |= < worm, LION, Pa; 1 > a (4.27)
< worm, STATUE, Pi, P2; 1 >]
and
P2 = [p | <c animate, p; 0 a (4.28)
< four-legged, p; 1 > a
<C one-tailed, p; 1 >]
That is, this constraint involves a different sense being associated with the word lion,





Now Fred, whilst walking to his park bench, has come across an individual whose
description is of this last sort, i.e., an inanimate object with 4 legs and a tail. So,
provided that the constraint he is exploiting is expressed by this coworm, Fred can
rightly assert that he has seen a lion which is, fortunately, what the art student was
hoping for.
What should be clear is that coworms are sensitive to the information states of agents.
If Fred's background resource situation did not support the infon concerning the worm
for statue then, according to this view, he would not be able to rightly report that he
CHAPTER 4. THE RELATIONAL VIEW 114
had seen a lion. The significance of this point is much more obvious when we consider
Nunberg's metonymic puzzle.
4.4.2 Nunberg's Ham Sandwich
The waiter in the restaurant knows (we can assume) that ham sandwich is normally
appropriate to describe ham sandwiches and not human beings like the customer he is
serving. However, his particular background resource situation also supports the fact
that the worm relation holds between the type of uses of the word orders, and the
properties appropriate for things of type "customer" (P2) and for things of type "ham
sandwich" (Pi). Just as before, this worm can form a coworm with the worm for
ham sandwich which allows us to consider a new background situation type as follows.
B' = [b | b [= <C worm, HAMjSANDWICH, Pi; 1 > a (4.30)
<C worm, ORDERS, P2, Pi; 1 >]
Similar to Fred's case, we now have a coworm which expresses a constraint relativised
with respect to this background situation type. It is this new constraint that renders
it legitimate for the waiter to refer to his customer as a ham sandwich. The point
about this particular example that is not quite so clear in the others I have described
is precisely the contextual nature of this aspect of word use. It seems reasonable to
suggest that there is something about the particular background resource situation that
allows the waiter to call a customer a ham sandwich. Locating such a mechanism in
the background situation seems to offer a way of explaining how it would be considered
infelicitous were the waiter to describe the same person in the same way in a launderette.
It seems the particular coworm we have considered would not be supported given the
nature of those prevailing background conditions.
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4.4.3 Lakoff's Mother and Macken's Father
The final puzzle of Chapter 1 is that of kinship terms which is discussed in the anal¬
yses of Lakoff (1987) and Macken (1990). The problem, however, is widely known:
mothers, for example, are conventionally considered to be genetically related to their
offspring. Adoptive mothers, though, are naturally described as mothers even though
they and their adopted children are not related genetically. Similarly, as Macken's ex¬
ample demonstrates, fathers may be live-in but are fathers nonetheless. The Relational
View I have outlined suggests an alternative analysis to those offered by both Lakoff
and Macken which we will now pursue. Under this view, we might like to say that the
following constraint holds concerning the sort of objects that can be described by a use
of the word mother.
Sj => S2 | B (4.31)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P, p; 1 >] (4.32)
and
S2 = [s | s |=-C DESCRIBE, p, mother. 1 >] (4.33)
and
B = [b I b |=< WORM, MOTHER, P; 1 >] (4.34)
and
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P = [p | < female, p; 1 > A (4.35)
< child.of, p, q; 1 >> A
<C genetics_of, p, g; 1 » A
< genetics_of, q, g; 1 >]






It is this constraint that tells us that a female who is genetically related to her child,
may be described by a use of the word mother2. This, however, does not help us describe
adoptive mothers: we have no mechanism for stating that an individual described by
the following restricted parameter can be described by a use of the word mother.4
p | < female, p; 1 > A (4-37)
< chikLof, p, q; 1 > a
< geneticsjof, p, gx; 1 > a
< geneticsjof, q, g2; 1 >
In a similar fashion to before, we will use some other lexon to form a coworm which
provides a further constraint on the way in which the word mother can be used. We
will assume that agents have access to the lexon for adoptive. The worm for adoptive
relates the type of uses of the word adoptive and two related properties. One property
holds of two individuals having, among other properties, the same genetic material, the
other property is identical with respect to these other properties, except that it holds
of individuals whose genetic material is unrelated5. This worm, combined with the
worm mother gives us a coworm that expresses the following constraint.
3As described here, we have said that the child and mother must have the same genetics. Though
this is most certainly not the correct condition on the use of the word mother it will suffice for illustrative
purposes.
4In (4.37), gi and g2 are assumed to be distinct.
sAgain, this is not the correct condition but will suffice for illustrative purposes.
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Sx =» S2 | B' (4.38)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P2, p; 1 >] (4.39)
and
S2 = [s | s |=< DESCRIBE, p, mother.; 1 >] (4.40)
and
B' = [b | b |= < worm, MOTHER, Pi; 1 > A (4-41)
< worm, ADOPTIVE, Pi, P2; 1 >]
and
?2 = [p I < female, p; 1 > A (4.42)
< child_of, p, q; 1 > A
< geneticsj^f, p, h; 1 > A
< genetics_of, q, g; 1 >]
Now, this constraint suggests that a different sense of mother may be associated with
its uses, namely the one described as follows.
sex: female
child: [ genetics: gi
genetics: &
(4.43)
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It is this constraint, expressed by the coworm of our worms for adoptive and mother,
that allows that individuals who are adoptive mothers and have no genetic relation to
their children can nonetheless still be described by a use of the word mother. Impor¬
tantly, this analysis does not lead to the suggestion that there are several independent
models underlying the word mother as Lakoff's analysis does. Nor does it require that
we have to accept the apparently unintuitive suggestion of Macken's analysis, that the
"father" relation is really a relation between a father, a child and some parameter.
4.5 Characterising Analyticity
So far in this Chapter, we have argued that the relational view of word meaning is
consistent with a number of concerns which figure in both the psychological and philo¬
sophical literatures. However, we have said little about how this view of word meaning
or, more precisely, this view of senses, may be seen in terms of a wider theory of seman¬
tics. In this section, we focus on one aspect of this issue, namely the characterisation of
meaning on which the relational view rests. We expand on this by initiating a discussion
of analyticity. In Chapters 5 and 6, we take up this issue once more. Our attempt at
addressing this important issue will focus on the relation between this theory of sense
and traditional theories of meaning and, in particular, the implications of the former
for the latter.
Our accounts of Sense Generation and of the Relational View have made a number of
assumptions. Firstly, we have assumed that the conventional uses of words betray mul¬
tiple meaning relations and, consequently, multiple senses. Secondly, we have suggested
that these senses are related to Situation Theory's notion of informational content and,
indeed, that these senses constitute information conveyed by utterances of their corre¬
sponding words. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we have suggested that these
meaning relations and these senses are descriptional. Our position, outlined in Chap¬
ter 2 and adopted in Chapter 3, is that the rejection of the general claim that word
meanings may be descriptional is one that arises as a corollary of a particular approach
to meaning. We suggested that it arises from construing the uses of words as betraying
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one single sense, one single meaning relation and, further, that this meaning relations
and, hence, the sense exhibited the property of monotonicity or indefeasibility. We ar¬
gued that this construal, together with a consideration of counterfactual conditionals,
prohibits meaning relations from being descriptional in general. In particular, the sug¬
gestion has been from Kripke and Putnam that natural kind terms are non-descriptional
in this sense: their senses cannot be explicated in terms of descriptions.
But it should be clear that this position is in stark contrast with the one we have
developed in this Chapter. With a natural kind word such as lemon we have associated
descriptions such as yellow, acidic, oval-shaped fruit. The issue to which we must
now turn, then, is the motivation for the position that natural kind terms are non-
descriptional. For, if we are unable to combat this position, our own will surely crumble.
Now the claim that words are non-descriptional does not arise solely in the case of
natural kind terms; it also arises in the case of proper names. Though proper names have
been deemed to be descriptional, due largely to an influential rejection of this position
by Kripke, the view that their meaning cannot be explicated in terms of descriptions
is popular. Indeed, the literature on proper names is germane for our purposes for
this very same rejection is the one that has ben advanced as a rejection of the view
that natural kind terms are non-descriptional. The rejection is made on the basis of a
traditional conception of analyticity.
Analyticity is fundamentally a semantical notion. A statement which expresses an
analytic truth one that is deemed to be true in virtue solely of its meaning, that is, true
almost by definition. Accordingly, assuming that a given word has a meaning, it should
be the case that there is a statement which exemplifies that word's meaning such that
the statement expresses an analytic truth. For example, consider our word noj, and
suppose noj means tap, then the statement noj is tap will be true solely in virtue of
it meaning. That is, it will express an analytic truth. Over the next two chapters we
will focus on some conceptions of analyticity and, in particular, how one conception of
analyticity has been used to reject the general position that the meanings of words may
be descriptional. We will suggest an alternative conception of analyticity based on the
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construal of meaning relations that we have adopted. That is, our construal in terms of
conditional constraints.
4.6 Conclusion
During the course of this chapter we have established a particular view of senses. Specif-
Ok.
ically, we have suggested that all uses of^word may, in principle, belie a number of
different senses. That the nature of these senses depends upon the context in which
uses are made and that their number may, in principle, be non-denumerable. What
distinguishes this position from Sense Creation is our treatment of conventional uses
of words. In particular, we have suggested that it is logically possible to describe the
meanings associated with the conventional uses of natural kind terms. That is, we have
suggested that such terms may be descriptional.
Now, it is generally assumed that the arguments of Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975)
have been influential in establishing the position that the meanings of terms such as
natural kind terms are non-descriptional. That is, the meanings of such terms, inasmuch
as they can be said to have meanings, cannot be given by description, though this is not
to say that descriptions play no role in a wider theory of meaning. However, as is clear,
this is quite at odds with the relational view. For it is a conclusion of this view that
such terms have multiple senses, these being amenable to description. The consequences
of such a position we no more than pointed to earlier, however this striking divergence
will form the focus of our attention for the next two chapters. First, we will consider
the literature on proper names where the argument has also been made, contrary to
established views, that proper names are similarly non-descriptional. We trace the line
of argument back to a characterisation of analytic statements, statements whose truth
is deemed to be both necessary and a priori knowable. It is this view which is at odds
with the relational view we have established and an important aspect of this chapter
will be to make two suggestions: that the Kripkean argument concerning proper names
can be treated as a reduction and that the view of analyticity we sketched in the previous
section is, at least a priori, a plausible one.
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In chapter 6 we turn to the literature on natural kind terms and show how the traditional
conception of analyticity has been used to argue that these are also non-descriptional.
Our argument with respect to this position, however, is similar to the position adopted
on proper names, namely that such a conclusion is a reduction on the traditional con¬
ception of analyticity. Finally, we show how our revised conception of analyticity offers
a potential solution to the problems raised by natural kinds and argue that this allows
a reconciliation between psychological and philosophical views which the traditional
conception of analyticity had previously prevented.
Chapter 5
Proper Names and Analyticity
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these
constructions — namely the disjunction of all their common properties" -
I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well
say: "Something runs through the whole thread — namely the continuous
overlapping of those fibres".
(Wittgenstein, PI, §67)
Having described Sense Generation, in this chapter we examine some of the philosophical
literature on proper names and by this we mean, ordinary proper names. We do not
mean Fregean proper names, Russellian singular terms or the like. Simply, good old-
fashioned proper names. Our overall objective is to examine views of meaning which
may have points of contact with our view of the generation of senses. Though this
may seem something of a departure, our goal is to effect a better appreciation of Sense
Generation in light of the traditional arguments which have been advanced with respect
to word meaning. So we must turn to such arguments and where better to start than
by examining proper names. Again, our intention is not to provide an exhaustive precis
of the literature, but rather to consider trends therein.
One such trend is pointed to by Kripke's arguments and rightly so, since his position
is one of refuting the efficacy of this trend. Our position is somewhat similar but our
presentation will not be nearly so bold. We will argue that the Kripkean argument
may be taken either of two ways. Either as an argument to the effect that the meaning
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of proper names, inasmuch as they can be said to have meaning, cannot be given by
description. Or, and this is what we shall suggest, as suggesting the possibility of
viewing Kripke's argument as an inadvertent reductio on the conception of analyticity
which it assumes. And further that a view of the analytic based on the picture of
Sense Generation offers the possibility of rescuing description theories of proper names.
With this position established, we turn in Chapter 6 to the psychological literature on
concepts, focussing on natural kinds, and argue that a similar rescuing can be performed.
We begin by outlining those theories which Kripke assimilates to the category of de¬
scription theories of proper names. Thus, we look first at Frege, then at Russell and
then we turn to the theories of Searle and Strawson. Though, in this chapter, we will
do little more than point to the fact, these description theories have striking parallels
with psychological conceptions of meaning. Indeed, we will be at pains to point out
that description theories often take as motivation, explanations of the epistemological
status of proper names and, in this, they are quite consonant with psychology.
However, Kripke finds fault with these theories. Indeed, the problem is that that they
presume the meaning of proper names can be explicated in terms of descriptions which
hold only contingently, if at all. To see why this is problematic, we turn to Kripke's
exposition in which the importance of necessity in naming is argued and we briefly
sketch Kripke's position on proper names. Having done so we will suggest that this
view leaves little room for an explanation of the epistemology of proper names, nor of
the psychology of their use. However unsatisfactory this conclusion may appear, the
logic of Kripke's argument seems difficult to fault.
However, as we have already mentioned, another way of viewing the Kripkean argu¬
ment is as a reductio on the notion of analyticity on which it is based. To advance this
position, we will emphasise that a theory of proper names must explain the cognitive
significance of their use. Since Kripke's approach offers little hope of such an expla¬
nation, we must consider his conclusion absurd. In offering an alternative conception
of analyticity, we will consider some conceptions which have already been mooted. We
suggest that Kripke's arguments in favour of distinguishing metaphysical, epistemolog-
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ical and semantic notions of truth, counts against the conception of analyticity which
JU,he assumes. we spell out the notion of meaning which is inherent in Sense Gen¬
eration, and, on this basis, suggest an alternative conception of analyticity. Finally, we
will attempt to relate the picture of meaning in Sense Generation to the later positions
of Frege and of Wittgenstein.
5.1 Description Theories
Kripke's seminal article, Naming and Necessity, offers many insights into what we should
expect of a theory of meaning. One insight surfaces in his emphasising the importance
of distinguishing two claims often associated with theories of meaning. One claim is
that the theory is truly a theory of meaning, so talk of synonymy, antonymy and other
meaning relations is germane to the analysis of such a theory. Another claim is that
the theory of meaning is a theory of the determination of reference. That is, such a
theory may explicate how it is that we determine the reference of various terms in our
language. We might add a further distinction: Kripke talks of fixing a reference and, at
least implicitly, he distinguishes this from determining a reference. At least in ordinary
parlance, the fixing of reference can be taken to refer solely to the initial "long-ago"
act of naming. The determination of reference, however, in its ordinary interpretation,
seems to refer to all those "here-and-now" cases in which, given a name, we determine
which individual is its referent.
Many of the other insights Kripke offers, we will discuss in section 5.2 when we consider
Kripke's argument against description theories of proper names. However, with some
of these distinctions in mind, let us try and say what is meant by a description theory
of proper names, and discuss later what kind of a theory of meaning it might be.
Kripke offers (pp. 280-281) a definition of what a "cluster-concept" theory amounts to.
In modified form, such a definition also serves to indicate what description theories are
in general. Here, then, is this modified definition.
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1. To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds either
(a) a single property (f> or
(b) a cluster of properties, namely the family of properties <fi
such that the speaker A believes '4>X\
2. Either
(a) this single property (f> or
(b) one of the cluster of properties <f>, or some conjointly,
is believed by the speaker A to pick out some individual uniquely.
3. If
(a) this single property <j) or
(b) most, or a weighted most, of the <£'s
are satisfied by one unique object, y, then y is the referent of 'X'.
4. If
(a) the single property <f> is not satisfied or
(b) the "vote" between the cluster of properties <p yields no unique object
then 'X' does not refer.
5. The statement,
(a) 'If X exists, then <pX or
(b) 'If X exists, then X has most of the <£'s'
is known a priori by the speaker.
6. The statement,
(a) 'If X exists, then </>X' or
(b) 'If X exists, then X has most of the </>'s'
expresses a necessary truth (in the ideolect of the speaker).
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As we shall see, for Kripke, 6 need not be a thesis provided that the description is taken
not as an explication of meaning but as a theory of the determination of reference.
However, with some of the preliminaries out of the way, we can now turn to some of the
theories which fit, more or less, this definition.
Before doing so, though, it is worth concentrating a little on some of the motivations
for description theories of meaning. Firstly, if we explicate the meaning of a proper
name by a description, then problems concerning the meaning of various statements
such as identity statements with proper names and existential statements become sol¬
uble. Frege's analysis, for example, is often credited with being able to account for the
cognitive difference between statements such as Scott is the author of Waverley and
Scott is Scott. Russell's analysis is also credited with accounting for the meaning of
statements such as Pegasus does not exist. Both these accounts depend on being able to
give the meaning of a proper name in terms of some description(s), descriptions which
the language user can know or come to know. The accounts of Searle and Strawson can
similarly be seen as attempts to explicate, if not the meanings of proper names, their
use in terms which make epistemological sense. Searle, for example, explicitly attempts
to tie the uses of proper names such as Aristotle to facts about Aristotle that are known
to language users. Thus, various aspects of the meaning and use of proper names are
to be explicated in epistemological terms.
The determination of the referent of a proper name, then, is that process by which
a language user determines which individual satisfies descriptions which the language
user knows to be true of the bearer of the name. The "passing" of the referent of a
proper name is then a process by which language users communicate what they know of
the bearer of that name. And semantic facts concerning the meaning of proper names
and the meanings of sentences in which they are embedded reduce to facts about the
epistemology of language users. Prima facie, such a view offers considerable scope for
facts about the psychology of language users to play a role in theories of the meaning
and use of natural language. It is also quite consistent with our discussion in Chapter 1,
where we associated with uses of words certain conditions of use and claimed that the
satisfaction of these conditions is what makes such uses informational. The claim that
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such conditions can be described lay implicit in that discussion. In the rest of this
chapter, in many respects, it is precisely this that is explicit. In the next few sections
we outline some commonly held description theories of proper names before turning in
section 5.2 to the Kripke's argument which suggests such theories are neither theories
of the meaning of proper names nor of the determination of their reference. It also
suggests that the conditions of use associated with proper names may be ones that are
not amenable to description. If this is correct then the possibility of explicating the uses
of words in terms which make epistemological and psychological sense would appear to
be remote indeed.
5.1.1 Frege
A key objective for any semantic theory is to explain facts about the significance of
language in terms of facts about the semantic values that are accorded expressions in
the language. As Evans (1976) tells us, in Frege's early view of language, he equated
semantic value with Meaning.1 Meaning is what we might ordinarily think of in terms
of reference. So, proper names, for example, have as their semantic value a Meaning,
namely, the objects which we would normally call their referents. So the Meaning of
the proper name "Allegri" is the composer Allegri.
Now, as Evans points out, this view of proper names ignores much. In particular, one
thing it ignores is the possibility that proper names don't correspond to objects: the
name "Dracula" doesn't refer to any object, at least, no existing object. Frege, before
he introduced the notion of Sense, however, was happy to concede that sentences which
contained such empty singular terms were neither true nor false (Evans, p. 11). But,
though this didn't particularly worry Frege, it might worry us and, indeed, Frege was
worried by one important consequence of his theory of meaning. Namely, how to explain
the cognitive significance of language.
For Frege, explaining the cognitive aspects of language was an important objective of his
theory of meaning. The problem with this early theory of Meaning, however, was that
'We will follow Evans in using Meaning for Frege's Bedeutung.
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it failed to distinguish between statements with the same semantic value yet different
informational value. As Evans puts it,
He [Frege] found it necessary to recognise the possibility of an objective
semantic difference between two expressions not distinguishable by the the¬
ory of Meaning (two expressions with the same Meaning) — this difference
having to do with the different ways in which the expressions are to be
understood by competent speakers, these different ways in turn ultimately
resting upon the different thoughts and propositional attitudes that compe¬
tent speakers will have on hearing and understanding sentences containing
the two expressions.
(Evans, 1976; p. 13)
An example of the sort of expressions Frege found troublesome for his early theory is
the case of two intrepid explorers who sight the same mountain from different vantage
points. On their maps, they enter the name of this mountain as Mt. Aphla and Mt. Ateb,
respectively but when they compare their maps, they find out that Ateb is Aphla. Now
the proposition expressed by Ateb is Aphla is not just a consequence of the principle
of identity: it does not simply assert that this mountain is self-identical. Rather it
contains geographical knowledge, which has significance for the epistemological states
of our two explorers. To reiterate, Ateb is Aphla contains knowledge over and above that
deriving from the principle of identity in a way that Ateb is Ateb does not. Similarly, the
statements Ateb is at least 5000 metres high and Aphla is at least 5000 metres high, can
express different information and, indeed, the same person may take different attitudes
to these statements.
Now such observations as these are problematic if one holds, as the early Frege did, to
the following two principles:
1. Semantic values are to be equated with Meaning, i.e, objects of reference.
2. Semantics, built on such semantic values, must explain the cognitive significance
of language.
The case of Ateb/Aphla indicates the tension between these principles. Ateb and Aphla
CHAPTER 5. PROPER NAMES AND ANALYTIC1TY 129
refer to the same object and, by 1, must have the same semantic value. But then we
cannot account for the cognitive difference between statements containing these names,
statements like Ateb is at least 5000 metres high and Aphla is at least 5000 metres
high, for example. For such a difference in cognitive attitude must surely be because
the names themselves are associated with different cognitive attitudes. Assigning them
to have the same semantic value prevents this cognitive difference being drawn as a
semantic distinction. And this is in direct opposition to 2. So, to maintain consistency,
one or other of these principles must go. Frege, fortunately, chose to reject 1. And it is
to the alternative, in favour of which he made this rejection, that we now turn.
In On Sense and Reference, Frege spelt out his alternative theory based on the inter¬
twined notions of Sense and Meaning. Such problematic cases as that involving Ateb
and Aphla are now to be explained by the fact that, though these proper names have
the same Meaning, they have different Senses.
It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign ..., besides
that to which the sign refers, which may be called the reference [Meaning]
of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the
mode of presentation is contained.
(Frege, 1977; p. 57)
We can obtain an idea of the intuition behind Frege's position by examining some of the
other things he says in connection with senses. For example, he considers the case of a
triangle where a, h and c are the lines connecting the vertices of the triangle with the
mid-points of the opposite sides. Then the point of intersection of b and c is the same
as the point of intersection of a and b. That is, there are different ways of designating
the same point, there are different ways of presenting the same object and, in this, lies
the analogy with senses. Expressions not only designate a Meaning but they present
the Meaning in a certain way. This is what senses do: they present the Meaning in
particular ways and this is what is meant by saying that the sense contains "the mode
of presentation" of the Meaning.
So, the phrases the evening star and the morning star, though designating the same
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planet, Venus, nonetheless have different senses. Just as the planet Venus presents
itself to us differently according to circumstance, so the different senses of these phrases
present the Meaning differently. And the same is deemed true of proper names.
Scott is Scott
Scott is the author of Waverley
It has become a common-place that the pairs such as that above betray different cogni¬
tive significances. That is, it is possible to take different attitudes to statements made
with such sentences. And this despite the fact that the proper name Scott and the
definite description the author of Waverley denote the very same object. Now, accord¬
ing to Frege, what explains the cognitive, informational difference between these two
sentences is the fact that the definite description the author of Waverley and the proper
name Scott have different senses. That is, they do not simply denote but they denote
in a particular- way, they present their Meaning in a particular way. Frege also claimed
that senses are grasped by "everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language"
(Frege, 1977; p. 57). That is, they are public. Frege, of course, also had in mind that
the sense of an entire sentence, what he called a thought, could be built, according to
the principle of compositionality, out of the senses of its parts. To get a firmer grasp of
what this notion of sense might mean, let us return to Evans.
Evans mentions the fact that Frege spoke of senses as "illuminating the Meaning from
different sides" (Evans, 1976; p. 15). But he dismisses this and the metaphor concerning
"modes of presentation" as unilluminating. Instead, he ties Frege's conception of sense
tightly to his interest with thoughts.
It is unsurprising that we should turn to thoughts since, in many respects, this lies
right at the heart of Frege's enterprise. By choosing to attempt an explanation of the
"cognitive significance" of language, he must concern himself not only with the objects
of thought, but also with the nature of the thoughts themselves. For what is revealed
by cases like that of Ateb/Aphla is the fact that people may coherently take different
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attitudes to one and the same sentence. In Frege's terminology, they judge the True or
the False differently and to explain this fact we must concern ourselves not just with the
truth value of a sentence, but how one advances to that truth value. And this process
of advancing to a truth value involves advancing from a thought.
Now, as Evans notes, the notion of sense has intimate links with propositional-attitude
psychology. For Frege, the sense of a sentence, composed of the senses of its parts, is
a thought. And the single constraint that Frege imposed on this conception of thought
is, as Evans calls it, "the Intuitive Criterion of Difference":
... the thought associated with one sentence S as its sense must be different
from the thought associated with another sentence 5' as its sense, if it is
possible for someone to understand both sentences at a given time while
coherently taking different attitudes towards them, i.e., accepting (rejecting)
one while rejecting (accepting), or being agnostic about, the other.
(Evans, 1976; pp. 18-19)
But, then, what might the sense of a proper name actually be? It is clear from the
above that the sense of a proper name is the contribution which the name brings to
the thought of any sentence in which it is found. For example, the thoughts associated
with the sentences Ateb is at least 5000 metres high and Aphla is at least 5000 metres
high are different, by the above criterion. So, correspondingly, must the senses attached
to the proper names. But these different senses capture the fact that the names Ateb
and Aphla while referring to the same object, are attached to different thoughts about
this object. And it is this that leads Evans to claim that the different senses of proper
names are really different "ways of thinking" about an object. So Frege's claim that
senses must be public or shared amounts to the claim that people who understand a
proper name must not only think of the referent of the proper name, but that they
must all think of the referent in the same certain way. And the failure to take the same
attitude to the Ateb/Aphla sentences implies a difference in the ways in which someone
is thinking of the same object.
Now, Kripke viewed Frege's position as amounting to a simple description theory. And,
indeed, although Evans suggests Frege was inexplicit on this point, he concurs.
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It is fairly clear that he [Frege] supposed that the way in which we think
about a great many objects is, as Russell would say, "by description".
(Evans, 1976; p. 18)
As we have already mentioned, there seem to be numerous advantages to treating proper
names in terms of descriptions. One, as we have seen, is a treatment of cognitive signif¬
icance in terms of semantic value, a treatment which has its roots in propositional-
attitude psychology. By linking senses with descriptions, however, Frege's goal is
widened. For it represents an explicit attempt to introduce into a theory of seman¬
tics, descriptions, contingent facts of which language users are aware. That is, one can
see Frege's enterprise, while being overtly anti-psychologist (he claimed that senses are
public, not private), is committed, if not to a wedding of semantics and epistemology,
at least to an engagement.
5.1.2 Russell
Russell's conception of non-logically proper names is, quite simply, that they abbrevi¬
ate definite descriptions. This leads Russell to distinguish expressions which refer by
description and which need not, consequently have a referent, from those which refer
directly, and must therefore have a referent. The latter are commonly called Russellian
singular terms and are thought to include demonstratives such as this and that. Our in¬
terest, however, is with Russell's analysis of ordinary proper names, which he considers
to refer by description.
Russell held the view that empty singular terms are only Russellian singular terms if
they fail to express a proposition when in subject position. In Principia Mathematica,
we find:
Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not
to exist without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the
grammatical subject is not a proper name [in the Russellian sense], i.e., not
a name directly representing some object.
(Whitehead & Russell, 1927; p. 66)
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Accordingly, what are commonly thought of as empty singular terms, Pegasus, Super¬
man, etc., cannot be thought of as directly referential terms. For, according to Russell,
when in the subject position of some sentence, the failure of such terms to refer, renders
the sentence an aberration: someone uttering such a sentence would be like someone
uttering nonsense. So, patently, names such as Pegasus cannot be of this type: they
cannot directly refer and so, according to Russell, they refer by description. A name
such as Pegasus, for example, might refer via the satisfaction of a description such as
the winged horse of Greek mythology. Indeed, such a description is taken to not only
determine the reference of the name, but also to explicate its meaning. That is, Pe¬
gasus does not exist means the same as The winged horse of Greek mythology does not
exist. Russell's analysis of proper names, then, boils down to an analysis of definite
descriptions. And in this there are many advantages.
One advantage is the treatment of positive and negative existential statements. A
statement such as Pegasus does not exist first reduces to the statement The winged
horse of Greek mythology does not exist. This further reduces, given Russell's analysis
of definite descriptions, to the statement It is not the case that there is a winged horse
of Greek mythology and there is no more than one winged horse of Greek mythology,
which is clearly true.
So, with respect to proper names, Russell's view is not unlike Frege's. Certain ordinary
language proper names can be meaningful, alternatively, they can have sense, while
being, nonetheless, empty. And, indeed, if we advance the thesis that senses can be
explicated by description, then the picture we have is clear. Both Frege and Russell
adhered to description theories of proper names, both as theories of meaning and as
theories of the determination of reference. The thesis is one, however, that should
present us with no difficulty, for it is one that Kripke is most explicit about.
Frege and Russell both thought,..., that Mill was wrong in a very strong
sense: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description
abbreviated or disguised.
(Kripke, 1972; p. 255)
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Now, according to Evans' interpretation, this is a little strong, for Frege never explicitly
equated senses or ways of thinking of an object with descriptions. Nonetheless, this is
the way in which Frege has been standardly interpreted. So let us just summarise some
of the advantages we have observed with these description theories of proper names.
Firstly, they offer an explanation of how reference is determined and, further, they do
so in terms which have direct connections with the epistemology and psychology of the
use of proper names. Secondly, as we demonstrated with Frege's analysis, an account of
the informational differences between various identity statements is forthcoming. And
finally, as we have just seen with Russell, description theories allow for an account of
existential statements.
Before we consider Kripke's arguments against the Frege-Russell position, we will briefly
consider some of what Kripke calls "cluster-concept" theories. The reason for the ad¬
vancing of such theories is, in many respects, to combat the epistemological naivety of
the Frege-Russell position.
The Frege-Russell approach assumes that associated with a proper name there is some
description; a description which it is possible for a language user to know, and which,
in all likelihood, the language user does know. Searle and Strawson, however, take this
to task. For, according to this picture, it is simply not the case that all language users
will grasp the same sense of Aristotle. Some people may not know of Aristotle that he
taught Alexander, others will not know that he wrote De Anima.2 In order to reconcile
description theories of proper names with the facts about the epistemology of language
users, the simple picture which associates a single description with a single name must
be revised. The revision that Searle and Strawson suggest is that a proper name is
associated with a cluster of descriptions, only some proportion of which need be known
by an individual language user. Let us consider their suggestions in turn.
2Though it is true that Frege recognised the possibility that different language users may associate
different senses with the same name this was not a property that he felt an ideal language should exhibit.
Indeed, though he raises this possibility, he does so only in a footnote. Our point, in opposition to Frege,
is that the fact that the same word may possess many different senses is not a sloppiness of a less than
ideal language, but a central aspect of our own natural language.
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5.1.3 Searle
Searle's approach to proper names is to deny the efficacy of a strict sense-reference
(sense-Meaning) distinction, a distinction which the positions of Frege and Russell as¬
sume. For Searle, the whole point of names is that they avoid having to establish
identifying descriptions for the objects to which they refer. It is the difficulty of estab¬
lishing such descriptions that leads languages to give the whole enterprise up as a bad
job, and plump for good old-fashioned proper names instead. But, we cannot exclude
descriptions from playing any role whatever in an analysis of proper names. For as
Searle also notes, to say that Aristotle does not exist is not to say that the name Aris¬
totle has no denotation; rather, it is to say, that the name does not have a certain type
of denotation. In some sense, then, we would want to say that a negative existential
denies some descriptive statements, descriptive statements associated with the proper
name.
Thus, there is a considerable tension between descriptive theories of proper names and
what we might call denotative theories, those which hold that reference is direct or
Russellian. Searle sees the possibility of resolving this tension by relegating descriptive
content to the level of the conditions of use of a proper name rather than the level of
meaning. For example, he says "unlike definite descriptions, they [proper names] do not
in general specify any characteristics at all of the objects to which they refer". That
is, a definite description refers by specifying characteristics: "the teacher of Alexander"
refers to an individual by specifying that the referent of such a description has the
characteristic of being Alexander's teacher. Aristotle, on the other hand, does not work
that way. It specifies no characteristics of Aristotle, merely that the referent is Aristotle.
But, the question will always be put, how is the reference achieved? Or, in our termi¬
nology, how is it determined? According to Searle, proper names are such that "their
referring uses nonetheless presuppose that the object to which they purport to refer has
certain characteristics". And he goes on to say that these certain characteristics must
satisfy a sufficient but, so far, unspecified number of descriptive statements which are
true of that object. So, the picture of proper names that Searle paints, is the following:
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associated with a proper name is a set of statements which purport to be about the
referent of that name; the referent of that name is, then, that unique individual which
satisfies a certain proportion of said statements. Indeed, Searle goes further: he says
.1 am suggesting it is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive
disjunction, of properties commonly attributed to him: any individual not having at
least some of these properties could not be Aristotle".
Consequently, we should best interpret Searle's account, not as a theory of the meaning
of proper names like the positions of Frege and Russell, but as a theory of the deter¬
mination of their reference. And in this respect it is very like the view of Strawson, to
whom we now turn.
5.1.4 Strawson
The account of proper names that Strawson (1959) gives is so similar to that of Searle's
that we will not dwell on it long. The account we relate, however, is based on Strawson's
Individuals. Strawson suggests that associated with a proper name such as Socrates is
a set, a presupposition-set, of propositions such that the referent of the name satisfies
some proportion of this set. To understand better the nature of the proposal we need
to consider the epistemological origins of Strawson's account.
According to Strawson, the successful common determination, by speaker and hearer,
of the referent of a proper name depends on the speaker and hearer being able to cite
facts which are true of the putative bearer of the name. Needless to say, speaker and
hearer do not need to have in mind the same set of facts. Indeed, such a restriction,
if it were an actual one, would very nearly prevent proper names from being used as
part of the common language. For the epistemological conditions of language users
can hardly be said to be common. But, nonetheless, Strawson explicates his account
of proper names along the lines of their being some common epistemological condition
of successful users of a proper name. Suppose we take a group of people who believe
they use the same name to refer to the same individual. And, further suppose that
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each of these people writes down a list of salient facts pertaining to the individual that
they take to be the bearer of that name. Pooling these facts so as to incorporate the
most frequently mentioned facts will result in a set of propositions, a presupposition
set. Then Strawson's claim is that, while it may not reasonable to say that the bearer
of the name is that individual satisfying all the propositions of that set, it is reasonable,
Strawson suggests, that the bearer of the name be that individual satisfying some certain
proportion of the propositions of that set.
Strawson also suggests that specifying the precise proportion of propositions which need
to be satisfied by an individual for that individual to be the referent of the name, is,
in general, not something that can be done precisely. So the theory lacks a certain
amount of precision. However, what may be said in its defence is its commitment to
tying epistemology to semantics. This account of proper names, which is, properly, a
theory of the determination of reference of proper names rather than a theory of their
meaning, explicitly integrates facts of which language users can manifest an awareness
into an account of reference. As such it is consonant with the general enterprise we have
attempted to articulate, that of integrating facts about the psychology of language use
with semantical facts such as reference.
We now turn, however, to an argument that rejects the efficacy of explicating such
notions as reference and meaning in terms of descriptions and, hence, of the tying of
semantics to epistemology. That is, we turn to Kripke.
5.2 Naming and Necessity
Kripke's position on proper names is in opposition to all those theories we have so far
discussed. That is, in opposition to description theories, be they theories of meaning or
theories of the determination of reference. And the reason for Kripke's opposition can
be found in the title of his article: the role of necessity in a theory of naming.
Firstly, Kripke convinces us of the need to be clear about a number of notions that often
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appear in formulations of theories of meaning, notions concerning various categories of
truth. One notion is that, in contrast to contingent truths, there are also necessary
truths. Another is that, in contrast to a posteriori truths, there are also a priori truths.
Then there are deemed to be analytic truths, which are to be contrasted with synthetic
truths. Let us take these in turn.
The question of necessary truths is essentially a metaphysical one. The claim that a
truth is necessary amounts to the claim that the world could not possibly have been
otherwise. If the statement gold has atomic number 79 expresses a necessary truth then
the world could not possibly have been such as to make gold have any other atomic
number. Alternatively, if we think in terms of possible worlds, then we would say that
there is no possible world in which gold has an atomic number other than 79. So,
claims about truths being necessary are claims about the nature of reality, about the
essential structure of the world and how the world might have been. That is, they
are metaphysical claims. In this sense, claiming that a truth is contingent is a weaker
metaphysical claim. Contingent truths are ones which hold in some worlds and not in
others or, alternatively, indicate that the world could have been otherwise. If I utter /
have read Naming and Necessity my utterance expresses a truth but it is only contingent
since I might never have done so. Thus, the claim which is made is weaker: it is not a
claim about all worlds, merely about this one.
A related notion concerns how we come to know truths, in particular, whether truths
can be known a priori: that is, whether a truth can be known independently of any
experience. Often it has been thought that only necessary truths can be known a
priori but for Kripke and for us this represents a confusion. Whereas necessity is a
metaphysical notion, a prioricity is an epistemological one. It concerns our knowledge
of things and how we come by that knowledge. For instance, meaning relations, such
as entailments, are often thought to have this a prioricity to them. Knowing that p
entails q and knowing that p is sufficient for knowing that q. No further experience or
empirical enquiry is needed. And so the claim is that entailments are a priori relations.
Perhaps this is a bad example because entailment relations are also necessary. However,
the claim is often made in the literature on criterial relations that these are a priori
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relations, but that they are not necessary (cf. Baker, 1974; 1977: McDowell, 1982).
At any rate, it is quite clear that this notion of a prioricity is quite different from the
metaphysical notion of necessity. Indeed, one of the important results of Kripke's article
is to demonstrate this: that there are contingent a priori truths.
A third notion concerns analytic and synthetic truths. We will have more to say about
this later (section 5.3), so for now we will consider what Kripke has to say about
analyticity. Analyticity is prima facie a semantical notion. Statements are said to
express analytic truths if those statements are true solely in virtue of their meaning.
The standard example, and one Kripke gives, is that of bachelors are unmarried men.
The truth of this statement is due not to some empirical investigation: we do not
investigate all bachelors to see if each is an unmarried man. For it follows from the
meanings of the words in the statement and hence of the statement itself, that the
statement is true.
Now how this last notion of analyticity sits with the other categories of truth we have
discussed, it seems to me, is an open question. However, for Kripke it is not: ". ..let's
just make it a matter of stipulation that an analytic statement is in some sense true
by virtue of its meaning and true in all possible worlds by virtue of its meaning. Then
something which is analytically true will be both necessary and a priori" (Kripke, 1972;
p. 264).
Thus equipped with a notion of analyticity, Kripke begins to disassemble the various
forms of description theory of proper names. He begins with the Frege-Russell approach
which, even though Frege's commitment to senses as descriptions was at best implicit,
he regards as the view that the meaning of a proper name can be give by a definite
description.
Frege gave the example of Aristotle having the sense of the teacher of Alexander. Now as
a theory of meaning, which is undoubtedly as Frege meant it, such a view of the sense
of Aristotle would have to say that Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander expresses
an analytic truth, one whose truth is guaranteed by the meaning of the statement.
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Accordingly, the issue is whether this statement also expresses a truth which is both
necessary and a priori for this is how Kripke has construed analyticity.
Establishing whether the statement expresses an a priori truth is difficult. For the
question must be, a priori for whom, since the notion of a prioricity is a modal notion:
not that something must be known independently of experience, but that it can be
known independently of experience. So, the fact that you or I may not have known
whether Aristotle taught Alexander presumably has no bearing on the matter. It does
not show that the truth of the statement cannot be known independently of experience.
So, for sake of argument, let us suppose that the statement does express an a priori
truth.
Now does it express a necessary truth? Remember that necessity is a metaphysical
notion, to do with how the world might otherwise have been. So the question reduces
to: could the world have been such that Aristotle was not the teacher of Alexander?
Well, Kripke's answer is that this is obviously the case: Aristotle might never have met
Alexander, he might never have entered into pedagogy. So Kripke's claim is that the
statement cannot express a necessary truth and, in this, he is surely right. Consequently,
the statement Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander cannot express an analytic truth
and the description the teacher of Alexander cannot be the sense or the meaning of
Aristotle.
The important question which Kripke has raised is: what would the sense of a proper
name have to be like in order for it to be analytically true of the bearer of that name?
And the only answer which appears to be forthcoming is that the sense would have
to express the essential properties of the bearer of a proper name, for it is, by very
definition, only these properties that are metaphysically necessary. The difficulties in
specifying such essential properties, however, leads to at least three options.
1. Revise the notion of sense so as to capture necessity.
2. Deny that proper names have senses.
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3. Deny that the analytic is the necessary a priori.
The first option is that taken by theorists such as Seaxle, Strawson and others and is
one that Kripke has already considered. The second option is the one chosen by Kripke.
The third option is the one we will explore in section 5.3. Let us take options 1 and 2
in turn.
As we have already noted, Searle and Strawson adopt what Kripke calls "cluster-
concept" theories of proper names. That is, they hold that associated with a proper
name such as Aristotle there is a set of statements which are true of Aristotle (though
note, not necessarily true). The referent of Aristotle will then be that individual who
satisfies some unspecified proportion of these statements. Indeed, Searle's view is that it
is a necessary truth that Aristotle satisfies such a proportion. As we have seen, he claims
that an individual not satisfying this proportion of statement commonly attributed to
Aristotle could not be Aristotle.
Kripke's response to this position is in many respects similar to his response to the Frege-
Russell position and we will summarise it as follows. Take this set of true statements
commonly attributed to Aristotle. Most of these will only be contingently true of
Aristotle, they will express facts such as his teaching Alexander, for example, or facts
about his writings. Some, conceivably, may express necessary truths. Now consider all
these statements together. In what sense is some proportion of them necessarily true of
Aristotle? After all, the disjunction Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander or Aristotle
wrote De Anima is no more a necessary truth than either of the terms of the disjunction.
It is quite possible that Aristotle might, in another possible world, have done neither.
That is, the disjunction of two contingent truths is itself a contingent truth.3 The
disjunction of a necessary truth with any other statement must, of course, yield a
necessary truth. So the only sense in which some proportion of the true statements
commonly attributed to Aristotle can be necessarily true is in the sense in which this
3Note here it is important that we are considering the disjunction of truths and not falsehoods. The
disjunction Aristotle wrote De Anima or it is not the case that Aristotle wrote De Anima obviously
expresses a necessary truth, albeit a tautologous one, but one term of the disjunction is false in this
world. And so it cannot be a true statement commonly attributed to Aristotle
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proportion is made up of individual statements that are themselves necessarily true.
So the "cluster-concept" approach can only deliver the Kripkean picture of meaning for
proper names in as much as they can explicate the necessary properties of the individual
bearers of those names. Thus, the approach is hardly an extension of the Frege-Russell
position at all, and just as that fails to capture analytic truths so the "cluster-concept"
position does too.
Kripke's response to the failure to reconcile the view that proper names have senses or
meanings with the view that analytic statements are ones whose truth is necessary is
to jettison the whole notion that proper names have senses. Though earlier in Naming
and Necessity he tells us that he does not attempt to present an alternative theory, he
does, at least, detail some components such a theory may have.
Firstly, Kripke introduces some terminology. Rigid designators, designate the same
individual in all possible worlds in which that individual exists. A non-rigid or accidental
designator is one which does not designate the same individual in all worlds in which
that individual exists. And a strongly rigid designator designates the same individual
in all worlds, that is, the individual must also exist in all worlds, it must be a necessary
existent. The preceding discussion of description theories will hopefully have made
clear that Kripke views proper names as rigid designators. So, for example, Thatcher
designates Margaret Thatcher in all possible worlds where she exists. However, the
Prime Minister of the UK in 1984 is not a rigid designator: in this world, it designates
Margaret Thatcher; in another possible world it designates Michael Foot. And this,
for Kripke, gives an alternative way of saying that proper names cannot abbreviate
descriptions. Because descriptions are standardly non-rigid designators, while proper
names are rigid. No amount of semantic alchemy will turn one into the other.
Now perhaps the most obvious retort to Kripke would be along the following lines.
Granted, you have shown that there is a difference between names and descriptions
and you have argued that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. But surely this
is a mistake. For there are many good reasons to suppose that proper names have
senses. Firstly, names are not contentless. To deny that Aristotle exists is not to simply
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assert that the name has no denotation but rather that it doesn't have a certain kind of
denotation. Secondly, if we assert that "Hesperus is Phosphorus" we do not simply state
the law of identity. Yet a view which states that proper names have only a denotation
would have difficulties explaining this. Finally, and most importantly, one motivation
for senses is explaining how it is that people determine the referent of a proper name.
This is what descriptions do: they determine which objects do and do not satisfy them.
Kripke does not discuss the issue of existential statements in Naming and Necessity. He
does, however, discuss the issue of identity statements such as Hesperus is Phosphorus.
The fact that such statements can be used to convey information he explains as follows:
it is because, in general, they express necessary a posteriori truths. That is, the fact
of Hesperus being Phosphorus is, indeed, a necessary fact and hence the statement
necessarily true. However, this fact may be one of which we are unaware. That is,
our epistemic states may be unable to distinguish the case where these two stars in
the morning and evening are one and the same, from the case where they are in fact
two distinct stars or planets or whatever. So, the fact is also an a posteriori one: it is
incumbent upon us to investigate the situation before we may know it.
So Kripke does at least offer an explanation of why such identity statements are more
than simple statements of the law of identity. Now let us turn to Kripke's incomplete
picture of proper names and, in this, we will let him speak for himself.
A rough statement of a theory might be the following: An initial baptism
takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference
of the same may be fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from
link to link', the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns
it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I
hear the name 'Napoleon' and decide that it would be a nice name for my
pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition.
(Kripke, 1972; p. 302)
Kripke offers a little more on how this mysterious 'linking' is achieved.
Someone, let's say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name.
They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through
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various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain.
A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say
Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to
Richard Feynman even though he can't remember from whom he first heard
of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feyn¬
man was a famous physicist. A certain passage of communications reaching
ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring
to Feynman even though he can't identify him uniquely. He doesn't know
what a Feynman diagram is... So he doesn't have to know these things, but,
instead, a chain of communication going back to Feynman himself has been
established, by virtue of his membership in a community which passed the
name on from link to link...
(Kripke, 1972; pp. 298-299)
So the view that Kripke presents of proper names is that there is an initial baptism
in which an individual is named. This fixing of the reference of the name may be by
ostension or by giving a description which identifies the individual in the situation of
baptism. From then the name is passed, rather as the end of a piece of string can be
passed, from individual to individual and, provided the string stretches all the way back
to the individual baptised, each user of the name, each holder of the string, succeeds in
referring to that individual with uses of the name.
Now, though the analogy is most appealing, one has every reason to expect that a
theory of names should indicate in a little more detail how this name is passed from one
individual to the next. It surely is not simply by uttering the name but, presumably,
also by the giving of information concerning the bearer of that name. And it is precisely
the role of this information that is of interest for description theories and it is precisely
this that Kripke falls to discuss. But it is hardly surprising, such an account would
necessarily be highly complex and involved. However, there are other quibbles with
Kripke to consider.
Kripke's account is such as to deny the relation between knowledge about an individual
and the proper name which refers to that individual. That is, it is to deny that proper
names are descriptional, it is to deny that the meanings of proper names are associated
with any descriptive content. The reason is simple: equating the analytic with the
necessary a priori suggests that the only descriptive content associated with names
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would be that corresponding to unknown essential properties. However, despite this
reasoning, the conclusion seems to fly in the face of the facts.
Suppose, for example, that all Earthly language users used the names Hesperus and
Phosphorus as if they did in fact refer to different heavenly bodies even though, as
we know, they do not. Further, corresponding to these different names let us suppose
there are different conditions of use, consistent with the idea that they refer to different
bodies. In fact, let us suppose that our language users use Hesperus to refer to Venus
in the evening and Phosphorus to refer to Venus in the morning. Now, consider a
statement such as Hesperus appeared red and fiery, yesterday. The truth conditions
are just the same as those of the corresponding statement Phosphorus appeared red and
fiery, yesterday. But this is to ignore the crucial difference in the information conditions
associated with the two statements: the former contains information to the effect that
Venus appeared red and fiery yesterday evening whereas the latter contains information
to the effect that Venus appeared red and fiery yesterday morning.
Explicating meaning in terms of necessity entails that the only inferences one can derive
from the meaning of a word, or its use, are those to do with the essential properties
of the referent. It is precisely the point of the previous illustration that words, even
proper names, can be used to do much more. In particular, they can be used to convey
information about incidental properties of the referent and this important aspect of the
use of language is simply ignored by a view like Kripke's. So, in a very important sense,
Kripke is wrong when he claims that the user of a proper name need not know anything
in particular about the referent, for it is precisely what she does know that enables that
user to extract and convey information over and above that to do with essence.
It seems, then, that the view Kripke espouses, ties too closely a view of semantics with
a view of metaphysics, a view of how the world really must be. While we are not
advocating a rejection of Kripke's ontologically realist stance, his view just seems to fail
to appreciate the way words work. By explicit^J^expelling epistemology from semantics,
as he has done with proper names, the possibility of explaining how individual language
users can use language as an informational system is lost. This goal requires, almost by
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definition, that the information carried is known, that it be used in making inferences,
etc. So a view such as Kripke's which allows proper names only to carry information
about essences must be considered unsatisfactory. We conclude this discussion of Kripke
by echoing the sentiments we expressed in the first section of the first chapter. There,
we drew a distinction between two questions: what are the conditions under which the
word X could be used and what is an X. Kripke's account of proper names has, it seems,
reduced the former to the latter.
5.3 Analyticity: Towards a Revision
A number of intuitions concerning analyticity have prefigured Kripke's discussion. Leib¬
niz drew a distinction between "truths of reason" and "truths of fact" and further
suggested that the former have the property of being necessary while the latter are
contingent. Leibniz also made the suggestion that necessary truths of reason are ones
that are true in "all possible worlds". Leibniz' distinction parallels a distinction made
by Hume between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" and it is this distinction
which is often thought to lie between analytic and synthetic truths. Kant's concern
with this distinction led him to outline a number of characterisations of analytic truths.
For him, statements that can be cast into subject-predicate form which are analytic
statements are ones whose predicate is contained in, and is identical to, their subject.
Consequently, analytic truths are ones which cannot be denied without expressing self-
contradiction. In recent times great attention has been focussed on the validity of the
distinction. Quine (1951), White (1950) and illustrious others have sought to argue that
the distinction is without foundation for natural languages, while others have argued
in opposition. In this section, I am concerned not so much with this last debate but
with Kripke's characterisation of analytic truths as ones which are both necessary and a
priori and the suggestion that this may not be the only way of conceiving the analytic.
It is this we will now consider.
In Chapter 3 we explored an approach to senses in which the idea that they should
express necessary and sufficient conditions was explicitly rejected. In many respects,
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then, most of this chapter will have appeared a little askew: we have shown how Kripke
has proceeded to dismiss description theories of proper names precisely because such
descriptions do not express necessary truths. In order to clear this up and show how it
is only an apparent mess, we will recap on the reasons why we were able to claim that
the descriptions in Chapter 3 are senses.
Senses are those descriptions which express the informational content associated with
various meaning relations. And meaning relations come in different sorts. Situation
Theory, for example, has conditional constraints which hold only in certain circum¬
stances. So, the information that these relations convey is not, in any sense, going to
constitute necessary facts. If we take a constraint p =£> q given r, then in r-situations,
the relation between p and q is informational. In -ir-situations, however, the relation
between p and q is not informational. So, in no sense can p be considered a sufficient
condition for q, nor q a necessary one for p. But this is not to deny that the relation can
be informational and nor is it to deny that we can describe this informational relation¬
ship. Indeed, it is just such a description we call a sense. What this construal denies is
that the sense of a term must be explicable in terms of necessary truths.
Indeed, the picture of meaning, and hence of analyticity, that Sense Generation offers
is that meaning may be explicated in terms of contingent properties. That, within r-
situations, it makes sense to think of these as "necessary and sufficient", though they
are, in fact, nothing of the kind. Also, that such relations are a priori, in that, in r-
situations, knowing p and knowing p => q given r is grounds for knowing q. No empirical
investigation is required. So the suggestion, then, from Sense Generation is that the
analytic can be equated with the contingent a priori.
The view we offered in Chapter 3 was also that associated with a single word, even with
the conventional uses thereof, there are multiple senses. Now, in an intriguing way, this
can be seen to accord with some of the Fregean intuitions behind senses. Firstly, as
Evans (1976) has indicated, Frege viewed the sense of a proper name, for example, as a
way of thinking of the bearer of that proper name. The fact that the same individual,
Ateb/Aphla for example, can have two names and also two associated senses, indicates
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that, for Frege, such an object could be thought of in, at least, two different ways.
Presumably, there are infinitely many ways of thinking of an object but, of course, the
important point about senses is that these are ways of thinking that must be shared
though, of course, this is not Frege's view of indexicals such as I.
This Fregean picture entices us, then, to see the different senses that we have suggested
may be associated with words such as lemon, father, lion, etc., as indicating different
ways of thinking about lemons, fathers and lions. But, indeed, in some way this is
precisely what the puzzles of Chapter 1 do suggest. Fred's uses of lion do indicate that
he is thinking of lions in two different ways. One way he thinks of lions is as real,
animate, ferocious zoo-escapees and another way he thinks of lions is as statues. One
way in which Richard, in Betsy Macken's example, is thinking of fathers is as biological
fathers but, as Cassandra reveals, one can think of fathers as those male adults who live
with you, feed you, clothe you and buy you bicycles. Of course, the Fregean picture is
enticing, but we will not lay any more store by this than this little discussion.
Rather, we should now point to the logical possibility of an alternative account of proper
names, one based on Sense Generation. Let us consider for our example the proper name
Aristotle, and let us suppose that, by default, this name has the sense "the teacher of
Alexander". Now, the argument that this cannot be the sense of Aristotle because it does
not express a necessary truth concerning Aristotle need not alarm us. For our position is
that senses may express contingent truths and still be senses. So much of the argument
that Kripke presents against description theories of proper names will not affect our
analysis. What may affect it, however, relates to Kripke's consideration of counterfactual
conditionals. Suppose we consider the counterfactual conditional If he had not taught
Alexander, Aristotle would have become a hermit. However implausible this conditional
may be is not at issue. What is at issue is whether, in these counterfactual circumstances,
Aristotle still refers to Aristotle.
Clearly, if the only means by which the name may refer is via the description, "the
teacher of Alexander", then the name will not now refer to Aristotle. So, even allowing
for the possibility that senses may express contingent a priori truths will not furnish an
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explanation of all the uses of Aristotle. However, in Sense Generation, we are committed
to the view that not just one description underlies the uses of a term. Instead, we may,
according to circumstance, generate new descriptions which appropriately determine
reference in those circumstances. So, in the case of Aristotle, we can imagine that,
in the counterfactual circumstances we have described, a new description or sense of
Aristotle is generated. Perhaps, the description "the clever hermit philosopher of ancient
G^reece". And similarly for other counterfactual circumstances we can imagine that, in
these circumstances, a different sense from normal is generated. Even in cases where
we cannot begin to specify what this new sense may be, we may, nonetheless, know
enough to realise that the conventional sense is not appropriate and that some other,
unspecified sense is appropriate.
Similarly in the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus. We can envisage these having the
senses "the evening star" and "the morning star" respectively. A claim that these senses
do not express necessary truths concerning the planet Hesperus/Phosphorus cannot now
count against a claim that these are, nonetheless, senses. And, similarly, by allowing
that, in principle, these names may, in each counterfactual situation, have a different
though related sense, we allow, in principle, for an account of the counterfactual, possible
uses of these names.
Now, this said, it seems that the intuition that proper names do not have senses, unlike
other terms such as common nouns, is very strong. All we have attempted to demon¬
strate is the logical possibility that we may treat proper names as having senses. Indeed,
by allowing for this possibility we also allow this intuition to play a more significant role
in a theory of proper names. Whereas, in Kripke's account, regardless of our intuitions,
we could not allow for the possibility of proper names having senses. How this intuition
regarding proper names having senses is to be treated is, according to our account, open
to the theorist to decide. Our account, while not claiming that proper names have sense,
is agnostic as to the possibility.
We part by noting that the picture adopted in Chapter 3 has the potential to offer a
better interpretation of Wittgenstein than that offered by Kripke. Kripke attributes
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to Wittgenstein the belief in a "cluster-concept" position, namely, the belief that the
meaning of a proper name can be given by a (single) family, or cluster, of descriptions.
The picture offered by Sense Generation, however, is not a single cluster of descriptions
but a whole host of related descriptions. That is, a family of constraints, each constraint
being appropriate for a particular type of circumstance. We will have more to say about
Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance in the next chapter so, for now, we will
simply repeat the quote with which this chapter began and let Wittgenstein speak for
himself.
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these
constructions — namely the disjunction of all their common properties" -
I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well
say: "Something runs through the whole thread — namely the continuous
overlapping of those fibres".
(Wittgenstein, PI, §67)
Chapter 6
Natural Kinds and Sense
Generation
In this chapter we discuss some of the psychological and philosophical literature on
natural kinds. One aspect which we will consider is the way in which these literatures,
though having undergone similar developments, have recently diverged. In the psycho¬
logical literature, approaches to natural kind terms are found couched in one or other
of the corresponding theories of natural kind concepts. So we begin by considering the
so-called classical theory of concepts and relating it to the Frege-Russell conception
of the meaning of proper names. The literature on proper names will prove germane
for our purposes since we will contend that the same considerations that axe raised
to counter description theories of proper names are also ones which form the basis of
the Kripke-Putnam rejection of description theories of natural kind terms. With re¬
gard to the classical theory of concepts, our position is that this fails to counter the
same objection which Kripke raised against the Frege-Russell view of proper names.
Namely, that natural kind terms, just as proper names, must designate rigidly. That
is, their designation can only be expressed in terms of statements that are necessarily
true. Since descriptions are typically contingent, the meaning of natural kind terms, so
the argument goes, cannot therefore be explicated in terms of such descriptions.
We then turn to a consideration of prototype theory, the other major psychological
theory of concepts. We will again relate this psychological theory to a philosophical ap-
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proach to the meaning of proper names, that defined by the so-called "cluster-concept".
Our position is, once again, that the main argument to count against prototype theory
is that which Kripke also raises against the cluster-concept approaches. Though there
are differences between the types of description associated with proper names and natu¬
ral kind terms, it seems that even a cluster of contingent descriptions will not explicate
what Kripke would take to be the meaning of a natural kind term.
A third approach taken within the psychological literature is to adopt a so-called hybrid
approach to concepts in which conceptual cores are to be distinguished from identifica¬
tion procedures, the former being accommodated by something akin to classical theory,
the latter by something akin to prototype theory. Our position with respect to these
theories of concepts is that they fail to overcome the deficits of either classical or pro¬
totype theory alone and, further, that they treat much of the empirical evidence which
purports to concern conceptual cores as pertaining to identification procedures instead.
Having considered the three major psychological approaches to concepts and finding
them unable to satisfy Kripke's considerations, we turn to consider, in more detail, the
nature of the Kripke-Putnam position on natural kinds. Some consequences of this
position we find unsatisfactory. One is the acceptance of essentialism; the other is the
separation of epistemology from semantics. We re-iterate the position we adopted in
the previous chapter, that of viewing the Kripke-Putnam position as an inadvertent
reductio on the conception of analyticity which it presupposes. We then turn to a brief
presentation of an alternative conception of natural kinds, one which we claim maintains
both philosophical and psychological respectability. Finally, we suggest that this may
offer the prospect of a partial reconciliation between psychological and contemporary
philosophical views.
6.1 Classical Theory
In this section we detail a number of approaches to concepts which presuppose what has
become known as the classical theory of concepts. Quite simply, this theory assumes that
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a concept specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for membership of a category. So,
for example, the concept apple would specify necessary and sufficient conditions for an
entity to be an apple. Accordingly, every instance which falls under a classically defined
concept should possess certain properties which are common to all those instances.
Before we consider some of the problems of this view of concepts, let us examine a few
approaches which assume this classical approach.
Hull's (1920) study involved the presentation of different Chinese ideographs to subjects.
He presented each subject with twelve ideographs, each being paired with a nonsense
name. Having learnt the pairing of names and ideographs, each subject would successive
sets of twelve ideographs, each of these being paired with the same nonsense names as
before. The design of Hull's ideographs was intriguing for, common to each ideograph
bearing the same name, was a common element. And, as Hull found, successful perfor¬
mance in a test phase was apparently determined by memory of this common element
rather than memory of the specific ideographs. That is, there was transference from
one learning set to the next, the conjecture being that this was due to the fact that
what subjects were exhibiting was learning of the common elements of these learning
sets. So, this early investigation of concept acquisition seems to confirm the view that
the process of acquiring a concept is the process of determining consciously or otherwise
the common elements of the corresponding category.
A similar investigation by Vygotsky (1934) also presupposes the efficacy of this classical
view of concepts. Vygotsky's sorting task involved twenty-two blocks of varying shapes,
dimensions and colours. Each block has on its underside one of four nonsense names.
These names correspond to four categories: large thick blocks, large thin blocks, small
thick blocks and small thin blocks. The experimenter turns over one block revealing its
name and the subject is asked to pick out blocks of the same sort. The experimenter
corrects the subject by revealing the names of blocks until the sorting can be achieved
correctly. Now many children exhibit failures to sort correctly. Instead, they appear
to exhibit complexive thinking and, more particularly, chain complexes. These are
complexes where a child in, say, the block sorting task, will proceed from item to item
on the basis of attributes shared by two or more consecutive items but not by all of
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the items. Such behaviour has typically been taken to suggest that these children have
not acquired the concepts which the task requires. Again, the suggestion being that to
acquire a concept is to have determined the common elements of a category.
However, it is perhaps unnecessary to dredge too deeply into the psychological literature
on concepts since there are many adequate reviews. Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman
(1983) provide a brief statement of the classical position with respect to concepts. A
classical concept specifies a set of singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.
Membership of the corresponding category is determined by satisfaction or otherwise
of these conditions and, consequently, membership is "all or none". That is, either an
entity is or is not a member of a category.
Now, the overwhelming problem faced by this classical view of concepts is that of speci¬
fying these conditions of membership. That is, the problem of specifying what it is that
makes an entity a bird, say, or an elephant. Such conditions may be easy to state in
the case of artificial concepts such as those defined for the purposes of the experiments
of Hull and Vygotsky, but, in the case of more natural concepts and, perhaps, more
particularly, natural kind concepts, such conditions are extremely difficult to find. It is
precisely this problem which forms the initial focus for Putnam (1975) and the latter
part of Kripke (1972) and it is to their arguments that we now turn.
Putnam, in Is Semantics Possible?, begins by considering a traditional approach to
semantics of which the position articulated in Katz & Postal (1964) is a particular
version. The position adopted by Katz and his co-workers is that the meanings of
words may be given by a set of semantic markers. These markers have a number of
properties as follows.
1. A word's meaning is characterised by a string of semantic markers.
2. Semantic markers stand for concepts.
3. Each such concept is a linguistic universal.
4. The meaning of a word may be specified recursively in that they may be specified
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in terms of concepts which themselves are further specified.
5. Decomposition into semantic markers is taken to account for analyticity relations.
So, for example, we might presume the meaning of the word bachelor to decompose into
the semantic markers corresponding to "unmarried", "adult" and "male". Kill might
similarly decompose into "cause to die". Despite the fact that one might argue that the
meanings of these words and the paraphrases in terms of semantic markers are different,
there are other grounds to reject such an analysis. As far as Putnam is concerned, the
main complaint is that such a theory of word meaning cannot be applied to very many
words of the language and, in particular, natural kind terms.
Natural kind terms such as lemon and tiger are problematic for a theory of word meaning
such as Katz & Postal's precisely because such a theory requires the decomposition of
a word's meaning to account for analyticity relations. Since the analytic is equated
with the necessary a priori, the decomposition must be in terms of conditions which are
necessarily true of those entities to which the word applies. The problem for natural
kind terms arises because such conditions as these are difficult to identify. Putnam, for
example, starts with the following, admittedly putative, definition for lemon: yellow
colour, tart taste, certain kind of peel, etc.
As he points out, the most striking difficulty is that natural kinds have abnormal mem¬
bers. There are green lemons, three-legged tigers, etc. This first putative definition is
one which only applies to the normal members of the kind. So, the definition cannot
be correct since it supposes that statements such as All lemons are yellow are analytic.
The fact that such statements are not analytic, that is, not necessarily true, renders the
definition an incorrect analysis of the meaning of lemon.
Putnam considers refinements to this definition, refinements which incorporate the no¬
tion of "natural kind" and "normal member" directly in to the heart of the definition.
Even such drastic measures as these, however, do not save these definitions. As Put¬
nam argues, and we concur, they fail to express analytic (necessary) truths. Putnam's
conclusion is that it is simply mistaken to attempt to provide anything so simple as an
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analytic definition to account for the complex behaviour of a natural kind word.
Kripke presents a similar argument against the view that the meaning of natural kind
terms may be given by definition and, in many respects, a reformulation of his views
against description theories of proper names. It will be unsurprising, then, to find in
this argument an echo of the previous chapter.
Kripke starts by considering Kant's supposed claim that Gold is a yellow metal expresses
an analytic truth. That is, a truth that can be known a priori and which is also a
necessary truth. So, Kant's claim would appear to amount to the claim that gold could
not be otherwise than yellow in colour; it could not possibly be otherwise than a metal.
Now, this, as suggested by Putnam's observations, seems quite incorrect. Suppose,
Kripke tells us, that there are some peculiar properties of the atmosphere such that
gold appears to be yellow but that, when these atmospheric effects are absent, the true
colour of gold is revealed and it happens to be blue. We would not suggest that gold
does not exist, that gold had turned out to be a mythical substance. Rather, the claim
would be that though we thought gold was yellow, it turns out that gold is blue. That is,
for Kripke and, indeed, for Putnam, the word gold names a kind of substance. Though
we may believe gold to have certain identifying characteristics, it may well be that the
characteristics which we think of are not, in fact, true of gold at all. But this error on
our part does not effect the meaning of gold nor our concept of gold. It is simply that
the word's meaning and the corresponding concept are not to be explicated in terms of
identifying characteristics which could possibly be false. The explications must be in
terms of necessary truths.
So, the conclusion of this stage of the arguments of Kripke and Putnam is that a simple
model of word meaning or concepts such as that presented by Katz and his coworkers is
woefully inadequate in explicating the meaning of, or concepts corresponding to, natural
kind terms. Such theories are nothing other than a formulation of the classical view
whose programme of outlining the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a
word has proved so unsuccessful.
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In many respects, the arguments of Putnam and Kripke, in dismissing theories of word
meaning which fit the classical mould we outlined earlier, are akin to the arguments that
Kripke advances against the Frege-Russell position on proper names. The position that
Kripke attributes to Frege and Russell is that the meaning of a proper name can be given
by a simple description. So, Aristotle, according to this view, might mean "the teacher of
Alexander". Kripke's position with respect to the possibility that the meaning of proper
names may be given by description was, as we saw in the last chapter, that this is only
the case to the extent that these descriptions embody necessary truths. And we can see
that a similar- position can be adopted with respect to a classical approach to natural
kind terms. Namely, the meaning of these terms may only be given by description
inasmuch as the description embodies necessary truths regarding the referents of such
terms. So, though the classical approach might hold that tiger means "large, striped
feline", the fact that such a description is not necessarily true of those entities we call
tigers disproves the claim that the description explicates the meaning of tiger. Thus,
there is a likeness not only between the positions adopted by Frege and Russell and
those adopted by classical theorists, but there is also a likeness in the arguments ranged
against these positions.
Just as Kripke notes, the spirit if not the detail of these simple description theories is
preserved by those theories which adopt the notion of the "cluster-concept". And pre¬
serving the likeness between the philosophical views of Frege and Russell and the psy¬
chological views of the classical theorists, there is also a move towards "cluster-concept"
approaches in the psychological literature. It is to one such approach, prototype theory,
that we now turn.
6.2 Prototype Theory
There are other reasons, beyond the failure to find necessary truths, why the simple
classical view failed as a psychological theory of concepts. One is the existence of
prototype effects or graded structure.
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Rosch and her coworkers successfully demonstrated that subjects do not respond in
category decision tasks in a simple all-or-none fashion: on the contrary, responses are
graded. On one task, Rosch (1975) presented names of members of everyday categories.
So, for example, for the category furniture, subjects were presented with names such
as chair, coffee table, bed, etc. Similarly with the "natural" category of vegetables.
Each subject was then asked to rank these names according to the degree to which they
exemplify the category. Not only did the subjects find the task natural and sensible,
they produced reliable rankings. Carrots, for example, were reliably judged to be more
typical of vegetables than were cucumber or sprouts. Similarly, for furniture, chairs are
judged to be more typical of the category than are beds and desks.
Another study, Rosch & Mervis (1975), required subjects to generate lists of attributes
for 20 names of members of categories such as furniture. So, presented with the name
chair, for example, subjects would write down as many attributes of chairs as they
could. What Rosch & Mervis discovered was that the typicality of an exemplar seemed
to lie in direct proportion to the number of attributes it shared with other exemplars.
Consequently, the more attributes in common possessed by an exemplar, the more
typical that exemplar is rated. And the fewer common attributes an exemplar has, the
less typical that exemplar is rated as an instance of the category.
Now, on a model of concepts which treats the membership or otherwise of a category
to be a matter of the satisfaction of certain necessary and sufficient conditions, such
findings as these are problematic. According to the classical model entities are either
members of a category or not. And, consequently, the concept provides no means of
distinguishing between the members of a category since these all satisfy the required
conditions. Yet it is just such a discrimination between the members of a category that
the subjects in the above experiments demonstrated. These findings may be taken as
indicating either of two things: that the findings are not revealing of the structure of
concepts; or that the structure of concepts is such as to effect discrimination between
members. Whereas the former interpretation is one which might characterise the view
of a classical theorist, we turn to the latter interpretation, one which characterises
prototype theory.
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Though there are many versions of prototype theory, Hampton (1990) offers the follow¬
ing properties as defining, at least, a standard view of prototype concepts.
1. The prototype concept specifies a set of weighted attributes and it further specifies,
for each attribute, the allowable range of values.
2. Similarity of an entity to the prototype concept will be determined both by a
process of matching attribute-value pairs and by the weightings attached to the
attributes.
3. The typicality of an exemplar is determined by that exemplar's degree of similarity
to the prototype concept.
4. The prototype concept also specifies a threshold level or criterion of similarity
below which a member of the category cannot fall. That is, the threshold deter¬
mines membership: if the similarity of an entity is lower than threshold, then the
entity does not fall under the concept; if the similarity is higher than threshold,
the entity does fall under the concept.
In the next chapter, we will expand in a little more detail on some of the specific versions
of prototype theory. But, we can already see that, to describe prototype concepts such
as these, we will require a significantly different language for describing attribute-values
structures to that which we examined in Chapter 2. In particular, for each attribute we
must specify a disjunction of possible values and, for each attribute, we must specify
a weighting on that attribute. Though we will leave the details of such an enriched
language to others, we can offer the following example for the prototype concept for
tiger.












Now, in many respects, the position adopted by prototype theorists is similar to that
adopted by Searle and Strawson with respect to proper names. Indeed, we can see
that the brief description of prototype theory that Hampton gives fits precisely the
definition Kripke gives of a "cluster-concept" approach. Kripke's requirement that to
each designating expression there corresponds some cluster of properties, is satisfied by
prototype theory's claim that to each attribute of a concept there corresponds a set
of possible values. The fact that the cluster of attribute-values is believed to pick out
the category members falling under that concept, meets Kripke's requirement that the
cluster should uniquely pick out the entities to which they apply. Whether an entity
falls under a concept is determined, as Kripke might have it, by a "vote" between the
cluster of attribute-values. And, should the votes not reach criterion, then that entity
is said not to fall under the concept. Finally, we should note that prototype theorists,
while perhaps not being explicit on this point, nonetheless require there to be a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the prototype concept. That
is, whether or not the cluster is satisfied by an entity is an "all-or-none" affair. To put
it another way, there are necessary and sufficient conditions on an entity satisfying the
prototype concept. It is simply that such conditions are generally disjunctive and more
complex than those stipulated by classical theories of concepts.
So, according to Kripke's definition of cluster-concept approaches, prototype theory
is just such an approach. It would hardly be surprising, then, to find that prototype
theory falls foul of Kripke's main consideration, necessity. However, there are differences
between the attempt of prototype theory to express necessary truths and that of the
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cluster-concept accounts of proper names. So, we shall now consider in a little more
detail what we would require of prototype theory in order that it express necessary
truths.
In order that the sense of a proper name express a necessary truth, it must either express
the essential properties of the individual who bears that name or it must express all the
possible properties of that individual. The sense of Aristotle, for example, could either
specify his essential properties or it could disjunctively specify his possible properties.
So, if the teacher of Alexander does not express a necessary truth, we might regard the
sense of Aristotle as specifying the disjunction the teacher of Alexander or the author of
De Anima or ... and so on, presumably indefinitely. What Kripke argued in Naming
and Necessity was that such a move failed to capture the missing quality of necessity.
And his proposal was that to capture the notion of necessity, a sense or concept would
have to express the essential properties of the entities to which it applies.
It is similar, though not the same, in the case of natural kind terms. In order that the
sense of a natural kind term expresses necessary truths about that kind, it must also
either express the essential properties of the kind or it must express all the possible
properties of the kind. Indeed, it is on this last option that prototype theory settles.
So, the task for a prototype theory of concepts, then, is to express necessary truths
concerning those entities which fall under the concept. And it attempts this task via
the disjunction of contingent truths. So, as part of the descriptions of concepts and of
the senses of natural kind terms, we find, as Hampton suggests, a specification of the
range of possible values which each attribute may assume. Let us consider an example.
Smith & Osherson (1984), as we shall see in the next chapter, also assume that each
attribute of a concept is associated with a range of possible values. So, the shape
attribute of apple is associated with the open-ended fist of values, round, square and
cylindrical. And, since these are not the only possible shapes that an apple may have,
the actual list of values would presumably be much larger. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine what shapes would not be possible for an apple to assume, as the arguments
of Putnam testify. For the shape of an apple, its colour, texture, taste and so on, are
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surely prime examples of its contingent properties. The question of interest is whether
or not one can capture necessity by specifying contingent possibilities. Whether one
can specify a necessary truth concerning the shapes of apples by specifying each of the
possible shapes.
A trivial way in which one might attempt to capture necessity is by introducing tau¬
tologies. So, for example, we might say of the concept apple that it specifies the shapes
either round or not round. Clearly, such a disjunction will be true of every apple and,
moreover, necessarily true. That is, it could not possibly be the case that an apple
could fail to be either round in shape or not round in shape. However, such a trivial
solution is also unsatisfactory for it fails to respect the fact that the concept of apple
should apply to all apples and only to apples. It is just such a discrimination that the
concept is hypothesised to effect. The property of being either round in shape or not
round in shape is one that cannot discriminate apples from non-apples precisely because
the property is true of all entities.
Another means of capturing necessity via the disjunction of contingent properties is
that which we might call "exhaustive disjunction". Rather than express logical tau¬
tologies as above, this method would require us to specify the disjunction of all the
possibilities inherent in the model. So, for example, if we admit of just five possible
shapes, round, square, cylindrical, rhombic and toroidal, and assuming that all these
shapes are contingent possibilities for apples, then the concept apple would specify all
these possibilities disjunctively. Whether, in principle, this strategy will work, that is,
whether it is possible to express a necessary truth concerning shapes by expressing a
disjunction of possible shapes, seems open to question. It would, after all, require that
there be some finite limit to the types of shape an entity could possibly assume. But,
even assuming that these possibilities are finite in number, the problem remains that
such a concept, while expressing necessary truths will fail to express sufficient ones.
That is, a specification of the shapes that an apple may possibly have cannot serve to
discriminate apples from non-apples. The disjunction of possible shapes will be satisfied
by the majority of entities, not simply apples.
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A similar point can be made with respect to the proposals of Searle and Strawson.
These require that the referent of, say, Aristotle, satisfies some certain proportion of
statements which are true of Aristotle. But, it certainly seems to be possible that, in
other worlds if not in this one, this proportion might be satisfied by someone other than
Aristotle. Just as it seems that it cannot be a necessary truth that Aristotle satisfies
this certain proportion of statements, so it seems hardly credible that satisfaction of
these same statements will provide sufficient grounds for being the referent of Aristotle.
The point, then, appears to be that though, in principle, it may be possible to express
necessary truths in terms of the disjunction of certain contingent truths, such a move will
fail to capture the fact that satisfaction of the content of a concept or sense is deemed to
be sufficient grounds for the application of that concept or the corresponding word. The
fact that prototype theory requires the specification of possible values for each attribute,
renders the specification equivalent to a tautology, incapable of discriminating between
instances of the concept and non-instances.1
Perhaps the main issue of this section is whether the possibility of specifying values
disjunctively is the appropriate means of capturing the fact that concepts can apply
to entities with various properties. Whereas it is presumably the case that certain
disjunctions must be specified as such, the question is whether this strategy will work in
general. As we have seen, the considerations of Kripke suggest that the strategy cannot
be successful. To put it in Kripke's terms, prototype theory and theories like it have
abandoned the letter of classical theory while retaining its spirit. And, as such, they
are just as prone to the difficulties of divining necessary and sufficient conditions.
6.3 Hybrid Theories
In the previous section we indicated that there are, in general, two ways of regarding
the existence of prototype effects. One can argue that they are not directly revealing
JIt may, of course, be argued that prototype concepts do specify the appropriate sufficient conditions
for a concept to apply, and that they do this by introducing a weighting on possible values. In Chapter 7
we will adduce arguments against the efficacy of this particular approach.
CHAPTER 6. NATURAL KINDS AND SENSE GENERATION 164
of conceptual structure; or that concepts effect discrimination between instances of
the concept much as prototype concepts do. In the psychological literature the first
interpretation is relatively popular- and it is this that lies behind the so-called binary or
hybrid views.
In their 1981 paper, Osherson & Smith, offer a characterisation of prototype theory in
terms of fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965). Having failed to account, in terms of prototype
concepts, for many of the typicality effects associated with concept combinations (such
as pet fish), they conclude that there are three alternative ways of viewing prototype
theory. One possibility is that what is at fault is not prototype theory but their formal-
isation of it in terms of fuzzy set theory. Another possibility is that prototype theory
is inconsistent in some way and should be disregarded. Osherson & Smith, however,
present good arguments for rejecting both these possibilities and they opt, instead, for
a hybrid theory, one in which prototype theory plays only a partial role in a complete
theory of concepts.
According to their view, prototype theory is concerned only with a limited aspect of
concepts, that to do with a concept's identification procedure. Such identification proce¬
dures are taken to specify the kind of information used to make "rapid decisions about
membership" (p. 57) and are to be distinguished from concept cores. The core of a
concept plays a role in explicating that concept's relations to other concepts, and to
thoughts. So, concept cores, then, are implicated in determining the facts of concept
combinations and also of the truth conditions of thoughts.
The problems with a hybrid view such as this are not insubstantial. Firstly, there is the
major problem of specifying the content of a concept's core. Osherson & Smith assume
that some traditional theory of concepts might correctly characterise concept cores.
Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman (1983) also assume that a theory like classical theory
must specify the content of conceptual cores. Unfortunately, this theory of concepts,
classical theory, is also one that has been widely rejected and for the simple reason
that, in the case of natural kind terms in particular, the contents of such concepts are
nearly impossible to specify. The constraint that the concept should specify necessary
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and sufficient conditions, if applied to concept cores, renders the hybrid view just as
unsuccessful an elucidation of concepts as was classical theory. And if this constraint
is not to be applied to concept cores, then one must be left to wonder what principled
distinction can be drawn between a concept's core and its identification procedures. For,
after all, if both these specify contingent properties of instances of the concept, then on
what grounds do we partition this content between core and identification procedure?
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the proposal in favour of the core/identification
procedures distinction amounts to a relegation of the psychological. That is, it relegates
the psychological significance of prototypes to nothing more than a function of iden¬
tification. However, as Lakoff points out, the thrust of Rosch's early work was to do
with thinking and reasoning. Prototypes are not implicated merely in identification
but also in "making inferences, doing calculations, making approximations, planning,
comparing, making judgements, and so on — as well as in defining categories, extending
them, and characterising relations among subcategories. Prototypes do a great deal of
the real work of the mind, and have a wide use in rational processes" (Lakoff, 1987;
p. 96). The point being that prototypes are implicated in thought and the attempt to
relegate them to identification procedures must be considered to be unsatisfactory from
the point of view of a study of thought. This, then, is our view of hybrid theories.
6.4 Necessity and Counterfactual Conditionals
Now, as we have mentioned above, the main argument against all these expositions of
concepts and of sense is that provided by both Kripke and Putnam. Their focus is on
necessity and the possibility of obtaining analytic definitions for natural kind terms.
Just as we saw in the last chapter the logic of the argument is straightforward. If a
word has a meaning or sense then there will be some statement, expressing an analytic
truth, whose truth will depend solely on the meaning of the words in the statement.
So, for example, assuming bachelor to have the meaning "unmarried adult male", the
statement bachelors are unmarried adult males should be true simply in virtue of its
meaning, that is, analytically true.
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In the case of natural kind terms, such meanings are difficult to find as, indeed, are
any statements which are deemed to be analytic in virtue of the meaning or sense of a
natural kind term. The difficulty arises because analytic truths are also deemed to be
ones whose truth is necessary and knowable a priori. The task, then, is to find some
statement which both defines a natural kind term and is at the same necessarily true
and knowable a priori. The arguments of Kripke and Putnam are such as to suggest
that this task is, for all practical purposes, beyond us, and their conclusion is that
the meanings of natural kind terms cannot be given by a simple analytic definition or a
simple Fregean sense. The main argument for this conclusion comes from a consideration
of counterfactual conditionals.
Suppose that tiger means "large, striped, carnivorous, quadrupedal feline". The problem
with this particular putative simple definition is that there are counterfactual circum¬
stances in which a tiger may not have these properties. Some tigers may lose one of
their legs becoming three-legged as opposed to quadrupedal. Were the above definition
to express a necessary truth, however, to say that a tiger had three legs would simply
be a contradiction. The fact that it seems not to be a contradiction, indicates that the
definition does not exemplfy the meaning of tiger. Similar counterfactuals can be imag¬
ined. Suppose certain tigers became mysteriously infected and never developed stripes.
These beasts would still, seemingly, remain tigers, yet according to the definition they
would not. And similarly with virtually all the other properties of the definition.
Arguments such as these, then, are sufficient to convince Kripke that natural kind terms,
just as proper names, do not have Fregean senses. Putnam advances similar arguments
and reveals another aspect to this position on natural kinds: essentialism.
A natural kind term is a term that plays a special kind of role. If I de¬
scribe something as a lemon or as an acid, I indicate that it is likely to have
certain characteristics ...; but I also indicate that the presence of those
characteristics, if they are present, is likely to be accounted for by some
'essential nature' which the thing shares with other members of the natural
kind. What the essential nature is is not a matter of language analysis but
of scientific theory construction;... Thus it is tempting to say that a natural
kind term is simply a term that plays a certain kind of role in scientific
or pre-scientific theory: the role, roughly, of pointing to common 'essen-
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tial features' or 'mechanisms' beyond and below the obvious 'distinguishing
characteristics'.
(Putnam, 1975; pp. I4O-I41)
So, in many respects, what Kripke and Putnam have in mind is a theory of natural kind
terms which play a role analogous to proper names in that they name natural kinds,
each member of the kind sharing the essence of the kind. Indeed, Kripke suggests that
natural kind terms are rigid designators just as he assumes proper names to be. Now
this recourse to the notion of essential properties is a vital aspect of the Kripke-Putnam
position. Without it there can be no grounds for claiming something is a member of
a certain kind. That is, according to Kripke and Putnam it is right to think that an
entity is, say a lemon, because it possesses certain properties common to lemons, it is just
that these are properties that are not obvious, perhaps ones revealed in chromosomal
structure. So it is, then, that Putnam in The Meaning of Meaning argues that uses of
water rely on the presupposition that the substance referred to is the same, in Putnam's
sense of same, as the stuff that is referred to as water in the linguistic community in
which these uses are embedded. The position, then, relies on the presumption of essence:
on there being a fact of the matter concerning whether this bit of stuff is the same as
some other bit of stuff.
One of the consequences of the Kripke-Putnam position is a failure to explain how it is
that language users may use natural kind terms and exploit their uses to extract and
convey information. The failure arises from the fact that essential properties, which
may well determine the true conditions of use of a word, cannot be said to determine
the way in which the word is actually used. For not only do people undoubtedly use
such terms to describe entities that do not have the appropriate essential properties,
but all their uses of the word must also be made on the basis of ignorance. Ignorance of
whether the entity in question has the requisite essence. Since whether or not a given
entity possesses certain essential properties is generally an unknown, the actual use of
words must be based on properties other than essential ones. And, as we suggested in
Chapter 1, it is these properties, the properties on which uses are made, that invest
such uses with informational content. So, if we are to have a theory about how it is
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that people decide to use the word lemon and how it is that some uses can convey
information such as "yellow, oval-shaped fruit", we will need to appeal to something
other than essential properties. We will need, in particular, to appeal to properties of
which language users may have knowledge.
In this there is also an echo of the distinction that we drew in Chapter 1. Here we
distinguished between whether an entity can be said to be an X, that is, whether the
word X might apply to it, and whether that entity can be said to be an X. Now the
arguments of Kripke and Putnam are such as to run these two questions together and
it is precisely because of the presumption that natural kinds have essential properties
together with the assumption that natural kind terms are like proper names. That is,
they name natural kinds. Consequently, the only answer to the question of when an
entity can be said to be an X, where X is a natural kind word, is the answer, when that
an entity is an X.
So, we have good reasons to view the conclusions of Kripke and Putnam with some
scepticism and, as we suggested in the last chapter, our position is one of viewing the
argument as an inadvertent reductio on the conception of analyticity which it presumes.
To re-iterate, our position is as follows. Kripke and Putnam presume that analytic
statements are ones whose truth is both necessary and knowable a priori. The failure
to find any necessary truths underlying the behaviour of natural kind terms leads them
to suppose the existence of essential properties and to suppose, further, that natural
kind terms do not possess simple Fregean senses. There are reasons, however, to regard
this conclusion as unsatisfactory. Firstly, we are led to postulate properties which are
necessarily transcendent of our knowledge. At the current time, for example, scientists
may well conclude that an entity is a lemon because of its chromosomal structure. But
it is consistent with the Kripke-Putnam argument that these scientists may well be
wrong. That in one hundred years time these chromosomal properties turn out to be
more like obvious "distinguishing characteristics" and that some other property appears
to be more essential to lemonhood is, however unlikely, a possibility. Now, according
to the arguments of Kripke and Putnam, were this to be the case then the meaning of
lemon would not have changed. What would have changed would be our knowledge of
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the meaning of the word lemon. One problem with this view is that it follows that it
can never be said, with any certainty, that a given language user either knows or has
grasped the meaning of a word. For it is always logically possible that what she knows
are more akin to distinguishing properties than to essential ones. Another problem with
this view is, of course, the explanation of what does change in hypothetical cases such
as we have considered. Concomitant with a change in our knowledge of the meaning
of a word, comes a change in our use of that word and, consequently, a change in the
information that such uses can convey. For our enterprise of explicating a theory of word
meaning in terms that account for the information associated with the uses of words,
the Kripke-Putnam position, which argues that changes of word use do not imply a
change of meaning, seems inappropriate.
Their conclusion, however, may be viewed as so unsatisfactory for a psychologically
acceptable theory of semantics, one that attempts to explain the actual uses of language,
that we may treat the argument as an inadvertent reductio. Indeed, it seems that this
possibility is precisely what Putnam foresaw in naming his article Is Semantics Possible?
It is the assertion that analytic statements be ones whose truth is necessary that leads to
this apparent reductio. Consequently, our position is that the analytic may be something
other than the necessary a priori. In particular, as we suggested in the previous chapter,
we will pursue the line that it is the contingent a priori.
6.5 The Relational View
By taking contingent a priori truths to be constitutive of meaning, we can attempt to
rescue description theories of natural kind terms. Let us suppose that the following
description gives one set of appropriate conditions for uses of the word tiger. Further,
let us assume that the following description describes the default sense of tiger.






Such a description is reminiscent of the kinds of description that the classical theory
attempted to associate with senses and concepts. The difference, however, is that the
standard argument against such formulations, namely that they do not express necessary
truths, is no longer considered valid. And this is for the simple reason that we do not
require these descriptions to express necessary truths. It is enough that if someone either
knows or has grasped the meaning of tiger, that she either knows or has otherwise
grasped this description, and, further, can manifest their grasping. So, though the
precise nature of the description is clearly open to empirical investigation, the quality
of the description, whether it expresses a necessary or contingent truth is no longer at
issue.
However, in some sense, this is misleading. For there is a real problem with descriptions
such as that above. They simply do not apply to all tigers, and, indeed, they may
apply to non-tigers. The latter consideration should not worry us unduly since we have
already noted that tiger may apply to statues and the like. But the former consideration
does provide grounds for concern. And the concern is, quite simply, that there are other
circumstances, possibly counterfactual circumstances, in which tigers do not have the
properties indicated above.
We indicated earlier (Chapter 4) how we intend accommodating such circumstances as
these. Let us consider the circumstances under which a tiger has only three legs. Such
a beast might well satisfy the description given below, though it will not satisfy that
given above.






The problem is how to account for the fact that a language user may still call this crea¬
ture a tiger, despite it not satisfying the description which that language user associates
with the word tiger. In Chapter 4 we attempted to solve this problem by considering
the description that would result from combining concepts. In this case, let us consider
combining the concepts tiger and, say, amputee. Now the concept for amputee, let us
suppose, informs us that an entity which had x limbs now has x — 1 limbs. Though our
attribute-value language cannot represent this relation perspicuously, we will write it as
follows.
That is, the concept for amputee expresses a relation between kinds of description.
Essentially, it says that, given any description of the type indicated by
it will return the very same description except for one change. Namely, that the above




Combining the description given for the concept tiger with that given for the concept
amputee results in the following description.






This description is satisfied by our three-legged tiger, though, presumably, combining
the concept tiger with concepts other than amputee would result in similar descriptions.
Likewise, one can imagine what may happen in the cases of genetically abnormal tigers,
ones whose stripes have faded, even ones whose four-leggedness is simply the result of
an optical illusion. In each case we can assume that the appropriate description may
be arrived at by a suitable process of concept combination. The concepts genetically
abnormal, faded, and optical illusion, for example, are all ones which may be implicated.
Indeed, in this regard our position is not so distant from Putnam's. Just as the im¬
portance of considering our theories of what may happen to natural kinds is obvious
to him, so it is to us. All the theories which he explicitly raises, it seems, could be
implicated in the process of generating appropriate descriptions or senses.
Consequently, though we have not provided exhaustive analyses of multiple examples,
our position is that it is by these means that we can argue that description theories of
natural kind terms may be rescued.
6.6 A Reconciliation
In the earlier sections of this chapter we attempted to highlight two trends in the
literatures of contemporary psychology and analytic philosophy. Firstly, we attempted
to show that the same simple analytic conception pervaded both, leading to classical
theory in the psychological literature on concepts and the positions of Frege and Russell
with regard to proper names. The first trend, then, was the trend away from these
views to those defined by cluster-concept approaches. In psychology, we see this in
prototype theory and, in contemporary analytic philosophy, we see this in the rejection
of the Frege-Russell position by philosophers such as Searle and Strawson. The second
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trend, however, is a move away from description theories altogether and, though we see
this in the arguments of Kripke and Putnam, there are few comparable arguments in
the psychological literature. Indeed, the prevailing view of concepts appears to be that
these are best described by some version of prototype theory. So, the second trend is a
divergence of psychological and philosophical views. The current framework, one which
concentrates on the informational content associated with word uses, has attempted
to attain degrees of both philosophical and psychological respectability. In order to
show this, let us consider in more detail the relation between the view I have proposed
and that which Putnam proposes in his attempt to argue that semantics is, despite its
difficulties, still possible.
Putnam's solution accords considerable significance to the fact that the meanings of
(certain) words may be conveyed with remarkable ease.
The fact that one can acquire the use of an indefinite number of new words,
and on the basis of simple 'statements of what they mean', is an amazing
fact: it is the fact, I repeat, on which semantic theory rests.
(Putnam, 1975; p. 149)
So, any theory of word meaning should presumably respect this central fact and it is
this that Putnam's notion of core fact is intended to do. For Putnam, associated with
each natural kind term is a stereotype: "the associated idea of the characteristics of a
normal member of the kind". Now, to convey the meaning of a term is to convey the core
facts associated with that term which are, according to Putnam, the stereotype and the
extension of the term. However, as Putnam goes on, the extension need not always be
given since the hearer may always consult an expert on the matter of the appropriate
extension for a given term. In certain circumstances, though, where the hearer may
attach the kind word to the wrong natural kind, extra help must be given. That is, it is
necessary to communicate some means of getting the extension right, perhaps by giving
a sample of the correct extension, just as one might give a colour sample.
Now, it is clear that much of what Putnam has said is consistent with our account.
Firstly, the fact that we may associate a default description with the concept of a
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natural kind term respects Putnam's considerations in favour of the notion of stereotype.
And, indeed, it seems that, in many ways, Putnam's conclusion is a vindication of our
position. Particularly, in the way that we treat the role of theories in natural kinds.
It is, after all, precisely those explanations that Putnam gives as to why a particular
member of a kind has exceptional properties, that play the role, in our framework, of
determining whether that entity can be described by a use of the corresponding natural
kind term. That is, when Putnam tells us of the possibility of a gas descending into the
atmosphere, turning all lemons blue, he has provided precisely the kind of "explanation"
that, according to our framework, language users will employ in determining whether a
blue, oval-shaped fruit can be called a lemon.
Where we disagree with Putnam is in his claim that descriptions such as those we have
given do not explicate the meanings of natural kind terms. But, as we have argued, this
depends upon one's prior conception of what meaning relations should be like. In par¬
ticular, if one regards meaning relations as being contingent then those descriptions we
have given can be thought of as explicating meaning. It is only the insistence that mean¬
ing relations should have the property of necessity that suggests the contrary. Indeed,
it is the insistence that a natural kind term should act as a name, a rigid designator,
of a kind that disallows the possibility of explicating an account of natural kind terms
in terms of descriptions. Yet it is just this kind of account that is being sought in the
psychological literature where the concern is less with the question of whether a given
entity is a such-and-such and more with whether the entity can be said to be a such-
and-such, more with whether the entity falls under the concept such-and-such. It is in
this spirit, the spirit of moving toward a reconciliation of contemporary psychological
and philosophical views, that we propose the possibility of rescuing description theories
of natural kind terms: a possibility raised by construing the uses of these words as be¬
traying multiple meaning relations, each having the properties of being both contingent




Instead, the concepts that people use are constructed in working memory
from knowledge in long-term memory by a process sensitive to context and
recent experience. Concepts in working memory may be stable under some
conditions, however, concepts typically appear to vary widely as a function of
goals, current context, and recent experience. Although theoretical abstrac¬
tions that correspond to invariant concepts may serve some useful theoretical
and empirical purposes, it may generally be more useful and more accurate
to view concepts as temporary constructions in working memory.
(Barsalou, 1987; p. 135)
In Chapter 1 we talked about the relations between the studies of word meaning and
of concepts. In Chapter 4 we discussed some of the literature on concepts in order to
motivate a particular view of sense generation. In this chapter, we return to a theory
of concepts, namely, prototype theory, and re-examine it from the perspective of the
relational view we have developed.
As we suggested in the previous chapter, prototype theory stands little obvious chance
of withstanding the force of a Kripkean attack. In evaluating the claim that senses
must be explicable in terms of necessary truths, there are two options for prototype
theory. One is to conclude that prototypes do express necessary truths by means of the
disjunction of contingent ones. The other is to claim that prototypes do not describe
senses. This last option, it seems, is the one that Kripke would have us take. But, as we
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have seen, psychology seems to be of the opinion that prototypes do describe senses. At
least, it is prototypes that are deemed to be implicated in the compositional semantics
of sentences and phrases. This impasse between philosophical and psychological views
is of exactly the same nature as that between Kripke's position on proper names and
the position of the description theorists. Just as we saw in Chapter 6, a way of restoring
confidence in the psychological claim that senses may be described by concepts is to
treat the Kripkean argument as a reductio on the conception of analyticity which it
presumes.
Thus, one goal of this chapter is to spell out a plausible alternative to the traditional
analytic view of concepts. This we attempt in section 7.3. The means by which we
approach this task is via an evaluation of prototype theory. In the next section, then,
we offer an outline of prototype theory and classify it in terms of the choices of Chapter 2.
In section 7.2 we detail a number of problems with prototype theory. Some of these are
directly suggestive of an alternative, namely the Relational View, which we consider in
section 7.3 though we now rename it the Family of Constraints (or FoC) view. After
a brief re-iteration of this view's main points, we turn to re-interpreting prototype
theory by means of a detailed comparison with the FoC view. Among the results of
this comparison are the suggestions that the FoC view is better placed to interpret
both Barsalou's claim that concepts are simply convenient fictions and Wittgenstein's
observations and comments concerning family resemblance. Indeed, it is this fact that
suggests the new name for the view presented in Chapter 4.
The motivation for this comparison between prototype theory and the FoC view is
twofold. Firstly, we hope that the claim concerning prototype theory is not simply that
it is flawed in certain respects, but that these flaws appear because it may be attempting
to describe problems at a different level from the FoC view. That is, we hope to make
sense of the flaws in prototype theory. Secondly, the comparison is motivated by the
fact that the assumptions of the FoC view are such as to undermine the motivation for
prototype theory. Let us consider this second reason in a little more detail.
One way of examining the psychological enterprise of viewing the senses of words in
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terms of prototype concepts, is as an explicit attempt to capture the necessity of such
senses. For example, Smith & Osherson's (1984) model assumes that, for each attribute
relevant to a category, the prototype concept specifies the set of possible values. That
is, the set of values that it is possible for the instances of the category to assume.
Specifying all such possibilities would, indeed, amount to specifying all counterfactual
possibilities and such a specification, in disjunctive terms, would clearly be necessary of
every instance of the category.
Now what is of interest for our purposes is the consequence of adopting our alternative
conception of analyticity, for this does not require a sense to express necessary truths.
Indeed, they may express truths which are only contingent. So, such a conception of
analyticity obviates the motivation for this move by prototype theorists in favour of
disjunctive properties, though, it does not, of course, obviate the empirical observations
which motivate the notion of prototypes. And, in this, lies the interest. For, if the
need for a prototype treatment of senses is obviated, how are we to interpret prototype
theory? How much, then, of prototype theory is in accordance with our FoC view and
how much not? Answering these questions, then, forms the other major focus of the
present chapter.
We begin, then, by outlining the basic features of prototype theory and two recent
models of prototype concepts.
7.1 Classifying Prototype Theory
The choices in Chapter 2 principally concern word meanings and how they might be
mentally represented in terms of the components of some "mental lexicon". In section 1.3
we hinted at the close relation between concepts and word meanings and, indeed, in
Chapter 6 this relationship was further specified: our discussion has illustrated that,
within the psychological literature, the mental representations of word meanings are
taken to be concepts. That is, (at least, a subset of) concepts are taken to be components
of some "mental lexicon". In this section we will, therefore, be concerned to elucidate
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precisely what claims are made by a particular theory of concepts, namely prototype
theory, in terms of the choices for theories of word meaning we have already outlined.
Before we consider these choices, let us outline the theory under consideration, prototype
theory.
7.1.1 Prototype Theory
Prototype theory is an umbrella term for a large number of different approaches to
concepts and word meaning. Though a number of these are quite recent, the history of
prototype theory is relatively long, at least in terms of contemporary cognitive psychol¬
ogy, and many of its roots can be traced to the debate concerning the possible relativity
of thought to language. Our goal in this section is far more modest than a detailed
history of prototype theory would require, and it is, quite simply, to outline the current
conception of prototype theory, the conception which guides a considerable amount of
contemporary research into concepts.
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, Hampton (1990) offers a number of properties
which may be taken as defining the standard view of prototype concepts. Namely, the
following four conditions. The prototype concept specifies a set of weighted attributes
and it further specifies, for each attribute, the allowable range of values. Similarity
of an entity to the prototype concept is determined both by a process of matching
attribute-value pairs and by the weightings attached to the attributes. The typicality
of an exemplar is determined by that exemplar's degree of similarity to the prototype
concept. The prototype concept also specifies a threshold level or criterion of similarity
below which a member of the category cannot fall. That is, the threshold determines
membership: if the similarity of an entity is lower than threshold, then the entity does
not fall under the concept; if the similarity is higher than threshold, the entity does fall
under the concept.
Theories which match these conditions are not too difficult to imagine. Indeed, the
conditions above are highly reminiscent of those we enumerated in Chapter 5 in defining
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"cluster-concept" approaches to proper names. But to place a little flesh on these meagre
bones, let us reflect on a couple of the more explicit versions of prototype theory. These
are firstly, the "Knowledge Representation Model" of Cohen & Murphy (1984) and
secondly, the "Selective Modification Model approach of Smith et. al. (1988).
Cohen & Murphy's model has four basic features.
1. Concepts have roles which are filled by feature lists or values.
2. Concepts are organised hierarchically so that certain roles and values may be
inherited, though only by default.
3. Roles are restricted so as to take only particular values.
4. The instances or tokens of concepts are also concept-like descriptions that are
subsumed by the concept.
Further to these points, Cohen & Murphy also assume that the possible values for a
given role are ordered according to typicality. They also assume that the subordinates
of a given concept are ordered according to typicality. So, for example, the subordinates
of the concept bird would be ordered ... robin ... chicken ... penguin .... Similarly, the
values are ordered. The concept bird, for example, has a moves role whose possible
values are ordered .. .flies ... walks ... swims This is portrayed in Table 7.1.
The other version of prototype theory we will consider is Smith & Osherson's (1984)
"representational" model. In their later paper, Smith et. al. (1988) propose a "Selective
Modification Model" which, while it is similar in spirit, is not identical to the "Repre¬
sentational" model they proposed in Smith & Osherson (1984). Hence, the outline is
based on the formal presentation of the later paper, though some of the comments I
draw on are to be found in the earlier paper. Wherever possible, I will try to indicate
the precise source.
Smith & Osherson assume a representation for prototype concepts that embodies the
following aspects.















Table 7.1: A Schematic for Cohen & Murphy's (1984) Knowledge Representation Model:
the Prototype Concept for Bird.
1. The representation possesses a set of relevant attributes for the concept.
2. For each attribute, the representation specifies a set of possible values, or features,
that instances of the concept can assume.
3. The representation specifies a weighting ("votes"), or salience measure, for each
possible value of each attribute.
4. Each attribute is itself weighted, this being termed that attribute's diagnosticity.
Smith & Osherson assume that objects may be described in a similar manner and that
the process of determining whether or not a given object is an instance of the concept
is a relatively complex process of attribute-matching. It goes as follows.
An object will typically receive "votes" for only one possible value of each attribute.
A prototype concept will typically receive votes for many such possible values. The
similarity of an object to a prototype concept is determined by a version of Tversky's
(1977) "contrast" rule. That is, for each attribute, the number of votes which match
for both the object and the prototype concept are summed and subtracted from this
are the number of votes for which no match is achieved. For example, assume that the










Table 7.2: A Schematic for Smith & Osherson's (1988) Selective Modification Model:
the Prototype Concept for Apple.
prototype concept has the following weighted values for the attribute colour: red 25;
green 5; brown 0. Assume that the object has the following for its colour attribute: red
20. Then the number of matches are 20 (on the red value) and the number of mismatches
are 10 (5 from the red value, 5 from green and 0 from brown). So the overall "matching"
sum is 20 — (5 + 5 + 0) = 10. This number is then multiplied by the diagnosticity of the
colour attribute and the result for each attribute is summed to give an overall total of
the similarity of the object to the prototype concept. One of the great virtues of Smith
& Osherson's model, then, is its explicit formulation. In Table 7.2 we reproduce their
description of the prototype concept for apple.
In the following sections we will have much to say concerning the nature of the two
models we have considered and the nature of prototype theory, in general. For now,
however, we will simply point out one of the ways in which these models of prototype
concepts differ. Both the models of Cohen & Murphy and Smith & Osherson explicitly
encode typicality differences in terms of an ordering over the values a given attribute may
take. However, in each case, the precise details are distinct. Cohen & Murphy's model
assumes a simple linear, that is, ordinal, ordering: the prototype concept contains lists
of values where ordinal position in the list reflects typicality. Smith & Osherson's model,
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to be essentially free-valued. That is, values may be listed according to the size of the
corresponding weight, but typicality is determined by the size of that weight, not by
ordinal position in the list. So, whatever else one may say about these models, they do
at least have interesting differences. The model of Cohen & Murphy, for instance, would
hold that, for a particular attribute of a particular concept, the difference in typicality
between the second and third most typical values equals the difference in typicality
between the least and next to least most typical values. Whether this would suggest
that the difference in "birdness" between a robin and a sparrow equals that between
an emu and a penguin is a matter for Cohen & Murphy. That the model of Smith &
Osherson is not similarly committed is clear from the fact that their model stipulates
no relation between the weightings of different values. For them, the determination of
such weights is, presumably, an empirical matter.
This difference aside, the two models are very similar and both fit Hampton's desiderata
concerning prototype theory. In the remaining sections we outline some of the arguments
against models such as these, before engaging in a comparison of these models with the
Relational View, or FoC view, outlined in Chapter 4.
7.1.2 Are Prototypes Conditional or Unconditional?
In section 1.4, we suggested that under those views that equate concepts with the
mental representation of word meanings, concepts can be seen to stand in the relation
of attunement to word meanings. However, this raises the issue of the kind of meaning
relations to which concepts express attunement. In particular, whether such relations
are unconditional or conditional.
As we saw in section 1.4, unconditional constraints have the property of holding in all
situations. No matter what situation is under consideration it must be of a type such
that the constraint is a component of that situation. Conditional constraints, on the
other hand, hold only in certain types of situation. That is, not all situations must have
conditional constraints as components. Now, to see whether we should conceive of pro-
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totype concepts as expressing attunement to unconditional or conditional constraints,
let us proceed as follows.
Firstly, let us assume that concepts express attunement to conditional constraints. One
conditional constraint pertaining to apples, for example, might be that they have pips.
Such a constraint is conditional because we can conceive of conditions, such as those
relating to genetic malformation, under which things which are apples do not have
pips. Yet such a constraint is a constraint, because it is the case that under certain
circumstances knowing such-and-such is an apple can carry information to the effect
that the very same such-and-such has pips. In situations, for example, where all the
apples do have pips. So, let us assume, for sake of argument, that this is the constraint
to which our concept of apple expresses attunement. We can write it as follows.
Si =» S2 I B
where B is the type of situation where, among others, the conditions associated with
certain kinds of genetic malformation do not hold, Si is the type of situation in which
a given entity is an apple, and 52 is the type of situation in which that same entity has
pips. Let us write this more informally as follows.
apple(x) =>■ has-pips(x) | B
To be consistent with our discussion of prototype theory, we can formulate a related
concept-like description in terms of attributes and values as follows.
[ contains: { pips | J
So, the claim that we are examining is, to be precise, not exactly the claim that concepts
express attunement to conditional constraints, but that they express attunement only to
conditional constraints. Now, there are several points that can be made in response to
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this claim. Firstly, the above constraint applies only in situations of type B and yet this
local nature is not traditionally a characteristic of concepts. Concepts, it is traditionally
assumed, apply in all situations in which entities falling under that concept exist. Since,
there are thought to be no a priori conditions on the existence of entities, that is, it
cannot be said a priori that such-and-such thing cannot exist in such-and-such situation
there can be no restrictions on the domain of application of the concept.1 That is,
according to traditional views we cannot claim that the concept of apple applies only in
certain situations.
Secondly, the question must be raised as to what is involved in deciding that an apple
without pips is, nonetheless, an apple. For this job is traditionally conceived as that of
the concept for apple. Yet if the above constraint is constitutive of this concept, then
it cannot deliver any judgement on an apple without pips. So, according to traditional
views, a concept must be much richer in information than concepts like that above. It
must deliver judgement on all entities to which it applies, not just some. That is, the
concept of apple must apply to all apples, not just those with pips.
Such considerations as these do indeed inform traditional views of concepts and the
position we develop later will be in stark opposition to these views. However, for
present purposes it is sufficient to recognise that traditional theories of concepts require
a concept X to apply to all entities which are X, and that, since there can be no a
priori argument to the effect that Xs can only exist in certain types of situation, such
traditional views require concepts to apply, in principle, in all situations. That is,
traditional views of concepts are, in our parlance, seen as expressing attunement to
unconditional constraints.
This fact can be seen in one of the oft cited claims for support for prototype theory,
family resemblance. Wittgenstein's (1953) observations of family resemblance concern
the failure to find any common elements underlying the category of games. A similar
observation holds for our example, apples: some are pipless, others have pips. The
possession of pips, then, is not a common property of apples and, in this, apples appear
'Of course, this is not true if we allow circularity. That is, we could say that apples do not exist in
situation of type A, and define A as the type of situation in which apples do not exist.
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to exhibit a family resemblance structure. In prototype theory, such facts as these are
taken as evidence not that there are no common properties for certain categories, but
that, for those categories, there axe no common simple properties. To be explicit, the
simple property having pips would not be common, but the complex disjunctive property
having pips or not having pips would be common. And, in this move of explicitly
introducing disjunction, one can see the goal of trying to preserve the notion that there
may be common properties to the instances of a category. Indeed, one can go further
and suggest that, in this way, prototype theory is attempting to establish conditions
which are truly necessary of instances of the concept. Whether this genuinely reflects
Wittgenstein's own views on family resemblance is, of course, open to question, but the
quote with which Chapter 5 began suggests otherwise. Indeed, we will assume that it was
Wittgenstein's point that there may be no truly necessary conditions on the instances
of a concept, even complex, disjunctive conditions. That is, following Wittgenstein,
suggesting that disjunctive properties axe common properties is tantamount to playing
with words. Nonetheless, interpreting prototype theory in this way, as an attempt to
establish necessary and sufficient complex conditions on the application of a concept,
makes the view that prototype concepts express attunement to unconditional constraints
even more compelling.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that if we view concepts as expressing attunement to
constraints then prototype concepts express attunement to unconditional constraints.
7.1.3 One or More
In Chapter 2, we discussed the logical possibility of regarding the various uses of a single
word as exploiting more than one meaning relation or constraint. The counterpart of
this choice for our discussion of concepts is whether or not prototype theory is committed
to the view that more than just one concept X is implicated in determining whether an
entity is or is not an X.
The models of Cohen & Murphy and Smith & Osherson (1984) are unequivocally com-
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mitted to the view that the process of judging whether or not a given instance falls
under a concept is a function of the description of that instance and of the appropriate
prototype concept. For example, determining whether a given individual is an apple,
depends on how we describe the properties of the individual and on the concept ap¬
ple. So their view is that whether or not a given object is an instance of a category is
determined by the one concept for that category. As we shall see later, this view has
some unfortunate consequences with respect to a number of psychological considera¬
tions. However, for now, we will simply note that, as far as prototype theory is explicit
on this matter, the determination of whether a given entity is or is not an instance of a
category X is achieved by the single concept X.
Before concluding this section, let me make it clear that we are not suggesting that
Smith & Osherson cannot account for certain effects of interaction among concepts. For
example, having the concept of cup distinct from the concept of mug, may enable us
to think of cups as cups. It may also, in many cases, prevent us from thinking of cups
as mugs and vice versa. However, were we not to have the concept of cup we might
well normally think of cups as mugs. Thus, a concept may prohibit other concepts from
applying to entities within its domain. In this, concepts may behave similarly to words
in that the presence of one word may block other words. For example, the word cup
may prevent or block the use of the phrase mug from applying to cups. Ignorance of
the word cup, however, allows mug to apply to cups.
So, we cannot, and nor do we mean to, discount the possibility that Smith & Osherson
can account for various forms of interaction among concepts. However, in terms of
a synchronic account of which conceptual organisation determines whether an entity
is or is not an X, the assumption is that this determination is achieved by the single
concept X. That is, not only are prototype concepts seen as expressing attunement to
unconditional constraints, it is deemed that each expresses attunement to one single
constraint. One unconditional constraint, then, is thought to determine the conditions
of application of concepts.
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7.2 Some Apparent Problems
In this section we consider only some of the more obvious problems associated with
prototype theory. That is, we are not attempting to exhaustively evaluate prototype
theory, but merely those aspects on which we will later compare prototype theory with
the Relation View, or FoC view, developed in Chapter 4. Necessarily, some of these
issues we will have already discussed in motivating the Relational View but, in most
cases, the discussion here will be significantly different. Our first consideration concerns
the adequacy or otherwise of prototype theory in accounting for the development of
concepts.
7.2.1 Coherence
Murphy & Medin (1985) concentrate on an issue to which any theory of concepts should
have an answer: conceptual coherence. Roughly, the question is as follows: what makes
such-and-such group of individuals fall together under the same concept? As we have
already seen, the view according to prototype theory is that individuals "fall together"
because of some intrinsic similarity to one another, this similarity being determined by
a prototype concept. That is, all these individuals will be similar to one another to the
degree that they may share certain attributes and values. Should they share sufficient
of these, then they will be judged similar, and grouped under the same concept. So
similarity, being determined by attribute-value matching, determines the coherence of
concepts. It is the thrust of Murphy & Medin's article that this view of conceptual
coherence is woefully inadequate.
Murphy & Medin's enterprise is one of demonstrating that any approach to conceptual
coherence which ignores higher level "theories" of the world will be lacking. The spe¬
cific goal which is of interest given our current purposes, however, concerns whether the
models of prototype concepts offered earlier can capture the coherence of concepts. One
example Murphy & Medin offer concerns the concept intoxicated. It is quite unlikely
that such a concept would incorporate the description jumps into swimming pools fully
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clothed, yet, on certain occasions, the truth or otherwise of this description may well
determine whether an individual is categorised as being intoxicated. Murphy & Medin's
explanation of examples such as this is that acts of categorisation are made with refer¬
ence to our knowledge of theories of the world. So, for example, in categorising someone
as intoxicated, we are aided by our theories of intoxicated individuals, theories of house
parties, theories of drowning and of heroism, among others. That is, categorising an
individual as falling under a concept is not determined solely by that concept, but rather
by that concept in conjunction with numerous relevant theories.
Let us be a little more precise about this. As we indicated earlier (section 4.1), Murphy
& Medin also note the important role in categorisation played by our knowledge of
"constraints about operations that are permissible" (p. 295). They offer the following
example.
Suppose that all the soda cans you have come into contact with have been
7.5cm in diameter and that all the silver dollars you have seen have been
4cm in diameter. Suppose further that you are told that some entity has a
diameter of 5cm and you are asked whether it is more likely to be a soda
can or a silver dollar.
(Murphy & Medin, 1985; pp. 295-296)
Murphy & Medin suggest that one is more likely to judge the 5cm wide object as a
soda can since it is an aspect of our theories of monetary systems that coins of a given
denomination are of a uniform size. That is, it is not similarity as computed by some
simple attribute-value matching metric that determines whether we view such an entity
as a can or a coin, but rather the determination arises, as Murphy & Medin state, from
"knowledge about transformations and operations associated with concepts, and this,
in turn, relies heavily on our general world knowledge" (p. 296).
Murphy & Medin point out that they do not intend to offer a model of concepts but,
rather, to articulate constraints on any such model. The thrust of their article is to
suggest that concepts are embedded in theories. Conceptual coherence is seen as arising
from the fact that a concept may be related to a number of theories of how the world
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operates. So, for example, we can say that determining whether an instance falls under
the concept of lemon does not depend on a superficial similarity metric. Instead, it
may depend on our ability to infer and reason about the possible attributes of lemons.
We might, for example, reason just as Putnam does. That is, we might reflect on the
possibility that some gas has descended into the atmosphere and turned all lemons blue.
So, from then on, determining whether an instance falls under the concept lemon will
depend not on whether the instance is yellow or, for that matter, blue, but whether we
can infer some kind of relationship between its properties and the properties of those
things we know to be lemons. That is, we must work out why this thing is blue when
all the other lemons we have previously come across have been yellow. Provided we
can reason as to why a lemon would appear blue, then blue lemons can be categorised
as lemons. Presumably, the converse is also true. Namely, if we cannot reason as to
why lemons might appear blue, then we will not categorise any blue thing as a lemon.
Explanations such as these, it seems, is what Murphy & Medin mean by "theories".
Coupled to their view of conceptual coherence arising from theories is a suggestion that
ties it simply to the number of "explanatory links". Decorating bathrooms and eating
out may, for example, not appear to form a very coherent category but, if these activities
are ones which occupy one's partner, then the category gains in coherence. That is, the
coherence of decorating bathrooms and eating out is not derivative on some superficial
similarity but on what else we know that relates them, on their being explanatory links,
and the coherence of a concept can be enhanced simply by adding more explanatory
links. So, one could offer explanations as to why one's partner commonly engaged
in decorating bathrooms and eating out, and such additional explanations would add
coherence.
Needless to say, all these observations concerning conceptual coherence are problematic
for the models of prototype theory we examined earlier, and those like them. We can
make two points in this regard, a theoretical one and a methodological one.
The theoretical point is quite simple and, indeed, ably made by Murphy & Medin: the
models of prototype theory we examined earlier are inadequate as theories of concepts.
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They do not capture the important observation that there are dependencies between
concepts and between the attributes and values of a concept and that these dependen¬
cies play an important role in the psychology of categorisation. Now, the most obvious
response to this is one that has been made by, among others, Osherson & Smith (1981).
They distinguished two aspects to concepts: a core and an identification procedure.
Further, they suggest that prototype theory is best seen only as a theory of the identifi¬
cation procedures associated with concepts and not as their core. Since the conceptual
core is intended as the locus of "those aspects of a concept that explicate its relation
to other concepts, and to thoughts" to suggest that prototype theory does not express
such relations is, therefore, not to argue against prototype theory at all.
However, this response seems unsatisfactory. Murphy &: Medin's case of the soda
can/silver dollar is a case where the categorisation asked for must be made solely on the
basis of perceptual information. It is, prima facie, a case well-suited for prototype the¬
ory, a case which asks solely for an identification judgement. But even were Osherson &
Smith able to offer good reasons why such a case does not constitute a counter-example
to their version of prototype theory, there would be other theoretical reasons for not
accepting the identification procedure/conceptual core distinction, reasons which we
outlined in section 6.3.
The methodological problem is less easy to articulate. The representations offered in
explicating the models of Cohen & Murphy and Smith & Osherson can be thought of
as expressions in some language. We might, for example, think of them as expressions
in some (extended) attribute-value logic (cf. Johnson, 1988). The essence of such lan¬
guages, however, is precisely that they deal in attributes and values. That is, they are
well equipped to express facts concerning objects. We might, for example, uncontrover-
sially assume that our world is inhabited by individuals and that these individuals either
do or do not possess universal properties, such as being red. However, without extending
our metaphysics we cannot talk of relations between individuals, nor relations between
universals. That is, in order to correctly express truisms concerning such relations, we
must enrich our ontology to include relations.2
2We are using relation here so as to exclude one-place relations. That is, here at least, we intend
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Now, what Murphy & Medin have so clearly demonstrated, is the need for a theory of
concepts to be able to express facts about relations, not merely properties. In order to
express some similarity between decorating bathrooms and eating out, a theory should
not appeal to some intrinsic properties of these activities. Rather, it should appeal to
the fact that both activities stand in the same relation, say engages-in, to some salient
individual. What should be clear is that a formal language equipped with an ontology
of attributes and values is particularly ill-suited to expressing facts about relations. So,
one possible response to Murphy & Medin might be along these methodological lines,
that it is the formal language which is conceptually impoverished, not prototype theory
itself.
While these options are indeed open, in general they must be seen as dissatisfying. In
each case, they serve to seriously weaken the claim being made, sometimes even to
the point of invalidating that claim. In the case of the theoretical option of appealing
to a distinction between core and identification procedures, the claim that prototypes
explicate concepts is seriously undermined. Indeed, they are to be regarded as expli¬
cations of how subjects recognise instances of a category, not how they think of them.
That is, under this interpretation, the models we have considered say little, if anything,
about thought. Appealing to the methodological point is less serious. It allows one to
claim that a particular version of prototype theory can account for conceptual coherence
in the way Murphy & Medin suggest but that the formal account fails to express this
fact. However, in the absence of such an account of conceptual coherence accompanying
the models we have examined, we can safely conclude that these models of prototype
concepts do not and cannot adequately account for conceptual coherence.
7.2.2 Developmental Adequacy
The view of concepts which prototype theory offers is, as we have seen, that the concept
X determines for all entities whether that entity is a member of the category of Xs. So,
for example, for all trees it is our concept of tree which determines whether we judge
relation and property as disjoint.
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an entity to be a tree or not. Such a view holds that any developmental changes which
affect judgements on treehood must reflect changes in the concept tree. There appear
to be good reasons to think that this view is simply wrong.
Consider, by way of an example, how it is that one can judge a tree which has been
struck by lightning, nonetheless to be a tree. Firstly, there can be no suggestion that
this is a peculiar skill or one that requires prior knowledge that the entity in question is
a tree. The fact that, on the basis of perceptual evidence alone, people can judge such
scarred and deformed trees to be trees nonetheless, is, I take it, not open to question.
However, what is in question is precisely which concepts they bring to bear in making
such a judgement. Prototype theory would have us believe that people simply use their
concept of tree. Consider, for example, the case of some tree which, having been struck
by lightning, is now horribly disfigured. The claim that recognising this object as a
tree is a function solely of the concept tree, amounts to the claim that such an act of
recognition is in no way dependent on other concepts such as struck by lightning. Now,
the question must be raised, what does it mean to say that someone's recognition of Xs
which have been struck by lightning is in no way dependent on their having the concept
of struck by lightning?
One possibility, the one adopted by prototype theory, is that this claim is such as to
suppose that all the possible attributes for a given concept are simply disjoint. So, for
instance, we may say of apples that their colour is, among others, either red, brown or
green. That is, we specify their possible attributes as a disjunction. So, in specifying
the concept tree, we can specify the possible shapes of trees similarly, to include the
disjunction f2-shaped or S-shaped, where the former is the normal shape of trees and
the latter is the shape of trees struck by lightning. Now, under such a view, recognising
a tree that has been struck by lightning as a tree, would involve determining whether the
disjunction, fNshaped or S-shaped, would be satisfied by that tree. Most importantly,
it would not involve the concept of struck by lightning.
Now, if this is intended as a theory of all concepts, as the framework of prototype theory
suggests, then it seems to be straightforwardly incorrect. Consider the concept dog. This
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concept applies to all manner of objects which are quite dissimilar in appearance. Yet it
is the case that we can recognise many dogs on the basis of perceptual evidence alone.
So, for instance, the concept dog is satisfied by the very youngest puppies and the very
mangiest mongrel. Now, a prototype model of the concept dog might, for example,
specify number of ears disjunctively. The reason is, as Cohen & Murphy and Smith &
Osherson note, due to the fact that the prototype concept dog must specify all possible
values for relevant attributes. Since it is undoubtedly possible that dogs may have
no ears, one ear, or two or more ears, these possibilities must be listed as the terms
of a disjunction. So, for the attribute NUMBER-OF-EARS, the prototype concept dog
might assign a high positive weight for the value two and a low positive weight for, say,
none. Certainly, the disjunction of these values will be satisfied by every dog. But the
problem is that this disjunction fails to express the fact that if a dog has no ears this
is usually for certain reasons. We may, for example, appeal to certain facts regarding
the dog's genetic make-up; we may propose the existence of some chemical imbalance
in the puppies foetal environment; we may speculate that the dog has lost its ears in
an accident. Indeed, there are a host of possible explanations, just as Murphy & Medin
might suggest.
So prototype theory brings with it the suggestion that earless dogs can be categorised as
dogs regardless of whether there is any explanation for their earlessness. The suggestion
is not simply that categorisation does not depend on our knowing the reasons why this
dog has no ears; rather, the suggestion is that categorisation does not depend on our
assuming that there is an explanation. So, the suggestion is that categorisation treats
the relation between a dog with no ears and a dog with ears as being qualitatively of the
same type as that between an apple which is red and one which is green: the presence
or absence of a causal relationship has no effect on the categorisation.
The previous discussion of Murphy & Medin's approach to conceptual coherence pro¬
vides sufficient grounds for us to view this suggestion from prototype theory with sus¬
picion. Indeed, it seems to be plainly false. It just seems to be the case that were there
to be no possible explanation whatever of how a dog has no ears, then we would not
regard it as a dog. Unless, of course, we changed our concept of dog. Similarly, it seems
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that people lacking the concept of lightning, or some similar concept, would not judge
a tree which has been struck by lightning to fall under the concept tree. To expand, if
one is not aware that entities can be altered in such a way as to leave them scarred and
deformed, then one will conclude that there is no conceivable way a tree can come to
look this way.
Consider another example. Suppose that you are not in the possession of the concept
sliced. That is, for you, there is no conceivable way in which, say, a spherical object
can be transformed into a number of circular slices. Now suppose that you come across
a lemon which has been so sliced. The claim that I wish to make is that you will not
admit that such an entity constitutes a lemon, rather that it must be seen as a number
of distinct circular objects which bear certain similarities to lemons. And this is not
because of some deficit in your concept of lemon, rather because you don't possess the
concept sliced.
So, the claim is that developmental changes in judgements of whether an entity is or is
not an X, should be seen not merely as arising from changes in the concept X but also
from changes in, and the acquisition of, other concepts. As we have seen this is both
something which prototype theory cannot account for and something which is perfectly
consonant with the approach of Murphy & Medin. However, before turning to the
next possible problem with prototype theory, let us consider an objection to this claim
concerning development.
It may be objected that the examples concerning lemons and trees show how the con¬
cepts of lemon and tree change on encountering more instances of the appropriate cat¬
egories. So, it might be argued, when we encounter this sliced lemon, initially we don't
judge it to be a lemon because we are not aware that lemons can look this way. That
is, our prototype concept does not specify sliced-shape as one of the possible values for
SHAPE. However, on being told that this sliced thing is a lemon, our concept of lemon
changes: the list of possible values for the SHAPE attribute increase to include sliced-
shape. So, the argument goes, the fact that we may not initially accept a sliced lemon
as a lemon, may be attributable to an impoverished concept of lemon. The fact that we
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later come to accept that lemons can be sliced, demonstrates the fact that this concept
of lemon has changed.
Similar arguments could be raised in the other cases. The example of the tree struck
by lightning shows that, initially, our prototype concept does not include S-shaped as a
possible value of the attribute shape. However, once we are made aware that S-shaped
trees are trees nonetheless, our prototype concept of tree changes so as to include this
possibility. That is, the change in judgement results from a change in the concept tree,
not in the acquisition of the concept struck by lightning.
My response to this particular objection has already been hinted at and it runs as
follows. No doubt there are concepts for which the values of attributes are specified
disjunctively. The fact that apples can be red or green seems an obvious candidate.
So, the argument is not one that suggests the values of attributes cannot be specified
disjunctively. This is not a struggle against disjunction. Rather, the claim is that there
are many cases where the values of attributes are related. The fact that apples may be
brown (brown through being rotten, that is) is a case in point. Here the relationship
between the possible colours of apples, red and brown, say, is qualitatively different to
that between apples being either red or green. In the former case, there is a causal
relationship to which we are attuned: we have words to describe the process, over-ripe,
bruised, rotten. In the latter case there is none. In categorising a rotten, brown apple
as an apple the claim is that we do not simply think of this individual as a brown apple
even though we, perhaps, could: rather we think of it as a rotten, brown apple. To
the degree that a theory of concepts purports to be concerned with thought, any such
theory must reflect facts like these.
So, to repeat, though we could specify the fact that apples may be brown through
being rotten by specifying brown as a possible colour in the prototype concept apple,
the argument is that a psychological theory of concepts should not. Categorisation, as
Murphy & Medin have so ably argued, is sensitive to the causal relationships to which
we are attuned. Any theory of concepts must respect this fact.
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From the standpoint of development, prototype theory fares poorly in explaining how
change in one concept may effect changes in other concepts. So, for example, it paints
a picture of concept development in which information is accrued by static, isolated
concepts. It does not indicate how the presence of one concept, slicing for example,
may affect the applicability of others, lemon say. Such a failure, as our arguments
suggest, must be seen as a significant inadequacy. We will suggest later (section 7.3)
that one reason for this inadequacy is the fact that prototype theory is too abstract a
statement of a theory of concepts.
7.2.3 Representational Economy
In this section we will mention two aspects of prototype concepts which appear to render
them uneconomical in terms of representation. The first relates to the interaction among
concepts that we have discussed in the previous two sections. The second relates to the
significance of the way in which values are assigned weightings.
As we saw in section 7.1.1, a prototype concept must specify all the possible values which
the attributes of that concept may assume. So, for instance, if it is possible that apples
may be blue, as Putnam's arguments (Putnam, 1975) demonstrate, then the concept
must specify blue as a value for the attribute COLOUR. But, of course, it is not simply
the concept apple which must represent such possibilities. Presumably, our concepts
for lemon, tree, tiger, etc., must also specify the possibility that at least one of their
instances could be coloured blue. Indeed, it is difficult to place constraints on what we
may call the proliferation of possibilities for concepts. What are all the possible values
of all the relevant attributes for all concepts? Is the number of possibilities finite?
While such a question is difficult to answer, there are good reasons to suppose that
prototype theory does not have the right one. For prototype theory would maintain
that each prototype concept will specify the possibilities pertaining to its instances.
For example, the prototype concept offered in Table 7.2, would presumably be further
specified to include all possible colours, all possible shapes and all possible textures, not
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to mention sizes, tastes, etc. Yet the puzzling fact is that most of these possibilities will
also be specified by other concepts, concepts such as car, orange, tiger, etc.
Although it is possible that one way of avoiding this difficulty would be to invoke
Cohen & Murphy's suggested mechanism of default inheritance for prototype concepts
(perhaps, the value flat being inherited from the concept object), there seem good reasons
even for not accepting this "solution". As has already been suggested in the two previous
sections, the fact that, say, lemons may be flat is not best thought of as just one more
possibility for the concept lemon to specify. Rather, this possibility is best expressed
as the product of our concept lemon in conjunction with other concepts, say, that for
flattened. Accordingly, such possibilities are not encoded in all concepts for which they
are possibilities, nor in some concept superordinate to those. Rather, they are encoded
in the concepts which express those very possibilities. They are encoded in concept such
as flatten, lightning-strike, slice, etc.
This, then, shows one way in which prototype theory postulates uneconomical represen¬
tations. Facts concerning the possible flattening of various objects should be encoded
in concepts such as flatten, not in each and every concept some of whose instances may
be flattened. So, prototype theory seems committed to there being a reasonable degree
of redundancy of information in concepts. That is, if each prototype concept some of
whose instances can be flattened, specifies this possibility, then essentially the same
information, namely the possibility of flattening, is repeated. So, this is one sense in
which prototype theory can be said to postulate uneconomical representations. The
other sense in which this claim can be made, concerns the fact that prototype theory is
committed to the view that values are weighted.
The weightings that are assigned to the values of a concept can be taken to reflect a
number of things. Smith & Osherson, for example, suggest that, among others, such
weights reflect the subjective probability associated with that value: the subjective
probability that an instance possesses that value given that it is an instance of the
concept. Cohen & Murphy assume that their ordinal ordering reflects a measure of
family resemblance and that this measure is derived in the following way: sum the
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number of features an instance has in common with other instances and subtract the
number it shares with non-instances.
This view is clearly related to the notion of cue validity, roughly, the probability that
given an entity has a certain feature, the entity is of a certain type. Let us consider an
example: the value four lor the attribute NUMBER-OF-LEGS with respect to the concept
dog. Let us assume that the number of relevant instances and non-instances are a, b, c




Now, the conditional probability that something is a dog given that it is four-legged, is
equivalent to The conditional probability that something is four-legged given that
it is a dog, is equivalent to
Now, the problem with views of prototype concepts that assume weightings on val¬
ues reflect some notion of cue validity or subjective probability is simply that these
change. They depend on the number of instances encountered and on the number of
non-instances. So, for example, the probability that an instance is a dog given that
it is four-legged depends not only on the number of four-legged dogs encountered but
also on the number of four-legged non-dogs encountered. The task for a child in the
process of acquiring a prototype concept is to maintain, for each and every such concept,
the number of instances and non-instances encountered. Such a task, as Cohen (1983)
notes, seems at first glance to be "near-impossible" (p. 87).
This, then, is the other sense in which prototype theory can be said to postulate uneco¬
nomical representations. By supposing that the ordering between the values of attributes
is based on notions of cue validity or subjective probabilities, the only way in which such
weights can change over time is if the numbers of instances and of non-instances of cat¬
egories are recorded. This conclusion applies equally to Smith & Osherson's model in
which weights may be free-valued and to Cohen & Murphy's model in which values are
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effectively listed.
7.2.4 Central Exemplars
This section concerns a virtue of prototype theory, namely its treatment of the central
tendency of categories. Prototype theory came into being as a result of the seminal
work of Rosch. In a series of experiments she demonstrated that the central tendency
of categories exhibited what we might think of as enhanced cognition. So, for example,
subjects' judgement of whether or not various instances of bird fall under the concept
bird are made reliably and significantly faster in the cases of typical birds as opposed
to atypical birds. Robins, being fairly typical birds, are judged to be birds faster than,
say, an ostrich. Indeed, on the basis of these reaction time studies, one can deduce
an ordering among exemplars, from those eliciting the shortest response time to those
eliciting the longest. In another experiment, Rosch demonstrated that subjects will quite
readily order instances of a category according to their judged typicality. Though it is
perhaps unsurprising, it has always been taken as strong support for prototype theory
that these two, differently produced orderings of instances, often exhibit remarkable
correlations.
The view that emerges from Rosch's work is that various aspects of our cognizance of
atypical exemplars is dependent on our cognizance of the typical ones. For example,
the time taken to judge whether an entity is an instance of a concept, depends on
how similar the entity is to the typical exemplars of that concept. More properly,
though, it depends on the similarity between the entity and the central tendency of
the category, what has become known as the prototype. So, prototypes, themselves,
are not necessarily descriptions of any particular exemplar, but they are descriptions
embodying the most typical attributes and values associated with the category.
Rosch's work has assumed a central position in the psychology of concepts but it seems
likely that in a very important sense, it has been misunderstood. Lakoff (1987) distin¬
guishes between the prototype effects which Rosch's experiments demonstrate, and the
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claims of representation made on their basis. He distinguishes two interpretations of
prototype effects.
1. The Effects = Structure Interpretation: Goodness-of-example ratings are a direct
reflection of category membership.
2. The Prototype = Representation Interpretation: Categories are represented in
the mind in terms of prototypes (that is, best examples). Degrees of category
membership for other entities axe determined by their degree of similarity to the
prototype.
Lakoff's points are, one: that most versions of prototype theory assume one or other,
and sometimes both, interpretations of prototype effects. Two, that both such interpre¬
tations are not entailed by the existence of prototype effects.
Both points are valid. Prototype effects cannot be directly revealing of mental repre¬
sentation as interpretation 2 would have us believe. Similarly, the issues of goodness-
of-example ratings and membership are logically distinct. The work of Armstrong,
Gleitman & Gleitman (1983), for instance, demonstrates that subjects will readily or¬
der instances according to their perceived typicality, regardless of the facts of their
category membership. In particular, one of Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman's tasks
involved asking subjects for typicality judgements for odd numbers. So, they would be
asked to rate various odd numbers for their typicality of the category of odd numbers.
The fact that subjects do this, while knowing full well that the category has sharp
boundaries, that there are clear conditions of membership and that membership itself
is either all or none, indicates the fallacy in assuming that goodness-of-example ratings
directly reflect graded membership.
Lakoff's intention is to argue against the proposal we have already mentioned, namely
that of partitioning concepts into a core and a set of identification procedures. The
motivation for such a partition comes from studies such as Osherson & Smith (1981) and
Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman (1983) which purport to demonstrate that prototype
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theory cannot be a complete theory of concepts. The rationale of these studies is to
show that there is more to conceptual structure than that revealed by prototype effects.
Correspondingly, the claim is that there is more to conceptual structure than prototype
concepts. However, as Lakoff points out, this rationale is based on the two fallacious
interpretations of prototype effects. So, Lakoff's argument is that versions of prototype
theory like that of Smith & Osherson (1984) are not the only conceivable versions of
prototype theory and, correspondingly, one cannot discount prototypes as playing a role
in the central aspect of a theory of concepts, thought.
Our discussion in this section, then, has been to reflect on some of the original motivation
for prototype theory, namely robust prototype effects. Some theorists have erroneously
interpreted these effects as directly revealing of various aspects of conceptual structure
and representation. Consequently, these theorists have been led to the erroneous view
that it is not possible to characterise adequately a theory of concepts solely in terms of
prototypes. However, these arguments show, instead, that it is not possible for these
theorists to obtain such a characterisation in terms of their models of prototype effects.
Such arguments do not count against the position that prototypes do play a central role
in theories of concepts. They count only against existing models of prototype concepts.
Our conclusion, then, is that the original results of Rosch in demonstrating prototype
effects, the crucial role of the central tendency in categorisation, is unscathed by the
inadequacies of the models we considered earlier (section 7.1.1). Indeed, the claim still
stands: any theory of concepts must account for the importance of the central exemplars,
the central tendency of a category.
7.2.5 Contextual Sensitivity
The models of protoype theory detailed in section 7.1.1 share the property of represent¬
ing what is known as graded structure. Graded structure refers to the fact that subjects
are capable of discriminating members of a category on the basis of how typical they are
of that category. Similarly, non-members of a category can also be ordered according
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to how typical they are of that category. So, for example, with respect to the category
of birds, subjects may generate the following order of most to least typical: sparrow,
penguin, butterfly, golf ball. In Smith & Osherson's "Selective Modification Model",
such graded structure is represented, in part, by the weights attached to the different
values: flies would receive a higher weight than does-not-fly so as to discriminate robins
from penguins; has-beak would discriminate penguins from non-birds such as butterflies.
And so on. Similarly, in Cohen &: Murphy's "Knowledge Representation Model", graded
structure is reflected in the fact that values axe ordered.
The observation of graded structure seems, then, to be part of the motivation of these
models. Hence, it is all the more surprising that these same models cannot account for
some notable findings regarding graded structure. They come from Barsalou (1987).
Barsalou summarises a number of findings which suggest that graded structure is not
simply a function of similarity to the central tendency. Barsalou (1985), for instance,
demonstrated that similarity to the central tendency failed to determine the graded
structure of goal-derived categories such as things to eat on a diet, things to pack in a
suitcase. Also ideals are implicated in determining the graded structure of categories.
For example, the graded structure of things to eat on a diet is partly determined by
how similar an instance is to the ideal thing to eat on a diet, namely something with
zero calories. Barsalou also found that a major determinant of graded structure is
how frequently an exemplar is perceived as instantiating its category. As perceived
frequency of instantiation increases so does typicality. Despite the obvious interest of
this for the models of prototype concepts that we have considered we will focus on a
different determinant of graded structure, context.
Context, broadly construed, can influence the graded structure of categories in a number
of ways. Firstly, in different contexts subjects seem to differentially employ the different
determinants of graded structure we noted above. So, for example, in certain contexts
subjects used ideals to determine graded structure, in other contexts, and for the same
category, they would use the category's central tendency. Similarly, Roth & Shoben
(1983) found that the graded structure of animals depends on linguistic context. In the
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context of milking a cow is more typical than a horse. In the context of riding, this
order is reversed. Perhaps one of the most interesting demonstrations of the instability
of graded structure concerns its determination by subjects' point of view.
Barsalou & Sewell (1984) asked subjects to rate various instances of appropriate cat¬
egories according to a point of view. These points of view were chosen according to
nationality and according to occupation. For example, subjects were asked to rate var¬
ious birds according to their typicality of the concept bird, and from, say, an American
or a Chinese point of view. According to these different perspectives, different graded
structures were indicated. For example, eagle is typical from an American perspective
while atypical from a Chinese perspective.
The weight of evidence supporting the instability of graded structure, renders the models
of section 7.1.1 impoverished, at least, as a theory of concepts. For, to capture such facts
as we have considered, these models would have to specify some means by which the
weights assigned to values may alter. In the absence of such a specification, then, such
facts can only act to disconfirm the hypothesis that such models axe models of concepts,
even, indeed, of identification procedures. One can go further, in fact, and claim that
the whole notion that weights based on subjective probabilities and cue validities can
change with context is simply incoherent. For it is a property of such probabilities and
cue validities that they do not change as a function of context. They should change
only as a function of the number of instances and non-instances encountered.
The considerations of this section provide compelling evidence that any theory of con¬
cepts must explain the variability of the content that is ordinarily associated with the
same concept on different occasions of use. This, then, is one of the standards by which
the view of the next section must be judged. However, before we conclude this section
on some of the deficits of prototype theory, let us briefly return to Barsalou for, in his
description of the nature of concepts, we will find a number of interesting parallels with
the view we present in the next section.
One important question for a theory of concepts is how they are to be mentally rep-
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resented. According to Barsalou there axe two obvious possibilities. The first is that
concepts are represented as invariant structures in long-term memory and that these
representations are accessed on those occasions that the concept is required. Conse¬
quently, the very same conceptual content should be retrieved on all such occasions.
The second possibility is that concepts are represented as constructions in working
memory, the information from which they are constructed being drawn from (possibly)
invariant representations in long-term memory.
The first possibility reflects most traditional views of concepts. Concepts are seen as
having a fixed content and this content is accessed whenever the concept is needed. Such
a view, however, has marked difficulty in accounting for the facts concerning contextual
variability that we have noted, namely, that people tend to associate different informa¬
tion with the same concept on different occasions of use. Indeed, we have suggested
in Chapters 5 and 6 that, with respect to word meaning, the problem of accounting
for the variability of content is created by adopting a traditional analytic view. It is
the very nature of this traditional analytic conception of meaning that meanings are
not sensitive to context, that one and the same meaning holds globally. And, indeed, a
similar conclusion can be applied to theories of concepts.
At any rate, given this problem, Barsalou assumes that the second possibility for a the¬
ory of the source of concepts is the correct one. Thus, according to his view, conceptual
content arises from a constructive process which yields representations in working mem¬
ory from those stored in long-term memory. However, Barsalou, perhaps unsurprisingly,
regards the traditional analytic view of concepts as genuinely mistaken. Whatever else
such a a view may be a view of, it is not to be mistaken for a view of concepts. This is
what he says.
Consequently, the concepts that theorists "discover" for categories may never
be identical to an actual concept that someone uses. Instead, they may be
analytic fictions that are central tendencies or idealisations of actual con¬
cepts. Although such theoretical abstractions may be useful or sufficient
for certain scientific purposes, it may be more fruitful and accurate to de¬
scribe the variety of concepts that can be constructed for a category and to
understand the process that generates them.
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It should be noted that this argument is not meant to imply that there
is no stable knowledge in long-term memory. Instead, the point is that
the same exact representation does not appear to represent a category on
every occasion in working memory. As discussed in the following section,
it is entirely possible for there to be relatively stable knowledge in long-
term memory, but for it rarely to be the case that the same information is
retrieved from this knowledge to represent a category.
(Barsalou, 1987; p. 120)
Barsalou's claim, then, is that concepts, as traditionally conceived, are "fictions".
Though there may be some knowledge stably represented in long-term memory, these
are almost certainly not to be thought of as representing conceptual content. Rather,
the content that we associate with concepts is generated from such stable representa¬
tions according to some mechanism which is sensitive to, among others, context. In
Chapter 4 we presented a view of senses which was motivated, in part, by observations
such as Barsalou's and by the suggestion that senses are mentally represented in terms
of concepts. Hence, that view can be seen, quite naturally, as a view of concepts. In the
next section we briefly re-iterate this view and enumerate the ways in which it purports
to avoid the pitfalls of prototype theory. Having done this, we will attempt a detailed
comparison with prototype theory.
7.3 The Family of Constraints View
The Relational View that we developed in Chapter 4, the view which we now call the
Family of Constraints or FoC view, makes a number of commitments. One is to the view
that underlying the various uses of, what is traditionally thought of as, a single concept
are different combinations of concepts. All of these involve combinations with a concept
which corresponds to the central tendency of the category traditionally associated with
the single concept. Thus, the central concept may encode information pertaining to the
prototype but, importantly, it will not be a prototype concept in the sense intended by
prototype theorists. Let us consider an example, the concept lemon. Just as we did in
Chapter 4, we will describe the example both in terms of feature structures and in terms
of the conditional constraints of Situation Theory. And, just as before, the claims of the








Table 7.3: A Possibility for the Contents of the Concept lemon.
theory must be seen as less to do with the precise contents we associate with concepts,
and more to do with the mechanism by which those contents may change. Table 7.3,
then, details one possibility for the concept lemon.
Now, we can express such facts in terms of Situation Theory, firstly by assuming that
there is some relation between the type of uses of the word lemon and some properties,
P, given by the concept lemon and, secondly, by assuming that this conceptual content
is related to conditions under which the word lemon may be used. The first assumption
is expressed as follows. Just as before this relation is a worm.
< worm, LEMON, P; 1 >
where
P = [p | < fruit, p; 1 >
< yellow, p; 1 > A
< oval, p; 1 > A
< acidic, p; 1 > A
The second assumption is expressed by the following conditional constraint.
Sj =► S2 | B
where
Si = [s | s |=< P, p; 1 >]
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and
S2 = [s | s |=< describe, p, lemon; 1 >]
and
B = [b | b |=< worm, LEMON, P; 1 >]
and
P = [Pi I < fruit, pi; 1 >]
< yellow, pi; 1 » A
< oval, pa; 1 > A
< acidic, pi; 1 > A
Now, in many respects, the conceptual content illustrated in Table 7.3 seems to exem¬
plify the classical theory of concepts. But this is a deception, for, as we saw in Chapter 6,
the classical theory of concepts is committed to the traditional conception of analytic-
ity. Namely, that concepts should express necessary and sufficient conditions for their
application. This view, however, is committed to the notion that a concept's content
may express conditions which are only contingently true of that concept's application.
This forces us to be extremely careful in talking of what it means for an entity to fall
under a concept.
All manner of weird and wonderful lemons will not satisfy the description given in
Table 7.3, yet, it is clear, that we need to say that such entities nonetheless fall under the
concept of lemon. In many respects, this tension is reminiscent of the discussion of 1.3
where we distinguished two claims of concepts: a functional claim, and a representational
claim. There, we argued that a functional classification of behaviour, such as concepts
are deemed to effect, cannot lead directly to a theory of how such classifications are
to be mentally represented. Indeed, ignoring this fact can lead to theories of concepts
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SHAPE: X SHAPE: flat
Table 7.4: A Possibility for the Contents of the Concept flatten. The ...indicate at¬
tributes and values which are repeated or inherited across the two arguments to the
concept.
falling into error. Well, the question of what it means to fall under a concept requires
a similar answer.
If, as we hypothesise, the contents of the concept lemon are mentally represented, even
though we may not specify how they are represented, then falling under the concept
can be determined according to how you interpret this theory of concepts. If, for
example, you take concepts to be those stable structures which a theory hypothesises
to be represented in long-term memory, then what it means to fall under the concept
lemon is simply to satisfy the contents exemplified in Table 7.3. That is, if an entity
falls under the concept lemon, that entity must be a yellow, acidic-tasting, oval-shaped
fruit. However, such a view of what a concept is seems far too narrow for our purposes.
And falling under a concept is similarly more complex than suggested.
As Barsalou has indicated, concepts are associated with different contents on different
occasions of use. This is precisely the view which emerged in Chapter 4 and, conse¬
quently, we shall say that what it means for an entity to fall under a concept is for that
entity to satisfy the content associated with the concept on a particular occasion of use.
In order to examine this in a little more detail, let us consider how it is that the concept
lemon can come to be associated with different content.
As Murphy & Medin's arguments suggest, our knowledge of operations and transfor¬
mations are likely to be implicated in the content of concepts. Indeed, such a view can
be seen as giving credence to the view presented in Chapter 4. There, we considered a
number of relations, some of which correspond to such operations. One was the concept
flatten, whose contents are exemplified in Table 7.4.
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Again, the concept flatten can be described in situation-theoretic terms as follows. We
assume that there is a worm relation holding between the type of uses of the word flatten
and two properties given by the concept flatten One property will apply to individuals
of indeterminate shape, the other to individuals with exactly the same properties except
that of having flat shape. Now, when the concepts for lemon and flatten combine, that
is, by the concept lemon standing in the first argument of the concept flatten, the second





Such a content also expresses attunement to a situation theoretic conditional constraint
as follows.
Sj =► S2 | B'
where
Sj = [s | s |=< P2, p; i >]
and
S2 = [s | s |=< describe, p, lemon; 1 >]
and
B' = [b | b (= < worm, LEMON, Pi; 1 > a
< worm, FLATTEN, Pi, P2; 1 >]
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and
P2 [p | < fruit, p; 1 >]
< yellow, p; 1 > A
< flat, p; 1 > A
< acidic, p; 1 > A
So, as a consequence of the process of combining of concepts, a new conceptual content,
one that is not hypothesised to be stored in long-term memory, is generated. And this
content expresses attunement to a different though related constraint. This gives us
a hint as to the more sophisticated answer as to what it means for an entity to fall
under a concept. We will tentatively suggest that an entity can be said to fall under
a concept X if that entity satisfies the conceptual content associated with concept X
on an occasion of its use. So, in the case of an entity falling under the concept lemon
it is not simply a matter of that entity falling under the contents hypothesised to be
represented in long-term memory. Rather, it is constituted by that entity falling under
either the contents of the mentally represented concept or the contents generated from
that concept by some process of concept combination. This, then, allows us to say
that flattened lemons fall under the concept lemon even though they do not satisfy the
content of the concept lemon which is deemed to be represented in long-term memory.
Whether such a view of what it is to fall under a concept can be sustained is, I assume,
an empirical matter and one worthy of further investigation. Needless to say, this is a
matter for further research and not for the present goal of articulating a view of word
meaning and concepts.
However, there are one or two obvious objections to this view which need to be answered.
Firstly, it has been suggested that there all manner of possible concept combinations,
some of which apply to entities which cannot be said to fall under a constituent concept.
For example, if we are committed to the view that flattened lemons fall under the concept
lemon, surely we are as committed to the view that fake guns fall under the concept
gun. This, it is argued, is absurd. On the contrary, I think this is exactly what a theory
of concepts should strive to attain.
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It must be remembered that under the view I am proposing, falling under a concept is
a contextually sensitive process. Only in certain situations will the constraints to which
concepts express attunement actually hold. So, in certain situations, if one were to
claim that fake gun falls under the concept gun, one would be wrong. The claim would
be misinformative. However, in certain other situations, the claim that fake gun falls
under the concept gun would, in some way, be correct: it would be informative. That
is, to claim that a fake gun is a gun would not, in all circumstances, simply be a false
assertion. In many cases, it can carry information. For example, consider a situation
where there are two guns in the room, one real, one fake. And suppose that one needs a
gun for a certain purpose such that it does not matter which of the two guns you choose.
Making a drawing, for example. Or, provided the real gun is unloaded, for using as a
prop in a play. Under these circumstances, to ask for a gun is not to ask for a real gun.
Nor, if one was handed a fake gun, would the claim that one had not been handed a
gun be felicitous.
Similarly, in the Lion Puzzle of Chapter 1, Fred assents to the claim that a stone lion
is a lion. In the same sense in which fake guns are taken not to be guns, stone lions are
also not lions. But the fact is that the word lion can, under certain conditions, apply to
stone lions, just as gun can apply to fake guns. Indeed, we have suggested that the word
lion may have a sense "stone statue of a lion", and we are similarly committed to the
view that the word gun may have a sense fake gun. As we noted in section 5.1.1, Evans
(1976) has argued that the intuition behind the Fregean conception of sense is that a
sense is a way of thinking of the entity or entities to which that sense applies. Accepting
this position, then, commits us to the notion that there are numerous different ways of
thinking of an object, these ways being associated with the same linguistic string. So,
for example, the uses of the word lion betray numerous ways of thinking of the objects
to which that word refers. And this returns us to our discussion of concepts.
By assuming that there are numerous different ways of thinking of one and the same
object or group of objects, we are committed to the notion that associated with what is
traditionally thought of as a single concept, are numerous different conceptual contents.
So, for instance, we can think of a flattened lemon as a lemon because, under certain
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circumstances, the concept lemon is associated with a content satisfied by flattened
lemons. However, it may well be the case that, in certain other circumstances, the
concept lemon is not, that is not in those circumstances, associated with such a content.
In those very same circumstances, then, the view I am proposing is committed to the
view that it is possible to think of flattened lemons as not falling under the concept
lemon. Whereas some claim that this is absurd, I would disagree. In the case of fake
guns, I would claim that it is perfectly acceptable to claim that we can view these both
as guns and not as guns, but that how we view them on any particular occasion depends
on the circumstances of that occasion.
So, the retort to this particular objection is that it is possible, under certain circum¬
stances, even in the cases of privative combinations such as fake gun and stone lion, to
assert that entities of this type are also of the head noun type. That is, they are also
guns and lions, respectively.
Another related objection is that while squashed lemons undoubtedly are real lemons,
stone lions are not real Hons and that this difference should be accorded a distinction in
their theoretical treatment. Firstly, our theory does accord this difference a theoretical
distinction. It is assumed that only certain contexts facilitate a use of lion to refer to
real lions, and only certain other contexts facilitate a use of lemon to refer to flattened
lemons. Though we have not been precise about the nature of these differences in con¬
text, our position is quite consistent with results that suggest that there is some intrinsic
difference between these two sorts of context. Secondly, as we argued in section 1.1, it
is important to distinguish the conditions under which an entity can be said to be an X
and the conditions under which an entity is an X. This second objection presumes that
these two questions will yield the same answer. So the retort to this objection is that
we do not make such a presumption.
We are now in a position to enumerate some of the ways in which this view avoids the
problems that have seemingly beset prototype theory.
1. Coherence: Conceptual coherence is determined, in part, by explanations of the
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sort Murphy & Medin describe. The fact that the concept lemon can only apply
to flattened lemons if there is some concept which furnishes an "explanation" as
to why flattened lemons are not oval as the concept lemon indicates.
2. Developmental Adequacy: The application of concepts is determined, in part,
by the acquisition of other concepts. Not having a concept such as flatten precludes
the application of the concept lemon to flattened lemons.
3. Representational Economy: Proliferation of possibilities is avoided by allowing
such possibilities as flat shape for the concept lemon to arise from the combination
of concepts. Possibilities are not encoded in each concept for which they are
possibilities as they are in prototype theory. The resource overheads associated
with weighted values are avoided by reverting to an apparently classical means of
conceptual representation.
4. Central Exemplars: The central exemplars, or central tendency of a category,
are accorded a special cognitive significance. Indeed, concepts may well represent
prototypes, though not prototype concepts. It is left to empirical studies to decide
whether a particular concept should represent prototypes, ideals, paragons, etc.
5. Contextual Sensitivity: The fact that numerous different conceptual contents
are associated with what is traditionally thought of as the same concept, offers
an explanation for the fact that the contents of concepts seem highly context
sensitive.
One query which must be raised for a view of concepts such as this concerns the absence
of weighted values. Within prototype theory such weights are taken to reflect, and
sometimes taken to explain, the prototype effects we discussed earlier. Precisely how
our view explains such prototype effects we will see in the course of the next section
where our focus is on comparing the view we have described directly with prototype
theory.
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7.3.1 A Comparison with Prototype Theory
A comparison between prototype theory and the FoC view might seem, at first glance,
problematic. Firstly, according to prototype theory the application of a concept is
determined by one constraint, according to our view it is determined by many such con¬
straints, indeed a whole family of related constraints. Secondly, protoype theory seems
committed to the view that concepts express attunement to unconditional constraints.
Our view is that these constraints are conditional. However, we will attempt a compar¬
ison, nonetheless. The means by which we approach this task is by way of attempting
to modify the view we have developed in order that it may express the sorts of proto¬
type concepts modelled by Smith & Osherson and Cohen & Murphy. The nature of the
modifications we will have to make, will determine how we are to interpret prototype
theory.
Firstly, let us introduce a number of abbreviations so that we may describe our view in
as economical a way as possible. Let us abbreviate the situation type where x has the
property P to prop(P, x) and the situation type where x can be described by a use of the
word lemon or, alternatively, where x can be said to fall under what would traditionally
be thought of as a concept, to describe(x, lemon). Similarly, worm(LEMON, P), Bl7
etc., all refer to situation types. What should be clear, at any rate, is that this notation
is not intended to convey formal precision but, rather, to simplify what we do intend to
convey which are the bones of the frameworks under consideration.
Now, the view we have developed is committed to the view that underlying the vari¬
ous uses of a word and the domain of application of what are traditionally though of
as concepts, are multiple conditional constraints. In the case of prototypical lemons,
lemons which have been flattened and lemons which have been painted blue, these are,
respectively, as follows.
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prop(P, x) =>• describe(x, lemon) | worm(LEMON, P) a Bi
prop(Q, x) =>• describe(x, lemon) | worm(LEMON, P)a
worm(FLATTEN, P, Q) a B2
prop(R, x) =>• describe(x, lemon) | worm(LEMON, P)a
worm(PAINT, P, R) a B3
Now, our first task in attempting to reconstruct prototype theory is to attempt to
convert these conditional constraints into unconditional constraints. For conditional
constraints cannot be thought of as complex "conjunctive" constraints unless the back¬
ground conditions with respect to which each are relativised are identical. Hence, we
must first try to establish unconditional constraints equivalent to those above.
One way of making conditional constraints unconditional is to do what Baker (1974)
calls "conditionalisation". This involves reducing a constraint such as
5i => S2 | B
to the "logically" equivalent form
si a B =>• s2
Now, there are good reasons to avoid such a reduction. As Baker notes, Wittgenstein
explicitly denies the efficacy of such a move. Barwise (1989) suggests that this reduction
is not valid, although he suggests that there is a reduction of a more complex nature. In
Braisby & Franks (in preparation), it is argued that this "conditionalisation" mistakes
the nature of conditional relations. In particular, it is argued that certain defeasible rela¬
tions may be considered reducibly defeasible. That is, they may be recast as conditional
relations. Other defeasible relations, however, are irreducibly defeasible and cannot be
reduced to conditional relations: they remain intrinsically defeasible and are inherently
unreliable. Conditionalisation casts all conditional relations as defeasible ones, hence
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losing the important distinction between conditional or reducibly defeasible relations
and irreducibly defeasible relations.
So, there are good reasons against this "conditionalisation" but, if we are to reconstruct
prototype theory from the view we have developed, then this is a move we must make.
Hence, at this stage, intermediate between prototype theory and our own view, the
picture we have is as follows.
prop(P, x) A worm(LEMON, P) A Bi =» describe(x, lemon)
prop(Q, x) a worm(LEMON, P)a
worm(FLATTEN, P, Q) a B2 => describe(x, lemon)
prop(R, x) a worm(LEMON, P)a
worm(PAINT, P, R)aB3 => describe(x, lemon)
Now, our avowed goal is to reduce these three constraints to a single constraint to
which a prototype concept might express attunement. If we re-examine the models of
prototype concepts we discussed earlier, it is clear that, in these models, no mention is
made of other concepts like those explicitly shown in the above constraints. No reference
is made, for example, to the concept flatten, though the value flat is represented and.
indeed, this may even represent the concept flat. However, this value flat is encoded
in terms of the property Q. The additional concepts in the constraints indicated above
merely serve to indicate the "origin" of such values and, as we saw in section 7.2.1, this is
not something that prototype concepts encode. Consequently, one task we must perform
is to eliminate this dependence on such coherence-inducing concepts. If we eliminate
such concepts from our constraints then we will come closer to specifying a relationship
simply between the fact of a concept applying, and the properties an object must have
for that concept to apply. That is, we will have constraints such as the following.
prop(P, x) a Bj => describe(x, lemon)
prop(Q, x)aB2=> describe(x, lemon)
prop(R, x) a B3 => describe(x, lemon)
Now we have three simpler constraints, ones relating properties to facts concerning the
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application or otherwise of a given word. That is, corresponding to the three categories,
normal lemons, flattened lemons and painted lemons, we have three unconditional con¬
straints. Notice, that in making this last move, we have lost all information concerning
why these properties and not others are implicated in determining the conditions of
application of the concept. That is, we are now at a loss to explain the important role
that theories play in the psychology of categorisation. But we are still far from our
goal of obtaining a constraint to which a prototype concept might express attunement.
In particular, there are two outstanding differences to be resolved. One concerns the
fact that prototype concepts are unitary structures, they express attunement to single
constraints, not the several that we have above. The other concerns the background
situation types, Bi to B3. Let us consider these first.
The question we have to answer is whether a constraint of the form
P A Q => R
can be reduced to the form
P =► R
In some respects this is the question we should have answered in determining whether
we could dispense with concept expressions from the previous set of constraints. Our
answer then was in the affirmative simply because prototype theory is committed to
the fact that a psychological characterisation of concepts can abstract away the effects
of other concepts. So, if we are to reconstruct prototype theory then we must adopt
such a move. However, it is distinctly unclear that prototype theorists would accept
the reduction indicated above in general, or, even in the case of background situation
types in particular. In fact, such a reduction will only be valid if Q is a necessary
existent. That is, Q is true in all situations. So, in order to reduce our three constraints
in a similar manner, we must be committed to the view that Bi to B3 are true of all
situations. That is, every situation is of these three types. Now, such a view is almost
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certainly false. One of the intuitions behind the view that we have developed was that
the uses of concepts are extremely sensitive to context. In certain situations the concept
is used with such-and-such content, in other, different situations it is used with different
contents. That is, the approach assumes that Bj, B2 and B3 do distinguish different
types of situation: there are situations which are not of each type.
To assume that all situations are of these types is to reject the notion that the contents
of concepts are determined by context. One is left only with the notion that the content
of a concept subsumes all the contents associated with its uses and, moreover, that the
contents associated with those uses may not be exactly the content of the concept. Such
a view seems tied to the idea that on all occasions of use the same content is accessed,
even though it may not all be employed. However, this, too, is a move we are required
to make. It results in the following set of constraints.
prop(P, x) => describe(x, lemon)
prop(Q, x) =*> describe(x, lemon)
prop(R, x) => describe(x, lemon)
In order to obtain a better approximation to prototype theory, we must attempt to
reduce these three different constraints to one. Now, the supposition that there are
constraints of a certain type, carries, at least, two commitments. Firstly, there is a
logical commitment. That is, one must be committed to the view that the relata of
the constraint are logically related in the way the constraint suggests. So, for example,
suppose that the relation between being gold and having the atomic number 79 is best
expressed by a necessary unconditional constraint. The logical commitment is, then,
that the relationship between gold and this fact about atomic structure is one that holds
in all circumstances and holds necessarily. If we are of the view that the relationship
does not have these properties, then we will not view the relation in terms of a necessary,
unconditional constraint. However, positing constraints carries a further commitment
of an ontological nature. To suggest that there is an unconditional constraint relating
the fact of being gold to the fact of having atomic number 79 is not just to specify the
logical nature of the relationship between these facts, it is also to commit oneself to the
view that situations contain not just these facts but also a fact that relates them, this
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being a constraint. To see how it could be the case that just by considering the logical
nature of constraints, we can make an unfortunate ontological commitment, consider
the following example. Suppose, we consider two elements, gold and hydrogen. Now,
gold has the atomic number 79 and hydrogen the atomic number 1. We might assume
that there are two unconditional constraints relating each element to its atomic number.
This, then, carries two commitments: the logical one, and the ontological one. Now,
were we to combine these we would obtain a single constraint relating x being gold and
y being hydrogen to x having atomic number 79 and y having atomic number 1. But
notice that, while the logical characterisation of this combined constraint is no different
in this case from the case where we have two separate constraints, an entirely different
ontological statement is being made. Ontological grounds for accepting the ontological
commitments made by each separate constraint will surely not be grounds for accepting
the ontological commitments made by the combined constraint. For, in the latter case,
our ontology must group together gold and hydrogen, and plausible reasons for such
a grouping must be given. In the case of the independent constraints no such reasons
are required. And, whereas plausible reasons may be available in the case of gold and
hydrogen, we can render this unlikely by considering cases where ontological boundaries
are crossed. For example, we could combine the constraint relating gold to its atomic
number and a constraint relating elephants to some hypothesised elephant-essence.
Combining the above constraints, then, as we must do if we are to obtain a view re¬
sembling that of prototype theory, is likely to represent a not inconsiderable ontological
pitfall. However, let us proceed in our attempt to reproduce a constraint to which a pro¬
totype concept might express attunement. The three constraints we have indicate that,
associated with a concept, are three different contents. Prototype concepts, however,
specify a single content which is associated with any particular use of a concept. The
only way we have of combining these constraints is, therefore, via disjunction. That is,
we will obtain a constraint that will tell us that either of three sets of conditions must
hold for the concept to apply. The result we obtain, then, is as follows.
prop(P, x) V prop(Q, x) V prop(R, x) => describe(x, lemon)
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We have now arrived at a picture of conceptual content which is expressible in terms of
one, unconditional constraint. However, we have not yet arrived at the kind of constraint
to which a prototype concept might express attunement. To see this we need to remind
















Now, what our constraint suggests is a disjunction of complex conjunctive properties.
And, as such, the constraint expresses what we might think of as "feature co-ocurrence
restrictions". That is, suppose that one of our complex conjunctive properties, call it
S, was satisfied by rotten lemons. Further suppose it is a fact that all normal rotten
lemons not only change to a brown colour but also become sweet flavoured. Further
suppose that the only way a lemon can be sweet flavoured is by being rotten. Under
such conditions, a sweet lemon is always a brown one. That is, the presence of one
feature places a restriction on the presence or absence of another. Now, it is a point
made by Murphy & Medin (1985) that the kinds of model exemplified by those we
discussed earlier do not express such facts as these feature co-occurrence restrictions.
These, too, must be lost if we are to obtain something akin to a prototype concept.
Prototype theory specifies for each concept all the possible values that each attribute
may assume. So, for example, whereas our constraint may specify the following
(acidic(x) a yellow(x)) v (sweet(x) a brown(x))
prototype theory seems to prefer the following form.
(acidic(x) v sweet(x)) a (yellow(x) v brown(x))
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As we have noted, these forms are truth-conditionally distinct. However, we now recast
our above constraint into these terms. The result follows.
(fruit(x) V fruit(x) V fruit(x)) A
(yellow(x) V yellow{x) V blue(x)) A
(oval(x) V flat(x) V oval(x)) A
(acidic(x) v acidic(x) v acidic(x)) => describe(x, lemon)
We have deliberately written this out in long-hand, redundant form, in order to point to
the last outstanding difference between what we now have and the kind of constraint to
which prototype concepts express attunement. Namely, the weights on values. We can
clearly see that certain values are repeated and, while this makes no truth-conditional
difference, it does suggest that certain attributes are more typical of the category. Thus,
the final move of eliminating the truth-conditional redundancy, but introducing a no¬
tion of typicality based on the frequency of occurrence of attributes' values, yields the
following.
fruit (x):3 A
(yellow (x):2 V blue (x):l) A
(oval (x):2 V flat (x):l) A
acidic (x):3 => DESCRIBE(x, lemon)
This constraint, then, is of precisely the kind suggested by the models of prototype
concepts we discussed earlier. Notice, however, that this last move only makes sense if
one believes that a concept should express abstractions across different contexts, even
contexts in which the content associated with that concept is palpably distinct.
At any rate, it can be said that prototype theory can be reconstructed out of the FoC
view we have developed. The picture which emerges, however, is that prototype concepts
express abstractions over the uses of concepts to a degree that the content associated
with uses of the concept are some subpart of the specification of the prototype concept.
Presumably, prototype theorists must invoke some additional mechanism to explain why
only a subpart of a concept's content appears to be employed on various occasions of
use. It is to the benefit of the alternative view we have developed that a natural account
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of this phenomenon is forthcoming. Before we finish this section, let us enumerate the
difficulties encountered in reconstructing prototype theory. Although, the existence of
these difficulties does not invalidate prototype theory, (one will, after all, only encounter
them if one first adopts a view such as our own), they do suggest that our account may
offer a more natural account of concepts. Here, then, are what we assume the difficulties
we encountered suggest for prototype theory.
1. Conditionalisation: Prototye theory appears to rely on conditionalisation. That
is, it relies on treating relations which are intrinsically conditional or reducibly
defeasible as irreducibly defeasible. Prototype theory, then, seems committed
to the view that concepts only express attunement to relations which are not
conditional.
2. Coherence: Prototype theory appears to require abstraction over concepts and
theories of which those concepts are a part. That is, it assumes that information
concerning why it is that possible values are possible is dispensable as regards
categorisation.
3. Background Conditions: Prototype theory requires us to assume that the ap¬
plication of a concept is essentially non-conditional. That is, there are no back¬
ground conditions on which that application depends. Hence, we can dispense
with the hitherto unknown situation types Bj to B3.
4. Ontology: Prototype theory risks an ontological pitfall by assuming that differing
information, possibly relating to different ontological categories, may be conveyed
by one and the same relation.
5. Feature Co-occurrence: Prototype theory seems committed to the view that
concepts do not express feature co-occurrence restrictions. As such it is committed
to there being loss of information pertaining to exemplars.
6. Weighted Values: Prototype theory seems committed to the notion that weights
on values represent the frequency of occurrence of those values across all contexts.
That is, prototype concepts represent context-independent aggregations of con-
textually sensitive information.
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All of the above, then, are, from the perspective of the view we have developed, viola¬
tions. We now turn away from our direct comparison with prototype theory and towards
one of the much vaunted virtues of prototype theory, its account of family resemblance.
7.3.2 On Family Resemblance
Prototype theory has a fairly natural and easily understood account of family resem¬
blance. Associated with each prototype concept is a cluster of descriptions or attribute-
value pairs, not all of which need be true of every exemplar. For an exemplar to be
an instance of the concept it need only receive a sufficient number of "votes". There is
no commitment to the idea that every exemplar possesses some set of core or common
features. In this, then, it is said that prototype theory accounts for family resemblance.
While this much is beyond dispute, I would like to suggest that an alternative account
of family resemblance is forthcoming from the view we have developed. According to
FoC, underlying the various uses of a word there are a number of related constraints.
For example, underlying uses of the word lemon are constraints corresponding to normal
lemons, flattened lemons, painted lemons, toy lemons, wax lemons, even stone statues
of lemons, if circumstances require. A number of things are clear from such an account.
First, that underlying all uses there need be no common properties to all those entities
to which the word may apply. Second, that all these uses, all these constraints, are
related.
The content associated with uses of lemon in referring to flattened lemons is related, via
the concept flatten, to the content associated with uses of lemon in referring to normal
lemons. The content associated with uses of lion in referring to stone lions is related,
via the concept statue, to the content associated with uses of lion in referring to normal
lions. The content associated with uses of mother in referring to adoptive mothers
is related, via the concept adoptive, to the content associated with uses of mother in
referring to biological mothers. And so on. This, I take it, is what Wittgenstein means
in the quote with which we begin Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 7. REINTERPRETING PROTOTYPE THEORY 224
7.4 Conclusion
The conclusion of this discussion concerns the efficacy of prototype theory. We have
argued that prototype concepts must be seen as expressing attunement to single uncon¬
ditional constraints. We have presented a number of problems with standard models
of prototype concepts. In contrast, we re-iterated the view we presented in Chapter 4
and we detailed reasons why such a view avoids many of the difficulties which face
prototype theory. Having done so, we attempted a detailed comparison with prototype
theory, the purpose of which was to suggest some underlying reasons for prototype the¬
ory's difficulties, perhaps the most important of which, is its inadequate treatment of
context. Finally, we have pointed out that the view we have developed, the Family of
Constraints view, offers an account of family resemblance which seems to be in keeping
with Wittgenstein's observations.
I want to conclude this chapter, by returning to Barsalou. He claimed that concepts are
nothing more than "analytic fictions". We are now in a position to say the following.
According to the Family of Constraints view, prototype concepts are indeed fictions.
They represent abstractions of content over all contexts of use. Concepts, as Barsalou
noted, are best thought of as having content for an occasion of use. However, such
an account should not be accused of lacking formality or precision. We have offered
a formal interpretation of this account and, indeed, this framework has been cast into
computational form (Braisby, 1990).
Barsalou has also claimed, some may think paradoxically, that the suggestion that what
are traditionally thought of as concepts are not stored in long-term memory, does not
imply that the content of concepts are not constructed out of invariant structures in
long-term memory. Indeed, we have shown that this is not paradoxical for, while it is
possible for what we call concepts to inhabit long-term memory and remain invariant,




In this chapter we conclude by casting a retrospective glance over the ideas presented in
chapters 1-7 and by offering some pointers at future research which may further develop
those ideas and tease out some of their implications. We begin by recapping. We end
by pointing out some implications for future research.
This thesis has attempted to develop an account of word meaning which not only re¬
spects psychological arguments but also philosophical considerations. Part of the ap¬
proach has been to express this account in terms of a formal semantics, that provided by
Situation Theory, and to describe the informational contents associated with word uses
in terms of feature-structures. It is hoped, then, that the thesis marks the beginning of
a truly interdisciplinary, cognitive science of word meaning.
The thesis not only contains an argument, albeit a well-disguised one, but also much
which cannot be argued for or, at least, much for which I cannot argue. There are
various prejudices, inclinations, suspicions, hopes and hunches most of which concern
the role that psychology should play in a cognitive-scientific study of word meaning.
In the following, I hope to mark the boundary between my arguments and these other
important aspects of scientific research.
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8.1 The Arguments
In the first chapter we sketched the background to the rest of the thesis. Firstly, we
attempted to do no more than hint at the location of this thesis in terms of a wider goal
of characterising what Vygotsky calls verbal thought. Thus, we too are led to consider
the meanings of words. That our enterprise concerns not only the behaviour of words
but also the thoughts associated with their uses, has been made more explicit in later
chapters.
One of the main aims of Chapter 1 is to draw a distinction between two related concerns.
One goal of a study of word meaning must be to explicate the conditions under which
a given word may apply to a given entity. Consequently, we may wish to ask when an
entity may be said to be a lemon, that is, when the word lemon may apply to the entity
in question. Often the answer is forthcoming: when that entity is a lemon. But one of
the goals of the first chapter is to show that this does not follow. The issues of when an
entity can be said to be an X and when that entity actually is an X are, prima facie,
independent. The puzzles of Chapter 1 demonstrate this. The Lion Puzzle indicates
the possibility that the same unambiguous word can be said both to apply and not to
apply to one and the same entity: the word lion applies to a statue of a lion under one
set of circumstances and does not apply under other circumstances. Such flexibility in
the conditions under which lion is actually used cannot, however, be said to be due to
an inherent flexibility in whether this entity actually is a lion. The question of whether
a statue of a lion actually is a lion obtains an unequivocal negative answer. Similarly,
in the case of Nunberg's Ham Sandwich. Here again we have a case where the use of
a phrase, ham sandwich, crosses ontological boundaries. The cases of Lakoff's mother
and Macken's father also provide a similar demonstration. Here too we can see that
the issue of what constitutes an entity being a father or mother has only an indirect
bearing on the use of the words father and mother.
The puzzles, then, are an attempt to show that we may choose not to conflate the
ontological issue of what an X is, with the more obviously semantical issue of what
conditions must hold for the word X to apply to an entity. Indeed, the rest of the thesis
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has, in some way, been a statement of some of the benefits of rejecting this conflation.
However, the puzzles demonstrate more than this. They point to the possibility that
there appear to be different thoughts associated with the same linguistic string. That
this is the case at all is unsurprising. Indexical expressions purport to convey different
thoughts via the same linguistic expression. That this might be the case for expressions
which are thought of as being neither indexical nor ambiguous, expressions such as lion,
father, etc., is not only surprising but problematic. The problem centres on how it
is that we may associate the same linguistic string with potentially indefinitely many
different contents of thought.
A related problem in linguistics concerns apparent cases of non-intersective adjective
noun combinations. A case such as stone lion, for example, appears not to be something
that is both made of stone and a lion. Indeed, a stone lion is generally said not to be
a real lion at all. But, this denies the inherent flexibility of word use. The word lion
can indeed apply to stone statues of lions as long as the circumstances of use are of a
non-standard kind. And it is by recognising this fact that we allow for the potential
simplification of accounts of non-intersective adjective modification. It is a consequence
of recognising the fact that lion may have the sense "statue of a lion" that the adjective-
noun conjunction stone lion can be seen to be intersective. So our argument here was
that, although there are cases of non-intersective adjectival modification, these in general
may be related to the puzzles we have discussed and, further, that the proper treatment
of the latter may lead to a considerably easier treatment of the former. Many of the
complexities associated with analyses such as Levi's (1978) are not necessarily to do
with the composition of adjective and noun but to do with the flexibility of one or other
or both.
As we mentioned above, what is meant by flexibility is that different contents of thought
may be associated with the same unambiguous linguistic expression. In the psycholog¬
ical literature, there are two areas upon which we may focus to gain insight into a
psychological treatment of this flexibility of content.
One area concerns dictionary theories of mind. Herb Clark's work on sense creation sug-
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gests that the same linguistic string may be associated with radically different thoughts.
The problem, as he sees it, is that the same linguistic expression may be associated with
infinitely many different thoughts. The problem, then, is that of deciding which of the
many different senses of a word are stably mentally represented. The second area con¬
cerns the psychological literature on concepts. This literature, too, is concerned to
detail not only the stable contents of semantic memory but what may be thought of
as the stable "building blocks" of thought. So, here too, we may expect some kind of
answer to the problem posed by the inherent flexibility of word uses. These, then, are
the literatures we explored later in the thesis.
Another aspect of the first chapter was to introduce a further distinction, one that is as
germane to psychological theories of sense as it is to psychological theories of concepts.
Two claims are associated with these theories. One is a claim that the contents that
we, as theorists, ascribe to concepts and senses, serves to classify behaviour in certain
ways. The particular classificatory schema we adopt, however, must respect various
constraints from the disciplines of cognitive science. That is, as far as a theory of word
meaning is concerned, though all classifications are equal, in that they all classify, some
classifications are more equal than others. This, then, allows us to choose between a
number of different theories of concepts.
The other claim associated with theories of concepts and senses concerns mental rep¬
resentation. That is, concepts, with such and such content, are deemed to be mentally
represented in a particular way. In this thesis we have made no detailed claims about
mental representation. Indeed, it is hard to do so. For, as the theory of computation
suggests, we can with no certainty progress from a claim about the nature of a function
that is computed to a claim about the way that function is computed.
Having established a little theoretical framework, we then turned to some of the formal
framework that we have employed throughout this thesis. The view we have adopted,
taken directly from Situation Theory, is that word meanings are informational con¬
straints relating types of uses of a word with certain worldly properties. We described
the relation between conditional and unconditional constraints and attempted to fore-
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stall the argument that the formulation of conditional constraints is incoherent by ap¬
pealing to a general distinction between a semantical enterprise and a natural scientific
one. In this chapter we tied the notions of sense and content, which we use for the rest
of the thesis, to the situation theoretic notion of informational content. This was done
to avoid confusion with existing notions rather than to tie us to a particular situation-
theoretic approach. It is also here that we mentioned the connection between semantics
and information, an association that allows, at least in principle, for a tying of semantic
issues with epistemological ones. Developing the motivation for this general position
would be both inappropriate and too difficult to do in this thesis. Instead, the position
should be seen as just that: a position.
Finally we discussed the possibility of misinformation arising from concepts and we
argued that this possibility does not constitute grounds for rejecting the position that
concepts nonetheless express attunement to informational constraints. Thus armed, we
then turned to some of the more obvious choices we might face in attempting to account
for puzzles like those of Chapter 1.
In Chapter 2 we outlined some of the choices which must be faced by a cognitive scientific
account of word meaning. The first choice concerns how we construe external meaning
relations, relations between the types of use of a word and the properties about which
those uses convey information. As we suggested in Chapter 1, the formal framework that
we assume is that of Situation Theory, and this for reasons of its wedding of a theory
of semantics to a theory of information. Another beneficial aspect of Situation Theory,
however, is the choice it allows in analysing meaning relations in terms of informational
constraints. Barwise & Perry (1983) talk, in particular, of the distinction between
conditional and unconditional constraints and it is this choice that we considered first.
We suggested that the prime consideration in making this choice was the treatment
of defeasibility. Standardly, meaning relations may be seen in terms of entailment
relations which exhibit the property of monotonicity or indefeasibility. Indeed, bar
certain caveats, this is the picture we would assume were we to analyse meaning relations
in terms of unconditional constraints. However, by treating meaning relations in terms
of conditional constraints we allow the possibility that meaning relations may give rise
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to defeasibility while not being themselves intrinsically defeasible. This, then, is the
property of conditionality. Another property of constraints is there a priori nature. That
is, given knowledge of such a constraint and knowledge of its "antecedent" situation type,
knowledge of the "consequent" situation type is a priori in that it depends on no further
empirical investigation. Consequently, a view of meaning relations which analyses them
in terms of conditional constraints seems committed to a view of meaning relations as
contingent a priori relations.
Another choice that may face an account of word meaning is whether we treat the
various uses of words as resulting from attunement to a single constraint or to many
constraints. Which choice we take will have a bearing on how we treat considerations
of counterfactuals. If, for example, we treat the uses of a word in terms of a single
constraint, then should we envisage counterfactual circumstances in which the word
applies but in which the "antecedent" of the constraint is not satisfied, then we must
re-examine our formulation of this single constraint. However, if we regard the uses of
a word as belying multiple constraints then, were we to encounter the same problem,
another solution would be available to us. Namely, we would claim that these coun¬
terfactual circumstances are ones in which another constraint held. And we could thus
preserve our initial formulation of the first constraint.
Related to this is the third choice, that of whether we regard meaning relations as de-
scriptional. That is, can the relata of such relations be given by description. Standardly,
for certain words such as natural kind words, it is thought that meaning relations are
not descriptional. But this position often rests on an argument from counterfactual
circumstances. If we accept that meaning relations may be both conditional and that
there are many of them underlying the uses of a single word, then, we argued, the claim
that word meanings are descriptional may be maintained. That is, it is our position
that the view that meaning relations are not descriptional is in some sense a corollary
of the view that underlying the various uses of a word is a single indefeasible meaning
relation.
Another set of choices we face in developing a cognitive scientific view of word meaning
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concern what we assume language users to have as stable mental representations. We
introduced the word LEXON to refer to the informational content that is stably mentally
represented. The choices we faced are similar to those for the nature of meaning relations
and concern, principally, the number of LEXONs we postulate for each unambiguous
word, the content of these LEXONs and the nature of the relation between the contents of
senses and LEXONs. The first choice concerns whether we wish to treat words which are
strictly not ambiguous as either ambiguous or general, or whether we want to preserve
the intuition that the content of the LEXON may express the default sense of the word.
We suggested that, for the puzzles of Chapter 1, this last option was the more plausible.
The second choice, the relation between the contents of senses and LEXONs, depends on
the first. Assuming that senses can be quite specific in nature, the generality option
would maintain that the contents of senses are but monotonic extensions of the content
of LEXONs. An alternative, one that is required if lexons express the content of default
senses, is to regard the content of senses as non-monotonically related to the content of
LEXONs. The ambiguity option, depending on precise details, may well opt for one or
other of these relations.
Finally, in Chapter 2, we considered a possible language, one based on Johnsons' (1988)
attribute-value logic, in which we might express the contents of senses and LEXONs.
This was for several reasons. Firstly, we found it necessary to be clear about the kinds
of feature-structure that we employed later in the thesis. Secondly, we also found it
necessary to be clear about the ontology assumed by such a language as this. Indeed, in
Chapter 7, we had reason to question the efficacy of just such a language in describing
the facts pertaining to concepts. And thirdly, we considered it important to distance
ourselves, once more, from claims concerning the precise nature ofmental representation.
Our use of feature-structures, we pointed out, carried no necessary commitment to
decompositional theories of meaning or to the claim that these features play a privileged
role in mental computation. Rather, we see these feature-structures as simply classifying
both linguistic behaviour and mental states. They do not represent claims about the
precise nature of mental representation.
Having, in the first two chapters, pointed to some general issues for theories of word
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meaning and sense, in Chapter 3, we turned to motivate a particular kind of theory
of word meaning, Sense Generation. We began by considering the related theory of
Sense Creation as developed by Herb Clark and his co-workers. Clark's claim is that
non-conventional uses of words may have senses which are created for the nonce. His
point is made by a consideration of so-called contextual expressions, expressions such
as the denominal verb to thesis, which appear to have senses, or informational content,
dependent solely on the circumstances of use. That is, the senses of contextual ex¬
pressions have the properties of non-denumerability and contextuality. As Clark points
out, such properties as these prove difficult to reconcile with traditional view of pars¬
ing, views which rest on the sense-selection assumption, the assumption that the senses
of words may be finitely listed in a context independent manner. Now, though we
agreed with much of Clark's argumentation, we disagreed on emphasis. In particular,
we suggested that many expressions which Clark does not consider to be contextual
expressions, in particular, indexical expressions and what he calls purely intentional
expressions, may also exhibit the properties of contextuality and non-denumerability.
And, further, and most importantly, we pointed out that Clark appears to restrict his
attention to non-conventional uses of words. It has been our contention in this thesis
that the conventional uses of words cannot be assimilated to the sense-selection view as
Clark assumes.
With this caveat to Clark's views, we proceeded to consider two kinds of sense selection,
strong and weak. Strong sense selection treats the various senses of unambiguous words
as if they were the different senses of ambiguous words. That is, it fails to distinguish
between ambiguity and degrees of vagueness. It also fails to respect the suggestion
from Clark and others that the senses of a word may be infinite in number. Another
form of sense selection, weak sense selection, we also found lacking as a psychological
theory of sense. Its problems seemed twofold. Though it allowed for the possibility of
treating unambiguous words as general, in the case of certain words, such as natural
kind words, such an option seems to allow the possibility that the word may apply
indiscriminately. That is, the satisfaction of the content of the corresponding lexon
would not, in general, prove sufficient for the application of the word. Avoiding the
generality option, one is unfortunately forced to treat vagueness in terms of ambiguity
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by postulating multiple LEXONs for the same unambiguous word. However, even were
we to allow this to occur, there would be an equally serious problem with sense selection
accounts. The argument comes from a consideration of the psychological literature on
concepts and, in particular, the literature on conceptual coherence.
Sense selection accounts treat related senses sis independent. Consider the two senses
of lion: "real lion" and "statue of a lion". By postulating an independent LEXON for
each sense, as sense selection accounts would, they fail to express the coherence or
relatedness of their contents. We indicated that the arguments of Murphy & Medin,
while perhaps in need of slight modification, are strongly suggestive that the use of
words, being mediated by the application of concepts, is extremely sensitive to this
coherence or relatedness. And, further, that a failure to capture this coherence must
result in a failure to express either the psychology of concept use or the psychology of
word use.
Having rejected some possible conceptions of sense, we turned to an exposition of Sense
Generation. Sense Generation embodies the following assumptions as regards the choice
of Chapter 2: it is assumed that there is one LEXON only for each unambiguous word;
that the content of LEXONs expresses the default sense of the corresponding word; that
the relation between senses and LEXONs is non-monotonic, the content of the sense
being derived from that of the LEXON. In the remainder of the chapter, we described in
more detail the properties of senses, words and LEXONs. Our main focus was, however,
senses. In particular, we concentrated on relating the notion of sense which we had
employed fairly intuitively in the early part of the thesis, to the notion introduced by
Frege and expanded upon by Evans (1976). Part of our objective here was to articulate
a criterion for individuating word senses and, perhaps more importantly, to re-orient our
work towards the theme with which we began: the role of word meaning in an account
of thought. In particular, by re-iterating Frege's original motivation for introducing the
notion of sense, we made the link between senses and the thoughts of language users
and, hence, of the concepts that mediate their uses of words.
In Chapter 4, we outlined a particular view of Sense Generation, rather unexcitingly
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called the Relational View. Much of the motivation for the Relational View comes from
the psychological literature on concepts. We argued for the importance of four particular
morals in a theory of word meaning: the moral of coherence; the moral of representa¬
tional economy; the moral of central exemplars; and the moral of context sensitivity.
The rest of the chapter was taken up by an exposition of this Relational View in terms
of Situation Theory and with an analysis of the puzzles. Our conclusions were: that this
theory of word meaning respected the psychological literature on conceptual coherence;
that it maintained simple economical representations for the senses of words; that it
accorded central exemplars a privileged status as suggested by prototype theory; and
that it respected some of Barsalou's (1987) considerations on the contextual sensitivity
of the content of concepts.
At this point of the thesis our attention turned away from the psychological literature
and towards a debate in the contemporary analytic philosophical literature concerning
the "meaning" of proper names. The reasons for this apparent diversion were twofold.
Firstly, to prepare the ground for a discussion of natural kinds in Chapter 6 which,
in itself, was to prepare the ground for a discussion of prototype theory in Chapter 7.
And, secondly, to relate the notion of meaning which we had so far employed, that in
which meaning relations were construed as contingent a priori conditional constraints,
to traditional notions ofmeaning. The literature on proper names is germane for another
reason: it was this literature that first saw the introduction of the Fregean notion of
sense only, then, to see its demise. Since we have tied the psychological conception of
sense to the Fregean one, it was necessary to reflect on the reasons why Fregean senses
have become unpopular.
So, in Chapter 5, we turned to the literature on proper names and, in particular, Kripke's
argument against the possibility that proper names have Fregean senses. We began by
outlining a revised version of Kripke's definition of description theories of proper names
and by considering some of the motivations for description theories in general. In par¬
ticular, they have been seen as providing accounts of existential statements, statements
of identity and the determination of reference. Having prepared the ground, we then
turned to the description theories of Frege and Russell, the first that Kripke criticises.
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The early Frege held a theory of meaning in which semantic values are to be equated
with Meaning or referents. He also held, however, that his theory of meaning should
explain the cognitive significance of language. Thus, the theory should explain how it
is that the same person may coherently take different attitudes to one and the same
sentence at one and the same time. It should also explain the fact that statements of
identity convey more information than the simple law of identity. How it is, for example,
that The evening star is the morning star conveys information over and above the claim
that an object is self-identical. However, if semantic values are equated with the objects
of reference then, as Frege found, accounting for these facts is difficult. That is, there
is a tension between the choice of semantic value and the goal of explaining cognitive
significance. For reasons such as these, then, Frege rejected his earlier position in favour
of a theory of meaning which distinguished between the Meaning, or referent, of a
sentence and the thought or sense connected to it. And it is this notion of sense which,
for Frege, was deemed to explain any possible cognitive difference between sentences
having the same Meaning. Though Frege was inexplicit on this point, both Evans and
Kripke seem committed to the view that Frege believed that senses can be given by
description. As such, Frege's view falls directly under Kripke's rubric of description
theories. And, though we will not re-iterate the points made earlier, the same is true of
Russell's account of proper names.
Another category of theories of proper names is defined by what Kripke calls the
"cluster-concept" approach. Roughly, the idea is that the meaning of a proper name
can be given by a cluster of descriptions, some proportion of which must be true of the
referent of that name. The accounts of Searle and Strawson, with the caveat that these
are more properly thought of as theories of the determination of the referents of proper
names rather than their meaning, both fall into this category. Such cluster-concept
approaches are of interest for several reasons. First, they purport to explain how it is
that language users associate different descriptions with the same name and yet achieve
successful reference to the bearer of the name. Second, and perhaps more importantly
given our interest in integrating facts about the epistemology of language users into
semantic analysis, of the cluster of descriptions associated with a proper name, to each
language user, a certain proportion are deemed to be known. That is, semantic facts
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concerning proper names are explicated in terms of facts concerning the epistemological
condition of language users. It is partly for this reason that our attention turned to
Kripke's well-known and apparently successful attack on these description theories.
Kripke begins by outlining his conception of the analytic as the necessary a priori and,
above all else, it is this conception which, for Kripke, prevents description theories
from being theories of meaning. Necessity is primarily a metaphysical notion. It is a
notion that concerns the way of this world and all other worlds: if a statement is true
necessarily then it must be true in all possible worlds. That is, the world could not have
been such as to make the statement false. Now, an explication of the analytic in terms
of this notion, necessity, is what Kripke claims counts against the possibility of there
being a description theory of the meaning of proper names. Supposing, for example,
that Aristotle means the author of De Anima, then Aristotle is the author of De Anima
would express an analytic truth. That is, it would express an a priori truth in that the
truth of the statement would depend solely on the meanings of the terms of the sentence
and not on any empirical investigation. And it would also express a necessary truth.
But it is precisely this which Kripke disputes. Aristotle is the author of De Anima
cannot express a necessary truth for it is not a necessary fact about Aristotle that he
ever wrote De Anima. Aristotle might, presumably, never have put pen to paper, so to
speak.
We indicated in Chapter 5 our general agreement with this argument but suggested sev¬
eral ways of concluding. One possibility is to attempt modifications to the descriptions
associated with proper names in the hope that they may, then, express necessary truths.
This possibility, adopted by cluster-concept approaches is one that is also rejected by
Kripke. And, again, we are in agreement. A second possibility, the one adopted by
Kripke, is to suggest that proper names simply do not have Fregean senses; their mean¬
ings cannot be explicated by description. And a third possibility is one that we adopted,
namely, of treating the Kripkean argument as an inadvertent reductio on the conception
of analyticity which it presumes. That is, our position is one diametrically opposed to
Kripke's. While he jettisons Fregean senses in favour of the analytic as the necessary a
priori, we jettison this view of the analytic in favour of Fregean senses.
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In the last section of the chapter, we turned to developing an alternative account of
analyticity. We began by noting that many of the intuitions behind the philosophical
conception of analyticity do not explicitly tie the analytic to the metaphysical notion
of necessity. A rejection of the analytic as the necessary a priori, then, should not be
seen as constituting a rejection of the notion of analyticity, merely of its reformulation.
With this in mind, we proceeded to demonstrate that the notion of meaning in situation
theory, the notion we exploited in developing Sense Generation and the Relational View,
suggests that the analytic might be construed as the contingent a priori. Though we
have not developed the view in any detail, we did briefly illustrate how such a view
allows one to preserve description theories of proper names.
In Chapter 6 our attention turned to natural kind terms and the issue of whether their
meaning can be explicated in terms of descriptions. The issue is closely related to that
of proper names and the development of the chapter proceeds in a similar manner. The
difference is that, in this chapter, we considered not only philosophical theories but also
psychological ones.
We began by considering the so-called classical theory of concepts, the theory which
holds that a concept specifies necessary and sufficient conditions on entities to which
the concept applies. The problem with applying this theory to the cases of natural kind
terms is, quite simply, that there appear to be no necessary and sufficient conditions on
the application of the corresponding concepts. Consequently, as a psychological theory
of concepts, the classical approach has lost favour. And, in this, is a similarity with
arguments in the philosophical literature. In particular, we drew the connection with
the arguments of Kripke and Putnam against such views on word meaning as those of
Katz & Postal (1964). These views similarly hold that the meaning of a natural kind
term may be given by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions on its use. As both
Kripke and Putnam point out, there appear to be no such conditions in the case of
natural kind terms.
In the psychological literature, there has been a move away from classical theory and
toward prototype theory, essentially a cluster-concept theory. Our position with regard
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to prototype theory as an explication of the meaning of natural kind terms was that
just as classical theory failed to find conditions which were truly necessary of entities
to which the word applied, so prototype theory similarly fails. We argued that the
only way in which this theory may allow for the expression of necessary truths was
via the expression of tautologies which render the concept indiscriminate. That is,
though it may express necessary conditions on word use, it fails to specify sufficient
conditions. Again, we related this argument to Kripke's argument against cluster-
concept approaches to proper names.
A third class of theory in the psychological literature goes by the name of hybrid or
binary. These assume that a concept has two aspects, a conceptual core which is suited
to description by classical theory and a set of identification procedures suited to de¬
scription by prototype theory. Though such a distinction has much currency in the
psychological literature, we suggested a number of problems. In particular, we sug¬
gested that the classical theory fails to account for conceptual cores for precisely the
reasons it fails to account for complete concepts. Another problem with this proposal is,
it seems, far more damaging. For, if the proposal is correct, then most of the empirical
studies taken to motivate and support prototype theory must necessarily be construed
as evidence concerning identification procedures and not conceptual cores. Since it is a
claim of hybrid theories that it is the core and not the identification procedures which
are implicated in thought, it follows that this empirical evidence has no bearing on the
nature of thought. That is, most of the psychological studies of concepts can be taken
to have had no relation to thought and it is this dreadful relegation of empirical studies
of concepts which we must seek to avoid. Consequently, the hybrid proposal is one we
found lacking.
However, the main problem for psychological theories of concepts is the same as for
standard theories of word meaning, the problem of divining necessary and sufficient
conditions. It is precisely this problem which allows Kripke and Putnam to reject
the notion that the meanings of natural kind terms may be explicated in terms of
descriptions. Our attention, then, shifted to the arguments of Kripke and Putnam.
Having considered the proposal they make, we indicated a number of problems. One
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was the assumption that there be essential properties possessed by all members of a
kind. Another is the failure to furnish an explanation of how uses of natural kind terms
can be informational. For it is generally the case that the presence of essential properties
are not known to language users and so their presence or absence cannot determine the
actual uses of natural kind terms. These uses must be made on some other basis, and
it is this other basis which invests the uses with information, information concerning
this basis. These problems, then, raise the possibility that the Kripke-Putnam position,
based as it is on the conception of the analytic as the necessary a priori, may also be an
inadvertent reductio. Indeed, given the position we adopted in the previous chapter, it
is hardly surprising that this should be our conclusion. Consequently, we then turned
to a brief re-iteration of the Relational View with respect to natural kind terms and
suggested that in its workings it is not so far removed from Putnam's principal concerns.
Namely, the treatment of exceptional cases.
We ended the chapter by pointing out some of the trends we have attempted to illustrate
with respect to the psychological and philosophical literatures. In particular, the trend
away from simple description theories and toward cluster-concept approaches. But
also the trend of recent years of divergence of psychological from philosophical views,
exemplified by the rejection by Kripke and Putnam of approaches so often advanced
in the psychological literature. Our position is that much of this divergence and the
trend towards cluster-concept approaches is forced by the conception of the analytic as
the necessary a priori. Our hope is that by adopting the position in which the analytic
is equated with the contingent a priori, a reconciliation between the concerns of these
psychologists and philosophers will be forthcoming.
In our last main chapter, Chapter 7, our attention turned away from the philosophical
literature and towards the psychological literature on concepts, in particular, towards
prototype theory.
Prototype theory stands as a particularly robust and popular statement of what a
concept is. We began, then, by specifying the fundamental aspects of prototype the¬
ory: its commitment to describing concepts in terms of clusters of weighted attribute-
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value descriptions; similarity being determined by attribute-value matching and the size
of weights; typicality of exemplars being determined by similarity; and there being a
threshold on similarity. To further exemplify the sort of theory which forms the focus of
our attention, we offered two explicit accounts of prototype concepts, those of Cohen &
Murphy (1984) and Smith et. al. (1988). These we then classified in terms of the choices
outlined in Chapter 2. That is, we argued that prototype concepts thus construed can
only sensibly be seen as expressing attunement to unconditional constraints and, further,
that each prototype concept expresses attunement to only one such constraint.
Having attempted a classification of prototype theory, our attention turned to some of
its more obvious problems: the problems of accounting for conceptual coherence; for
developmental adequacy; representational economy; central exemplars; and contextual
sensitivity. It is this family of problems, indeed, that motivates the account that we
develop in the following section, the Family of Constraints view, formerly, the rather
unexcitingly labelled Relational View. After a brief exposition of the view, we attempt
to furnish explanations of how the problems faced by prototype theory are resolved by
the Family of Constraints View. This done, we attempt the major goal of this chapter,
which is to attempt a detailed comparison of a prototype view of concepts with the one
we have developed.
We begin by outlining the Family of Constraints View in its barest essentials. The
first problem of comparison is that prototype concepts express attunement to single
unconditional constraints, whereas, under our account, underlying the use of a word
are multiple conditional constraints. Our first move, then, is to reduce our multiple
conditional constraints to one unconditional constraint. First we are required to condi-
tionalise the conditional constraints. Though there are good reasons to believe such a
move is not valid it is one we must take in order to compare our view with prototype
theory. Conditionalisation, then, makes our multiple conditional constraints uncondi¬
tional. The next step is to abstract over the combining concepts which are implicated
in these unconditional constraints and which we argued play such an important role
in determining conceptual coherence. Our third step is to abstract over the remain¬
ing background conditions which now figure in the antecedent condition of our now
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unconditional constraints. It was the presence of these background conditions which
we suggested gave an account of the context-sensitivity of concept and word use. The
fourth step requires us to combine the constraints with which we are left, constraints
which are unconditional, and make no reference to other concepts or background condi¬
tions. The pitfall associated with this particular move is that, in reducing the number
of constraints which these different theories of concepts assume underly the use of these
concepts, we make an ontological commitment. That is, the difference between assum¬
ing that there is one constraint instead of, say, ten is the same as that between saying
that in a room there is one chair instead of ten. Though in the case of constraints, we
may have no privileged knowledge of the actual number of constraints, it is clear that
each theory makes a different claim about the nature of reality, just as if each disputed
the actual numbers of chairs in a room. The fifth step requires us to ignore certain
relations between attributes, namely, the possibility that in the FoC view we can en¬
code the fact that certain attributes must co-occur, that certain other attributes cannot
co-occur. This information is lost in formulating prototype theory. The final step is to
interpret the redundancy in the constraint that we have now formulated in terms of a
weighting on attribute-values. But, as we indicated, such a step can only make sense if
one is committed to the notion that concepts express abstractions across all contexts.
These moves, then, serve to convince us that the FoC View we have developed is better
equipped to account for what is known of the psychology of concepts than prototype
theory.
Our parting shot in this chapter was to indicate that the Family of Constraints View
is also better placed to account for Wittgenstein's much quoted observations on family
resemblance. In particular, the account we have developed illustrates how one can
account for his notion of family resemblance while respecting his intuition that the
fact that there may be quite disparate uses (either of words or concepts) does not
indicate that the word or concept is disjunctive. In a similar vein, we also indicated
that the account we have offered, while preserving the notion that there are stable mental
representations underlying concepts, is entirely consistent with Barsalou's claims that
concepts are nought but "analytic fictions".
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8.2 Implications and Future Research
The main implications of the research presented in this thesis divide naturally into five
distinct categories. The first concerns some empirical predictions of the FoC view we
developed in Chapter 4.
8.2.1 Empirical Psychology
The view of word meaning that we have developed in this thesis suggests a number
of empirical studies which fall, roughly, into two categories. The first concerns the
psychology of language acquisition, the second the relation between psychological views
of proper names and natural kind terms.
The FoC view, then, has implications for the precise course of acquisition of words
relevant to some domain. There are two kinds of acquisition that may be studied. One
concerns the acquisition of words by children, the other concerns the acquisition of
words by novices in some, more technical, learning experience.
Children routinely experience difficulties in learning to which entities a word may apply.
They may over-extend as, for example, when a child uses "moon" to refer to all round
objects. Or they may under-extend as, for example, when a child uses "shoes" only to
refer to a particular pair of shoes in a particular location. Now, prototype theory seems
to predict a similar sort of underextension. Namely, prototype theory seems committed
to the view that there is no generalisation of exceptional cases across categories. For
example, a child's discovering that lemons can be squashed seems a sufficient learning
experience for the child to realise that many things can be squashed, not simply lemons.
However, the suggestion from the various models of prototype concepts is that this is
not the case, that, in fact, such an experience will only change our concept of lemon.
The FoC view, however, predicts that such a learning experience can concomitantly
alter a wide number of different concepts and so affect the use of a comparable number
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of words. The suggestion is that learning that a squashed lemon can be called a lemon
may be sufficient for a child to learn that the word orange may similarly be applied
to squashed instances of oranges even if these have not formed a part of the child's
experiences. So one implication of this research is that there may be empirical grounds
for distinguishing the FoC view from the models of prototype concepts we have con¬
sidered. One possibility is for a small series of experiments with children of various
ages. The aim would be to investigate changes in the uses of already learned words,
belonging to a certain semantic field, to apply to particular presented objects, and what
effect the learning of new words in the semantic field has on the uses of the previously
learned words. The prediction being that learning of new words, particularly those that
label operations, can, in certain contexts, widen the domain of application of previously
learned words. For this reason, it may be more appropriate to arrange the experiments
in the form of a computer game where objects which play a role in the game can be
freely manipulated. The goal would be to investigate whether children would both com¬
prehend, and produce, uses of words to describe entities that would not normally be
described by those words. And, further, whether these controlled changes in word use
also affected the uses of other words.
A second implication for language acquisition concerns the acquisition of "expert" lan¬
guage: for example, the change in language use that accompanies the transition from
novice to expert in some particular domain. An example of such a domain is medical
diagnosis where it is of considerable importance that the right word is used to label the
right condition. Similar to the study outlined above, one possibility would be to model
how, for example, the use of terms for certain medical conditions shifted as diagnosti¬
cians became more expert. So, for example, how the use of the word epilepsy might
change as subjects progressed from medical students to expert consultants. Another
aspect of this work might be to develop a computational treatment, possibly with a
view to interfacing this with existing expert systems in the area of medical diagnosis.
Another possible implication of the FoC view concerns the relation between psycho¬
logical approaches to concepts and psychological approaches to proper names and face
recognition. Whereas the arguments of Kripke and Putnam suggest that proper names
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and natural kind terms are quite alike, recent work in the psychological literature con¬
ducted by Gillian Cohen suggest that these terms can be distinguished by their psycho¬
logical properties. So, one aspect that could be considered is whether a Sense Generation
approach to proper names would receive psychological support.
8.2.2 Linguistic Coverage
One interesting issue relating to the research we have described concerns the possibility
of assimilating work done on tense and aspect with the FoC view. The FoC view is
committed to the fact that the different senses of words may be non-monotonically
related to the lexical entries of LEXONs from which they are generated. Recent work
on tense and aspect (Moens & Steedman, 1988) also seems committed to such a non-
monotonicity, type coercion. In Max ran, for example, "run" may be assigned, by default,
the process aspectual type. However, in certain circumstances, Max ran may exhibit a
culminated process reading for "run". As, for example, where one knows that Max runs
one mile every day. The way this has been analysed is by claiming that the aspectual
type has been coerced into another, the relation between the types being non-monotonic.
It seems that, prima facie, these two different approaches relying, as they do, on similar
solutions can be assimilated. This is of great interest since Sense Generation approaches
have largely been applied only to noun phrases and this due to their relatively simple
inflectional morphology. However, the possibility of an integration raises even more
interesting questions. In the example with run, above, it seems that, aside from the
change in aspectual type, no other semantic change occurs. But, presumably, these type
coercion principles cannot apply universally. For example, there may be some verbs for
which there cannot be a culminated process reading. The interest for the FoC view, here,
is whether in such cases the coercion principles can be said to apply but only if there
is an accompanying change in sense of the main verb. So we have not only aspectual
change but other semantic change too. Isolating such cases would indeed be suggestive
that the FoC view is touching on a central aspect of language.
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8.2.3 Computational Concerns
Though we have not illustrated the relevant programs here, part of the strategy behind
the research reported here was the writing of two short prolog programs to illustrate
the FoC view of word meaning. One program attempts to demonstrate how the same
word may be associated with different conditions of use, these new conditions being
related to the old by some process of concept combination. Another program attempts
to demonstrate how the interpretive indeterminacy of complex nominals such as coal
merchant may be explained in terms of an indeterminacy in either unifying the descrip¬
tions associated with the component words, or in searching for an appropriate concept
which relates these descriptions. Both programs employ standard feature structure de¬
scriptions to describe the contents of lexical entries. Both programs also appear to raise
questions concerning the possible integration of psychological facts concerning word
meaning and unification-based approaches to grammar. So one possibility which may
be of interest is that the FoC view we have developed may be cast in terms of some or
other computational linguistic theory: CUG, UCG, HPSG, etc.
Another aspect which is of interest concerns the appropriateness of a language such as
an attribute-value language to describe facts concerning the psychology of word use.
In particular, the work of Erickson & Mattson (1981) suggests that, even were we to
be successful in associating feature structures with word senses and in combining them
according to the syntax of some associated sentence, there would still be a deficit. Er¬
ickson & Mattson showed that people may parse sentences apparently successfully even
when these sentences contain clear semantic contradictions. For example, the majority
of their subjects, when asked How many animals did Moses take into the Ark?, would
answer two. Even though Moses took none. Seemingly, listeners and parsers need to be
capable, at least, of remaining insensitive to such contradictions. Unification, strictly,
cannot be so insensitive. The interest is firstly what kind of operation we require over
the content of lexical entries and secondly how it relates to standard unification. What
this consideration raises is the possibility of exploring modifications to the standard
unification operation over feature-structures and, indeed, of possible modifications to
attribute-value languages. Thus, one might want to consider the possibility of what
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we might call partial unification. This would involve unifying feature structures at
their top-most level, that is, at the level of atomic values, ignoring embedded feature
structures. This, at first glance, offers the possibility of a unification-like operation
which preserves insensitivity to contradictions. Such thoughts, though, are clearly at
an embryonic stage.
8.2.4 Formal Aspects
Sense Generation approaches make the key assumption that the generation of senses
is essentially a non-monotonic process. That is, a sense generated from a LEXON may
not be subsumed by that LEXON. This relates Sense Generation approaches and the
FoC view quite naturally to a large literature in Artificial Intelligence on Knowledge
Representation (kr). Most approaches to KR take as fundamental the distinction be¬
tween default and exceptional cases of categories. For example, default birds fly but
exceptional ones, such as penguins, do not. The important issue for cognitive science
is that concerning exactly which knowledge we represent, and how we represent it, in
capturing the facts of everyday reasoning. The standard approach has been to assume
that people reason with defaults and only in cases where this leads to inconsistency do
we override default properties and infer exceptional ones. The resulting "logic" of ev¬
eryday reasoning is then non-monotonic in that conclusions may have to be retracted as
further premisses are added. The rejection of this central tenet, namely monotonicity,
of classical logic has led Israel (1980) among others to claim that non-monotonic logic
is, quite simply, a contradiction in terms. Though there are other objections to such
logics, one way of following up on the research reported in tis thesis is to concentrate
on psychological evidence which suggests that such logics are unlikely to capture the
facts of human reasoning. In particular, the facts which underly the psychology of word
meaning.
Now, Sense Generation approaches assume that one particular sense will be used by
default but that where this default sense leads to inconsistencies a different sense will
be generated. The FoC view we have developed is of great interest here, principally
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because we have couched it in terms of Situation Theory. In fact, when we phrased the
relation between default and generated senses in terms of Situation Theory we did not
get the same picture of non-monotonicity that we do in the standard AI formalisations.
In particular, we get a system whose properties are best described not in terms of
a single logic which is non-monotonic but in terms of several different logics. Each
logic being defined by the set of background conditions to which it is relativised. The
interest, then, for this approach to word meaning is the precise correspondence between
a situation-theoretic account of Sense Generation and one which is couched in terms of
non-monotonic logic. An interesting investigation, then, might pursue the divergences,
and parallels, between a situation-theoretic account and more standard AI accounts of
what is seen as the fundamental defeasibility associated with word meaning.
Another aspect of this particular implication of the FoC view is concerned with the
relation between this situation-theoretic model of apparent non-monotonicity and psy¬
chological evidence. An example of a constraint which empirical psychological studies
may place on the account of non-monotonicity we may hope to develop comes from
an experiment performed by Erickson & Mattson (1981). In this they found that the
standard assumption that the complete sense of a word is accessed during parsing does
not always hold. Indeed, only partial information concerning a word's sense may be re¬
trieved, the degree of retrieval being seemingly dependent on linguistic and non-linguistic
context. This has important ramifications for work in Knowledge Representation where
it is assumed that knowledge, say of the meaning of a word, comes in complete packets
which are either accessed wholesale or not at all. Thus, what this experiment suggests
is that a more subtle view of knowledge representation is required in which the degree of
accessing of knowledge is dependent on contextual factors among others. Such findings
as these, it seems, must be integrated with work on non-monotonic logics and situation-
theoretic alternatives if we are to achieve a formal understanding of the psychology of
defeasible reasoning.
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8.2.5 Philosophical Concerns
The philosophical aspects of this thesis research concern, principally, an evaluation of
Situation Theory in the light of arguments from the traditional analytic philosophical
literature. They divide into three categories. The first concerns accounts of vague¬
ness; the second concerns the significance of situation theory's notion of conditional
constraint; and the third concerns different types of realism.
Vagueness
Traditional formal approaches to word meaning have assumed that words are either
ambiguous or that they have a fixed sense which can be selected from the lexicon.
Such assumptions are not, in general, valid as Clark (1983) has argued. However, it is
assumed that, however vague relations are to be treated, these assumptions nonetheless
hold of them. The FoC view has been motivated by the opposite conclusion: vagueness
is not due to fuzziness or somesuch of senses but to the indeterminacy inherent in
deciding which sense a word has on any particular occasion of use. It is not that the
senses of words apply fuzzily to various objects, on the contrary they either apply or
not. Vagueness, rather, should be seen as arising from the fact that a word may have
many different senses and what is negotiable is not whether a given sense applies to
some object, but which sense the word has. Such a view allows solutions to a number of
problems associated with vagueness as well as metonymy and some degree of metaphor.
However, what such a view requires is a radically different picture of meaning.
Traditional theories of meaning hold that the meaning of terms such as lemon must be
explicated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a lemon. Accord¬
ingly, traditional theories of concepts and of the senses of words hold that, these express
information about the nature of the objects to which they apply. The problem for most
of these approaches is that such information may not be within the grasp of language
users. Certainly, most language users have no, even implicit, knowledge of the necessary
and sufficient conditions for lemonhood, even though, in most respects, they may appear
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to have grasped the meaning of lemon. Sense Generation is an attempt to explicate the
senses of words and the concepts which may underly their use in terms of properties
which are not necessarily singly necessary and jointly sufficient. The issue is, to what ex¬
tent are such senses or concepts anything to do with meaning? After all, the traditional
theories argue, meaning is to do with necessity; the kinds of senses which psychological
arguments discuss are to do with properties that are contingent. This, then, is where
we can see the importance of conditional constraints. They reconcile the notions of
contingency and meaning. So the senses which, according to Sense Generation, underly
the uses of words can indeed be seen as expressing some aspect of the meanings of those
words. This allows for a reconciliation between psychological and philosophical concep¬
tions of meaning which was strictly disallowed under traditional theories of meaning.
This, it seems, is an important aspect of Situation Theory. Another important aspect
of Situation Theory is that it can be applied via Sense Generation to vague predicates.
Vagueness has dogged formal accounts of word meaning. The vagueness of relations
such as "father", for example, has been a challenge to frameworks which are capable,
at the lexical level, of only expressing ambiguity. Different formal proposals have been
made and have generally been rejected. Osherson & Smith (1981) argued strongly that
fuzzy set theory could not accommodate the facts pertaining to the compositionality of
certain adjective-noun conjunctions. Similarly, Kamp k Partee (1989) cast doubt on
the possibility of the technique of supervaluations being able to account for compounds
such as stone lion. In this thesis, however, we have argued that the Relational View in
particular and Sense Generation in general can account for expressions such as these.
Indeed, this thesis is an attempt to account for these in a way which not only respects
the cognitive sciences but which is also amenable to a formal account. The apparatus
of Situation Theory makes such an account possible. The fact that it makes possible a
formal account of vagueness seems to be an important result of Situation Theory.
Another account of the vagueness of relations such as "father" is that of Betsy Macken
(forthcoming). An interesting question that is raised by the contrast between our ac¬
counts, is the issue of the projection of the argument roles of relations. Currently, this is
the mechanism by which Barwise has analysed perspectival relations. Interesting ques-
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tions to pursue here are: are these accounts mere "notational variants" of one another:
are there two kinds of perspectival-relativity associated with relations which require
these two accounts: can the projection analysis account for the range of cases which
motivate Sense Generation? Seeking answers to questions such as these would appear
to be an interesting and significant enterprise.
Conditional Constraints and Analyticity
Kripke's seminal article Naming and Necessity amounts to a vigorous critique of de¬
scription theories of meaning, both of proper names and natural kinds. His conclusions
are familiar: that proper names and natural kinds cannot be said to have senses, merely
meanings. That is, merely referents, designata, denotations. For Kripke, such terms
rigidly designate. His argument, and the similar arguments of Putnam (1975), however,
rely heavily on the traditional conception of analyticity. This conceives of the analytic
as being the necessary a priori. It is the focus on necessity which is of interest here. For
Situation theory's notion of conditional constraint is such as to suggest that meaning
may well be explicated in terms of statements which are merely contingently true. If
indeed we view some, though perhaps not all, analytic truths as being only contingently
true, then the Kripkean position is severely weakened. Indeed, one interpretation of his
argument is as a reductio on the traditional conception of analyticity. However, it is
important to realise that merely allowing contingency to be a facet of meaning does not
totally undermine Kripke's position. For if we assume that proper names and natural
kind terms have only one meaning then we cannot escape the consequence that our
contingent explications of their meaning will not apply in all situations in which the
words themselves can nonetheless be used. Such a fact allows Pratt (1987) to argue
that constraints, even conditional ones, cannot explicate meaning. However, if we re¬
ject this assumption, the Unitary assumption, that such terms have only one meaning
underlying their uses then Pratt's objections as well as the Kripke-Putnam position is
undermined.
There are a number of consequences that follow from this undermining. One is quite
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simply that description theories of both proper names and natural kind terms cannot be
discounted as theories of meaning by fiat. Another is that we can begin a reconciliation
of philosophical and psychological approaches to word meaning. Still further, we have
effected a certain "cleaving" of semantics from ontology. This can be seen in a number
of ways. The clearest manifestation of it is in the fact that we have weakened the
ontological commitment made by traditional theories of meaning. In particular, these
rested on a commitment to the existence of necessary truths. We now simply require
there to be contingent truths, a much weaker ontological commitment. However, the real
force of this "cleaving" is when we consider the relation between realist and anti-realist
semantic accounts.
Ontological Realism and Semantic Anti-Realism
Situation Theory is a strongly realist theory, but the force of its realism is ontological.
In this there is no conflict with the account of word meaning I have been developing.
An aspect of semantic realism is not only this ontological commitment, but a semantic
one. Statements are deemed to have a determinate truth value, even statements which
must necessarily transcend our knowledge. Statements, for example, about the past,
the future and about other minds. The point about such statements is that their truth
necessarily transcends our knowledge and so grasping their meaning must consist of
something other than apprehending their truth or falsity. But grasp their meaning we
surely do. Rejection of this tenet of semantic realism is, however, something which is
perfectly compatible with Situation Theory.
Wittgenstein's notion of criteria can be seen as an alternative to this strong claim
associated with semantic realism. Grasping the meaning of a term is to be equated
with knowing the conditions under which the use of that term is warranted. These
criterial relations, though conferring certainty, are weaker than entailment relations,
indeed they are defeasible. So criterial relations avoid the claims of semantic realism:
to make an ascription of pain to another individual is not to know the circumstances
which make such an ascription true, for these are beyond our grasp. Rather, making such
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an ascription consists in our knowing what circumstances warrant such an ascription,
circumstances which are within our grasp, such as howling, going red in the face, jumping
up and down, etc. Such relations can be defeated, of course, but such is their nature. To
see that Situation Theory offers ontological realism without a commitment to this strong
tenet of semantic realism, we need only recognise that conditional constraints have the
same characteristics as criteria relations. This is the subject of Braisby & Franks (in
preparation). This fact of Situation Theory adds to its philosophical importance. It
also makes it a more obviously attractive proposition for the cognitive sciences.
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In psychology, prototype theory stands as a robust and popular statement of what a concept is.
But, more recently, prototype theory has also become associated with the issue of word meaning.
In particular, it is assumed that the problem of giving some compositional semantics to complex
phrases such as "window box" reduces to the problem of how the constituent concepts combine.
That is, the meaning of a word is described by the concept the word labels. This paper is an
attempt to explore the psychological literature as it relates to the problem of describing word
meanings. Though we will not be committed to the view that word meanings are concepts, the
literature often will be. The next section of this paper outlines a number of puzzles that we would
expect a theory of word meaning to solve. The third section contains a brief discussion of the
two major psychological approaches to word meaning and a number of morals suggested by this
discussion. The fourth section details a Relational View of word meaning which, I shall argue,
not only respects these morals but offers solutions to the puzzles described in section two. These
solutions are presented in section five and the following section comprises an illustration of how
this Relational View may offer a solution to a particular problem in defining kinship relations
raised by Betsy Macken (1990). In the last main section, I shall begin to draw out some of the
implications of this view. An important step will be to indicate how the Relational View, being
psychologically motivated, relates to prototype theory. I will also suggest that Wittgenstein's
notion of "family resemblance", which has often been taken as motivation for prototype theory,
is equally well, if not better, accounted for by the Relational View. Finally, I will argue that the
Relational View is better placed than prototype theory to sit with recent work on concepts, work
emphasising their illusory and transient nature. In concluding, I will also suggest that within the
Relational View a clear and principled distinction between concepts and word meaning can be
drawn. While prototype theory may be a theory of concepts, I shall argue that it cannot be a
theory of word meaning.
2 The Puzzles
Each of these puzzles can be thought of as illustrations of the more general problems of defeasibility
and polysemy. The first illustrates the simple fact that the application of a word to an object is
highly dependent on the situation in which the word is used: in some situations the word appears
to apply, in others it appears not to so apply. The third puzzle illustrates the fact that words may,
in certain situations, apply to all manner of objects to which they would not ordinarily apply. And
the second puzzle illustrates the problem of isolating necessary and sufficient conditions underlying
even the conventional applications of words to objects: for example, the application of the word
*The research reported here was supported by an ESRC studentship, award No. C00428722001. My greatest
thanks go to Robin Cooper without whom this paper would not have been possible. Many thanks also go to
John Perry for his help in suggesting so many improvements to earlier versions of the paper. In addition, I would
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Franks, Liz Hutchinson, Ewan Klein, Karen Lyon, Mark Moens, Terry Myers, Scott McGlashan, Mike Oaksford,
Jon Oberlander, Mukesh Patel, Jerry Seligman, Keith Stenning and Max Volino. All errors, of course, are entirely
my own.
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"lemon" to objects which are undeniably lemons. The second puzzle is really the only one to have
been addressed by the two major psychological approaches to word meaning, classical theory and
prototype theory. I will argue that all three puzzles can be assimilated to the same framework,
the Relational View to be developed later.
2.1 The Lion Puzzle
Consider the following puzzle:
Fred is sitting on a park bench in London. He knows that at the other end of the park
there is a statue of a lion. A schoolgirl approaches him and, explaining that she has
been given an assignment to sketch a lion, she asks Fred if he has seen one. Fred replies
that he has and points her towards the statue. A little later an exhausted zoo-keeper
appears and, explaining to Fred that a lion has escaped from the zoo, he also asks Fred
if he has seen one. Fred replies that he hasn't.
How are we to characterise Fred's responses? We might be tempted to say that Fred is being flexible
with the truth but such a characterisation seems inappropriate: characterising one response as true,
the other as false, would not help us in capturing the fact that both seem equally felicitous. An
alternative might be to claim both utterances to be veridical but that "lion" is simply ambiguous:
that is, Fred's utterances employ different meanings of "lion", one meaning for real lions, another
for statues of lions. Quine (1960), for example, suggests that "light" is ambiguous in just this
way. He claims that one "clear condition" of ambiguity is the fact that the application of an
ambiguous word to certain objects can be both affirmed and denied: such terms can be "clearly
true or clearly false of one and the same thing" (§27 p. 131). A raven's feather, for example, is
both light (in weight) and not light (in colour). Similarly, a particular financial institution may
be both a bank (a money bank) and not a bank (a river bank). Fred's case seems similar, but
whereas we may be led to claim, intuitively, that Fred's statue both is, and is not, a lion, there
is an important difference in the cases of "light" and "bank". In these latter cases, the different
meanings of these words are deemed independent and unrelated (at least, synchronically). In the
case of Fred's uses of "lion", the two meanings are highly related and indeed it is crucial to the
success of his utterances that this is so.
In a similar vein, it seems, we wouldn't be tempted to claim that "lion" is simply vague as "heap"
and "bald" are considered vague. It is not that the application of the word "lion" to the statue is
fuzzy; rather, there is a clear sense in which we can say of the statue that it is a lion and a clear
sense in which we can say that it is not. Broadly speaking, it seems then that there are two sorts
of meaning attached to "lion": a core meaning, to do with real lions, and a peripheral meaning,
to do with other kinds of lion, which is related to the core meaning in a particular way. Which
meaning the word carries on a particular occasion of use seems to depend on the informational
requirements of the agents involved which, in turn, seem to depend on the sort of situation they
find themselves in. An adequate theory of word meaning must explain the relationship between
core and peripheral word meaning while doing so in a way that supports the basic intuition that
the application of a word to an object crucially depends on the nature of the situation in which
the word is used.
2.2 Putnam's Lemon
In trying to represent certain aspects of the meaning of words, it seems we want to capture certain
generalisations about the properties of the objects to which those words apply. Though puzzles
like the previous one may convince us of the difficulty of stating whether a given word applies to
a given object, we may be tempted to treat such puzzles as special cases. Accordingly, we may
consider the objective of a theory of word meaning to be the identification of those conditions
which allow a word to apply to, and only to, objects which it undeniably describes. We might,
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for example, consider the conditions which allow the word "lemon" to apply to objects which
most certainly are lemons and not to objects (like statues) which most certainly are not. Such
a restriction is not one we want to impose, as is made clear below. However, even with such
a restriction, such conditions are difficult to isolate, as the arguments of Putnam (1975) testify:
though we might want to say that lemons are oval-shape, we can easily imagine discovering one
that has been squashed. Similarly, we can imagine finding sweet-tasting lemons, lemons painted
red and so on. Virtually every property one might want to ascribe to the class of objects that
are lemons can seemingly be defeated. That is, for virtually every property, we can imagine
counterfactual circumstances under which a lemon does not possess that property. The problem
then is how a theory of word meaning can capture generalisations concerning the properties of a
class of objects and allow for defeasibility: how is it that we can infer that an object described as
a lemon is oval and acidic-tasting and yet accept that some lemons can be flat and sweet?
2.3 Nunberg's Ham Sandwich
Nunberg (1978) discusses a particular case of metonymy (see also Lakoff, 1987): a waiter employs
the description "ham sandwich" to refer to a customer who has ordered a ham sandwich. This
puzzle is similar to the Lion Puzzle though it offers a starker illustration of the fact that words
may apply to all manner of objects to which they would not ordinarily apply. In this case "ham
sandwich" applies to an individual (a customer) who has none of the properties of ham sandwiches
which make them ham sandwiches.
Similar considerations apply in this case as in the Lion Puzzle. Claiming that "ham sandwich"
is ambiguous ignores the important relations between its various uses. Additionally, since we
can imagine numerous similar examples, to analyse these in terms of ambiguity would suppose
a quite vast, and probably implausibly vast, lexicon. Indeed, this is very much the point which
Clark (1983) suggests undermines traditional views of parsing. Similarly, just as before, claiming
that "ham sandwich" is vague or questioning the veridicality of the waiter's utterances also seem
implausible.
It is also clear that in this case it is the situation in which the waiter finds himself that allows
him to make the particular use of "ham sandwich" that he does: if he said the same thing in
describing a total stranger in a launderette, it is unlikely he would convey the same meaning.
What we require of a theory of word meaning is that it allows the sort of defeasibility illustrated
by all these examples to be very much dependent on the nature of the situation.
2.4 Some General Remarks
One of our objectives in this paper is to assimilate puzzles like the above to the same framework.
This is something that the Relational View developed later is intended to do. However, one might,
at this point, be concerned that the puzzles reveal important differences as well as similarities
and that there should be differences in the treatments reflecting these differences in the puzzles.
Perhaps the most important difference between these puzzles, it is argued, is that puzzles 1 and 3
are cases where a word applies to objects to which it does not conventionally apply (a stone lion
is not really a lion), while puzzle 3 is concerned with the cases of words applying to objects to
which they undeniably apply. Even flattened, unripe lemons which have been painted blue are, it
may be argued, undeniably lemons. Our position will require focussing on this word "undeniably",
but before we can do this we must distinguish two concerns, one semantic, the other ontological,
which, it seems, are often conflated.
What we require our theory of word meaning to tell us is under what circumstances a given word
may apply to a given object. Indeed, to tell us also to which objects a given word may ordinarily
apply. That is, we are concerned with whether a given object can be said to be a "such-and-such".
This, then, is the semantic question which we seek to address. Now, this is very different from a
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related concern which is with whether something actually is a such-and-such. This, then, is the
ontological question for which we do not intend seeking an answer. To exemplify, in the case of,
say, a stone statue of a lion, we require our theory to outline some of the conditions of word use
which allow the word "lion" to apply to such an object. One can, after all, it seems, say of such
an object that it is a "lion". But this use of the word does not commit one, and nor should it
commit our theory, to the view that such an object is a lion. Correspondingly, it is precisely those
conditions under which something is or is not a lion, say, which we do not require our theory to
outline. Instead, we require the theory to outline those conditions under which words, such as
"lion", can be applied to various objects. It is important to see the distinction between these
concerns. The fact that under traditional theories of meaning, as exemplified by the arguments of
Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975), the two concerns are run together forms the subject of another
discussion (Braisby, 1990). These concerns, the ontological and the semantic, can be separated,
however, and it is on this fact that our approach relies.
So, returning to the sense in which words can be said to apply "undeniably" to certain objects,
we can now say this. First, that natural science may well inform us that squashed lemons really
are lemons, just as it may, conceivably, inform us that they are not. In this sense then, squashed
lemons may undeniably be lemons. Second, that this is not necessarily what should concern a
theory of word meaning, though it does according to traditional theories. Rather, we can sum
up our concern as follows. Our theory should tell us under what circumstances an object can be
said to be a "such-and-such". It is for natural science to tell us whether the object really is a
such-and-such. The relation between the fruits of natural science and the question as to which
objects a given word may apply is, presumably, complex and any account of it involved. Such an
account is beyond the scope of this investigation.
Setting aside any ontological concerns and concentrating on the semantic does not, it could be
said, necessarily lead to our treating the puzzles in the same way. It might be suggested, for
example, that whereas it can be said of a stone lion that it is not a lion, it cannot be said of a
squashed lemon that it is not a lemon. And this regardless of what natural science may tell us.
After all, it may be true that natural science is such as to convince us that squashed lemons really
are lemons and that stone lions really are not lions, but, as we have suggested, this is a strictly
separate issue from that of the word "lemon" applying or not applying to various objects. Rather,
to show the semantical similarity between puzzle 2 and the others, we need to show that there are
circumstances under which the word "lemon" would not apply to certain entities which, according
to natural science, are nonetheless lemons. Consider the following example. An assistant, working
at the local supermarket, is asked to put onto the display stand all the lemons to be found in
the warehouse. In the execution of this duty, the assistant comes across many lemons, which
nonetheless she doesn't return to the stand: lemons which are diseased, squashed, unripe and so
on. No doubt there are alternative analyses, but the one we pursue here is to assume that this use
of lemon, in this context, is such as to apply to some lemons and not others. That is, it applies to
normal, saleable lemons but not unusual, unsaleable ones. Other examples could be constructed.
Consider the issue of whether "lemon" applies to a lemon which has just been liquidised. It seems,
that here too, one can imagine cases where we would say that the word "lemon" would not apply
to such a mass. When, for example, someone is asking for a lemon in order to slice it and drop it
into a gin and tonic. Now, such uses may not be as common as those in the other puzzles and in
this, the puzzles differ. But in the fact that such uses are possible lies the similarity between all
the puzzles. And it is this similarity which leads us to expect them to be assimilated to one and
the same framework.
3 The Morals
In this paper our concern is with a psychologically plausible account of word meaning. Psycho¬
logical approaches to word meaning have become associated with the view that, in some way,
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the meaning of a word can be described by the concept the word labels. For example, Cohen
k Murphy (1984) describe the task of arriving at a compositional semantics for phrases such as
"ocean drive" as involving finding "a mediating relation between concepts1. In this section, we
will briefly examine the two major psychological approaches to concepts, classical theory (see, for
example, Hull, 1920; Vygotsky, 1962) and prototype theory (Rosch, 1973, 1975; Rosch k Mervis,
1975) before discussing what they tell us about word meaning.
If we take Putnam's lemon as an example, we can consider the sort of information that these
theories might have us encode in representing the concept "lemon". We can describe these concepts
in terms of attribute-value matrices that are at least implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the
discussions of many researchers in the area (for example, Murphy k Medin, 1985; Osherson k
Smith, 1981; Smith k Osherson, 1984; Smith et. al., 1988).
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In (1) we have a simple attribute-value structure, which we can view as expressing a conditional
constraint on inferences that the concept may licence: if we have an object X and X has acidic taste,
yellow colour and so on, then we can infer that X is a lemon2. Alternatively, and especially from a
consideration of word meaning, we can view (1) as a kind of "definition" or "lexical decomposition"
and the corresponding conditional as a "meaning postulate" (Cresswell, 1978; also Fodor et. ah,
1980). In (2) the attribute-value structure has been augmented in a fashion similar to Smith k
Osherson (Smith k Osherson, 1984; p.3603). Paths within {} braces are disjoint. The numbers
appearing after the values represent a weighting on the disjunction, higher numbers indicating
greater typicality. That is, a lemon with acidic taste is considered a more typical lemon than one
with sweet taste. The starred paths indicate the prototypical attribute-value pairs, those possessed
by the prototype for lemon4. This representation not only allows the possibility of a lemon having
a square shape and a sweet taste, but it also indicates that lemons having oval shape and acidic
'The emphasis is my own.
^This expresses the fact that such conditions can be seen as sufficient. Alternatively we can view the attribute-
value structure as expressing the fact that such conditions may be seen as necessary. In that case the conditional
would be reversed: if X is a lemon then we can infer that X has acidic taste, yellow colour, etc.
3 In fact, this picture is a simplified version of what Smith & Osherson describe. In their 1984 paper, Smith &
Osherson also talk of additional weightings they term diagnosticities. This omission is made solely for the purposes
of clarity and does not affect the arguments made later.
4 The prototype is a theoretical construct that may or may not correspond to an actual exemplar.
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taste are more typical. Having briefly considered how classical and prototype theories describe
concepts (and how, it is assumed, they describe word meanings) we are now in a position to
explore in a little more detail some of the problems associated with these theories. In doing this
I shall draw a number of morals that we would expect any psychologically plausible account of
word meaning to respect.
Moral 1 The Moral of Coherence
Categories cohere. That is, there is something that brings objects together to form categories
and whatever concepts are it is this "something" that they should specify. For classical theory,
coherence is determined by attribute-value matching. That is, to determine whether a given object
is a member of a category, we must match the attribute-value pairs of the two attribute-value
structures corresponding to that object and that category. For prototype theory too, coherence
is determined by attribute-value matching. There are a number of arguments, though, why an
attribute-value matching view of coherence is going to be insufficient to capture the full rich
structure of real-world categories.
Recent discussion has led to the view that representing coherence is necessarily going to involve
what might be described as "knowledge-rich" techniques. As a simple example we might consider
how a squashed, sweet lemon that has been painted blue is still categorised as a lemon. Seemingly,
this can't be modelled in terms of similarity as computed by attribute-value matching since very
few of the attribute-value pairs of either (1) or (2) would match those describing the object.
Murphy k Medin (1985) and Medin k Wattenmaker (1987) argue that similarity computed by
attribute-value matching is simply insufficient to determine the coherence of a category. Instead,
Murphy k Medin (1985) propose that a major part of the coherence of a category is determined
by "theories and knowledge of the real world" (p.312), these, in turn, being composed or "made
up" (p.313) from concepts. Theories like those, for example, which express knowledge of such
relations as flattening, painting, ripening, etc.
In trying to glean psychological truths for our account of word meaning this position seems circular.
If we accept for sake of argument that word meanings can be described by concepts then Murphy
k Medin's arguments suggest that word meanings are to be represented in terms of theories
which in turn are to be represented in terms of word meanings. Though, Murphy k Medin reject
the suggestion that their position is circular, a clearer rejection can be made, I believe, once a
particular assumption is abandoned: the Unitary assumption.
Underlying both the prototype and classical approaches is an assumption, the Unitary assump¬
tion, that a single, "basic-level" category (Rosch et. al., 1976) is to be represented by something
corresponding to a single, unitary data structure, variously called a concept, lexical concept or
word meaning. It seems that it is this assumption together with Murphy k Medin's arguments
concerning coherence which appear to lead to circularity. The problem arises because a word
meaning is seen as both being a component of a theory and being composed of theories. For an
account of word meaning, this suggests that underlying various uses of a single word are various
word meanings (that is, as components of theories). The circularity emerges when we stipulate
that, in fact, it is only one meaning that underlies all the uses of a given word. Thus we are
lead to represent meanings inside meanings and the circularity that implies. We can avoid this
circularity by denying that the various uses of a word all depend on a single meaning. Rather, we
may allow that these various uses may depend on a number of different, though related, meanings.
To conclude, any theory which attempts to represent all the meanings of the uses of a word in
terms of a single data structure can be ruled out by the moral of coherence a priori.
As an alternative, it seems that a much more intuitive account of conceptual coherence is forthcom¬
ing when we consider some more examples like the lemon. Intuitively, it seems that a dinner-table
turkey is a turkey, not because of some particular set of properties that it has, but because we
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know of relations that hold in the world such that the properties of the object we observe (dinner-
table turkey) stand in this relation with the properties of normal turkeys. Similarly, we can still
talk of a dismantled bicycle as a bicycle apparently not because of some similarity as computed
by attribute-value matching but because of our knowledge of dismantling operations. Murphy
& Medin (1985) make a similar point. They state that "much of our reasoning about concepts
may be based on constraints about operations that are permissible" (p.295). This point seems
fundamental and we might expect that this clue could help in developing our account of word
meaning. In particular, if some of the data structures which underly the uses of a word, express
facts about such permissible "operations", then it seems our account will have more promise in
respecting the psychological arguments regarding coherence.
Moral 2 The Moral of Representational Economy
In principle, there seem to be many ways of representing a category by encoding information in
our data structures. One way might be to record, for every exemplar, the value of each attribute
pertaining to the category. For example, if shape is relevant to the category of lemons then for
each lemon we encounter, we could simply record its shape. This is the strategy that prototype
theory adopts: if, equipped with (2) as our representation of the category of lemons, we encounter
a flat lemon, the prototype structure will be revised. The disjoint set of values for the attribute
"shape" will be expanded to include "flat" with a suitable weighting indicating its typicality. Such
a strategy seems grossly inefficient and also fails to respect the following intuition: concepts are hy¬
pothesised to capture generalisations in order that finite brains may represent infinite possibilities.
The strategy also seems implausible from the point of view of cognitive development, a point that
has been made by others (for example, Cohen, 1983; p.87). As an alternative, we might consider
that it is our knowledge of operations and other relations in the world that allow us to represent
categories in the way that we do. Such knowledge should not be encoded in each representation
we have for different classes of objects as it is in prototype theory: we wouldn't want to add
the value "flat" for the attribute "shape" for each of our representations for "lemon", "orange",
"house", "pie" and so on. Rather we would like to say that our knowledge of the "flattening"
operation is generalised across our representations of categories. This notion of generalisation of
knowledge of operations will be an important feature of the framework to be developed. The moral
of representational economy is that we must require that whatever structures we hypothesise to
describe word meanings they must genuinely generalise; in principle, they shouldn't incorporate
information specific to each exemplar.
Moral 3 The Moral of Central Exemplars
In everyday reasoning the inferences we make regarding categories are often based on typical
exemplars. If we have to explain what dogs are we tend to describe what have been called their
default properties. Such an observation is made much use of by Putnam (1975) and these default
properties seem to be very similar to what he calls "core facts". The pervasive nature of default
reasoning suggests that the central exemplars, or those exemplars for which "core facts" are indeed
facts, have special cognitive significance. This is also something that a theory of word meaning
should respect. Classical theory singularly failed to respect this moral and we might see this as
the reason for its problems. Prototype theory, on the other hand, accords the central exemplars a
special status in that they are represented by the prototype. Due to the weightings on attribute-
value pairs, prototype theory also offers a way of distinguishing different, non-central exemplars.
However, the moral of Central Exemplars is that any theory of word meaning must distinguish
between the representations of central and peripheral exemplars.
Moral 4 The Moral of Context Dependence
In a number of ways the meanings of words can be said to depend on the context in which we find
them. "Lion" when used to describe a fierce lion seems to mean something quite different from
"lion" when used to refer to a statue of a lion. Typically, it appears as though the same word carries
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different meanings and the nature of the difference directly reflects the nature of the differences
between the situations in which it is used and the purposes for which it is used. Barsalou, for
example, has shown very convincingly a number of effects of context on our representations of
categories (Barsalou, 1982; Barsalou, 1987). Barsalou's conclusion seems to imply that there are
no stable representations corresponding to concepts (a conclusion that the framework we develop
in the next section will endorse). However, were the same conclusion to apply to word meanings,
it would appear very unintuitive: words do seem to have a stable core meaning and the meaning
of words in use seems related to the core meaning. The two meanings of "lion" in the lion
puzzle, for example, seem highly related. Therefore the conclusion I will take from observations
of context dependence is that a theory of word meaning must have an adequate account of the
role of situational factors in determining the deviation of the meaning of words in use from what
I take to be their core meaning. This is the Moral of Context Dependence.
4 A Relational View of Word Meaning
In the previous section, we considered various arguments which suggest that both classical and
prototype theories run into problems in describing concepts. From the perspective of these psy¬
chological theories, similar problems are going to face their accounts of word meaning. However,
it seems that if we follow the morals in developing an account of word meaning, we might not only
develop a psychologically plausible account but one that may also solve the puzzles described in
section two.
The morals allow one a considerable degree of freedom and the framework I shall present here
should by no means be seen as the only approach consistent with them. As far as an account of
word meaning is concerned, these are the morals we must respect:
1. Descriptions of word meanings must express generalisations and lend themselves to econom¬
ical representations a la classical theory. In addition, we would expect that facts about
operations (such as flattening, drying, ripening, etc.) should be similarly expressed in an
economical way.
2. Multiple word meanings (perhaps especially those corresponding to operations) should be
implicated in the various uses of a single word.
3. Descriptions of word meanings must be sensitive to the important cognitive distinction be¬
tween central and peripheral exemplars. That is, we expect there to be some distinction
between the meanings a word has when used to describe central as opposed to peripheral
exemplars.
4. The deviation of peripheral word meaning from core meaning should be sensitive to the
situation in which the words are used and to the informational requirements of the agents
involved in their use.
In describing the framework I shall offer an interpretation of it in situation theory. Though I shall
not refer to it directly, an implementation in C-prolog has been completed.
4.1 Worms
We take it that a word is related to a data structure which describes that word's meaning. We will
label such a relation, WORd Meaning (or worm). Talcing the example of lemons once more, the
worm will relate the word "lemon" to a data structure just as in (1) which is repeated below. This
Relational View does not depend on the particular attribute-value pairs chosen in (1), that is, it
does not depend on whether (1) does indeed describe the core meaning of "lemon". Rather, what
the Relational View amounts to is a more general claim about the nature of such core meanings,
their relation to peripheral meanings and how language users may be flexible in their use of words.
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In Situation Theory we can view this worm as a relation in the following infon where the data
structure is represented by a property.
< worm, LEMON, P; 1 > (4)
where
P = [p| < shape, p, oval; 1 A
< taste, p, acidic; 1 A . ,
< colour, p, yellow; 1 A
< isa, p, fruit; 1 >]
As suggested earlier, worms5 can be thought of as expressing constraints. One constraint might
be used in parsing so as to constrain the possible interpretations associated with a given use of a
word. For example, given a use of "lemon" we may want to conclude that we have an individual
which has acidic taste, yellow colour and so on. Another constraint might be used in generation so
as to constrain the possible ways of describing a given individual. For example, given an individual
which has the properties of acidic taste, yellow colour and so on, we would wish to conclude that
the word lemon may be used to describe such an individual. That is, there are two possible
constraints, one which necessarily seems to involve word use, the other which involves the abstract
properties of a word. Here I shall be concerned solely with the latter kind of constraint.
Our worm will associate with a word a particular data structure which expresses the sort of
constraint we need to characterise the conditions under which the word can be used. Taking
the example of lemons again and assuming that we can also associate a data structure with an
individual, then provided that the data structure associated with the individual is subsumed
by that associated with the word then the individual can be described as a lemon. In Situation
Theory, we will represent the data structure associated with the individual by means of a restricted
parameter. What we then have amounts to the following: provided the restricted parameter
associated with the object has the property given by the worm then that word can be used in
describing the object. Following Barwise (1985), the constraint can be expressed as follows.
(3)
Si => S2 | B (6)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P, p; 1 >] (7)
and
S2 = [s | s )=< describe, p, LEMON; 1 »] (8)
and
B = [b | b [=« worm, LEMON, P; 1 »] (9)
and
P = [Pi I ^ shape, pi, oval; 1 » A (10)
< taste, pi, acidic; 1 A
<C colour, pi, yellow; 1 A
< isa, pi, fruit; 1 »]
5More correctly, we mean the data structure which is an argument of the WORM. Throughout the following,
however, we will use WORM to mean both this data structure and the relation. Although the distinction is not
unimportant, which is meant will be clear from the text.
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(6) is a conditional constraint. That is, it is a constraint that is relativised with respect to some
background situation type, B, such that provided we have a background situation of this type then
the constraint holds. (6) and (9) express the fact that if we have an individual with the property
P then it is in virtue of the worm "lemon", a component of the background conditions, that the
individual can be described as a lemon6.
So far we have a framework that is very similar to classical theory and we might consider whether
it respects the morals that are so important. Although we cannot yet see how all the morals are to
be respected, we can note in passing that the moral of representational economy is respected since
our data structures capture a significant degree of generalisation, a la classical theory, worms
also offer a way of describing the central exemplars. The question then remains as to how to
accommodate the peripheral exemplars and, as we shall see, these are to be accommodated by
what we will call combinations of worms (or COWORMs).
4.2 Coworms
Consider a peripheral exemplar of the category of lemons, one that has been squashed flat. With
this individual we can also associate what in Situation Theory can be modelled by a restricted
parameter. The parameter this time though will not have the complex property given by the
WORM for lemon but, instead, will be as follows.
p| < shape, p, flat; 1 > A (11)
■C taste, p, acidic; 1 A
< isa, p, fruit; 1 A
•C colour, p, yellow; 1 3>
Since p is not of the type expressed by the worm for lemon, the constraint (6) cannot allow that
this object can be described by a use of the word lemon. However, cognitive agents have a wealth
of information at their disposal that we might characterise as being in their background resource
situation. This situation allows the agent access to information about the world that will resolve
certain local inconsistencies. One such inconsistency is where the object we are considering does
not have the properties expressed by the worm for lemon (e.g.. a squashed lemon) and yet may
nonetheless be described as a lemon. In this instance the resource situation allows us to access
worms that can resolve the inconsistency. One such worm is that for "flattened". This worm is
also a relation between a word, "flattened", and two sorts of data structures. One data structure
will describe flat individuals, the other will describe individuals of indeterminate (though not null)
shape.
The arguments we considered in discussing coherence and representational economy indicate the
kind of solution we require. We need a further constraint which expresses the fact that an individual
with a certain set of properties may be described as, say, a lemon, provided that the properties it
has are related, by a worm, to those of the worm "lemon". So we will have a worm "lemon" and
a worm "flattened" which when combined suitably will describe a flattened lemon. In Situation
Theory, this can be expressed as another constraint governing the properties of the word "lemon".
Provided the restricted parameter associated with a given object is of a sort that is related by the
worm for flattened to the sort of parameter associated with the worm for lemon, then the object
is such that it could be described by a use of the word lemon. This new constraint is as follows.
Si => S2 I B' (12)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P2, p; 1 >] (13)
6Although I shall not discuss the issue of perspectives, by locating WORMs in the background situation type this




s2 = [s I s DESCRIBE, p, LEMON; 1 >] (14)
and
B' = [b | b (= < worm, LEMON, 1 > A
< worm, FLATTENED, Px, P2; 1 >]
(15)
and
?2 = [p I < shape, p, flat; 1 > A (16)
<C taste, p, acidic; 1 > A
< colour, p, yellow; 1 A
<C isa, p, fruit; 1 »]
Very briefly, we have seen how this Relational View can cope with both central and peripheral
exemplars. Respecting the moral of central exemplars, it treats central and peripheral exemplars
differently: central exemplars are accommodated by worms, peripheral exemplars by coworms.
The fact that peripheral exemplars are treated by COWORMs, however, allows the moral of coher¬
ence to be respected. For instance, in the treatment we gave for our flattened lemon, one can see
the worm "flattened" as expressing a theory. It is precisely this kind of "knowledge-rich" solution
that the moral of coherence demanded. The moral of context dependence is also respected by
ensuring that the worms that underly word use are seen as components of the background situa¬
tion. The background situation may change either as agents focus situations change or as agents
require different information from their focus situation. In addition, COWORMs capture the added
generalisation that prototype theory seems to miss. Our knowledge of flattening is not encoded
in each of our representations for various categories but it is encoded separately in a way that
will generalise. This plausible and desirable result suggests an interesting developmental predic¬
tion. Namely, when we acquire the worm "flattening" we concomitantly learn that all manner
of objects that are flat can be described in new ways: we learn that flat objects that otherwise
look like lemons can also be described as lemons. Unlike most other accounts, this allows that we
don't have to change our data structure describing lemons on encountering a flat lemon for the
very first time.
In addition to respecting the Morals, I believe the account offered here is promising for other
reasons. Consider a situation in which Fred comes into my office and tells me that he has a lemon
in his pocket. Corresponding to an instance of default reasoning, there is a sense in which I come
to believe that Fred has a yellow, oval-shaped fruit on his person. This inference can be expressed
by considering that it is the worm for lemon which is used in such reasoning. We may, however,
acquire further information that conflicts with the worm for lemon and so rules out "lemon" as an
accurate description. In such circumstances we may have to find a different appropriate coworm
or COWORMs. However, there is also a sense in which I know nothing of what Fred has in his
pocket other than that there is something and Fred calls that something a lemon. The fact that
so little information can be conveyed by the use of a word seems to correspond exactly to the
indeterminacy in finding a particular corresponding worm or coworm to describe that word's
meaning.
COWORMs are also implicated in the realisation of the background conditions with respect to which
conditional constraints are relativised. When we wished to describe a squashed lemon as a lemon,
the first constraint (6) clearly failed as (11) does not have the property P in (9). The inapplicability
of the constraint we can assume to be due to the fact that the actual background situation was not
of type B in (6). The inappropriateness of the constraint leads to the utilisation of a different but
related constraint as in (12), relativised with respect to some new set of background conditions,
B'. This time the constraint holds because (11) has the property P2 in (15). If we consider the way
this constraint is expressed then we can see it as revealing something of the nature of the original
background conditions with respect to which the constraint in (6) is relativised. The particular
COWORM that is part of the second constraint tells us that the negation of that COWORM was
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a condition of the original background situation type. That is, returning to our example, the
fact that the worm "flattened" relates the constraint (12) to the constraint (6) tells us that (6)
presupposes that lemons aren't squashed flat and this then is one of the background conditions
with respect to which (6) was relativised. In this framework then, the process of finding an
appropriate coworm is the process of realising background conditions.
So now we have a very basic framework with which to explore word meaning. It seems to respect
the morals that I have tried to argue are so important and by the use of COWORMs the account
seems to offer a solution to the problem of Putnam's Lemon (puzzle 2): one can imagine similar
analyses to that offered for some of Putnam's other examples. Lemons, having turned blue in the
presence of some gas, for example, might be accommodated by some worm or coworm expressing
the relation between affected and unaffected lemons. But what of the other puzzles in section 2?
Can the framework begin to explain what is going on? I believe that it can, in a most natural and
appealing way.
5 The Puzzles Reconsidered
Fred has been sitting on a park bench experiencing a number of situations. In one situation he
claims to have seen a lion and in this we would probably agree. In another, he claims not to have
seen a lion and again we wouldn't argue. Now we can suppose that Fred knows that something
like the following constraint holds concerning what kind of object may be described as a lion.
Si => S2 | B (17)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P, p; 1 >] (18)
and
S2 = [s I s [=< DESCRIBE, p, LION; 1 >] (19)
and
B = [b I b [=< worm, LION, P; 1 >] (20)
and7
P = [p | <C animate, p; 1 » A (21)
<C legs, p, 4; 1 » A
< tail, p, 1; 1 >]
When Fred responds to the zoo-keeper, his use is in accordance with this constraint. That is,
Fred hasn't come across an object whose description is of the sort expressed by the worm for lion,
i.e., an animate object with 4 legs and a tail. So provided that the constraint Fred is exploiting
is expressed by the worm "lion", he has replied correctly to the zoo-keeper. But what of the
schoolgirl? Fred has access to a background resource situation which supports many infons. One
expresses the fact that the there is a worm "statue". This worm relates two data structures to
the word "statue". One data structure may describe animate things (the class of things modelled
by statues), the other inanimate things that stand in certain relations to the animate things (the
class of statues). Though this doesn't accurately or fully describe the relationship between statues
and the things they model, it will suffice for our purposes. In a similar fashion to before, the
worm "statue" allows us to arrive at the following constraint.
Si => S2 | B' (22)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P2, p; 1 >] (23)
7Clearly, P only expresses some of the information relevant to lionhood.
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and
s2 = [s I S (=< DESCRIBE, p, LION; 1 >] (24)
and
B' = [b | b (= < worm, LION, P^ 1 » a
< worm, STATUE, Pi, P2; 1 >]
(25)
and
P2 = [p | <C animate, p;0>A
< legs, p, 4; 1 » A
<C tail, p, 1; 1 >]
(26)
Now Fred, whilst walking to his park bench, has come across an individual whose description is of
this last sort, i.e., an inanimate object with 4 legs and a tail. So, provided that the constraint he
is exploiting is expressed by this coworm, Fred can rightly assert that he has seen a lion which
is, fortunately, what the schoolgirl was hoping for.
What should be clear is that coworms are sensitive to the information states of agents. If Fred's
background resource situation did not support the infon concerning the worm for "statue" then,
according to this view, he would not be able to rightly report that he had seen a lion. The
significance of this point is much more obvious when we consider the third puzzle of section 2.
The waiter in the restaurant knows (we can assume) that "ham sandwich" is normally appropriate
to describe ham sandwiches and not human beings like the customer he is serving. However, his
particular background resource situation also supports the fact that the worm relation holds
between the word "orders", things of type "customer" (P2) and things of type "ham sandwich"
(Pi). Just as before, this worm can form a coworm with the worm for "ham sandwich" which
allows us to consider a new background situation type as follows.
Similar to Fred's case, we now have a coworm which expresses a constraint relativised with
respect to this background situation type. It is this new constraint that renders it legitimate for
the waiter to refer to his customer as a ham sandwich. The point about this particular example
that is not quite so clear in the others I have described is precisely the contextual nature of this
aspect of word use. It seems reasonable to suggest that there is something about the particular
background resource situation that allows the waiter to call a customer a ham sandwich. Locating
such a mechanism in the background situation seems to offer a way of explaining how it would
be considered infelicitous were the waiter to describe the same person in the same way in a
launderette. It seems the particular coworm we have considered would not be supported given
the nature of those prevailing background conditions.
So far, I have tried to argue that the Relational View of word meaning can offer solutions to the
sorts of puzzle exemplified by those of section 2. Now we turn to another puzzle, that provided
by kinship terms, and apply the same kind of analysis.
The problem of defining kinship relations has been made clearer by the accounts of Lakoff (1987)
and Macken (1990). Mothers, for example, are conventionally considered to be genetically related
to their offspring. Adoptive mothers, though, are naturally described as mothers even though they
and their adopted children are not related genetically. Similarly, as Macken's example demon¬
strates, fathers may be live-in but are fathers nonetheless. The Relational View I have outlined
suggests an alternative analysis to those offered by both Lakoff and Macken which we will now
B' = [b | b (= < worm, HAM.SANDWICH, Pi; 1 > a
< worm, ORDERS, P2, Pi; 1 >]
(27)
6 Lakoff's Mother and Macken's Father
13
pursue. Under this view, we might like to say that the following constraint holds concerning the
sort of objects that can be described by a use of the word "mother".
Si => S2 | B (28)
where
Sx = [s I B |=< p, p; 1 >] (29)
and
S2 = [s I s |=< describe, p, MOTHER; 1 »] (30)
and
B = [b | b |=< worm, MOTHER, P; 1 »] (31)
and
P = [p | <C sex, p, female; 1 A (32)
<C child.of, p, q; 1 ;§> A
< genetics, p, g; 1 > A
< genetics, q, g; 1 >]
It is this constraint that tells us that a female who is genetically related to her child, may be
described by a use of the word "mother"8. This, however, does not help us describe adoptive
mothers: we have no mechanism for stating that an individual described by the following restricted
parameter can be described by a use of the word "mother".9
p | < sex, p, female; 1 A (33)
< child.of, p, q; 1 A
•C genetics, p, gi; 1 > A
< genetics, q, g2; 1 >
In a similar fashion to before, we will use some other worm to form a coworm which provides
a further constraint on the way in which the word "mother" can be used. We will assume that
agents have access to the worm for "adoptive". This worm relates the word "adoptive" and two
data structures. One data structure expresses the fact that two individuals have the same genetic
material, the other expresses the fact that their genetic material is unrelated10. This worm,
combined with the worm "mother" gives us a coworm that expresses the following constraint.
Si => S2 | B' (34)
where
Si = [s | s )=< P2, p; 1 >] (35)
and
S2 = [s I s )=< describe, p, MOTHER; 1 >] (36)
and
B'= [b|bt= < worm, MOTHER, Pi; 1 » A (37)
< worm, ADOPTIVE, P), P2; 1 >]
and
P2 = [p | <c sex, p, female; 1 A (38)
< childjof, p, q; 1 A
< genetics, p, h; 1 > A
< genetics, q, g; 1 >]
8As described here, we have said that the child and mother must have the same genetics. Though this is most
certainly not the correct condition on the use of the word "mother" it will suffice for illustrative purposes.
9 In (33), gi and g2 are assumed to be distinct.
10Again, this is not the correct condition but will suffice for illustrative purposes.
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It is this constraint, expressed by the coworm of our worms for "adoptive" and "mother", that
allows that individuals who are adoptive mothers and have no genetic relation to their children can
nonetheless still be described by a use of the word "mother". Importantly, this analysis does not
lead to the suggestion that there are several independent models underlying the word "mother"
as Lakoff's analysis does. Nor does it require that we have to accept the apparently unintuitive
suggestion of Macken's analysis, that the "father" relation is really a relation between a father, a
child and some parameter.
7 Some Implications
In this section we briefly consider three of the implications of this Relational View of word meaning.
Just as previous psychological theories of concepts have been advanced as theories of word meaning,
so one of our concerns is to consider the implications for a theory of concepts of our view of word
meaning. Another concern is with Wittgenstein's "family resemblance". As other psychological
theories have claimed to be able to express family resemblance, it is important to examine the
capabilities of the Relational View in this regard. Our first concern, however, is more directly
psychological. It is to attempt, in some detail, a comparison between the Relational View and
prototype theory. The means of achieving this is to effect a reconstruction of prototype theory
from the Relational View, noting what is lost in the process.
7.1 On Prototype Theory
In this section, we return to prototype theory, more properly, a variant of this known as the
Modification Model (Smith & Osherson, 1984), in an attempt to provide some better understanding
of it and of the Relational View we have developed. As already indicated, we will attempt to
reconstruct prototype theory out of the Relational View and note the consequences. Accordingly,
our goal is to arrive at some rough translation of the sort of data structure we have in (2).
Whereas we are attempting to reconstruct prototype theory by "tinkering" with the Relational
View, this is purely for expository purposes. As I have tried to argue, the Relational View receives
much stronger support from psychological considerations than does prototype theory. It is via
this "tinkering" that we hope to understand better what is wrong with prototype theory and,
concomitantly, what is right with it.
The Relational View is tied to the claim that a word's core meaning may be described by a single
data structure. This serves to describe that word's meaning on certain occasions of use and acts
as one constraint on the word's meaning. For different occasions of use we have seen that different
sorts of data structure are implicated. In particular, those involving relations such as "flattening",
etc., hence, the Relational View. That is, underlying word use generally is a whole family of
related constraints or meaning relations. Our first goal in reconstructing prototype theory is to
try and reduce this family of constraints to one. By these means, we will be able to see more
clearly how to retrieve the single data structure that prototype theory postulates as underlying
word use. The fact that this one data structure is supposed to account for all the meanings of a
word, means that, in terms of constraints, we should be trying to reduce our family of conditional
constraints not merely to one constraint, but to one unconditional constraint. These then are the
moves we have to make. Schematically, our starting position, the Relational View, is as follows,
where property(P, x) means the Situation Type where x has the property P and describe(x,
LEM) means the Situation Type where x can be described by a use of the word "lemon". Similarly,
worm(LEM, P), Bi, etc., all refer to Situation Types. Hopefully it is clear that this notation is
not intended to be formally precise, but rather to provide a simple and intuitive illustration.
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property(P, x) =>■ describe(x, LEM) | worm(LEM, P) a Bi (39)
property(Q, x) => describe(x, LEM) | worm(LEM, P) a worm(FLAT, P, Q) a B2
property(R, x) => describe(x, LEM) | worm(LEM, P) a worm(PAINT, P, R) a B3
That is, (39) expresses schematically the Relational View that we have developed for those in¬
dividuals which are, respectively, ordinary lemons, flattened lemons and painted lemons. Now,
in order to make these conditional constraints unconditional the background conditions must be
made explicit. Doing so yields the following family of constraints.
property(P, x) a worm(LEM, P) a Bi => describe(x, LEM) (40)
property(Q, x) a worm(LEM, P) a worm(FLAT, P, Q) a B2 => describe(x, LEM)
property(R, x) a worm(LEM, P) a worm(PAINT, P, R)aB3 => describe(x, LEM)
If we make the further assumption that B1-B3 will always hold11 and we abstract over the WORMS
we get the following.
property(P, x) => describe(x, LEM) (41)
property(Q, x) =>• describe(x, LEM)
property(R, x) => describe(x, LEM)
This last move we can think of as analogous to partial execution in prolog or to some sort of
compilation. Here, P, Q and R are the different properties which may be associated by various
relations (such as "flattened") with the worm for "lemon". It now seems a straightforward step
to combine these unconditional constraints into a single unconditional constraint as follows.
property(P, x) V property(Q, x) V property(R, x) => describe(x, LEM) (42)
It seems that the constraint we now have is of pretty much the same sort as the one expressed
by the attribute-value structure in (2)12. What is important to note, though, is the important
intuitions that have been lost in trying to reconstruct prototype theory from the Relational View.
Above all else, it seems, this is what makes the Relational View a more attractive proposition
than either classical theory or prototype theory. So what are these important intuitions?
Firstly, the moral of coherence requires that something like theories should underly word use.
This is what COWORMs are intended to express. Having abstracted over them, as prototype
theory seems to, we lose the possibility of respecting the important arguments made by Murphy
& Medin, among others. Secondly, we have had our family of conditional constraints replaced by
a single unconditional constraint. This violates the unitary assumption which appeared to lead to
an unfortunate circularity: we argued earlier that this assumption would lead us to represent one
meaning inside another. It seems that this is what has happened in obtaining a representation like
(2). The fact of the matter is that we have lost the generalisations that a word like "flattened"
expressed in the Relational View. In prototype theory, this information concerning flattening is
subordinated to the level of a feature in a data structure, such as the one for "lemon", for example.
Assuming such structures describe word meanings, it seems, then, that we have been led to
represent meanings inside meanings. Thirdly, we now require some additional apparatus to respect
the distinction between central and peripheral exemplars. This is precisely what the weights on
the disjunctions in (2) achieve. Such weights, though, are not required under the Relational View,
and we might require additional arguments to provide their justification. And fourthly, there is
11Strictly, we do not have to assume that b1-b3 hold but simply that so many background conditions can be
realised or made explicit that the remaining background conditions always hold. Alternatively, we may conclude
that there are no background conditions to be satisfied.
12Ignoring the fact that (42) has the power to express what have been called feature co-occurrence restrictions
which (2), as it stands, does not.
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the moral of Context Dependence. In the formalisation of the Relational View, the contribution
of context was made relatively explicit. The constraints which licence the application of a word to
an object were all conditional. That is, they depended on various background conditions holding.
Whereas we were not, nor should we attempt to be, explicit about the nature of these background
conditions, we were explicit about their role in word meaning. Our reconstruction of prototype
theory has left the role of context at best inexplicit, at worst ignored. Such a result can only be
unsatisfactory.
I have tried to argue above that though we can reconstruct prototype theory from the Relational
View, this could only be done through doing great violence to our intuitions. Another argument
that is of significance concerns Wittgenstein's (1953) much quoted observations on "games".
7.2 On Family Resemblance
Wittgenstein's characterisation of the category of games as having a family resemblance structure
has often been taken by prototype theorists as motivation for their view. This is perhaps not
surprising when we consider that prototype theory is an example of what we may call "cluster-
concept" views. For the notion of "family resemblance" has been taken by many, Kripke (1972, p.
258), for example, to support such views. In this section we will suggest that, on the contrary, an
equally plausible, and arguably better, account of family resemblance is inherent in the Relational
View.
According to the Relational View, underlying the various uses of a word (and the objects it can
describe) is not a single data structure or a single constraint or meaning relation, but a (possibly
indefinite) number of such constraints. Now, while these constraints differ, importantly, they are
all related. In particular, they are all related to some particular core constraint. In the case of
Putnam's lemon, for example, the constraint underlying the various uses of "lemon" (for normal
and for flattened lemons) are, as we have seen, systematically related. This fact is expressed by
the use of what we have called coworms. Crucial for our concerns is the fact that such relations
may belie the appearance of non-monotonicity or defeasibility. The specification of oval shape, for
example, may be defeated by the worm for "flattened". And, at least in principle, as the Puzzles
of section 2 have shown, any such specification may be so defeated. This fact, then, allows that
the various constraints underlying the uses of a given word apply to objects which, though related,
may not necessarily exhibit common properties. It is this same fact, then, which allows us to claim
that these constraints form a family. Thus, under the Relational View, family resemblance among
the members of a category is captured by the idea that the various uses of a word belie a family
of constraints. That is, a family of different but related meanings.
Now, if one takes Wittgenstein's arguments to support the Unitary assumption, then his concern
with family resemblance can only be taken to support some means of making more complex, or
more flexible, the sort of data structure underlying the meaning of a word. That is, the Unitary
assumption, together with the observation of family resemblance, seems to force the adoption of
some "cluster-concept" position. Such is prototype theory. However, a rejection of the Unitary
Assumption, leads to a denial of the connection between the observation of family resemblance
and "cluster-concept" views. The former need not lead to the latter. Indeed, we have seen this
with the Relational View.
It should be obvious that the intention is not, in this meagre fashion, to attempt any kind of
exegesis of Wittgenstein's intentions. Rather, simply to point to the possibility of an alternative
account of family resemblance. So, to recap, indeed there may be no common features underlying
the use of "game", for "game" has no single meaning. Rather, there is a family of different but
related meaning relations underlying the various uses of "game". That is, a family of constraints.
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• 7.3 On Concepts
We saw in section 7.1 that prototype theory, ostensibly a theory of concepts, can be reconstructed
by "tinkering" with the idea of a family of constraints or meaning relations which is central to
the Relational View. What prototype theory calls word meanings, though, seem best described
by single, unconditional constraints on word use. Accepting the Relational View suggests that
prototype theory cannot be a theory of word meaning. The suggestion which is most important for
the purposes of this section is that, even as a theory of concepts, prototype theory is unsatisfactory.
The morals that we drew in section 3 are drawn on the basis of psychological evidence concerning
theories of concepts. As we have seen, prototype theory appears to transgress a number. The
morals of coherence, representational economy and context dependence, in particular, are not
respected. We have argued that the Relational View does not suffer a similar fate. But the
Relational View we have developed might, at first glance, seem a strange candidate for a theory
of concepts. The reason is as follows.
Our comparison of prototype theory and the Relational View relied on the fact that the role
played by such a structure as (2) in prototype theory is played by attunement to a family of
constraints in the Relational View. This may seem disconcerting since people have been happy to
think of concepts as single entities just as in (2). Replacing this notion, we have suggested that
the work of a single concept is done by the attunement to a family of constraints. Indeed, whether
a word applies to a given object, is determined not by some fixed entity but by some process of
combining fixed entities called worms. So, under the Relational View, there is no single (mentally-
represented) object that plays the role of what has traditionally been called a concept. Rather, the
traditional notion of a concept would, in these terms, amount to an abstraction over a whole family
of mentally represented objects each of which expresses attunement to individual constraints or
meaning relations. Though the conclusion that there may be no single object corresponding to a
concept may strike some as perplexing, it is, fortunately, quite consistent with some recent work
on concepts by Barsalou (Barsalou, 1987).
8 Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to develop a psychologically plausible account of word meaning.
The psychological literature suggests certain morals that should be respected. I have tried to
show how the two major approaches, classical and prototype theory, variously transgress these
morals. By paying attention to the considerations of coherence, representational economy, central
and peripheral exemplars and context dependence a framework can be developed to respect these
morals. The Relational View is an attempt to do just this. While the core meaning of a word
can be described by a data structure or WORM, the peripheral meanings can be seen to be given
by combinations of these data structures or coworms. Since these structures axe constructed in
context, the picture we have painted is one that requires word meanings to be strongly context
sensitive. This position seems to be supported by the discussion and very influential arguments
of Clark (1983). Indeed, the construction of COWORMs in context seems to be a form of the sense
creation he argues so strongly for. We have also seen how the simple relational framework is
able to give a general account of the problems of word meaning that we considered earlier as well
cis the problems of the meaning of kinship terms that the recent analyses of Lakoff and Macken
have raised. Finally, from the perspective of the Relational View, I have suggested a number
of implications. One amounts to a reinterpretation of prototype theory. By starting from the
Relational View and trying to reconstruct prototype theory from it, it can be seen that prototype
theory does violence to a number of intuitions. Another concerns the notion of family resemblance
which, I have suggested, is better accounted for by the notion of a family of constraints than
by the notion of a "cluster-concept". Finally, as a theory of concepts, prototype theory seems
unsatisfactory. Indeed, it seems that the Relational View is better placed to account for recent
work on concepts that suggests their illusory and transient nature. Also, as we have seen, what the
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Relational View considers to be descriptions of word meanings, are far removed from what have
traditionally been thought of as concepts. That is, from the perspective of the relational view, it
seems there is a clear distinction to be drawn between concepts and word meanings, a distinction
that is not often drawn in the psychological literature. Importantly, this distinction has emerged
quite naturally from arguments drawn, in essence, from the psychological literature itself.
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Prototypes and Word Meaning
Nick Braisby
1 Introduction
This paper arises from a concern over the bifurcation of the psychology and philosophy of language on the
issue of natural kinds. Its objective is to formulate a position on word meaning which is both psychologically
and philosophically plausible. In the next section I shall outline some conceptions of meaning that have
figured in the psychological literature. In the following section I shall draw parallels with conceptions of
meaning found in the philosophical literature. The striking nature of these parallels makes it all the more
distressing that current philosophical arguments suggest that the psychological conceptions of meaning are
not conceptions of meaning at all. In making this point, I will make much use of Kripke's arguments in which
the analytic is equated with the necessary a priori. After outlining Kripke's position, I shall suggest that
a way of preserving the intuitions behind the various psychological positions is to view the Kripke-Putnam
argument as having the force of a reductio and to regard the analytic as something other than the necessary
a priori. In particular, I will pursue the possibility that analytic truths may be contingent. I will suggest
that there are two assumptions of the traditional approach which need to be questioned. One concerns
the issue of whether meaning relations need be necessary or may be contingent, the other concerns the
assumed unitary nature of meaning. This last concerns the assumption prevalent in both psychological and
philosophical approaches that words have single meanings. Whereas suggestions such as these may appear
to divorce psychological conceptions of meaning even further from philosophical ones, on the contrary, I
believe it offers their potential wedding. Firstly, I shall suggest that the philosophical theory of situations
developed by Barwise & Perry, gives us the alternative conception of analyticity that we require. Secondly, I
will argue that a more radical version of what Clark calls sense creation allows us to construe words as having
multitudinous meanings. Both of these notion are crucial in developing a framework for word meaning, an
example of which I will briefly outline in section 8.
2 Some Psychological Conceptions ofWord Meaning
In their article, What some concepts might not be, Armstrong, Gleitman fz Gleitman briefly detail the most
prominent conceptions of word meaning that have figured in the psychological literature1. One, perhaps
not surprisingly the most prevalent, is the view that the meanings of common nouns can be described in
terms of singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Such a view seems successful for certain nouns,
generally ones applying to concrete, artificial categories. For example, one might regard having a certain
computational power as a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for a pocket calculator. Hence, the
possibility that "pocket calculator" means, among others, an entity with a certain computational power. This
view has perhaps been exemplified by the work of Katz tz Fodor (1963). Their semantic markers amount
to definitions of the meanings of words in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. A related view is
that of Fodor et. al. (1980) who hold that the meanings of words may be described in terms of meaning
postulates. "Bachelor", for example, may be related via meaning postulates to "unmarried man". Again,
these can be seen as expressing necessary and sufficient conditions. However, the major problem for this
conception of meaning is the apparent difficulty to isolate any necessary and sufficient conditions for certain
nouns, particularly those that label natural kinds.
5 That such conceptions have often been confused with views of concepts will not concern us. Here I am interested just to
outline views that have been held, regardless of whether they are confused.
1
The problem of isolating necessary and sufficient conditions underlying the meaning of a word reduces to
the problem of identifying common features or properties, these features or properties being jointly sufficient
for the application of that word. The existence of common features is, however, a hypothesis and one that
has suffered much criticism. Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations (1953), implores us to try to
find common features which might underly the meaning of "game" and, from the failure of this enterprise,
concludes that none exist (§66, §67). Instead, Wittgenstein claims that those entities to which a term applies
can be likened to a family. Entities are members of the family not because of their possession of certain
common properties but rather because each and every member of this family exhibits a high degree of family
resemblance. That is, there is assumed to be a collection of properties, often termed a cluster, associated
with the family, possession of a certain number of which entails family membership. This powerful idea has
been taken to vindicate the notion that such clusters describe the meanings of words and recent expositions
of prototype theory are among the most explicit formulations of this position. It is this conception which
today stands out among psychological conceptions of word meaning.
There have been numerous attempts both to suggest that prototype theory can account for compositional
meaning and that it cannot and many are not content with the notion of prototypes and cluster-concepts at
all (cf. Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman, 1983). However, in a long series of articles, Smith & Osherson and
others have advanced the conjecture that the meaning of adjective-noun combinations may be describable in
terms of the composition of the constituent prototypes (cf. Smith &; Osherson, 1981; Osherson & Smith, 1984;
Cohen & Murphy, 1984). Their model is perhaps one of the most explicit attempts to formalise the notion
of prototypes. Prototypes are represented in terms of attribute-value matrices where values of attributes
may be disjoint and weighted. That is, the prototype for "lemon", for example, may specify an attribute of
shape but the values this attribute may take may be disjoint between perhaps, flat, oval or whatever and
values may be weighted indicating that some values are more likely and more indicative of lemonhood than
others. Attributes also receive a weighting indicating their diagnosticity. This last complication need not
detain us and is omitted from the example which follows.
The attribute-value structure above applies to a large number of entities to which the word "lemon" applies.
The fact that values are disjoint suggests that there need be no features common to those entities and such
a suggestion invites the conclusion that prototype theory has formalised Wittgenstein's notion of family
resemblance. However, this is only apparently, and not strictly, true. In order that the prototype, represented
above, can apply to an entity it is necessary that the entity in question is either oval or square in shape, either
yellow or green in colour and so on. These conditions are deemed to be jointly sufficient since prototypes are
taken to admit all and only the entities in the associated category2. What we have then is similar to what
we had before: a word's meaning can be described in terms of certain necessary and sufficient conditions.
What is different is that these conditions are now complex and disjoint which means we need see no (simple)
common features. Whereas some may argue that this point is trivial and amounts to a misunderstanding of
the spirit of the cluster-concept position, on the contrary, I will argue in section 4 that this is precisely why
prototype theory must necessarily fail to be a theory of meaning.
2This is not to suggest that membership is all or none. Prototype theory admits of entities which may be poor instances of




3 Some Philosophical Conceptions of Word Meaning
It is probably fair to say that the current domination of the psychological literature on word meaning by
cluster-concept views, belies a division. Many theorists hold what may be called hybrid views: that the
meaning of a word consists of two components, one being a core describable in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions and the other being some set of identifying conditions describable in terms of a cluster
concept. The suggestion is that one way of interpreting prototype theory is as a theory of the determination
of reference. The fact that there is general disagreement on the proper interpretation of prototype and
related theories betrays current confusion in the field. One way of trying to make more sense of the two
conceptions of meaning on offer is by exploring the recent philosophical literature on word meaning. Here,
as we shall see, the dominant notion is that of analyticity.
Philosophers have puzzled over proper names for some considerable time and their musings are particularly
fertile ground for anyone interested in reaping the benefits of semantic analysis. Russell's theory of proper
names3 has been influential (Russell, 1956). In opposition to Mill, who held the intuitively appealing view
that proper names have denotation but no connotation, Russell held that proper names abbreviate definite
descriptions. "Aristotle", we assume, might abbreviate the definite description, "the teacher of Alexander"
and, in this world, such a description certainly appears to pick out Aristotle and noone else. Now this thesis
is not unlike that advanced in the psychological literature before the ascendancy of prototype theory. Our
theory of common nouns like "calculator" might hold that its designation is determined by the applicability
of some description such as "has such-and-such computational power". However, just as with that theory
of common nouns, Russell's theory of proper names also came under attack and it is perhaps not surprising
that one line of attack came from those proposing the notion of a cluster-concept.
One problem with Russell's approach to which Strawson objected was that of explaining the common deter¬
mination of reference: different people having different knowledge of and beliefs about Aristotle who may be
unaware of the fact that Aristotle taught Alexander, nonetheless seem to refer to the very same man with
utterances of "Aristotle". This apparent fact about language use suggests a problem with Russell's position,
for if a proper name abbreviates a definite description then who is to say which description it abbreviates
or what may happen when people take the name to abbreviate different descriptions? For Strawson, these
problems are not due to the spirit of Russell's enterprise but to its finer details. The suggestion is that
Russell's theory needs an added degree of sophistication, in particular, the notion of a cluster-concept.
Under Strawson's view (Strawson, 1959), associated with every proper name is a set or cluster of propo¬
sitions, a "presupposition-set", whose truth is presupposed by the use of that proper name. His theory
of proper names is then that the referent of a proper name is that unique individual which satisfies some
"reasonable proportion" of the propositions in this set. This proportion need not be fixed, nor indeed need
the membership of the set be given in any precise way (pp. 191-192). A similar position is adopted by Searle
in his article Proper Names (Searle, 1958). Whereas for him proper names such as "Aristotle" don't have
Fregean senses, Searle, like Strawson, holds that referring uses of proper names do nonetheless imply the
satisfaction of a certain number of statements commonly attributed to the bearer of that name. Aristotle,
whoever he may be, the argument goes, necessarily satisfies some certain proportion of the true statements
commonly attributed to him4. Such cluster-concept views are not so different from the position advanced
in prototype theory. The various disjunctions in (1) can be viewed as clusters of propositions each of which
need not be satisfied by an individual lemon, but necessarily some proportion being satisfied.
The relations between these approaches to proper names and the psychological literature on natural kind
terms are striking. It is the nature of these relations that make it both particularly unfortunate and of
great relevance to psychological debate that the philosophical literature has generally come to reject these
approaches to proper names. The rejection has as its base the arguments of Kripke and Putnam, focussing
on necessity, a word used much in this discussion but to which scant attention has been paid.
31 use "proper name" in the conventional sense and not in the sense of Russell's logically proper names.
4 Searle goes on to say "any individual not having at least some of these properties [...the ones commonly attributed to
Aristotle...] could not be Aristotle"
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4 Necessity and Word Meaning
Kripke's seminal article Naming and Necessity is an attempt to ground discussions of meaning firmly within
the bounds of the analytic tradition. A number of intuitions concerning analyticity have prefigured Kripke's
discussion. Leibniz distinguished between "truths of reason" and "truths of fact" and further suggested
that the former have the property of being necessary while the latter are contingent. Leibniz also made
the suggestion that necessary truths of reason are ones that are true in "all possible worlds". Leibniz'
distinction parallels a distinction made by Hume between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" and it is
this distinction which is oft thought to lie between analytic and synthetic truths. Kant's concern with this
distinction lead him to outline a number of characteristaions of analytic truths. For him, all statements could
be cast into sunject-predicate form and analytic statements were ones whose predicate was contained in and
identical to their subject. Consequently, analytic truths are ones which cannot be denied without expressing
self-contradiction. In recent times great attention has been focussed on the validity of the distinction. Quine
(1951), White (1950) and illustrious others have sought to argue that the distinction is without foundation
for natural languages, while others have argued in opposition. In this section, I am concerned not so much
with this last debate but with Kripke's characterisation of analytic truths as ones which are both necessary
and a priori. In particular, it is the explication of meaning in terms of necessity which is of central concern.
Kripke seems to a conception of analyticity not unlike Leibniz'. For Kripke, analytic statements are those
statements which are true (or false) in all possible worlds and, hence, necessarily true (or false). Since analytic
statements depend for their truth or falsity on "relations of ideas" or, less prosaicly, on their meaning they
are also deemed to be a priori. Thus, the analytic is the necessary a priori. This criterion on statements of
meaning, however, is too strong for Russell's theory of proper names to withstand. Returning to Aristotle,
of whom it is only contingently true that he taught Alexander, we can see that the statement "Aristotle is he
who taught Alexander" is not analytic since it does not express a necessary truth: we can envisage possible
worlds in which Aristotle never even met Alexander. Consequently, "Aristotle" cannot mean "the teacher of
Alexander". This then is the house that Kripke built and Russell's theory cannot be admitted but neither,
it seems, can the cluster-concept views.
In pitting Kripke's arguments against the cluster-concept views of meaning, we must remind ourselves that
these views can be seen as attempts to express necessary and sufficient conditions on meaning. Searle,
for example, claims it is necessary that "Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of properties
commonly attributed to him". But from Kripke's point of view this is not the case. Just as possession of
each of those properties can only be contingent so is possession of any proportion of them. Consideration
of counterfactual conditionals seems enough to convince us of this. "If Aristotle had not taught Alexander
then such-and-such" does not suggest that Aristotle would no longer be Aristotle. Yet this is precisely what
follows under the Searle-Strawson views if we strengthen the antecedent to incorporate all the properties
commonly attributed to Aristotle. Kripke's point is that Aristotle is still Aristotle (i.e., the same man) even
under possible circumstances where he has none of the properties we normally associate with him. He is the
same by fiat, by stipulation: by the very act of using the name "Aristotle" we refer to Aristotle. In Kripke's
terms, "Aristotle", as with other proper names, rigidly designates.
Kripke's arguments strongly suggest that the standard description and cluster-concept accounts of proper
names are neither theories of meaning nor of the determination of reference. The scope of Kripke's argument
is, however, not nearly so narrow and his attention turns to natural kind terms where his arguments have
perhaps greatest import for psychological conceptions of word meaning.
If (1) describes the meaning of "lemon" then certain statements, which exemplify the contents of (1), should
be analytic. In particular, "Lemons are fruit and either yellow or green and either oval or flat and either
acidic or sweet" should express an analytic truth. According to Kripke's view, the truth of the statement
should therefore be a priori knowable and it should be necessary: in Kripke's terms it should be true in all
possible worlds. Evidently this statement is not analytic and the fact that we can envisage lemons of all hues,
shapes, sizes, tastes shows this. Each property represented in (1) holds only contingently and so does their
disjunction. This though is not necessarily a problem for a theory of prototypes. It can always be argued
that the actual prototype for "lemon" is not as represented by (1). The question is whether prototypes can
in principle give rise to statements that are analytic and truths that are necessary.
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One way we can arrive at necessary truths from disjoining contingent ones is by expressing the law of excluded
middle. For our case of lemons, we could have descriptions such as "yellow or not yellow". Now it is clear
that this description applies to all (possible) lemons and so is necessary. The point about such descriptions,
however, is that while capturing necessity they fail to capture sufficiency which is the other side of the coin
of word meaning: "lemon" must not only apply to all lemons but it must apply only to lemons and not to
non-lemons. The point being that tautologous descriptions such as "yellow or not yellow" are grounds for
nothing: they in no way discriminate between lemons and non-lemons. An alternative route to necessary
truths via the disjoining of contingent ones is by exhausting possibilities. For "lemon", for example, we could
exhaustively include all the possible colours lemons might have. A suitable description might be "yellow or
blue or green or red or black or...". Again, however, this description is of little utility in a theory where we
require the meaning of "lemon" to distinguish between lemons and non-lemons. Any coloured object will
satisfy this description.
We have considered two possible moves prototype theorists might make to counter the Kripkean arguments
both of which capture necessity only at the expense of sufficiency. The "meanings" that would be left us
would be ones which apply to objects indiscriminately. Such moves seem, therefore, out of the question. The
problem we face now is the one which provides the motivation for this paper: philosophical and psychological
conceptions of meaning are divergent. The divergence seems, at first glance, irreconcilable. In the next section
I shall outline an argument which I believe offers a potential reconciliation, an argument that I believe has
probably already been countenanced by Putnam, from whose article the section heading is shamefacedly
stolen.
5 Is Semantics Possible?
Putnam (1975) raises the issue of the very possibility of doing semantics because of the apparent failure of
a thesis which lies at the heart of the analytic tradition. The thesis is such as to presume that if a word
has a meaning then there must be some statement which is analytic in virtue of that meaning. That is,
the truth or falsity of the statement depends only on the meanings of its components and their mode of
combination rather than on any empirical investigation. It is this thesis that drives the endeavours of Kripke
and Putnam. That words such as "lemon" and "tiger" have meaning does not seem controversial. That
there are statements which are analytic in virtue of those meanings does.
The first part of Is Semantics Possible? is occupied by two concerns. One is to suggest that the then
current theories of meaning were in reality nothing of the kind; the other is to pursue analytic truths.
The first concern is argued in much the same way as Kripke does in his criticisms of description theories
of proper names. Necessity is the key and it is the failure of those earlier theories to express necessary
truths concerning the meaning of natural kinds that renders them theories of something other than meaning.
Putnam's suggestion, it seems, is that they are theories of which core facts it may be whose articulation
allows the meaning of a word to be commonly grasped. Such a conclusion seems to offer little hope of
reconciling psychological and philosophical views and it is the success of Putnam's own approach to meaning
which must come under scrutiny. So it is the second concern of Is Semantics Possible? that is of more direct
interest.
Putnam's search for necessary, analytic truths concerning the meaning of natural kinds leads him to consider
a number of putative definitions of the meaning of his example, "lemon". Putnam's arguments serve to
convince that each such definition unfortunately fails the test of necessity and so neither expresses any
analytic truths nor captures the meaning of "lemon". It is the failure of this enterprise that raises for
Putnam the spectre of the impossibility of doing semantics. It is the fact that standard assumptions of the
analytic tradition are called into question by the failure to find analytic truths that prompts his extremely
disturbing question.
The failure to find necessary truths concerning the meaning of natural kind terms suggests a number of
responses. The move adopted by Kripke and Putnam is to suppose that this failure is to do with our
knowledge of natural kinds. The fact that we have not discovered necessary truths is then a fact of our
epistemological condition and not evidence for the non-existence of such truths. In this regard the argument
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is not unlike that of Grice & Strawson (1956). In response to Quine's pessimism over the existence of
the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quine, 1951), they claim that Quine's arguments concern our ability to
make the distinction well-defined and not the matter of whether the distinction exists. Similarly, Kripke and
Putnam assume that such necessary truths do exist, it is merely that they remain, in large part, undiscovered.
While this essentialist response is open, it is one which allows little role for the psychology of language users
to play in theories of meaning (cf. Franks, 1989). It is for this reason that it appears an unsatisfactory
option for a theory which hopes to draw psychology back into the philosophical fold.
The Kripke-Putnam move to essentialism is, however, not the only possible response to the apparent failure
to find necessary truths. Another is to view Putnam's dilemma as being due to the fact that his conclusion
has the force of a reductio on the premisses of his argument. It is to this alternative interpretation of the
Kripke-Putnam position that I now wish to turn.
The fact that necessary truths are difficult to find and may, in certain cases such as natural kinds, be beyond
our grasp can be taken to be such an unsatisfactory conclusion that the arguments on which it is based must
be incorrect. In the case of the Kripke-Putnam arguments, I want to suggest not that the structure of the
argument is wrong, for I think it is right, but that one premiss is at least in need of reconsideration. The
premiss that analytic truths are also necessary ones is one, I believe, that cleaves psychological conceptions
of word meaning from philosophical ones. Accordingly, I want to suggest that analytic truths need not
be necessary ones. In the next section I will outline the analysis of meaning offered by Situation Theory
and argue that meaning so construed provides the basis for this different conception of analyticity. In the
following section, another assumption, concerning the assumed unitary nature of meaning, is discussed.
Rejection of this assumption paves the way for a view of word meaning which is briefly presented in section
8.
6 Meaning in Situation Theory
Kripke's arguments rely heavily on the equation of analyticity with the necessary a priori. My argument in
this section is not with the characterisation of analyticity as a priori. Instead, I shall be concerned to show
that statements true in virtue of their meaning need not be necessarily true and that it is this characterisation
of meaning which has lead to the bifurcation between philosophical and psychological approaches.
In the Relation Theory of Meaning of Barwise & Perry (1983), meaning is explicated in terms of constraints
which, when actual, relate situations. The abstract notion of a constraint exists as a relation between
situation types. Though Barwise & Perry don't offer a complete taxonomy of constraints, they certainly
offer enough for our purposes.
Barwise &; Perry consider two broad classes of constraint: unconditional and conditional. Within each cate¬
gory we can further distinguish between nomic, necessary and conventional constraints. A nomic constraint
might be expressed by the statement that "smoke means fire" and is similar to Kripke's category of the
contingent a posteriori. Necessary constraints might be expressed by statements such as "kissing means
touching" and is similar to Kripke's category of the necessary a priori; that is, for Kripke, such a statement
would express an analytic truth. Conventional constraints can be expressed by statements like "rain means
rain". The fact that such and such word has been linked by language to such and such part of reality is
naturally merely a fact of convention and also corresponds to Kripke's contingent a posteriori.
Cutting across this classification is the distinction between unconditional and conditional constraints. Bar-
wise (1985) argues strongly for the value of conditional constraints in accommodating various puzzles and
in order to illuminate the distinction between unconditional and conditional constraints we will use one of
his examples.
Barwise tells us that when his daughter, Claire, rubs her eyes this means she is sleepy. Attunement to this
constraint is what allows Jon and Mary-Ellen to get Claire to bed at appropriate times. The theory allows
us the choice of whether we model this constraint as unconditional or conditional. If it is an unconditional
constraint then it can be described as follows: whenever Claire rubs her eyes she is sleepy. The constraint
that the Barwise's are attuned to is hardly likely to be of this nature, however. Were an abundance of pollen
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to be in the atmosphere, even a fully alert Claire might start rubbing her eyes. It is this contingency that
would lead Kripke to complain that rubbing one's eyes cannot mean that one is sleepy5. However, Barwise
&; Perry offer us an alternative. We can model the constraint as unconditional. That is, rubbing one's eyes
means that one is sleepy provided that prevailing background conditions define a certain type of situation.
Before elaborating on the benefits of this way of looking at meaning, it is perhaps illuminating to relate it
to some rather older proposals. Fillmore (1982) discussed the problems of defining the meaning of terms
like "bachelor". Though certain individuals (Popes, gay men, muslims with less than the allowed number of
wives) are technically bachelors to whom the term does not easily apply, there is no requirement to question
the nature of the definition of "bachelor". The reason is that the meanings of words can be taken to be
defined with respect to some set of background conditions. The fact that a word may not easily fit individuals
to which the definition may apply may not be a fact about the meaning of the word but rather a fact about
the background conditions with respect to which the word can be said to have its meaning.
6.1 Analyticity in Situation Theory
In characterising analyticity, we are naturally concerned with linguistic meaning and not the sorts of natural
meaning discussed so far. However, situation theory still allows the choice of whether we analyse linguistic
meaning in terms of conditional or unconditional constraints. Unconditional constraints appear to require
necessity as a property of meaning. Now it seems from the preceding discussion that necessity is too strong
a criterion. It prevents psychological evidence from having a bearing on philosophical notions of meaning.
It also appears to tie semantics too close to ontology. Quine, for example, seems to adopt an ontology which
excludes necessary truths altogether (Quine, 1953). So the positing of necessary truths really is an issue
of one's ontology, not of one's semantics. One way of keeping semantics further from ontology is to take
seriously the notion that meaning can be explicated in terms of contingent truths. This is precisely what
situation theory's notion of conditional constraint offers. Accordingly, in section 8, we will pursue the notion
that analytic statements are ones whose truth, in spite of being a priori knowable, is nonetheless contingent.
7 The Unitary Nature of Meaning
Having accepted the idea that meaning may be related to contingent truths, it is important to see that
this does not of itself relieve us of our problem with natural kind terms. The prototype represented in (1)
clearly embodies contingent truths. However, it has only limited applicability to the category of lemons.
As previously argued, in order to apply to all lemons the prototype is likely to be rendered indiscriminate.
What is required is a way of retaining the specificity of meaning while capturing the flexibility of meaning
over different contexts.
Related to this is work which largely accepts the description theory of proper names. The work centres on
the problem of trans-world identification. Roughly, on description theories of proper names, the bearer of
that name may not, in certain possible worlds, satisfy the description. Under such circumstances, conditions
must be given by which the name still refers to that individual. One response to capture the applicability of
a name across worlds would be to divine necessary truths underlying the name. Another might be to treat
the name as abbreviating a disjunction of contingent truths in the spirit of the cluster-concept approach.
The generality of applicability of names across worlds renders the last suggestion untenable as the name
becomes indiscriminate just as natural kind terms do in prototype theory while the assumption that there
are necessary truths is perhaps one that should be justified on ontological rather than semantic grounds.
An alternative way of capturing flexibility in meaning while retaining specificity (i.e., while retaining discrim¬
inating meanings) is via what is variously known as Sense Selection or Sense Generation. The distinction
is due to Clark (1983). According to Clark, novel uses of words can involve cases where they can be used
to mean something other than their conventional meaning. As theorists we have a choice as to the status
we accord these new meanings. We may suppose that the word is ambiguous having multiple meanings or
5Of course, we are not talking of linguistic meaning here.
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we may suppose that meanings are, in some sense, created at the time of novel use. The latter is what
characterises Sense Creation.
Returning to Kripke, we might want to argue that what Kripke is observing is more akin to a case of
polysemy rather than the ineffability of meaning. In the case of "lemon", for example, we might argue that
a conventional sense need only apply to some specified subset of lemons and that in the case of other lemons,
related senses are generated. This proposal seems to advance a more radical version of Sense Creation,
what we call Sense Generation which is expanded upon in more detail elsewhere (Myers, Franks & Braisby,
1989). In the next section I outline an alternative view of the meaning of natural kinds which utilises these
two cornerstones of a combined philosophical and psychological approach: conditional constraints and sense
generation.
In this section I will briefly outline a view of word meaning which attempts to respect not only the consid¬
erations raised in this paper but also a number of considerations from the psychological literature that we
have not discussed. A more detailed picture can be found in Braisby (1989).
The considerations of section 6 allow us a choice in describing the meaning of, say, "lemon". Both of the
prominent psychological conceptions of meaning can now be thought of as precisely that; conceptions of
meaning. It is this fact which allows a host of psychological evidence to bear on the choice and some of
this evidence is discussed in more detail in Braisby (1989). However, what is clear is that the move taken
by prototype theory, a move ostensibly to avoid contingency in meaning, is unnecessary. At least, it is
unnecessary from the point of view of meaning. Considerations like this lead me to describe the meaning of
"lemon" in what we might call pseudo-classical terms. I hope the following example will clarify this.
Let us suppose that this is related to the meaning of "lemon" and for convenience refer to all such Word
Meanings as WORMs. WORM s then relate words (in this case "lemon") to properties (acidic taste, etc.).
To say that this describes the meaning of "lemon" is, however, misleading because, as we shall see, the
assumption of sense generation allows us to view "lemon" as having multitudinous meanings. Before turning
to that consideration let us try and put the proposal we have on a more formal footing. In particular, we
will model these WORMs in situation-theoretic terms as conditional constraints. The previous structure
(2) then can be seen as describing the following constraint.






Sj => S2 | B (3)
where
Si = [s | s (=< P, p; 1 >] (4)
and
S2 = [s | s (=< DESCRIBE, p, LEMON; 1 >] (5)
and
B = [b | b WORM, LEMON, P; 1 »] (6)
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and
P = [Pi | < SHAPE, pi, OVAL; 1 > A (7)
< TASTE, pi, ACIDIC; 1 > A
<C COLOUR, pj, YELLOW; 1 > A
< ISA, pi, FRUIT; 1 >]
Without attempting a detailed explanation of this formalism6 we can see roughly what is meant by (3). It
tells us that a relation holds between types of situation Si and types of situation S2, provided that certain
background conditions prevail. The nature of the relation is such as to say that if we have a situation of
type Si then we have a situation of type S2 given, of course, that the background conditions prevail. These
background conditions can be taken to define another type of situation B. (4) and (7) define Si as the type
of situation in which (2) can apply to an object. In this case, the type of situation where an object has the
properties of being oval in shape, yellow in colour, acidic in taste and being a fruit. (5) defines S2 as the
type of situation in which this same object can be described as a lemon, that is, in which the word "lemon"
may apply to the object. What (6) tells us that this relation (3) only holds when the properties the object
has are related to the word "lemon" by the WORM relation.
The fact that we model word meanings in terms of conditional constraints allows us to reject the Kripke-
Putnam arguments. However, we still have a problem, one which is directly analogous to that faced by
those who hold to description theories of proper names. The fact that descriptions are contingent means
that, in certain cases, they will not satisfied by the very bearers of the proper name they abbreviate. If
"Aristotle", for example, abbreviates "the teacher of Alexander", how can the proper name refer to Aristotle
in (counterfactual) circumstances where Aristotle never taught Alexander? There are numerous moves one
can make to avoid this problem. One, due to David Lewis, is to enrich one's ontology to include counterpaxts
(Lewis, 1968). Such a move accepts that reference to an individual in another possible world is not reference
to that individual in our world but rather to one of that individual's counterparts. Accordingly the fact
under description theories proper names seem not to refer to the same individual across worlds is not a
problem. It only makes sense to talk of the same individual in the same world. What should be clear is that
our proposal concerning natural kinds now faces an exactly analogous problem. How do we refer to lemons
in circumstances where the properties represented in (2) do not hold? The answer to this problem, as we
suggested earlier, comes from an approach derivative of Clark's Sense Creation called Sense Generation.
To illustrate sense generation, consider a flattened lemon. Such an individual will neither satisfy (2) nor the
antecedent condition in (3). Consequently, if (3) was our only option, we would be unable to describe such
an individual as a lemon. The proposal though is that we can generate other senses for "lemon", derivative
on the WORM for "lemon", which in turn describe different but related constraints to (3) which will allow
such maverick individuals to be described as lemons.
The proposal is that one way of generating an appropriate sense is to combine knowledge of "flattening"
with our knowledge of "lemon". "Flattening", for example, seems to express a relation between things
of indeterminate shape and things of flat shape. By allowing (2) to stand as one of the relata of this
relation we can determine the other relata which, intuitively, describes flattened lemons. Combinations such
as these we will label COWORMs. COWORMs thus generate further senses for given words that are
related to the standard sense describable in terms of WORMs. These COWORMs also express constraints
and the example that follows describes the COWORM which arises from the combination of "lemon" and
"flattened".
Si => S2 | B' (8)
where
Si = [s | s |=< P2, p; 1 >] (9)
and
S2 = [s | s (=< DESCRIBE, p, LEMON; 1 »] (10)
6This is something that is best left to experts and Barwise & Perry (1983), Barwise (1985) and Barwise (1989) are where
the interested reader will find help.
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and
B' = [b | b |= < WORM, LEMON, Pi; 1 > A
< WORM, FLATTENED, Pj, P2; 1 >]
(11)
and
Pa = [p| « SHAPE, p, FLAT; 1 > A (12)
< TASTE, p, ACIDIC; 1 > A
< COLOUR, p, YELLOW; 1 » A
« ISA, p, FRUIT; 1 >]
Roughly, this can be read as follows. If an individual has the properties of flat shape, acidic taste, yellow
colour and is a fruit then it can be described as a lemon provided those properties are given by the combination
of the WORMs for "lemon" and "flattened".
9 Conclusion
I have argued that psychological conceptions of word meaning are strikingly similar to philosophical ones
and that this fact makes it all the more distressing that recent philosophical arguments leave no role for
psychological evidence to play in theories of meaning. In particular, the arguments of Kripke and Putnam
which reduce meaning relations to those that hold between words and some essential properties of the in¬
dividuals to which they apply cleave psychological and philosophical conceptions of meaning wide apart.
One reason for this, I have suggested, is that Kripke and Putnam may be making too strong an ontological
commitment and explicating semantic issues in these terms. The adoption of necessity as underlying ana-
lyticity is a case in point. The existence of necessary truths is an ontological committment which is open
to doubt. An alternative way of analysing meaning is to allow analytic statements to be contingent. Such
a conception is one allowed by the recent theory of situations developed by Barwise & Perry. This allows
us to rescue what we might call description theories of natural kind terms. However, it leaves us with an
analogous problem to that of trans-world identification which faces those who hold description theories of
proper names. Adopting an ontological solution to this problem is one which seem unsatisfactory. Indeed,
Kripke's argument can be seen as one which replaces a strong and controversial ontological committment to
counterparts with a weaker, more acceptable one to necessary truths. Our criticism of Kripke prevents us
from adopting an ontological solution. This problem is one to which a suggestion made by Clark to do with
the creation of senses is readily amenable. By adopting a more radical position, sense generation, we can
allow words to mean differently according to circumstances. The process of sense generation employed relies
on the combination of what Clark might call pre-stored senses and what we have taken to underly WORMs.
COWORMs, as we have called them, are the result of sense generation. The fact that such COWORMs
apply to individuals to which the corresponding WORM may not offers the hope that we have a semantic
solution to the traditional problem facing description theories. As described, the mechanism of combination
can clearly not be unconstrained. The formulation here allows that a variety of contextual factors may play
a constraining role. Clearly, the identification of these factors and others which may constrain the process of
sense generation is a matter for considerable future research. What the research described in this paper has
attempted to do is simply demonstrate that such research may be of philopsophical as well as psychological
significance.
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How to Make the Mental Lexicon Flexible
Bradley Franks Nick Braisby
1 Introduction
In this paper, our aim is to consider some possibilities for certain aspects of a theory of word meaning, and
thereby to motivate what we call Sense Generation. We briefly outline the crucial phenomena of flexibility and
specificity of senses in Section 2. In Section 3 we sketch some of the sorts of object which might be required
in a theory of sense, and, most importantly, the relations between them. This provides the apparatus for a
discussion of some possible theories of senses, in Section 4. In Section 5, we turn to a more detailed exposition
of Sense Generation, indicating how it may account for flexibility and specificity. Finally, we sketch some
implications of this view and touch on some wider concerns for theories of word meaning.
2 Preliminaries
The phenomena of flexibility and specificity are best illustrated by example.
Mary is giving a dinner party at her home in the country. Unfortunately, her cupboards are bare.
The appetites of her voracious guests are, however, whetted by the sight of Mary's pet mouse,
Midge, tucking into some mouse food, and by the sight of Mary's pet canary eating some bird food.
Aware of all this food-eating, one of Mary's less subtle guests asks "Do you have any food, Mary?".
Mary replies that there is none but proceeds to feed her dog, Mungo.
How are we to resolve the semantical nature of the guests' problems? They are led to believe that Mary has no
food and yet they can clearly see that she has: that she has pet food, but no food fit for human consumption.
We require that any theory of word meaning respect the intuition that there are different but related senses
attached to the word food, senses, for example, which apply to different types of food: human food, dog food,
bird food, etc. We employ "sense" in a similar manner to Clark (1983): as the mentally represented aspects
of the semantic content of a word on a particular occasion of use; we will be more precise about this in 3.
The fact that the same word can seemingly have many different senses, illustrates what we call diversity. One
aspect of the diversity of senses is illustrated by the fact that food seems to have senses corresponding to both
types and subtypes of food. In this case, it has senses ordinarily associated with pet food, and its subtypes,
for example mouse food. This aspect of diversity is what we call specificity: some senses of a word appear to
be more specific than others. The fact that food may have senses for different types, for example, senses for
"mouse food", "dog food", "mouse food", etc., illustrates another aspect of diversity, flexibility.
Our discussion of theories of sense will concentrate on several factors: we will be concerned to respect the
arguments of, among others, Clark (1983) and Murphy & Medin (1985), which we will outline in more detail
later. We also require that any plausible account of reflect two important distinctions between types of senses:
between senses that express default information and those that express non-default information, and between
senses of vague and ambiguous words. Throughout, our overriding concern is to provide an evaluation which
not only respects basic linguistic intuitions, but does so in a way that is consonant with a broad range of
psychological considerations.
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3 Some Components of a Theory of Sense
In this section, we will set out some aspects of a theory of sense. Two categories of object play a central role
in our discussion. The first, Senses, are descriptions that we take to mediate relations between uses of words
and their referents. These descriptions are both publicly specifiable and mentally representable. The notion of
sense as employed here, although derived from that of Frege, does not carry a commitment to Frege's abstract
semantical "third realm", distinct from the realms of mental and physical objects. The most important aspect
of senses for our purposes is the way in which they guide linguistic behaviour. The application of a word to
an entity (objects, events, substances - any individuum) is mediated by the sense of that word: in particular,
the description that constitutes the sense subsumes the description of the object. So the uses of a word must
be explicable in terms of the sense or senses which that word possesses. In this way, senses may be taken to
classify the linguistic behaviour of agents.
The description of the phenomena of flexibility and specificity relied upon the various senses noted for food
being different. This assumption was motivated by the application of what Evans (1976) labels the "intuitive
criterion of identity" for senses. This determines that if a rational agent can both assent to and remain agnostic
about the application of a referring expression to an entity when used in utterances of the same sentence, then
that referring expression must have two different senses. As an illustration, reconsider Mary's dinner guests.
Here, food is being used in different ways: sometimes it is being used to refer to all food, and at other times to
types of food. So it is possible that one of Mary's guests could both assent to, and dissent from the statement,
"Mary has food in her house". So it is quite felicitous for Mary to say, of the same entity (i.e., some mouse
food, say), both that it is food, and that it is not. The intuitive.criterion of identity for senses then requires
that we treat food as having such different senses. Different senses express the fact that an entity may have
different "modes of presentation" with respect to an agent: different ways the agent may refer to that entity.
They also correspond to different ways of cognizing that entity: they are indicative of different perspectives
that an agent may adopt.
The second type of object that we require is lexons. Most accounts of the psychology of language presuppose
the existence of a "mental lexicon", in which words have "entries", that contain orthographic, phonological,
morphological, syntactic and semantic information. The semantic component has been variously referred to as
a "concept" or "lexical concept"; in order to avoid correlative unwarranted assumptions, we will refer to it as
the lexon. A lexon, then, is a description that defines the stable mental representation in this mental lexicon;
it also forms the semantic contribution of a word to the meaning of the expressions of which it forms a part.
We also assume that senses are derivative in some way on lexons. That is, language users arrive at a sense for
a word through first accessing its lexon. Given the multiplicity of senses which a word may have it is clear that
a major problem for theories of is the relation between senses and lexons. Our discussion of such theories rests
primarily on the way this issue is addressed.
Pre-theoretically, we are led to believe that senses usually outnumber the words with which they are associated:
that is, the senses of a given word always number one or more. Considering the relations between words and
their senses in terms of lexons then gives rise to two crucial questions. One concerns the number of lexons we
postulate in order to effect these relations; and the other concerns the relations between the contents of senses
and lexons.
In order to facilitate our discussion we will describe the contents of lexons and senses in terms of feature-







This feature-structure is not intended to be an exhaustive specification of the content of the lexon for chair,
it is presented for illustrative purposes only. If any lexon or sense has the same feature-structure as this one,
we may conclude that they are in fact identical lexons/senses. There may be cases where one feature-structure
subsumes another, by having the same content or some addition of features. Another possible case is where
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two feature-structures cannot be ordered by this relation. The former is indicated by the relationship between




















The subsumption relation amounts to the kind of relation that holds between a type and one of its tokens;
typically, we might assume that that defining features of a type are possessed by a token that can be categorised
as a member of that type.
On just these two dimensions, the number and contents of lexons and senses, we distinguish three classes of
theory. The first, Strong Sense Selection (5), is that which Clark demonstrated to be unsound; we will note
some additional problems. S may appear to be a straw man; a more plausible alternative is the second class,
Weak Sense Selection (W). W has two variants, both of which appear to be flawed. The third class, Sense
Generation, avoids these difficulties, and is the one we would like to endorse.
4 Problematic Theories of Sense
4.1 Strong Sense Selection
Two assumptions identify S. Firstly, the number of lexons: there is a lexon for each and every sense of a
given word. Secondly, the contents of the lexons and senses: S assumes that the contents of each lexon and its
corresponding sense are identical. S accords well with standard model-theoretic analyses of word meaning. For
example, the approach taken in Montague-style semantics requires that different interpretations for the same
syntactically unambiguous linguistic string result from the same word having different basic expressions. In
the case of bank, for example, there would be two distinct basic expressions, bank[ and bank'2, in the lexicon.
5 then offers the possibility of being able to treat the diversity of senses which might be associated with food in
the same way, and thus to provide a precise semantics. All of the idiosyncratic information which demarcates
senses is thus represented in lexons.
The diversity of senses that might be attached to mother provides another illustration of S. Such senses include
"adoptive mother", "biological mother", "surrogate mother", "foster mother" and "step-mother". According
to S each of these senses is assigned a distinct lexon whose content expresses that of the sense.
Despite its prevalence in formal approaches to word meaning, S has some irremediable deficits. Some of these,
relating to flexibility, coherence and ambiguity, are also problems of W and we will turn to these in 4.3.
However, there are also problems unique to S. One concerns the number of lexons we are led to hypothesise
in order to capture diversity. This is essentially the same point that Clark made in respect of "nonce" senses;
however, as we have seen, even for common nouns such as food and mother the number of senses greatly
exceeds the number of words. Accordingly, in 5, so does the number of lexons. This is problematic since the
multiplication of lexons must make psychological sense. It is unclear that this is so in the case of S since such
a multiplication places an intolerable burden on memory and presumably would result in a highly complex
search procedure. These problems are difficult enough in the case of the interpretation of single words: in the
case of combinations, such as simple noun phrases, there would be an explosion of combinatorial possibilities,
in which the appropriate sense would have to be selected from a list comprising each and every permutation of
all of the lexons associated with each constituent.
Regarding flexibility, S appears to proffer a solution that treats vagueness and context-sensitivity in the same
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way as ambiguity: by postulating independent lexons for each sense of a vague word. We will return to this in
4.3. It is also clear that specificity raises difficulties for S. The issue is whether we can have a limitless number
of ever more specific senses for a given word. We remain agnostic about this possibility though it is clear that
very many senses may be associated with the same word. However, S rules out the possible unboundedness
of specificity by fiat. That is, the only way that S can possibly capture specificity is via the multiplication of
lexons, and, given the uncontroversial assumption of a finite lexicon, the possible unboundedness of specificity
could not be captured by S.
S also appears unable to distinguish between senses which express default information and those which express
non-default information. For instance, the default sense for mother is, presumably, "biological mother" yet this
sense is accorded the same status as the other senses of mother. That is, they are each assigned a separate
lexon. Of course, S theorists may have in mind some other bit of theoretical apparatus which to capture this
distinction. The fact is, though, that as it stands, S does not respect this very important distinction. An
alternative to this rather straw-mannish way of trying to capture the phenomena is offered by Weak Sense
Selection.
4.2 Weak Sense Selection
W is characterised by three assumptions: firstly, there may be more than one lexon for a given word; secondly,
there may be more than one sense for a particular lexon. Thirdly, it is assumed that the contents of senses and
the contents of corresponding lexons lie in the relation of subsumption: that is, the only possible difference
between a sense and the lexon from which it comes, is that the sense may have had features added. W is
more appealing than S in the following ways. Firstly, senses seem to be intrinsically context sensitive: in
conventional circumstances mother has the sense of "biological mother", but in a social work inquiry, for
example, mother may have the sense of "biological mother who is also a carer". A way in which this context-
sensitive specificity can be captured is through some process by which features are added to the contents of
lexons in a manner appropriate to context. Though W does not specify such a process it is clearly implicit
in its definition. This aspect of W is in the spirit of the findings of Barsalou (1982): different senses may be
different "context-dependent" elaborations of a single "context-independent" lexon.
Another appeal ofW is the fact that it allows lexons to express generalisations with respect to the category to
which a word applies. That is, W allows that lion may have various senses but that the lexon for lion may be a
description that applies to all (and only) lions. This is again quite appealing given standard assumptions about
word meaning. The arguments of Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) for example, assume that senses apply to
all and only those individuals to which the word applies. Further, the fact that W distinguishes between the
different senses deriving from a lexon, that is, between those whose content is the same as the lexon and those
whose content is an elaboration of the lexon's, may allow for the expression of default information. That is,
default information might be expressed as part of the content of lexons.
There are two extreme versions of the W thesis: one is that the number of senses and lexons are equal, which
forces equivalence with 5; another is what we might term the "Generality" option. This results from the
assumption that a word has only one lexon, whose content may be added to and made more specific. W allows
that the number of lexons may be intermediate between the number of words and the number of senses: what
we will term an "Intermediate" option. Our previous discussion of S allows us to consider just the Generality
and the Intermediate options of W. The Generality option would operate in the following way. Mother, for
example, would be assigned a single lexon whose content would subsume all the senses that mother can have.
So all of its senses result from the addition of features to this lexon's content. Given the diversity of senses for
mother such a lexon must needs be maximally unspecific. In contrast, the Intermediate option allows mother
to have more than one lexon underlying its senses. For example, we might have lexons for "biological mother"
and "surrogate mother", say. The latter might be further specified to yield senses for "adoptive mother",
"step-mother" and so on.
There are a number of problems with W some of which we will deal with in 4.3. However, we will outline
some problems unique to W here. A critical problem of the Generality option is that it appears to be unable
to express default information. Reconsider the example of mother. The appropriate lexon cannot express a
relation of genetic inheritance because although some mothers are related this way to their children and some
are not (e.g., foster mothers). To specify such a feature in the lexon would be to exclude mothers such as these
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from the domain of application of the lexon and all its associated senses, since features can only be added to
the lexon and not taken away. For similar reasons, the lexon cannot express any relation of caring between
mothers and children. And so on for any other feature-specification which we might ascribe to the lexon for
mother. Arguments such as these indicate that in many cases the Generality option leaves us with a maximally
unspecific lexon. This, however, flies in the face of the strong intuition that words do have default senses. The
fact that this option renders the expression of such defaults as difficult to obtain as the expression of exceptions
is a major deficit.
The Intermediate option postulates a certain multiplicity of lexons: there might be more than one lexon for
mother (in contrast to the Generality option), but less than would be postulated by S. The critical problem
here is exactly how the number of lexons might be determined. Whereas for S and the Generality option,
there is an overt constraint on the number of lexons postulated, it is not clear what principle there could be
for deciding on the number of lexons in Intermediate option. For example, what lexons might we postulate for
chair so that it may have a sense corresponding to "rocking-chair"? Since feature-adding is the only way in
which senses may be derived from lexons, the sense for "rocking-chair" shown in (2) can only be derived from a
lexon which either does not specify the number of legs or specifies no legs. Under this Intermediate option we
are allowed to postulate several lexons for chair, one corresponding to (1), say, and one corresponding to that
for "rocking-chair" in (2). A problem may arise, however, in the case of a special type of rocking-chair having
no legs and no rockers. Assuming that chair can have this sense, the question arises as to how it is derived
from the lexons we have postulated. If we only have feature-adding at our disposal, such a sense simply cannot
be derived from either of the lexons for chair we have postulated. Our only option is to suppose that there
is another lexon for chair. The problem is that, in principle, there seems to be no bound to the number of
exceptional chairs we can imagine and for each type, we would be led to posit an additional lexon. The issue
then would be, what degree of exception do we rule out as invoking a new lexon? One way of constraining the
number of lexons might be to determine a threshold for permitted specificity of lexons: if a particular sense is
more specific than the threshold level, it must be represented as a sense deriving from a particular lexon (and
not as a lexon in itself). Three problems render such a criterion untenable.
Firstly, it is not clear just how we could go about comparing the relative specificity of senses that have non-
overlapping contents; for example, is "biological mother" less specific than "adoptive mother"? The operation
of this criterion is perspicuous within groups of senses that can be ordered according to specificity (i.e., where
the only difference between senses is in the degree of specification of the same set of features), but not in
groups that cannot be so ordered. The general application of such a criterion would require a complete theory
of content for lexons and senses, and some precise and motivated means for comparison. Neither are at present
available. Secondly, to stipulate that lexons must be relatively non-specific may mean that they cannot express
default information, since this is typically quite detailed and specific in nature. A third problem concerns the
plausibility of postulating independent lexons to account for senses that are discriminable though related. This
will be picked up in the next section.
4.3 Difficulties with Sense Selection
There are three principal flaws common to Sense Selection accounts. The first concerns the multiplication of
lexons. The second concerns the ability of Sense Selection to account for the full range of flexibility. And the
third concerns the underlying commitment to monotonicity, which gives rise to the first two problems.
The difficulty with assuming multiple lexons is that it is not clear to what extent they plausibly reflect mental
representations. Arguments from linguistics and psychology caution against unprincipled multiplication. The
linguistic considerations concern the difference between ambiguity and vagueness. Accounting for the diversity
of senses by postulating distinct underlying lexons assumes that they are, synchronically, wholly independent.
That is, supposing different lexons for a given word assumes they are as different as different lexemes with
a single orthographic/phonological form. Postulating two lexons for food ("animal food" and "human food")
treats food as an ambiguous item like bank. This amounts to making no distinction between different senses of
a vague term, and different senses of an ambiguous term. However, if we consider any of the standard linguistic
tests for ambiguity (Cruse, 1986), then we find that the independence of content assumed by postulating
different lexons does not hold for examples such as food. For example, consider zeugmatic contexts (those
which give rise to two different senses of a word at one time): "He sat on the bank whilst fishing and put his
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cheque in it". The strong contrast or opposition between the two senses of bank requires the postulation of
independent lexons to account for them. In contrast, the various senses for food or mother, noted earlier, do
not produce an opposition of sufficiently marked character. The examples are, rather, characterised by the
relatedness of the various senses: they are distinct but clearly not independent.
Multiplication of lexons is also countered by psychological considerations raised by Murphy & Medin (1985).
Murphy & Medin's discussion bears on the issue of the mental representations underlying the application of
words to referents. In the current framework, these are lexons. The question for both W and S is whether the
postulation of multiple lexons accords with psychological evidence. Murphy & Medin's arguments convince
us that such multiplication is unwarranted. Consider whether the postulation of independent lexons for "an¬
imal food", and "human food", say, is justified on psychological grounds. The thrust of Murphy & Medin's
arguments is to suggest that categories such as food are highly structured, and that the application of food to
individuals thereof is highly dependent upon this structure. That is, the application of a word to entities in
a category reveals what Murphy & Medin call "coherence". And the crucial point regarding coherence is that
the application of a word to such an entity is dependent upon our theories concerning that entity. It is the fact
that entities can be related by theories that allows their grouping together to be psychologically plausible. If
lexons are to be psychologically plausible, then entities that form a coherent category (e.g., all different types
of mother) should all fall under the extension of the same lexon.
However, even if we were to allow some multiplication of lexons - that is, even if the above considerations
have no purchase - there are still cases in which the postulation of independent lexons to underly senses for a
particular word would be implausible. These include the "contextual expressions", discussed by Clark (1983),
and many examples noted by Nunberg (1977). Nunberg notes several different possible referents (and therefore,
senses) for newspaper, a particular token of the newspaper (as in, "here's your newspaper, sir!"), the newspaper
company as a whole (as in, "the newspaper's profits are less than expected!"), and a particular journalist (as in
the case of a dubious piece of governmental behaviour: "don't say a word, the newspaper is here!"). It is clear
that we would not want to claim that newspaper, for example, has a pre-stored lexon that expresses the sense
of the third use ("journalist"). Yet this is precisely what Sense Selection accounts would have to hypothesise,
since this sense of newspaper could not be said to be a simple specification of a lexon for newspaper (as VV
might aver). Clark argues that the parsing of contextual expressions (including certain denominal verbs, such
as to teapot) stems from the creation of interpretations associated with those phrases. It is clear that the same
kinds of considerations apply equally to Nunberg's examples. Since the only possibility of a creative process
for Sense Selection is provided by the specification mechanism of W, the only contextual expressions that >V
could accommodate would be those that are mere specifications of pre-stored lexons. And this cannot capture
the flexibility evidenced in, for example, denominal verbs. It is clear that, even though Clark's discussion of
S might appear to have attacked a straw man, his arguments have a broader significance, and have played a
central role in undermining the more plausible W.
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that none of the versions of Sense Selection are adequate to the
task of accounting for the phenomena in a way that does justice to basic psychological and linguistic intuitions
and requirements. The major problems stem from Sense Selection's adherence to monotonicity. That is, to the
assumption that any alteration in the content of a lexon in the formation of a sense must be feature-addition.
The Sense Generation approach (section 5) circumvents these problems by denying precisely this assumption
and then tracing the ramifications.
5 Sense Generation
In opposition to the above types of theory, Sense Generation regards the variation we observe in senses to
be due not to variation in lexons nor the generality of lexons but to some generative process which generates
various senses from a (lexon) base.
5.1 Aspects of Sense Generation
Sense Generation is characterised by the following assumptions. Firstly, the number of lexons is identical to the
number of non-ambiguous words. A single linguistic string is assigned more than one lexon if and only if it has
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genuinely unrelated senses, as indicated by tests for ambiguity. Secondly, the content of a lexon comprises the
default sense of the word. Thirdly, the different senses of a word are generated from the lexon for that word.
Fourthly, generation may result in a sense that is non-monotonically related to the lexon; that is, generation
may result in a sense that does not simply add features to those of the lexon: features may be retracted or
negated in the generation process.
Such a view can readily account for the kinds of example that are so problematic for Sense Selection. Recall the
different senses for newspaper. In Sense Generation the lexon corresponds to the default sense of newspaper,
perhaps as in "the newspaper hit the mat". The two other senses we have identified would then be non-
monotonically derived from this lexon. The sense, for example, in "the newspaper's profits halved" would have
to involve a retraction of those features expressing the facts that newspapers are material objects, made of
paper, containing ink, etc. It would also need to include features expressing facts about businesses, finance,
employment, etc. What Sense Generation claims is that this latter sense can indeed be generated from the
lexon for newspaper. That is, there is some process by which features are negotiated. The precise nature of
such processes is, clearly, a matter for further empirical enquiry but we suggest two possibilities. One is that
argued for in Franks (1989) which involves the emergence of the features of a sense being constrained by some
implicitly attached noun derived from an instantiation. For example, the sense of fake gun may be partly
derived from the lexon for replica (thus adding features such as the degree of resemblance to a gun, and the
way the object might be constructed), which is accessed as a result of the lexon for fake defeating certain
features of that of gun (like firing bullets). Another is that suggested in Braisby (1989) where a related process
of combining lexons results in the defeating of features. For example, the sense of lion which applies to stone
lions, can be seen to result from the combination of a relational lexon such as "statue" and the lexon "lion".
Similarly, for other non-default senses: they are derived from the combination of default and other lexons.
5.2 Implications of Sense Generation
The link between Sense Generation and Clark's sense creation should be noted. Clark's argument is that there
is a restricted and well-defined group of contextual expressions, for which a sense creation process is necessary.
Clark suggests that, for other kinds of expressions, a selection mechanism may be adequate. Since Clark's focus
of attention is not conventional senses, the impression may be gained that these are not similarly contextual
in nature. Where Sense Generation differs from sense creation is in its firm committment to the view that
conventional uses are higly contextual and therefore require some generative process to explain the diversity
of their senses. It follows that there is no clear dichotomy between contextual expressions and those used
conventionally, rather there is a gradation.
Sense Generation is, in general, agnostic about the precise time-course of the role of context in determining
senses. Indeed, it is meant as a formal, abstract characterisation of a class of theory. Consequently, it is
compatible with more detailed accounts which suppose context to play a pre-access as opposed to a post-access
role. That is, although context may choose from a number of possibilities for generation, it may also rule out
certain possibilities prior to any generative process. Ultimately, this entails that exceptional senses need not
require a longer time-course than default ones. Clearly, the exact time-course underlying the generation of
senses is a matter for empirical enquiry: it suffices to note that Sense Generation is compatible with either
outcome.
One implication of Sense Generation is that there are meanings of which senses are descriptions. Two questions
arise: is there a meaning relation which the default sense of, say, mother describes? And, since there are many
senses of mother, are there also many meanings to mother? Whereas the traditional theory of meaning may
answer these questions in the negative, support for affirmative answers comes from Situation Theory. Indeed the
notion of meaning relations as conditional constraints allows us to claim that default senses are descriptions
of meanings. The assumption that there are many meaning relations underlying the uses of a word is also
perfectly compatible with the framework of Situation Theory.
A further range of issues concerns the connection between Sense Generation and various hypothesised struc¬
tures and contents for lexons. The Sense Generation approach allows us to endorse certain aspects of both
classical and prototype representations, whilst rejecting problematic implications of both views. In terms of the
epistemological rationale of the classical approach, Sense Generation rejects the search for common features
or necessary conditions underlying the sense of a word (as a result of nonmonotonicity), whilst it allows us to
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retain the economical representations that would result were the search for necessary conditions successful. In
contrast, the relations between the various generated senses for a word mirror the intuitive and epistemologi-
cal underpinnings of family resemblance (as a result of nonmonotonicity and the emergence of new features),
which is acheived without postulating prototype representations, with their attendant difficulties. That is, the
various senses generated for a word in different contexts will be related by a family resemblance, in line with
Wittgenstein's (1953) original formulation.
Senses are descriptions that mediate a word's reference. There may appear to be a tension between this fact and
the unlimited scope for nonmonotonicity in Sense Generation: if generation defeats all of the default features
of a word's lexon, then we may refer to an entity through a description having nothing in common with the
usual properties of the type of referent. This point is countered by considering the perspectival-relativity of
categorisation. A situated agent, in referring to an entity through a particular sense, can be seen to be adopting
a perspective on that entity. Even though Sense Generation allows of the logical possibility that words may
refer to any manner of entity, an important constraint is deemed to operate. Namely, the agent in making such
a reference must be adopting a particular perspective. While a theory of perspectives is something we lack,
we note that for such a reference to be posited there must be independent evidence concerning the perspective
adopted. Further, we suppose that the nature of the perspectives that people may adopt is such as to determine
the content of senses which they relate to referents. This may of itself limit the degree of permissible difference
between the content of a word's lexon and its senses, since one of the purposes of perspectives is to allow mutual
reference. That is, one constraint is that several agents must be able to share a single perspective.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have sketched some of the assumptions that underly prevalent views of the senses of words
(Sense Selection views). We have also considered some of the problems that arise when such views attempt to
account for some basic phenomena of word meaning in a way that is consonant with linguistic and psychological
desiderata. This then motivated an alternative view that circumvents these difficulties (Sense Generation).
Finally, we noted some of the other advantageous implications of Sense Generation.
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Partiality and Coherence in Concept Combination
Terry Myers Bradley Franks Nick Braisby
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the problems of lexical representation and coherence. Our discussion
of these problems leads to what we call a sense generation approach. We will present two
accounts from within this approach and illustrate them with respect to concept combi¬
nation. In section 2 of this paper we describe the tension that exists between the two
phenomena of semantic flexibility and specificity. There are accounts of lexical representa¬
tion in which this tension raises major problems and there are others in which it provides
a clue to resolving these problems. The former are characterised by what Clark (1983)
calls the selection of senses and the latter by what he calls sense creation. In section 3
we discuss the implications of sense selection accounts for coherence and concept com¬
bination, indicating problems that arise. We rely heavily on Murphy & Medin's (1985)
arguments and suggest some extensions. In section 4 we present the sense generation view
(which is related to Clark's notion of sense creation) which avoids such difficulties. Cen¬
tral to this account is a consideration of partiality, reduction of partiality being brought
about by constraints provided by the discourse and situational factors. In section 5 we will
sketch two different approaches to concept combination within this framework. In section
6 we draw conclusions and raise questions regarding the nature of coherence and lexical
representation.
2 Flexibility and Specificity
Consider the following example:
Rudy is at the ballet watching a single ballerina dancing on stage. Excitedly, he
whispers to his friends, "Isn't she delightful?". His friend Ron agrees, replying,
"Yes, she's very beautiful". His other friend, Reg, agrees too, saying, "Yes, what
an exquisite pirouette". But Rudy replies, "I simply meant she's a wonderful
person".
Delightful in the above exchange seems to mean different things for the various individu¬
als involved. From Ron's perspective, delightful means 'physically delightful'; from Reg's,
delightful means 'dancing delightfully', while for Rudy delightful means 'delightful as a per¬
son'. From the perspective of an usher walking past who only hears Rudy's first comment,
the meaning of delightful is indeterminate with respect to these specific meanings.
The order of authorship is arbitrary. The first two authors were supported by European Basic Re¬
search Action, ESPRIT project 3175. The second two authors were supported by ESRC studentships Nos.
COO428622024 and C00428722001 respectively. We would like to express our deep gratitude to Robin
Cooper, George Dunbar and other members of the Mental Lexicon Workshop for many useful discussions
and insights. We would also like to thank Richard Cooper for his help in preparing the printed version of
this paper.
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Suppose that we want to characterise the semantic component of the lexical entry for
delightful. We might propose that the lexical entry is sufficiently general to encompass
all the observed meanings. In which case, we require a lexical entry which is general
enough to capture all the different meanings that can be conveyed by delightful, including
those illustrated in the exchange. Even if we could specify such a general lexical entry for
delightful, however, this would not then allow the possibility for delightful to convey, say, the
meaning 'delightful as a person'. Yet, in use, delightful can convey just this. What is more,
any of the meanings indicated above could be made even more specific if more contextually
provided information were available. For example, Ron's meaning for delightful, 'physically
delightful' could have been more specific: physically delightful with respect to coiffure' if
we know that Ron is, say, a hairdresser. In principle, there is no bound to this degree
of specificity and so a general lexical entry seems even more implausible. Tied to this
idea of unboundedness, we also want to allow that meanings can be indeterminate: for
example, the meaning for the usher, is non-specific with respect to the meanings for Rudy
and his friends. In conclusion then, our treatment of the lexical entry as general, being
motivated by the observation of flexibility, renders the lexical entry unable to provide for
the specificity of meaning that we observe. Seemingly, we can't treat the phenomena of
flexibility and specificity independently of one another: to do so produces the tension we
have illustrated1.
3 Sense selection
3.1 Weak and strong sense selection
For the purposes of a distinction to be made later, we will refer to the semantic contribution
of the lexical entry as the "lexical concept", and the intended meaning as the "generated
sense". One approach to characterising lexical entries is to treat the different meanings of
a word as different lexical concepts. For example, under this view we might suppose that
the lexical entry for mother includes several lexical concepts for mother, which we might
label "foster mother", "step mother", and "biological mother" - in the same way as, say,
bank is assumed to have a number of independent lexical concepts underlying its use. A
strong version of this view would hold that for each and every different sense a different
lexical concept is accessed from the lexical entry. A weaker version maintains that there
may be independent, unrelated lexical concepts from which, on different occasions of use,
different senses may be elaborated. For example, under the weak view, we could, in the
context of a fairy tale, arrive at a sense for mother corresponding to "step-mother who is
wicked" by elaborating the lexical concept for mother labelled "step-mother". Presumably,
on the strong sense selection view we would select the appropriate sense, "step-mother who
is wicked", relevant to the context and that could not be further elaborated.
Both versions of sense selection miss the crucial intuition that these senses are closely
related; they are not at all like the different senses of bank. That is, river bank and money
bank have clearly distinct meanings, and thus bank should have (at least) two different
lexical concepts. In the case of mother the different lexical concepts we could hypothesise
are clearly related. Accordingly, in the strong version, we have a granular picture of
flexibility and specificity. Flexibility is granular in that the possible senses a word may
'A similar point has been made by, among others, George Dunbar. In Dunbar (1988) he suggests that,
"while lexical meaning is flexible, lexical use can be very precise ... this is paradoxical"(p. 69).
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have cannot alter and we have an impoverished view of flexibility. Specificity is also fixed by
the set of senses in that senses can be no less or no more specific than those represented.
The weak version allows senses to vary in terms of their specificity but we only have
apparent flexibility: the range of possible senses is restricted by the initial choice of lexical
concept.
3.2 Coherence in sense selection
In exploring the implications for coherence of the sense selection view we will treat Lakoff's
(1987) analysis of mother within this account, although we accept that he may not actually
be committed to such a view. That is, we might see each of his sub-models as a different
lexical concept within the lexical entry for mother. A number of consequences then follow.
In particular, we will argue that we cannot maintain both weak sense selection and a
theory-based view of coherence. To see this we must turn to Murphy &: Medin.
In Murphy & Medin's (1985) account we may distinguish between internal and external
components of conceptual coherence. Both aspects derive from theories of the world.
Internal coherence results from the relations between features for which the theory provides
an explanation. For example, the various properties of chairs represented in the concept
(its size, having a seat, its rigidity and so on) cohere in virtue of theories concerning the
function of a chair. External relations between different concepts are also motivated by
theories that support causal and explanatory connections between those concepts. Consider
the concepts "cat" and "dog". According to Murphy & Medin these concepts are coherent
to the extent that they are embedded in our theories of the world: the greater the number
of connections between such concepts and the rest of our knowledge, the more coherent and
stable they are. The connection of "cat" to many different aspects of our knowledge (such
as our theories of domestic life, ownership, pleasure and so on) provides it with coherence
over and above that which is provided by our theories of "cat" alone, which is the source of
the concept's internal coherence. The same thing is true of complex concepts, for example
"cat and dog". The concept is coherent as a result of there being many common theories
of cats and dogs. Seemingly, on Murphy & Medin's view, we could not allow that complex
concepts such as "elephants and lemons" or "stone lions and trout" have the same level
of coherence as "cat and dog". This stems from the fact that such complex concepts has
fewer common theories to relate the component concepts.
This view of the theories underlying coherence seems to be intimately connected to meta¬
physical issues. Accordingly, for Murphy and Medin, concepts result from the way that
theories cut up the world. Consequently, categories that cut across ontological boundaries
would not be very coherent. For example, "elephants and hopes" would not be considered
coherent, unless this category were motivated by a theory. If this theory were consistent
with one's other theories, the coherence of the concept would be enhanced. The claim of
Murphy & Medin is that the flexibility of conceptual coherence derives from the flexibility
of particular theories. On our interpretation of their claim, this means that there are two
mechanisms for allowing coherence to be flexible. Either, in certain contexts, coherence is
enhanced by constructing an explanation or theory or, alternatively, the theories that un¬
derpin coherence are inherently flexible. It is not clear how these mechanisms for flexibility
in coherence would work for examples like the following.
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Imagine you are sitting on a park bench in London. In front of you is a stone
statue of a lion. Consider how you would reply, if someone were to ask you,
"Is that a lion?" Seemingly, there is one sense in which you might say "yes",
and a related one in which you might say "no": and, given these senses, either
reply could be appropriate, according to circumstances.
It seems, then, that the word lion can be used quite appropriately to talk of a statue of
a lion. However, there is a question as to just how many of our theories of lions involve
statues. Seemingly, our theories of lions are capable of cutting the world up so that we can
categorically assert that a statue of a lion is not a lion. One approach to this phenomenon
is to view it as a peculiarity of word use. However, we wish to preserve the intuition that
there is an essential perspectival aspect to this case. That is, we can adopt a different
perspective on a statue of a Hon: we may simply view it as a lion. Additionally, in
this case each of these perspectives seems equally coherent. As we see it, there are two
possibilities for Murphy & Medin to account for this apparent flexibility in coherence. One
is to invoke their suggestion regarding the flexible nature of theories. Another is to adopt
the standpoint of weak sense selection, and thus hold that there are two lexical concepts
for lion. In what follows we will explore the former possibility and conclude that the latter
is their only plausible option. This in turn leads to an inconsistency.
Under the first option, that of invoking flexibility in theories, we envisage three possible
mechanisms open to Murphy & Medin for achieving the flexibility of coherence. One
mechanism that Murphy & Medin offer is that of the construction of an explanation in cases
such as "elephants and hopes" where, seemingly, ontological boundaries are crossed. In the
above case, apparently there is a similar crossing of ontological boundaries. Our theories
of lions tell us that stone lions are not really lions, though presumably there are some
theories of lions that are also theories of stone lions. Perhaps then it is that the coherence
of the concept of lion in this case relies on a constructed explanation. However, since our
stable, underlying theories concerning lions cannot all apply in the case of the stone lion,
it must be that the use of lion in talking of a stone lion is less coherent than the use of
lion in talking of a real lion. This follows because coherence in Murphy & Medin's view
falls out of the number of explanatory links which structure the concept. Hence, on this
view such constructed explanations necessarily lead to less coherent concepts than those
stable explanations provided by the knowledge base. This is at odds with our intuitions.
Seemingly both uses are, in this case, equally coherent. What we want is to allow that
both ad hoc and stable explanations can provide for equal coherence. This is what we will
argue for in section 4.2.
Murphy & Medin provide another mechanism to account for the flexibility in coherence
that we observe. This is the possibility that we may have flexible theories. In the case of
the stone lion, we might suppose that our theories concerning lions are flexible, accounting
for the observed flexibility of coherence in use. The use of lion to talk of a stone lion can be
coherent as we would want in virtue of the fact that the same theories concerning lions can
also be theories concerning stone lions. However, this does not accord with the intimate
connection that theories have to metaphysical concerns. If our theories concerning lions
are also theories concerning stone lions then we have no principled manner of cutting the
world such as to differentiate between non-lions (like our stone lion) and real lions. We
take it that this undermines the metaphysical position that Murphy & Medin adopt.
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A third possibility that we believe Murphy & Medin may allow for is the option of theory
change. This option entails that in order to preserve the coherence of the Hon concept
when employed to talk of a stone lion, the theories underlying the concept would have
to change. This, however, seems problematic. Since they adopt the Quinian position of
viewing theories as components of a large and intricate web, a change in one will have
ramifications for the others. In this case we would have to change our theories concerning
lions so as to allow the possibility of inanimate lions. Changes as radical as this, as they
acknowledge, would require a global reorganisation of one's knowledge base. It would also
require, under most interpretations, a divorcing of theories from metaphysics. This is
precisely what we argue for. In section 5 we will present two views that are not tied to the
assumptions that lead to these counter-intuitive consequences. As we have seen there are
good reasons to suppose the kind of flexibility observed in coherence is not to be captured
by the notion of flexibility in theories. We now turn to the second possibility we pointed
to earlier.
The alternative position that we believe Murphy & Medin might adopt is the one that we
call weak sense selection. That is, the above arguments will not go through if we assume
that there are two lexical entries and hence two lexical concepts for lion. Aside from the
arguments already presented against this option, it seems there are further considerations
that would prohibit Murphy & Medin from taking this view. Following Quine (1960), we
might like to distinguish between two lexical entries for light. This move seems legitimate.
After all, it seems that the theories we have for light-weight objects do not have to be the
same as those for light-coloured objects. For the case of lion, although lions and stone lions
are differentiated by the theories provided by the knowledge base, Hons and stone lions are
nonetheless very closely related. It is presumably the case then that since we can relate
lions and stone lions we have theories to do just this.
Returning to our interpretation of Lakoff, we can see that similar arguments apply. That
is, if we tie Murphy & Medin's arguments to this assumed position then we may allow that
the different sub-models for mother are related by what they call theories. Consider the
following example:
Kim lives with her biological mother, Mary. Mary adopts a child, Jane, to whom
Mary behaves in all respects as she does to Kim. Jane calls Mary "mother" and
behaves towards her in the same way Kim does. Initially, Kim cannot accept
that Mary is Jane's mother but after some time she does.
How is it that Kim's notion of mother appears to change? One possibility is that initially
she only has the "biological mother" concept of mother and that she somehow acquires
another concept of mother, the "adoptive mother" concept. Even though Kim starts off
with the notion of mothers as biological mothers, one can envisage that Kim's theories
of the world allow her to construct an explanation of how Jane can call Mary "mother".
Indeed, she may come up with a new notion of mother, a mother who is like a biological
mother in all respects save the biological relations. That is, Kim, with her notion of a
biological mother, equipped only with her theories of the world, can construct the notion
of an adoptive mother. The fact that this seems so clearly to be the case undermines
the starting point of weak sense selection. Namely, that there may be independent lexical
concepts for mother. The fact that they may be related by our theories of the world
indicates that they are not independent.
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We have seen that to posit independent lexical entries is to undermine those very arguments
that Murphy & Medin advance in favour of theories. Yet, we take those arguments as very
good grounds to accept the theory-based account of concepts. Consequently, we also take
it that what is needed to avoid the pitfalls of the sense selection accounts is an extension of
this theory-based view. So, although we crucially need a way of describing the difference
between lions and stone lions and mothers and adoptive mothers, we need a way of avoiding
making an unprincipled distinction at the level of lexical entries.
There are several possible responses to this difficulty. One is to place constraints on the
way theories may relate these independent lexical concepts. That is, we may want to
place constraints on the possible extensions of any two of the lexical concepts for mother,
such that one cannot be extended to form the other. However, this flies in the face of
the observation that we can do just this. Kim can construct a notion of adoptive mother
from her notion of biological mothers. So for this to be a viable option, more justification
is needed. Another option is simply to reject the arguments of Murphy & Medin that
the coherence of senses is determined by theories. The fact that biological and adoptive
mothers may form a coherent complex concept has nothing to do with the theories that
relate them. As stated earlier we agree with Murphy & Medin's general position. We
believe that the only other alternative is to reject the assumptions on which weak sense
selection is based. As a consequence, we can see that the interpretation we placed on
Lakoff in order to discuss coherence must be rejected. Accordingly, we can only view
Lakoff's sub-models as describing something other than lexical concepts.
4 Sense generation
As we have shown, we can characterise lexical entries according to the assumptions of sense
selection. We believe that strong sense selection does not provide a viable characterisation.
We have illustrated weak sense selection by choosing to interpret Lakoff in this manner.
This position is challenged by the arguments in favour of theories as determinants of
coherence. In this section we will present an alternative account of lexical representation
that is consistent with such arguments.
4.1 Partiality
From our consideration of the arguments of Murphy & Medin concerning coherence, we
require independent lexical concepts only in those cases where it is clear that they are
unrelated by the kind of theories they discuss. For example, in the case of bank, we would
require two lexical concepts, one for river bank and one for money bank. These, after all,
seem unrelated unless we construct some ad hoc explanation. In the case of mother, though,
we would not want to hypothesise independent lexical concepts for "foster mother", "step¬
mother", etc. Instead we would want to represent mother with a single lexical concept.
In order for this concept to apply in the cases of all types of mother, that is to capture
the phenomenon of semantic flexibility, we would seemingly require it to be general with
respect to these cases. As we indicated before, this appears to disallow the possibility of
capturing the phenomenon of specificity. However, this conclusion is tied to the assumption
that lexical concepts and senses are total objects. Under this assumption, the sense for
mother cannot be extended or elaborated. That is, we can only have one sense for mother.
However, that there are many different senses is undeniable.
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An alternative is to view the various senses as extensions of a single lexical concept, a view
that is related to that of Dunbar (1988). That is, senses axe related to lexical concepts
via a relation of concept 2. Returning to our example of Rudy at the ballet, the different
meanings we may associate with delightful can be ordered in the following way. The usher's
meaning is only as specific as the lexical concept, and this meaning is compatible with any
of the possible extensions of the lexical concept. Ron's meaning, however, is more specific.
It doesn't just indicate that there is something that is delightful, it also indicates what
it is that is delightful, namely the dancer. Thus, for Ron, the information conveyed by
delightful would appear to contain the information gleaned by the usher. Similarly, for
Reg and Rudy with respect to the usher. Thus, the ordering is one of informational
containment. However, if we compare the information conveyed by delightful from Ron's
perspective with that conveyed from Reg's perspective, we cannot say that either is more
informative. Thus the relation of informational containment is undefined for these two
senses. It follows that the relation of informational containment is a partial one3.
Our position then is that semantic flexibility can only be properly captured by considering
the lexical concept as a partial object. This can be differently extended according to the
interaction of various constraints on each occasion of use. We see such constraints as being
provided by the discourse, the situation in which it resides and cognitive models which
pertain to both the discourse and the situation. It will emerge that these are the very
constraints that underpin the generation of a coherent sense. That being the case, we will
see that coherence and flexibility are but two sides of the same coin.
4.2 Coherence in sense generation
We have so far considered the coherence of concepts from the point of view of Murphy &
Medin's arguments. On their view coherence is intimately bound to metaphysical issues.
As we have seen there are a number of problems associated with this approach. In what
follows we will be concerned with the coherence not of concepts but of senses. In this way
we avoid being committed to a necessary connection between coherence and metaphysics.
Taking lexical concepts as partial objects seems to provide us with too many degrees of
freedom. So, for instance, we seem to require a constraint to prevent certain co-occurrences
of features. Consider our lexical concept for balloon. We might want to ascribe to it the
property of not being able to float in the air. Under the unconstrained account of the
extension of partial objects, this is perfectly permissible. However, following on from the
arguments of Murphy & Medin, we would want to claim that such an ascription could only
be valid if licensed by a theory. In this case, the balloon could be filled with a heavy gas.
Hence, in order to constrain what extensions we allow, the process of extending a lexical
concept to form a sense must be the very process by which that sense becomes coherent.
That is, the process of extension must realise the kinds of theory envisaged by Murphy &
Medin.
2From here on we use concept extension to mean that relation between a lexical concept and the same
lexical concept some of whose features have been modified. Modification here include the cases of simple
adding of features as well as the denial of features. In no sense do we mean extension to refer to the set of
objects described by the lexical concept.
3Since the relation is partial, it follows that concept extension need not result in a sense that is more
specific than the lexical concept.
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In order to illustrate the kinds of issues which emerge with respect to coherence in sense
generation, we will consider the example of the stone lion, of section 3.2. According to our
view, a given sense of a word derives from the corresponding lexical concept and may or
may not be an extension of it. Consider describing a stone lion as a Hon. We can account
for this sense of lion in either of two ways. One possibility is that the lexical concept is
general and no extension is required. From our preceding arguments this option would
disallow the possibility of simultaneously satisfying the conditions of semantic flexibility
and specificity. The only option then is to consider that the lexical concept is specific in
the following sense: it contains, or may inherit, among others, feature descriptions such as
"animate", "four-legged" and "golden-colour". This will capture the sort of specificity we
require for some occasions of use, for example, where we are describing a Hon at the zoo.
There may, however, be circumstances in which a lexical concept would be extended further,
perhaps in order to distinguish between lions and lionesses. More importantly though, as
it stands, the lexical concept cannot meet the flexibility requirement. In order to resolve
these problems, we will invoke a more general mechanism for concept extension. So, in the
case of the stone Hon being described as a lion, seemingly the feature "animate" present in
the lexical concept is denied in the generated sense. Accordingly, what we require of the
constraints which underpin concept extension is that they allow this sort of defeasibility.
In section 5 the two views we present will adopt different methods of achieving this.
In principle, we allow that any property ascription provided by a lexical concept can be
defeated. As a consequence, we cannot regard the various entities described by a given word
as forming a category which has some metaphysical significance. That is, such categories,
in contrast to those envisaged by Murphy & Medin, do not "carve the world at its joints".
Returning to the example, since a stone lion is inanimate, we require that the extension
of "lion" involves at least the defeat of the property ascription concerning animacy. In
this way we can meet the requirement of semantic flexibility. Given the lexical concept we
have for lion, there are circumstances in which it seemingly can't be used. However, via
our defeasible mechanism for concept extension, we can override any feature which would
prohibit its use. The important point here is that this overriding can only be licensed by
theories, ad hoc or otherwise.
The mechanism as we have described it so far is a little simplistic. Consider again the case
of the stone lion being talked of as a lion. In one sense, we may agree that the statue is a
lion but in another we may protest that it is not. That is, we require some choice in the
mechanism as spelled out. If we want to affirm that the statue is a lion then we will adopt
the defeasible method of extension already outlined. If, however, we want to deny that the
statue is a lion we will not extend the lexical concept in this defeasible way. Of course,
we may allow the statue to be described as just that, a statue. Again, in such a case we
wouldn't require any defeasible extension of the lexical concept for statue.
These different options for concept extension lead to different property ascriptions, that is,
different descriptions concerning the same entity. We take these descriptions of an entity
to define different perspectives. For a particular cognitive agent, a perspective associates
descriptions with given entities. So, if Fred approaches our stone lion adopting the "real
lion" perspective, one that is defined by the description given by the lexical concept for lion,
he won't categorise it as a lion. However, were he to adopt the "statue of a lion" perspective,
one given by a description resulting from defeasible extension of the lexical concept for lion,
8
he would categorise it as a lion. He could of course adopt a third perspective, the "stone
statue" perspective, resulting from a non-defeasible extension of the lexical concept for
statue. From this perspective, he would similarly categorise the stone lion as a statue.
We can now see that an adequate characterisation of coherence is not going to be provided
solely by the theories which Murphy & Medin discuss. Instead, we will pursue the idea
that theories may be local: that is, provided by ad hoc explanations, situational factors
and informational requirements. If Fred were to exclaim, "This is not a lion", then we
can only ascribe to him the perspective we labelled the "real lion" perspective. It is only
this perspective that makes this use of lion coherent. If we attribute the "statue of a
lion" perspective to Fred, then this particular use of lion would be rendered incoherent. It
follows then that the coherence of a sense can only be defined relative to some perspective.
So, clearly, perspectives may involve local or ad hoc theories: we don't carry around our
theoretical luggage everywhere we go.
There are many constraints on concept extension that give rise to coherence. Some are to
do with the extra-linguistic aspects of word use, such as the agents involved, the situations
in which they find themselves and the particular informational requirements they have.
Others are to do with the linguistic context, concept combination, for example. In what
follows we will focus on the notion of informational requirement and examples of concept
combination.
Consider the following puzzle taken from Braisby (1989):
Fred is sitting on a park bench in London. He knows that at the other end of
the park there is a statue of a lion. A schoolgirl approaches him and, explaining
that she has been given an assignment to sketch a lion, she asks Fred if he has
seen one. Fred replies that he has and points her towards the statue. A little
later an exhausted zoo-keeper appears and, explaining to Fred that a lion has
escaped from the zoo, he also asks Fred if he has seen one. Fred replies that he
hasn't.
Related to our discussion of perspectives, we would like to say that Fred is adopting differ¬
ent perspectives for different occasions. The reasons for choosing the particular perspective
he does are to do with the nature of the information required of him. Fred can infer that the
schoolgirl requires information germane to lions that one can draw and so adopts the rele¬
vant perspective in order to reply in the way that he does. The zoo-keeper, however, places
a different informational requirement on Fred. It is this that similarly helps determine the
perspective Fred adopts and so allows him to reply as he does to the zoo-keeper.
We would like to distinguish two aspects to informational requirement. One is appropriate
to the degree of specificity a given sense may have. So, in the above example, in replying
to the zoo-keeper, Fred means "real lion" by lion, a meaning given by the lexical concept
for lion. In replying to the schoolgirl, however, Fred has a more specific meaning in mind,
namely lion as meaning "statue of a lion", a meaning that can be derived via defeasible
extension from the lexical concept for lion. That is, the informational requirements of the
agents involved help determine the degree of specificity of the senses of Fred's use of lion.
In addition, these requirements lead to a difference in the flexibility of these meanings.
That is, the meaning of Fred's use of lion in replying to the schoolgirl, is only flexible
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enough to describe statues of lions. The meaning of his use of "lion" in replying to the
zoo-keeper, however, is different in terms of flexibility: it is only flexible to the degree that
it can describe real lions. So the informational requirements of the agents involved can
also lead to differences in the flexibility of meaning.
The other constraint on concept extension that we will consider is that provided by concept
combination. In the next section we will expound on this within the general framework
developed so far. We will do so via the application of two alternative views.
5 Partiality, coherence and concept combination
Our preceding arguments lead to a set of conclusions that we take as requirements on any
theory of lexical representation. First and foremost is the commitment to sense generation,
in which non-ambiguous words are represented by a single lexical entry, which contributes
one lexical concept, and particular senses are generated from this by concept extension.
Further, we take the lexical concept to contain a description of the central properties of
entities which can be described by the corresponding word. Accordingly, the lexical concept
is not general in the Quinian sense; that is, in itself it can only describe a subset of the
range of entities which the word itself can describe. Quine's notion of generality would
maintain that the lexical concept can describe all individuals the word is used to describe.
Entities outside of this subset, but which nonetheless can be described by the word, require
a different mechanism. The mechanism we propose is one of concept extension. We see this
as being determined by theories, though not ones that carry metaphysical assumptions,
a la Murphy & Medin. As a consequence, the extensions of concepts are senses, whose
coherence is provided by the nature of the extension. The kinds of theories which underpin
the generation of senses are those that allow for defeasibility. Similar to the "lion" case we
discussed earlier, we will treat such extensions as defining perspectives, and accordingly
coherence obtains relative to a perspective. Perspectives themselves are constrained by
factors of the situation, local context and the informational requirements of the agents
involved. The following two views are based upon these conclusions.
5.1 View 1
This section outlines a possibility for lexical representation developed by Braisby (1989).
Braisby refers both to an implementation in C-prolog and also a situation-theoretic inter¬
pretation of this implementation. For purposes of brevity, we will not go into these matters
here. What we will present is necessarily a simplification. However, the main points will
still emerge. In that account a word meaning (or worm) can be described in a similar way





When Fred responds to the zoo-keeper, what he is claiming is that he hasn't seen an
individual which this description satisfies. But this worm does not help us in the case of
the schoolgirl. For Fred has not seen any individual which can be described by this meaning.
How then can he reply to the schoolgirl that he has seen a lion? In Braisby's (1989) account,
(1)
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this case implicates what are called Combinations of sc worms (or coworms). Coworms
can also be involved in word meaning. Indeed, a word's meaning may be given by the
worm which corresponds to it or by any one of a number of coworms. A coworm is
arrived at by combining a number of worms. Taking the "lion" case as an example, there
is a combination of the worms for lion and statue as follows.
WORM(LION, Pi) (2)
WORM(STATUE, PI, P2)
What the coworm does is to relate various data structures. It does this by virtue of the
fact that "statue" relates two types of data structures. That is, we may view it as an
operator. Given a data structure of one particular type, we obtain a data structure of a
different type. For example, this particular coworm, relates the data structure above to





Here the "statue" worm is being used to form a different kind of data structure. In
particular, it tells us that a statue of a lion is inanimate and does not inherit the colour
it has from the thing it represents. The data structure given by this coworm describes
perfectly what Fred has seen. Thus, Fred's reply to the schoolgirl is based on this (or a
related) coworm. The crucial aspect of this account is that it is coworms which involve
a given worm that may underly the meaning of that worm's corresponding word. It is
given that this is a condition on word use. The particular coworm that is adopted by
a speaker or hearer depends on a large number of factors, ones that have been discussed
in the earlier parts of this paper. It is clear in this case though that it is the nature of
the information sought from Fred that determines the particular worms and coworms he
employs. This is not unlike the case of Rudy.







Here a subtlety in the process of combining worms is required. When "is delightful"
is predicated of the ballerina by Rudy, his friends may do a number of things with the
worm that describes her. One option, that chosen by Reg, is to combine his worm for
the ballerina with that for delightful so the feature of delightfulness is added to that aspect








In a similar fashion, Ron combines his worms for the ballerina and delightful, resulting in a
data structure in which "delightful" is a feature of the body attribute of the worm for the
ballerina. Similarly for Rudy. How, though, are we to capture the usher's interpretation?
The usher has a meaning for the ballerina that is the same as our ballet lovers, let us say.
However, she has many possibilities open to her. She may combine her worm of delightful
with that for the ballerina in any number of ways. The number of options open to her are
determined in two ways. Firstly, by the number of complex attributes of the worm for the
ballerina. Secondly, by the number of additional worms that she could employ. Similar
to the "lion" case where Fred used the additional worm of "statue" according to the
appropriateness of the circumstances, so the usher has similar options too. If, for example,
the usher is aware that certain members of the audience play all manner of language-games,
then the meaning of delightful is simply indeterminate. That is, there are many possible
cowoRMs that we may take to define these games and the usher has no way of deciding
which coworm to choose. It is this indeterminacy that renders her unable to say what
Rudy means.
Our other example involves Kim, Mary and Jane and the problems Kim has when Jane
comes to stay. In particular, we want to say that Kim has a notion of what it is to be a
biological mother but not an adoptive mother. However, she must come to acquire such
a notion. The crucial aspect of the general discussion has been that we do not want to
conclude that Kim ends up with more than one lexical entry for mother. Again, we will
use the mechanism of coworms.
We can describe Kim's WORM for mother as follows.
How is it that given this worm for mother Kim can later accept Jane's utterances concern¬
ing Mary? Again, we will claim that Kim learns of "adopting", which expresses a relation





worm (ADOPTIVE, P1? P2)
(7)
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This coworm will give a new kind of data structure, of a type related by the worm for
adoptive. This particular worm acts to deny the genetic connection between parents and
children. Accordingly, we get the following data structure which allows Kim to make sense




Within Braisby's framework worms and COWORMs can be taken as defining different per¬
spectives. Thus, we might say that Fred has two perspectives: one where he uses the worm
"lion" in isolation, one where he uses it in combination with the worm for statue. Similarly,
what Kim has learned is not a new lexical concept or worm for "mother" but a new way
of Combining worms (or a new perspective) and similarly with our long forgotten ballet
lovers. In a similar vein, we may envisage "concept combinations" being accommodated in
this fashion. Let us take as an example, "stone lion". It seems that we would like to say
that, at the very least, "stone" implies inanimate while "lion" implies animate. Such an
intuitively appealing view precludes the standard set intersective account. Alternatively,
the feature structures which describe the component worms will fail to unify. Here, we
would expect one or other of the component worms to be extended so that unification will
succeed between the extended senses. Just as before, a Combination is required. Com¬
bining the worms for "lion" and "statue" renders a sense for lion that implies inanimacy.
The feature structure described by this coworm can then unify with that for "stone".
However, just as we may view this as taking a particular perspective on what "stone lion"
means, we can imagine that this combination allows for a number of different perspectives
to be taken. So, although we may take the "statue of a lion" perspective defined by the
coworm of "lion" and "statue", we could also take the "petrified lion" perspective on
"stone lion" which is defined by the combined worms of 'lion' and 'petrified'. Given suit¬
able intonation and stress, we might also adopt the perspective which gives the meaning
"lion that sells stones" which is what we would want to say in the case of "coal merchant"
which means "one who sells coal". And so on.
We have seen that by considering the meaning of a word as being described by different data
structures on different occasions of use, we open up the possibility of capturing flexibility
and specificity. In addition, coherence is captured by the use of COWORMs which we may
think of as embodying atomic, local theories. This is consistent with the objectives of the
sense generation position.
5.2 View 2
This section presents some of the central aspects of the view of lexical representation
and combination sketched in Franks et. al., (1988), and developed in Franks (1989). The
outline given here is a simplification of that work in that it will focus primarily upon
concept combination. We will consider the way in which one concept's extension constrains
that of the other in a head-modifier relationship. In this way, the combined extensions
result in a single sense for the noun phrase. The properties descriptions of the lexical
concepts correspond to "Central" properties, derive from conventionalised lay theories.
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These include Central-essence properties, which relate to the ontological or functional
essence of an entity.
Let us again consider our ballet buffs. Suppose that the ballerina is known to them as
"Netty". Suppose further that Rudy's first comment had been:
(1) Netty is a delightful ballet-dancer.
Each of the meanings of Rudy's comment, for the ballet-buffs, can be seen to interpret (1)
in different ways. On a simple account, we might say that this combination involves the
concept for ballet-dancer being extended to incorporate the property of delightful. Hence,
we might then say that the interpretation of (1) is (2).
(2) Netty dances ballet delightfully.
This is Reg's interpretation. It is based upon an assumption of Explicit Semantic Attach¬
ment, in which the major source of the properties of the sense for a NP is the explicitly
given head noun, and the properties contributed by the modifier will be evaluated with
respect to this noun (Platts, 1979). In (1), the explicitly attached noun is "ballet-dancer".
Franks argues that, in order to capture semantic flexibility we must allow for Implicit
Semantic Attachment: that is, agents may evaluate the property of being delightful with
respect to a different noun concept. How is this effected? The initial combination of the
modifier with the head noun unifies their properties and results in a sense which carries
the meaning that Netty, who is a ballet-dancer, is delightful in some unspecified way. This
is the sense which is generated by the usher. Her sense is compatible with many different
extensions, in which the general property of being delightful is determined as a more spe¬
cific property by evaluating it with respect to an implicitly attached noun concept. For
example, Ron's meaning involves a choice of a noun concept such as "people seen in terms
of their bodies", which results in an appropriate specification of being delightful. We then
have this sense for (1):
(3) Netty is a ballet-dancer who is delightful to look at.
And Rudy's sense for (1) will similarly involve the selection of another implicitly attached
N concept. In these cases the different agents are adopting different perspectives on the
ballerina. We noted in 4.2. that a perspective defines a description of an entity. Franks
argues that perspectives have two components: the categorising sortal noun or nominal
phrase (either implicitly or explicitly attached to the construction which describes the
entity), and the range of properties which are used to make the categorisation. In this
case, we have perspectives whose major contrast is given by their different covering sortals.
In contrast, the perspective of the usher has a less specific range of properties, and no
particular sortal noun. Consequently, for the usher, the meaning of Rudy's phrase is
indeterminate. The flexibility in perspectives will be further evident in the consideration
of stone lion and similar combinations.
If combining concepts constrain the extension of the head noun, then they may act as
defeaters for some of the properties in the noun's lexical concept. This is exactly what
happens in what Franks labels Negating Functional Privative combinations, such as stone
lion and wooden banana. These behave in a similar way to to Negating Privatives Proper,
which involve adjectives such as fake and false. The latter have usually been defined as
denying such inferences as that from
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(4) This is a fake gun.
to
(5) This is a gun.
Franks argues that this conclusion omits the crucially perspectival nature of such categori¬
sations, which we will now examine.
Consider the combination "fake gun". The lexical concept for gun might include such
Central-essence properties as "internal mechanism for propelling bullets" and "barrell for
directing bullets", and other properties such as "trigger mechanism", "barrell mounted over
trigger", "colour and weight of metal", and so forth. The lexical concept for fake specifies
that it will defeat the Central-essence properties of "gun", and allow the ascription of some
of the "appearance" properties of "gun" to the sense for fake gun. The modifier, then, acts
as a Rebutting defeater for the noun's central-essence properties, that is we can ascribe
the negation of the properties to the sense. After this combination, where the modifier has
priority, we find that the sense for fake gun parallels the usher's for delightful ballet-dancer.
That is, it includes only the general property that the entity has some of the appearance
properties of the head noun. But we cannot say in precisely which way it looks like a real
gun. It is consistent with many different extensions of this 'appearance' property, through
the selection of a particular implicitly attached noun. This is consistent with our intuition
that there are many possible ways for a gun to be fake. An entity of the type described by
this sense would be indiscernable from a range of entities of the type of possible implicitly
attached noun concepts, which might be labelled "toy gun", "replica gun" or "model gun".
This means that we might adopt a categorising perspective on such an entity based on the
narrow range of "appearance" properties, with respect to any of these nouns, as well as
the head noun. That is, we might categorise it thus:
(6) The fake gun is a gun (or toy/replica/model gun) with respect to appearance.
Since this perspective does not incorporate any Central-essence properties, it could not be
generalized to a broader range of properties, and hence the categorization is restricted in
its applicability. We will refer to such restricted perspectives as Type II Perspectives.
If there is an informational requirement to make the sense more specific, then our agent
will access an implicitly attached noun in order to extend the sense. This choice is crucially
related to situational factors. If we know that the entity described by fake gun has been used
to overcome some intruder in a house, we might then select "replica" as the appropriate
noun type. This will be used to specify the detail of the "appearance" property, and the
sense will also inherit the Central-essence properties of this noun. So the sense for fake
gun includes properties to the effect that such an entity is a replica of a gun, which "looks
like" a real gun in the way that a replica does. Now, we might adopt two perspectives on
the entity described by the noun phrase. The first is the Type II Perspective:
(7) The fake gun is a gun with respect to appearance (as a replica).
The second is a Type I Perspective:
(8) The fake gun is a replica with respect to central-essence properties.
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A Type I Perspective is one in which the categorised entity has the central-essence prop¬
erties of the categorising sortal noun.
It seems that exactly the same kind of process occurs for a combination like stone lion. Here,
the sense can define two different perspectives. Fred's situational context would facilitate a
choice of "statue" rather than "rock-formation" or "ornament" as the implicitly attached
noun. The Type II Perspective is:
(9) The stone lion is a lion with respect to shape (as a statue).
This is the perspective of the schoolgirl, which Fred adopts in order to respond as he does.
The Type I Perspective is:
(10) The stone lion is a statue with respect to central-essence properties.
The perspective of the zoo-keeper would be a Type I: to satisfy his informational require¬
ments, the entity described by lion would need to be a Hon with respect to central-essence
properties. This clearly cannot be supported by the sense generated for stone lion. In order
for Fred to reply "yes" to any agent asking about the presence of lions, the perspective
of the questioner must incorporate a range of categorising properties which subsumes the
range of properties in the sense for stone lion. The schoolgirl's perspective satisfies this,
but the zoo-keeper's does not. Franks argues that this is a requirement on the coherent
use of a categorisation statement.
Our third example concerns Kim's quandary. This might be approached through a con¬
sideration of another type of privative combination, the Equivocating Privatives. These
include combinations such as blue orange and straight banana, as well as ones involving
adjectives like apparent and alleged. Equivocators are combinations in which we are unable
to state whether the entity described by the noun phrase is in fact a member of the head
noun or not. We simply have insufficient information. The modifier Undercuts the head
N's Central-essence properties. That is, on current information, we are unable to ascribe
these properties to the sense: it does not mean, unlike in the case of Negators, that we
can ascribe the negation of these properties to the sense. If our information changed, we
might reverse the Undercutting.
Consider the combination "apparent friend". The Central-essence properties of the concept
for friend might include "loyalty", "affection", "absence of self-seeking", whilst the other
properties include "solicitous behaviour", "smiles", "various vague kindnesses". And the
Modifier's lexical concept specifies the Undercutting of the head noun's Central-essence
properties, and an ascription to the noun phrase sense of some of the non-central-essence
properties. Having Undercut the Central-essence properties of the head noun, we are again
left with a sense which is indeterminate as regards exactly how the "appearance" properties
of the head noun are manifest. After accessing an appropriate implicitly attached noun,
such as deceiver, the general property is made more specific. This sense then defines a
Type II Perspective on an entity described by the noun phrase:
(11) This apparent friend is a friend (or deceiver) with respect to appearance.
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In order to decide whether this apparent friend is a real friend, we need to extend our
information through some process of inquiry. The outcome of this will determine the
appropriate combinations of perspectives. In an Affirmative outcome, the apparent friend
is a real friend, thus reversing the Undercutting of the Central-essence properties of the
head noun, and allowing for a Type I Perspective:
(12) This apparent friend is a friend with respect to central-essence properties.
In a Privative outcome, the sense defines the same combination of perspectives as in the
Negating Privatives case.
Let us return to Kim's quandary. This follows a pattern similar to Equivocators. In trying
to understand Jane's use of the word mother, through trying to adopt Jane's perspective,
Kim will Undercut the central-essence properties of her concept of mother. Hence she could
use this sense to define Jane's perspective, which is of Type II:
(13) Mary is Jane's mother with respect to behaviour.
This allows her to have some understanding of how Jane can call Mary "mother". However,
Kim may learn of "adopting", which enables her to determine that, from Jane's perspective,
the sense for mother involves a Rebuttal of the central-essence properties of the lexical
concept for mother. But as in the Negators case, this does not prevent Jane from calling
Mary "mother": it simply means that she must adopt a particular type of perspective to
do so. As in View 1, this implies that Kim is not learning a new lexical concept for mother,
as in our interpretation of Lakoff, but that she is able to adopt a new perspective - a Type
II Perspective - on her mother as Jane's mother.
On this view, then, the flexibility and specificity of a wide range of combinations are ad¬
dressed by the twin mechanisms of defeasible extension and implicit semantic attachment.
Both are viewed within the context of the perspective-relative nature of categorisation.
Accordingly, coherence is relative to the two aspects of a perspective, and both must be
appropriate for a coherent categorisation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have outlined a general account of lexical representation and presented
two approaches within this account and the way they treat the problems of coherence and
concept combination. Moreover, we have demonstrated that both approaches promise an
adequate treatment of the crucial phenomena of semantic flexibility and specificity. These
approaches have been motivated by arguments concerning coherence in sense selection.
Strong sense selection has unfortunate consequences especially regarding the combinatorial
explosion of interpretation associated with complex expressions. We take it that this
position is not only unfortunate but untenable. Weak sense selection, which is assumed
in a number of linguistic approaches, avoids an explosion of this magnitude. However, we
have argued that the position is undermined by a consideration of coherence. We concur
with the general position of Murphy & Medin that coherence is determined by theories.
As a consequence, we expect the relations between senses to be expressed in any theory
of lexical representation. This conclusion is in direct opposition to the starting position of
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weak sense selection. Our conclusion is that such a starting position is unprincipled. In
order to have a principled account of the phenomena we have discussed, it seems a sense
generation account is required.
An important implication of the sense generation approach is that lexical concepts should
be regarded as partial. The specificity of meaning we need is brought about by the pos¬
sibilities of concept extension. The mechanism of concept extension, in allowing for the
defeat of properties, also provides for the desired flexibility of meaning. Importantly, the
constraints on extension are provided by theories which, as we have seen, underpin the co¬
herence of the generated sense. We have strongly argued that theories are local: they may
be provided by the immediate situation. In addition, agents can choose to utilise certain
theories in preference to others on the basis of their informational requirements. This at
once extricates us from Murphy & Medin's connection between metaphysics and theories.
It also, crucially, leads us to the conclusion that an agent adopting different theories in
his cognitive activities is entertaining different perspectives. Consequently, the examples
which we have employed throughout this paper are essentially perspectival in nature as,
indeed, is word meaning.
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